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Abstract 
This thesis assesses the future security of the UK electricity system in a low-carbon 
context. Electricity provision is a crucial and ubiquitous component of industrialised 
societies, and over the past couple of decades a number of fundamental changes to 
electricity systems have meant that the security of this provision has taken a central 
place on the policy agendas of the UK and many other industrialised nations. Alongside 
this, emerging normative, legal and political imperatives to mitigate climate change 
mean that energy systems will need to undergo a fundamental transition. The 
overarching aim of this thesis is to assess the future security of the UK electricity 
system in a low-carbon context, in order to identify the main risks, trade-offs and 
synergies which may emerge between different objectives in a transition to a low-
carbon electricity system. To do this, this thesis develops a set of indicators for 
assessing the electricity security of low-carbon transition pathways, building on 
assessment frameworks from the existing literature and utilising a range of both 
quantitative and qualitative indicators. The indicator set is used to assess the security 
of three pathways for the UK electricity system, each of which aims to meet the UK’s 
2050 greenhouse gas reduction target. The indicators are then used as the basis for 
interview discussions with 25 experts from the UK energy sector, in order to explore 
the diversity of perspectives in the UK energy community. Finally, the experts’ 
perspectives are used as multiple ‘lenses’ through which to view the results of the 
security assessment of the three pathways.  
 
This thesis makes a contribution to knowledge and understanding in three ways. 
Firstly, it makes a methodological contribution by proposing and testing a set of 
indicators to measure the security of electricity systems in long-term scenarios of 
national energy transitions. The thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach and utilises 
both quantitative and qualitative indicators without aggregation in order to identify 
synergies and trade-offs. Secondly, this thesis makes an empirical contribution by 
applying this set of indicators in a novel way to assess the security of a set of low-
carbon transition pathways for the UK electricity system: this is the first time that such 
a comprehensive security dashboard has been used to assess a set of future electricity 
system scenarios. By including reliability and cost parameters alongside a range of 
other important aspects of energy security such as diversity, trade and acceptability, 
this thesis extends the empirical work of existing frameworks to explore the potential 
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implications of a low-carbon transition on electricity system reliability and costs, and 
the potential trade-offs between various objectives. Thirdly, this thesis makes a further 
empirical contribution by identifying the diversity of perspectives amongst UK energy 
experts; this is a novel contribution to the energy security literature, which contains 
few empirical studies on experts’ perspectives on energy security, and no previously-
existing work of this kind in the UK context. Finally, this thesis analyses the impacts of 
these perspectives on the results of the security assessment, thus providing the first 
study of this kind to actively incorporate multiple perspectives on energy security into 
an indicator assessment. 
 
The thesis finds that the three low-carbon pathways tested against the indicator 
framework all demonstrate a reduction in flexible, responsive supply capacity 
compared to the 2010 baseline, which could reduce the ability of the system to respond 
to unexpected perturbations in the supply/demand balance. The results show that 
demand reduction may be highly beneficial and results in co-benefits across multiple 
security dimensions (although this thesis has not conducted detailed investigation of 
the costs and risks of demand reduction, and therefore this issue needs to be analysed 
further in future research). Increasing the penetration of renewable electricity 
generation is shown to increase the diversity of the generation mix, and to have a 
positive impact on greenhouse gas emission reduction and resource depletion; 
however, it could lead to a reduction in system balancing capability, and does not 
necessarily minimise dependence on fuel imports. The decentralised transition 
pathway is shown to have the fewest ‘red flags’ of security risk in the longer-term; this 
finding is an interesting addition to the academic and policy literature which has 
debated the potential security benefits of a decentralised electricity system for the UK. 
However, this thesis also highlights that there are many areas of uncertainty and 
potential security risk in a transition to a decentralised electricity system, which may 
experience some aspects of heightened security risk in the medium-term.   
 
  
7 
 
 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................... 3 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 5 
Contents ...................................................................................................................... 7 
List of figures ............................................................................................................ 14 
List of tables .............................................................................................................. 16 
Acronyms and abbreviations .................................................................................. 17 
 
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 19 
1.1 Introduction to the topic ........................................................................................ 19 
1.2 Electricity in the UK ................................................................................................ 21 
1.2.1 Why focus on the UK? .................................................................................... 21 
1.2.2 Electricity in the UK ........................................................................................ 23 
1.2.3 UK electricity markets .................................................................................... 24 
1.3 Research objectives ............................................................................................... 26 
1.3.1 Research objectives and research questions ................................................. 26 
1.3.2 Overview of methodology ............................................................................. 28 
1.4 Structure of the thesis ........................................................................................... 29 
 
2 Literature Review ............................................................................................. 32 
2.1 Energy security: what does it mean? ..................................................................... 33 
2.1.1 Conceptualising energy security .................................................................... 33 
2.1.2 A broader view ............................................................................................... 35 
2.1.3 A slippery concept… ....................................................................................... 37 
2.2 ‘Security’ and ‘risk’ ................................................................................................. 41 
2.2.1 Conceptualising risk ....................................................................................... 41 
2.2.2 A risk framework ............................................................................................ 42 
2.2.3 Plural conditionality ....................................................................................... 44 
2.3 Energy security in a long-term carbon reduction context ..................................... 46 
2.3.1 Carbon reduction and the energy ‘trilemma’ ................................................ 46 
8 
 
2.3.2 Some potential synergies ............................................................................... 48 
2.3.3 Some potential trade-offs .............................................................................. 49 
2.4 Electricity security: background information ......................................................... 52 
2.4.1 Balancing electricity supply and demand ...................................................... 52 
2.4.2 Balancing a low-carbon electricity system ..................................................... 53 
2.4.3 Dealing with the balancing challenge ............................................................ 55 
2.5 Summing up chapter 2 ........................................................................................... 57 
 
3 Analytical Framework ...................................................................................... 59 
3.1 The dashboard approach ....................................................................................... 59 
3.2 Shocks and Stresses ............................................................................................... 61 
3.2.1 Towards an analytical framework for empirical analysis ............................... 62 
3.3 Low-carbon transition pathways ........................................................................... 64 
3.4 Summing up chapter 3 ........................................................................................... 66 
 
4 Methodology ...................................................................................................... 68 
4.1 Research questions and methodology overview ................................................... 69 
4.1.1 Reiteration of research questions .................................................................. 69 
4.1.2 Methodology overview .................................................................................. 69 
4.2 Choosing transition pathways ................................................................................ 70 
4.2.1 Methodology for choosing transition pathways ............................................ 70 
4.2.2 Transition Pathways to a Low-carbon Economy ............................................ 72 
4.3 Development of the indicator set .......................................................................... 76 
4.3.1 Indicator set overview and aims .................................................................... 76 
4.3.2 Developing a set of indicators ........................................................................ 78 
4.4 Detailed methods for each indicator ..................................................................... 82 
4.4.1 Availability ...................................................................................................... 82 
4.4.2 Affordability ................................................................................................... 88 
4.4.3 Long-term environmental sustainability ........................................................ 93 
4.4.4 Reliability ........................................................................................................ 96 
4.5 Stakeholder interviews ........................................................................................ 106 
4.5.1 Why analyse stakeholders’ perspectives? ................................................... 106 
4.5.2 Interview methodology ................................................................................ 107 
4.5.3 Methods for analysing the results of the interviews ................................... 110 
9 
 
4.5.4 Exploring the impact of stakeholders’ perspectives on the results of the 
security assessment ..................................................................................................... 111 
4.6 Summing up chapter 4 ......................................................................................... 111 
 
5 Results I: Results of the security assessment ................................................ 113 
5.1 Availability Results: domestic disruption ............................................................. 113 
5.1.1 Public approval ratings ................................................................................. 114 
5.1.2 Land requirements (proxy for disruptive opposition).................................. 115 
5.1.3 Participation and engagement in decisions ................................................. 116 
5.1.4 Domestic disruption results: key uncertainties and limitations .................. 117 
5.2 Availability Results: non-domestic disruption ..................................................... 118 
5.2.1 Diversity of fuel types in the electricity mix ................................................. 119 
5.2.2 Fuel imports: dependence, diversity and stability ....................................... 121 
5.2.3 Storage and stockpiles ................................................................................. 127 
5.2.4 External disruption: key uncertainties and limitations ................................ 128 
5.3 Affordability Results: cost to the system ............................................................. 129 
5.3.1 Generation costs .......................................................................................... 129 
5.3.2 Network costs .............................................................................................. 132 
5.3.3 Cost of the system: key uncertainties and limitations ................................. 133 
5.4 Affordability Results: cost to the consumer ........................................................ 134 
5.4.1 Wholesale prices .......................................................................................... 134 
5.4.2 Annual retail electricity bills ......................................................................... 136 
5.4.3 Fuel poverty ................................................................................................. 137 
5.4.4 Cost to the consumer: key uncertainties and limitations ............................ 139 
5.5 Sustainability Results: GHG emissions ................................................................. 141 
5.6 Sustainability Results: Resources ......................................................................... 144 
5.6.1 Primary fuels ................................................................................................ 144 
5.6.2 Secondary materials ..................................................................................... 146 
5.6.3 Resource depletion results for the pathways .............................................. 148 
5.7 Sustainability Results: Water ............................................................................... 150 
5.7.1 Sustainability results: key uncertainties and limitations ............................. 152 
5.8 Reliability Results: System adequacy ................................................................... 152 
5.8.1 Loss of Load Expectation .............................................................................. 153 
5.8.2 De-rated capacity margins ........................................................................... 153 
5.8.3 Capacity factors and oversupply .................................................................. 157 
10 
 
5.8.4 Electricity storage and interconnection ....................................................... 159 
5.8.5 System adequacy: key uncertainties and limitations................................... 160 
5.9 Reliability Results: Shock resilience ..................................................................... 161 
5.9.1 Flexible supply: Frequency response capability ........................................... 161 
5.9.2 Flexible supply: Short-term operating reserve (STOR) and black-start 
capability 163 
5.9.3 Response and Reserve requirements .......................................................... 164 
5.9.4 Flexible demand ........................................................................................... 168 
5.9.5 Does decentralisation equal increased resilience? ...................................... 171 
5.9.6 Shock resilience: key uncertainties and limitations ..................................... 172 
5.10 Summing up chapter 5 ......................................................................................... 173 
 
6 Results 2: Results from the stakeholder interviews ..................................... 175 
6.1 Results from Likert-scale ratings of indicators ..................................................... 175 
6.2 Interview responses: Availability ......................................................................... 179 
6.2.1 Acceptability, engagement and opposition ................................................. 179 
6.2.2 Diversity and imports ................................................................................... 182 
6.3 Interview responses: Affordability ....................................................................... 185 
6.3.1 Costs to consumers and to the system ........................................................ 185 
6.3.2 Networks and network costs ....................................................................... 187 
6.4 Interview responses: Sustainability ..................................................................... 189 
6.4.1 Carbon .......................................................................................................... 189 
6.4.2 Resources ..................................................................................................... 190 
6.4.3 Water ........................................................................................................... 191 
6.5 Interview responses:  Reliability .......................................................................... 192 
6.5.1 System adequacy: capacity margins and oversupply .................................. 192 
6.5.2 Flexibility: response-and-reserve, flexible demand, storage and 
interconnection ............................................................................................................ 194 
6.6 Interview results: Major cross-cutting themes emerging .................................... 198 
6.6.1 Theme 1: How broad is too broad? ............................................................. 198 
6.6.2 Theme 2: ‘Traditional’ energy security indicators ....................................... 200 
6.6.3 Theme 3: Economic and political feasibility ................................................. 201 
6.6.4 Theme 4: Context ......................................................................................... 202 
6.6.5 Theme 5: The demand side .......................................................................... 203 
6.6.6 Does ‘where you stand depend on where you sit’? .................................... 203 
11 
 
6.7 Summing up chapter 6 ......................................................................................... 204 
 
7 Discussion ........................................................................................................ 206 
7.1 Overview of security assessment results ............................................................. 206 
7.1.1 Dashboard analysis ...................................................................................... 206 
7.1.2 Overview of dashboard results: Dimensions and trade-offs ....................... 211 
7.1.3 Pathway results ............................................................................................ 212 
7.1.4 Conclusions from the dashboard analysis ................................................... 213 
7.2 Applying the interview results to the security assessment ................................. 215 
7.2.1 Theme 1: How broad is too broad? Affordability and sustainability 
dimensions ................................................................................................................... 215 
7.2.2 Theme 2: ‘Traditional’ energy security indicators ....................................... 216 
7.2.3 Theme 3: Economic and political feasibility ................................................. 219 
7.2.4 Theme 4: Context ......................................................................................... 220 
7.2.5 Theme 5: The demand side .......................................................................... 222 
7.2.6 Conclusions from the application of different stakeholder perspectives to the 
security assessment ..................................................................................................... 223 
7.3 Missing indicators ................................................................................................ 225 
7.3.1 Applying the suggested additional indicators to the pathways ................... 227 
7.3.2 Conclusions from missing indicators ............................................................ 237 
7.4 Summing up chapter 7 ......................................................................................... 238 
 
8 Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 241 
8.1 Goals of the thesis, and how they were achieved ............................................... 241 
8.2 Overview of results .............................................................................................. 243 
8.3 Contributions to knowledge ................................................................................ 246 
8.4 Limitations and areas for further research .......................................................... 247 
8.4.1 Data gaps that the research has identified .................................................. 247 
8.4.2 Limitations and areas for further research .................................................. 249 
8.5 Policy recommendations ..................................................................................... 250 
 
References ............................................................................................................... 253 
 
Appendix A: Indicators ‘long list’ ........................................................................ 283 
 
12 
 
Appendix B: Availability Methods ....................................................................... 289 
B.1 Likelihood of domestic disruption to electricity availability: Methods ..................... 289 
B.1.1 Public approval ratings ....................................................................................... 289 
B.1.2 Land requirements (proxy for disruptive opposition) ........................................ 290 
B.1.3 Public participation ............................................................................................. 292 
B.2 Likelihood of Non-domestic disruption to Electricity Availability: Methods ............. 293 
B.2.1 Diversity of fuel types ......................................................................................... 293 
B.2.2 Diversity and stability of fuel imports ................................................................. 294 
 
Appendix C: Affordability methods ..................................................................... 299 
C.1 Cost of electricity generation ..................................................................................... 299 
C.1.1 Mathematical method ........................................................................................ 299 
C.1.2 Generation costs assumptions ............................................................................ 300 
C.1.3 Generation costs sensitivity tests: methods ....................................................... 302 
C.1.4 Generation costs sensitivity tests: results .......................................................... 305 
C.2 Wholesale prices ........................................................................................................ 307 
C.4 Distribution upgrade costs ......................................................................................... 309 
C.2.1 Wholesale price assumptions ............................................................................. 311 
C.2.2 Wholesale electricity prices sensitivity tests ...................................................... 312 
C.3 Transmission upgrade costs ....................................................................................... 313 
C.3.1 Offshore costs ..................................................................................................... 313 
C.3.2 Onshore costs ..................................................................................................... 314 
C.5 Annual household electricity bills .............................................................................. 316 
C.5.1 Annual bills sensitivity tests: methods ................................................................ 316 
C.5.2 Annual bills sensitivity tests: results ................................................................... 319 
C.6 Fuel poverty ............................................................................................................... 320 
 
Appendix D: Sustainability methods .................................................................... 322 
D.1 GHG emissions and intensity ..................................................................................... 322 
D.1.1 Carbon intensity assumptions ............................................................................ 322 
D.2 Resource depletion .................................................................................................... 323 
D.3 Water usage for cooling and for biomass production ............................................... 324 
D.3.1 Type of cooling ................................................................................................... 325 
D.3.2 Weighting ........................................................................................................... 326 
D.3.3 Assumptions ....................................................................................................... 326 
13 
 
D.3.4 Water sensitivity tests ........................................................................................ 327 
 
Appendix E: Reliability methods .......................................................................... 330 
E.1 De-rated capacity margin ........................................................................................... 330 
E.1.1 DRCM Assumptions ............................................................................................. 331 
E.1.2 DRCM sensitivity tests: methods ........................................................................ 332 
E.1.3 DRCM sensitivity tests: results ............................................................................ 333 
E.1.4 DRCM sensitivity tests: marginal increases......................................................... 335 
E.2 Capacity factors and oversupply ................................................................................ 336 
E.3 Shock resilience: methods overview .......................................................................... 336 
E.4 Frequency response capability .................................................................................. 337 
E.4.1 Frequency response assumptions ....................................................................... 338 
E.5 Short-term operating reserve and black-start capability ........................................... 339 
E.5.1 Long-term STOR .................................................................................................. 340 
E.5.2 Short-term STOR ................................................................................................. 340 
E.5.3 Black-start capability ........................................................................................... 341 
E.5.4 Fast start capability ............................................................................................. 341 
E.6 Response and reserve requirements ......................................................................... 341 
E.6.1 Calculating the response (FR) requirement ........................................................ 341 
E.6.2 Calculating the reserve (STOR) requirement ...................................................... 344 
E.7 Flexible demand ......................................................................................................... 346 
 
Appendix F: Offshore wind technology costs ...................................................... 348 
 
Appendix G: Copy of briefing note sent to all stakeholders in advance ........... 352 
 
Appendix H: Application of individual stakeholder perspectives to security 
assessment results ................................................................................................... 355 
 
 
  
14 
 
List of figures 
Figure 1-1: Electricity supply in the UK, in TWh/y (DECC 2015b) ...................................... 24 
Figure 2-1: Three perspectives on energy security (Cherp and Jewell 2011: 2007) ........... 40 
Figure 2-2: The Uncertainty Matrix (Stirling 2010) ............................................................ 44 
Figure 2-3: Plural conditionality (Stirling 2013) ................................................................. 46 
Figure 2-4: The Energy Trilemma (Boston 2013) ................................................................ 48 
Figure 4-1: Generation mix in the Market Rules pathway in TWh/year, 2008 to 2050 ..... 74 
Figure 4-2: Generation mix in Central Coordination pathway in TWh/year, 2008 to 2050
 ............................................................................................................................................... 74 
Figure 4-3: Generation mix in the Thousand Flowers pathway in TWh/year, 2008 to 2050
 ............................................................................................................................................... 75 
Figure 4-4: Dashboard of indicators for the assessment of a low-carbon electricity system
 ............................................................................................................................................... 79 
Figure 5-1: Public approval ratings of the pathways, in GW and in % of total fuel mix .. 114 
Figure 5-2: Land requirements: generation and transmission infrastructure ................. 115 
Figure 5-3: Land requirements: domestic extraction of resources ................................... 116 
Figure 5-4: Generation mix in the pathways ...................................................................... 119 
Figure 5-5: Fuel mix diversity: Shannon-Wiener index results .......................................... 121 
Figure 5-6: Dependence on imported fuels, in TWh/y and % of total generation output 122 
Figure 5-7: Results from Shannon-Wiener diversity index and import stability index .... 123 
Figure 5-8: Gas supply projections to 2034 showing import dependency (National Grid 
2015b) ................................................................................................................................. 126 
Figure 5-9: Cost of electricity generation in £k/MWh, and £bn annual cost .................... 130 
Figure 5-10: Sensitivity analyses of £bn annual generation cost, 2030 and 2050 ........... 131 
Figure 5-11: Total cost of upgrades and additions to the transmission networks ........... 132 
Figure 5-12: Total cost of upgrades and additions to the distribution networks ............. 132 
Figure 5-13: Range of results from wholesale price sensitivity analyses, 2030 and 2050 135 
Figure 5-14: Range of results from annual bills sensitivity analyses, 2030 and 2050...... 137 
Figure 5-15: GHG emissions ................................................................................................ 142 
Figure 5-16: Carbon intensity range of estimates, gCO2e/kWh ........................................ 144 
Figure 5-17: Global proved gas reserves, 1993 to 2013 (BP 2013) ................................... 145 
Figure 5-18: Total water withdrawals and consumption for electricity generation (million 
m3) ....................................................................................................................................... 151 
Figure 5-19: De-rated capacity margins (base case) ......................................................... 154 
Figure 5-20: Range of results from DRCM sensitivity tests, 2030 and 2050 ..................... 156 
Figure 5-21: Generation-type capacity factors in the Market Rules pathway (Barnacle et 
al 2013) ............................................................................................................................... 158 
Figure 5-22: Generation-type capacity factors in the Central Coordination pathway 
(Barnacle et al 2013) .......................................................................................................... 158 
Figure 5-23: Generation-type capacity factors in the Thousand Flowers pathway 
(Barnacle et al 2013) .......................................................................................................... 159 
Figure 5-24: Storage and interconnection. Note: CC result in GW is the same as TF result
 ............................................................................................................................................. 160 
15 
 
Figure 5-25: Mean Frequency Response capability, primary and secondary (MWh) ...... 162 
Figure 5-26: Maximum Frequency Response capability, primary and secondary (MWh) 163 
Figure 5-27: Short-term STOR, long-term STOR, and black-start capability in % of total 
generation mix which is capable of offering these services ............................................... 164 
Figure 5-28: FR requirements and capabilities ................................................................. 166 
Figure 5-29: STOR requirements and capabilities ............................................................. 167 
Figure 5-30: Peak demand. Error bars show 20% reduction of peak due to shifting ...... 169 
Figure 5-31: Electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps ........................................................ 171 
Figure 6-1: Ratings of indicators by interviewees, 2030 ................................................... 178 
Figure 6-2: Indicator ratings: 'availability' dimension ...................................................... 184 
Figure 6-3: Indicator ratings: 'affordability' dimension .................................................... 188 
Figure 6-4: Indicator ratings: 'sustainability' dimension .................................................. 192 
Figure 6-5: Indicator ratings: 'reliability' dimension ........................................................ 198 
Figure 7-1: Dashboard analysis, Market Rules pathway ................................................... 208 
Figure 7-2: Dashboard analysis, Central Coordination pathway ...................................... 209 
Figure 7-3: Dashboard analysis, Thousand Flowers pathway .......................................... 210 
Figure C-0-1: Results of generation costs sensitivity tests 2030 ........................................ 305 
Figure C-0-2: Results of generation costs sensitivity tests 2050 ........................................ 306 
Figure C-0-3: Projected peak demand ................................................................................ 310 
Figure C-0-4: Wholesale price sensitivity results ............................................................... 313 
Figure C-0-5: Results from annual bills sensitivity tests, 2030 .......................................... 319 
Figure C-0-6: Results from annual bills sensitivity tests, 2050 .......................................... 319 
Figure D-0-1: Results of sensitivity tests using different weightings for freshwater vs 
seawater .............................................................................................................................. 329 
Figure E-0-1: Results from DRCM sensitivity analyses 2030 ............................................. 335 
Figure E-0-2: Results from DRCM sensitivity analyses 2050 ............................................. 335 
Figure E-0-3: Impact of sensitivity assumptions on marginal (per unit) changes in DRCM
 ............................................................................................................................................. 336 
Figure E-0-4: Primary Frequency Response Requriement (sic.), 2010 to 2026 (National 
Grid 2011)............................................................................................................................ 343 
Figure E-0-5: Secondary Frequency Response Requirement, 2010 to 2026 (National Grid 
2011).................................................................................................................................... 343 
Figure E-0-6: Operating reserve requirement Gone Green (0%, 30% and 100% wind load 
factor) .................................................................................................................................. 345 
 
  
16 
 
List of tables 
Table 3-1: Types of futures study. Adapted from McDowall and Eames (2006) ................. 65 
Table 4-1: Table showing dimensions, sub-dimensions and indicators, including literature 
for each indicator .................................................................................................................. 80 
Table 4-2: Overview of indicators with brief description of methods ............................... 103 
Table 4-3: interviewee details ............................................................................................. 108 
Table 5-1: Levels of public participation (from pathways storyline) ................................ 117 
Table 5-2: Annual bills (£/year, not including VAT) .......................................................... 136 
Table 5-3: Fuel poverty risk ................................................................................................ 139 
Table 5-4: List of critical metals and low-carbon technologies (Speirs et al 2014: 3) ..... 147 
Table 5-5: Criticality of 32 materials for low-carbon energy ............................................ 148 
Table 5-6: Secondary materials depletion for different generation types ........................ 148 
Table 5-7: Increase in response (FR) requirement (% increase, compared to 2010) ....... 165 
Table 5-8:  Increase in reserve (STOR) requirement (% increase, compared to 2010) .... 167 
Table 5-9: Peak and minimum load ................................................................................... 169 
Table 7-1: Indicators suggested as missing from the original set ..................................... 226 
Table A-0-1: Initial long-list of potential indicators for assessing the security of electricity 
system transition pathways ................................................................................................ 284 
Table D-0-1: Carbon intensity of various generation types. Source: Moomaw et al (2011)
 ............................................................................................................................................. 322 
Table D-0-2: Water withdrawal and consumption intensities. Source: Kyle et al (2013) 324 
Table D-0-3: Assumed cooling system shares in % (Kyle et al 2013) ................................ 325 
Table E-0-1: Capacity Credit of generation types (National Grid 2012: 30) .................... 330 
Table H-0-1: Application of individual stakeholder perspectives to security assessment 
results, 2030 ........................................................................................................................ 355 
Table H-0-2: Application of individual stakeholder perspectives to security assessment 
results, 2050 ........................................................................................................................ 357 
 
  
17 
 
Acronyms and abbreviations 
AD Anaerobic Digestion 
APERC Asia-Pacific Research Centre 
ASC Advanced Supercritical (coal plant) 
BAU Business As Usual 
CAPEX Capital Expenditure 
CC Central Coordination pathway 
CCGT Combined-Cycle Gas Turbine 
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage 
CfD Contract for Difference 
CHP Combined Heat and Power 
CSC Current Source Converter 
DECC Department of Energy and Climate Change 
DRCM De-Rated Capacity Margin 
DSR Demand-Side Response 
ECCC Energy and Climate Change Committee 
EIA Energy Information Administration 
EJ Exajoule (1x1018 Joules) 
EMR Electricity Market Reform 
ENSG Electricity Networks Strategy Group 
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme 
EU European Union 
EV Electric Vehicle 
FiT Feed-in Tariff 
FR Frequency Response 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
GW Gigawatt (1,000,000,000 Watts) 
HV High Voltage 
HVAC High Voltage Alternating Current 
HVDC High Voltage Direct Current 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IEM Integrated European Market 
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IGCC Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LCOE Levelised Cost of Electricity Generation 
LCPD Large Combustion Plant Directive 
LDC Load Duration Curve 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
LOLE Loss of Load Expectation 
LV Low Voltage 
MIIS Mass Impregnated Insulated Subsea cable 
MO-ESCo Municipal Energy Services Company 
MR Market Rules pathway 
MVA Mega Volt Amp 
MW Megawatt (1,000,000 Watts) 
MWh Megawatt Hour 
NGO Non-Government Organisation 
OCGT Open Cycle Gas Turbine 
ONS Office for National Statistics 
OPEX Operating Expenditure 
PV Photovoltaic 
R&R Response and Reserve 
RAEng Royal Academy of Engineering 
RES Renewable Energy Source 
STOR Short Term Operating Reserve 
SW Shannon-Weiner Index 
TF Thousand Flowers pathway 
TWh Terawatt Hour (1x1012 Watt Hours) 
UKERC UK Energy Research Centre 
VAT Value Added Tax 
VSC Voltage Source Converter 
WRI  World Resources Institute 
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1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter sets out the background to the topic of assessing energy security 
in a low-carbon context, and outlines the motivation for addressing this topic. The first 
section of this chapter provides a brief overview of energy security in policy discussions and 
in the academic literature. Section 1.2 then presents the rationale for bounding the thesis 
by focusing on electricity in the UK, and provides some essential background information by 
giving a brief overview of electricity systems, policy and markets in the UK. Section 1.3 then 
sets out the objectives of the thesis and how they will be achieved. Finally, section 1.4 
outlines the structure of the thesis as a whole by providing a brief synopsis of each chapter. 
 
1.1 Introduction to the topic 
Over the past couple of decades, a number of fundamental changes to energy systems have 
led to energy security taking a central place on the policy agendas of many industrialised 
nations. Instability in the Middle East created new fears about the security of fossil fuel 
supplies, and since around 2005 concerns have been raised about the rise of ‘resource 
nationalism’ in key fuel exporting regions such as China and Russia (Cherp and Jewell 2011; 
Kuzemko and Bradshaw 2013; Kuzemko 2014; Umbach 2010; Winstone et al 2007). China 
started to pursue bi-lateral fuel deals with producer countries, thus by-passing international 
markets, rules and norms, whilst Russia enacted a series of reforms whereby the state 
assumed greater control of energy assets (Kuzemko 2014). This was compounded by the 
ongoing Russia-Ukraine gas crisis and the stoppage of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine in 
2006 and 2009, which was widely seen as an aggressive attempt by Russia to use energy as 
a weapon in a political conflict (Umbach 2012). Simultaneously, global energy consumption 
has continued to increase over the past two decades, driven by strong economic growth in 
emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil (Grubb 2014); this has sparked 
widespread fears that global fossil fuel production will not be able to keep pace with 
demand (Cherp and Jewell 2011; Grubb 2014; International Energy Agency [IEA] 2014). 
 
Energy provision plays a fundamental role in everyone’s lives; in the words of Sovacool and 
Brown (2010: 79), “energy services are a ubiquitous component of modern lifestyles, 
needed to power modes of transport, light factories and workplaces, cultivate food, 
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manufacture and distribute products, and cool and warm residences”. In many 
industrialised nations, it is seen as imperative that the energy system can deliver affordable 
energy in the volume and quality required at any given moment; politicians are reminded of 
the very real threat to their political legitimacy in the event of energy shortages or severe 
spikes in consumer fuel price (Royal Academy of Engineering [RAEng] 2014). Moreover, 
environmental concerns mean that future energy provision will also need to be 
environmentally sustainable. Considering the multiple challenges of delivering on these 
aims, it is hardly surprising that energy security has received so much attention, or that it 
should continue to receive attention in the future. 
 
Literature addressing energy security in the sense that we know it today first appeared in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, partly as a response to the second oil shock in 1979 (Deese 
1979; Deese and Miller 1981; Smart 1985). Since then, the term ‘energy security’ has 
become commonplace in both academic and policy discussions; however, the term tends to 
resist a generally accepted definition, and often means different things to different people 
(Bielecki 2002; Chester 2010; Ciuta 2010; Månsson et al 2014a; Sovacool 2011). Because of 
this, the term tends to be open to exploitation by interest groups (Buzan et al 1998; Löschel 
et al 2010a; Winzer 2011). There has been a common tendency in the energy literature to 
focus on supply-side dynamics and fossil fuel resources (Bielecki 2002; Bohi and Tohman 
1996; Bordhoff et al 2010; Bradshaw 2010; Cherp and Jewell 2014; Frondel and Schmidt 
2014; Lefèvre 2010). Perspectives on energy security are often rooted in specific disciplines 
such as economics, politics or engineering, despite the fact that the issues involved usually 
cut across multiple disciplines (Cherp and Jewell 2011; Jewell et al 2014; Jonsson et al 
2013). This thesis therefore takes an interdisciplinary approach which recognises the 
importance of actors and policies as well as technologies, systems and markets. This 
approach, and the gap in the literature which it aims to fill, is succinctly summarised by 
Jonsson et al:  
“Papers emphasising the economic and technological 
perspectives are seldom combined with analyses of policy 
and actors, and vice versa for political science papers… There 
is a lack of papers using a comprehensive socio-technical 
perspective in which actors and policies, as well as 
technology, are equally represented (2013: 104-5).” 
 
Perspectives on energy security have recently become linked to environmental issues, in 
light of an emerging new paradigm of environmental and social concerns (Elkind 2010; 
Francés et al 2013; Hughes 2012; Mitchell et al 2013). Increasing scientific and policy 
21 
 
consensus of the imperative to cut carbon emissions has led to the development of the 
term ‘energy trilemma’, which posits that energy systems needs to balance the three 
elements of security, cost, and carbon reduction. It is often argued that if one of these 
aspects is ignored in favour of the others, it has a tendency to catch up in the end; as stated 
by van Renssen, “In responding to one crisis, it [the European Union] must be careful not to 
create another: energy security must join, not replace, competitiveness and climate change 
at the top of the agenda (2014: 757).”  The trilemma illustrates a central aspect of the 
energy security discussion: the fact that there may be certain trade-offs between 
objectives, as well as potentially certain synergies (Brown and Huntingdon 2008; Froggatt 
and Levi 2009; Sovacool and Saunders 2014). Therefore there is a need to explore the 
synergies and trade-offs which may emerge between different objectives in a transition to a 
low-carbon electricity system. A systematic literature review by Jonsson et al (2013) found 
that the majority of papers which link energy security and climate change only talk about 
climate change mitigation measures in very general terms; those which are specific tend to 
focus on energy mix changes, energy efficiency changes, or the introduction of large-scale 
Carbon Capture and Storage. Therefore there is a real need to assess low-carbon energy 
security from an analytical perspective which incorporates multiple options for 
decarbonisation as well as other changes which might occur in a transition from a high-
carbon energy system to a lower-carbon one. 
 
 
1.2 Electricity in the UK 
1.2.1 Why focus on the UK? 
Energy security is highly context-specific, and energy security concerns are strongly 
correlated with national energy policies and state imperatives (Ang et al 2015; Bielecki 
2002; Blumer et al 2015; Sovacool et al 2012), therefore it makes sense for this thesis to 
focus on one specific country. The UK is chosen as a case study because its energy system is 
in a major period of transition (Geels et al 2016), driven by a number of factors. The UK is 
entering a new phase of net fossil fuel imports due to declining domestic production: it has 
been a net importer of natural gas since 2004 and of oil since 2013 due to declining 
production from the UK Continental Shelf, and of coal since the mid-1980s (Energy 
Information Administration [EIA] 2014). Policy concerns over increasing import dependence 
were compounded by rising oil and natural gas prices from around 2004 onwards; this 
included an increase in the wholesale price of gas which has contributed to rising energy 
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bills (Bolton 2014; Sauter and MacKerron 2008; UK Committee on Climate Change 2012).1 
Furthermore, the electricity supply infrastructure is ageing and will require a significant 
proportion of electricity supply capacity to be replaced by the mid-2020s; the retirement of 
older fossil fuel power plant capacity has led to an erosion of capacity margins in the power 
sector (Ofgem 2012; RAEng 2013). There are also large parts of the electricity and gas 
transmission and distribution networks which are in need of replacing or upgrading 
(Department of Energy and Climate Change [DECC] 2015a; Dodds and McDowall 2013; 
Energy Networks Strategy Group [ENSG] 2012; Strbac et al 2014). Additionally, the UK is 
under pressure to decarbonise its energy system: the 2008 Climate Change Act (HM 
Government 2008) established the world’s first legally-binding climate change target of an 
80% reduction on UK Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions on 1990 levels by 2050, and 
meeting this target will mean that the energy system will need to undergo a major 
transition. These multiple challenges have meant that energy security has risen rapidly up 
the public and policy agendas in the UK in recent years, and unlike many other European 
countries, the UK has a specific energy security strategy (DECC 2012a). Nevertheless, many 
other industrialised countries, both in Europe and further afield, are experiencing similar 
pressures on their energy systems, meaning that the UK case can act as a useful basis for 
exploring energy security in other national contexts. 
 
Policy decisions and recommendations in the UK are frequently made on the basis of 
‘improving energy security’ or ‘meeting the goals of the trilemma’, without much in-depth 
empirical assessment of which measures or technologies may help to achieve this (see for 
example DECC 2012a; DECC 2013a; DECC 2013b; DECC 2014). Therefore, this thesis fills this 
gap in the literature by systematically assessing the future security of the UK electricity 
system in a low-carbon context, in order to identify the main risks, trade-offs and synergies 
which may emerge between different objectives in a transition to a low-carbon electricity 
system. To do this, this thesis develops a set of indicators for assessing the electricity 
security of low-carbon transition pathways, building on assessment frameworks from the 
existing literature and utilising a range of both quantitative and qualitative indicators. 
Multiple elements of this approach could be generalisable to other country contexts; 
however, it is always necessary to be aware of the limitations of broad generalisation, and 
to pay due attention to the particular technical, social and historical context of the country 
                                                          
1 These price increases have not been constant and have shown much volatility. Gas and oil prices generally 
dropped in 2008 as the result of the financial crash, but increased sharply again until the next oil price crash in 
2014. 
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in question. Therefore whilst the methodological approach is designed to be generalisable, 
the empirical findings may not be. 
 
1.2.2 Electricity in the UK 
As noted by Chester (2010), the energy security literature displays a prevalent focus on 
securing supplies of oil and gas, despite the fact that electricity is now one of the most 
dominant forms of energy supply. Projections suggest that electricity will be the fastest 
growing energy sector in the future (IEA 2014), and electricity and heat production is the 
largest single source of greenhouse gas emissions globally (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change [IPCC] 2014). Efforts are already underway to electrify heating and 
transport systems in order to make deeper cuts to emissions from these sectors in the 
future, meaning that findings relating to electricity security could eventually become a key 
component of efforts to decarbonise heating and transport (DECC 2011a; UK Committee on 
Climate Change 2013). Therefore there is considerable need to look in more detail at the 
challenges of improving the security of the electricity system in a low-carbon context.  
 
The majority of UK electricity is produced by burning gas and coal, with smaller but 
significant proportions from nuclear and renewables. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of the 
UK electricity mix over the past 33 years. In recent years, the gas-fired proportion of the 
electricity mix has fallen significantly due to rising gas prices and falling coal prices, whilst 
the coal-fired proportion rose to its highest level since 1996 in 2012 and then dropped 
again as electricity consumption continued to fall and as coal-fired power stations closed or 
converted to biomass. The amount of electricity generated from wind and solar has grown 
enormously in the past few years, from 10.3 Terawatt-Hours (TWh) in 2010 to 36.1 TWh in 
2014. Renewables including hydro and biomass provided 19% of electricity consumption in 
2014. Overall electricity consumption has fallen since 2000, mainly due to a marked 
decrease in consumption from the industrial sector; domestic electricity consumption also 
fell, due to energy efficiency measures, mild winters and the economic downturn. Installed 
generation capacity has grown steadily over the past 20 years, from 82.1 Gigawatts (GW) in 
2005 to 96.8GW in 2014; this reflects a decline in conventional thermal generation in 
favour of an increase in intermittent renewables (all information in this paragraph from 
DECC 2015b).  
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Figure 1-1: Electricity supply in the UK, in TWh/y (DECC 2015b) 
 
1.2.3 UK electricity markets 
The UK was one of the first countries in the world to privatise its electricity system. The 
Electricity Act (1989) laid the foundations for a total restructuring of the UK electricity 
industry, in which the state-owned generation and transmission company was split up and 
privatised, although some vertical integration remained (HM Government 1989; Simmonds 
2002). There are now 30 major power generators, although the market is dominated by the 
‘Big 6’ of British Gas, EDF, E.ON, Npower, Scottish Power and SSE, who together supply 
around 90% of domestic electricity and gas consumers (Ofgem 2015).  
 
Over the past few years, UK energy policy has moved increasingly towards government 
interventions (Foxon and Pearson 2013; Pollitt and Haney 2013). The 2009 Low Carbon 
Transition Plan clearly outlines the shortcomings of the markets and the need for a strategic 
role for government (HM Government 2009), and the 2011 White Paper ‘Planning our 
Electric Future’ begins with the statement:  
“Since the market was privatised in the 1980s the system has 
worked: delivering secure and affordable electricity for the UK. 
But it cannot meet the challenges of the future… Keeping the 
lights on will mean raising a record amount of investment. 
However, the current market arrangements will not deliver 
investment at the scale and the pace that we need.” (DECC 
2011a: 3) 
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In order to address these issues, Electricity Market Reform (EMR) set out a plan for four 
major new policy instruments (DECC 2012b; Pollitt and Haney 2013): 
1. A new system of long-term contracts in the form of Feed-in-Tariffs with Contracts 
for Difference (CfD).2 These are supposed to provide a clear, stable and robust 
revenue stream for generators of low-carbon electricity. Low-carbon non-
renewable supply technologies such as nuclear power and Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) are now included in the policy support mechanisms.  
2. A Capacity Mechanism, which will offer payments by auction for reliable capacity 
to be available when needed (see DECC 2013c). 
3. A Carbon Price Floor, which was originally set to increase from £15.70/tonneCO2e 
in 2016 to £32/tonne in 2020 and £76/tonne in 2030 (DECC 2012b), but which has 
since been reformed to be capped at £18/tonne until 2020 as a response to 
continually low carbon prices in the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading 
Scheme (HM Revenue and Customs 2014). 
4. An Emissions Performance Standard set at an annual limit relative to a baseload 
level of 450gCO2/kWh (DECC 2011a). 
 
The underlying logic behind much recent UK electricity policy is clear in the outline of the 
EMR policy framework. Increased intervention by government is seen as necessary; 
however, it has been argued that the government’s main role has been to reform the 
markets in order to ensure that they deliver the necessary investment, resulting in a 
hybrid mix of market-led and government-led approaches (Foxon 2013; Foxon and Bolton 
2013). Despite a move back towards government intervention, the market is still seen as 
central. Concerns over this have been raised by several authors (e.g. Bolton and Hawkes 
2013; Foxon 2012; Helm 2009; 2010; Mitchell and Watson 2013a). This overview is 
provided simply as background information to the case of electricity in the UK; an in-depth 
examination and critique of UK electricity policy and EMR is outside the scope of this 
thesis, therefore for more information see Mitchell et al (2014) and Pollitt and Haney 
(2013). 
 
                                                          
2 “A Feed‑in Tariff with Contract for Difference (FiT CfD) is a long-term contract between an electricity 
generator and a contract counterparty. The contract enables the generator to stabilise its revenues at a pre-
agreed level (the strike price) for the duration of the contract. Under the FiT CfD, payments can flow from the 
contract counterparty to the generator, and vice versa.” (DECC 2011a: 38) 
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Although there has been no official update to the 2012 Energy Security strategy or EMR, it 
is worth noting that a General Election in 2015 led to a change of administration and some 
shifts in energy policy more generally, illustrated here with some quotes from a major 
policy speech by the new Energy Minister in November 2015 (Rudd 2015). Energy security is 
now seen as the “number one priority” for energy policy, with markets seen as the best 
means of achieving this:  
We want a consumer-led, competition focussed 
energy system that has energy security at the heart of 
it and delivers for families and businesses. We want to 
see a competitive electricity market, with government 
out of the way as much as possible, by 2025. 
There is a major focus on enabling large supply-side technologies such as gas and nuclear 
power: 
We need to build a new energy infrastructure, fit for 
the 21st century. Much of that is already in the 
pipeline – new gas, such as the plant at Carrington, and 
of course, a large increase in renewables over the next 
five years and in the longer-term, new nuclear… 
Climate change is a big problem, it needs big 
technologies. 
There are also new plans to maximise production from the UK’s indigenous fossil resources, 
including the Continental Shelf and onshore shale gas. The speech also proposed that 
unabated coal-fired electricity generation be phased out by the mid-2020s in order to help 
meet carbon reduction targets, on the condition that new gas-fired stations are available to 
replace this coal capacity. 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
1.3.1 Research objectives and research questions 
It is clear that in order to meet the UK’s legally-binding carbon targets, and to help mitigate 
catastrophic climate change, the UK’s electricity system will need to undergo a transition. It 
is widely believed that there may be security risks and trade-offs between various 
objectives as we transition. The overarching aim of this thesis is to assess the future 
security of the UK electricity system in a low-carbon context, in order to identify the main 
risks, trade-offs and synergies which may emerge between different objectives in a 
transition to a low-carbon electricity system. This thesis aims to build upon and develop 
existing assessment frameworks from the energy security literature (for example, Jewell et 
al 2013; 2014), by proposing a set of indicators which is suitable for assessing the security 
of long-term national electricity scenarios. In doing this, the thesis aims to propose an 
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analytical framework which is potentially applicable to other industrialised countries as well 
as the UK. The set of indicators will be demonstrated by applying it to an existing set of low-
carbon transition pathways for the UK electricity system, in order to identify risks and 
trade-offs within the various low-carbon electricity systems proposed by the pathways. 
 
Additionally, it has frequently been noted that energy security is open to multiple 
interpretations. There are significant differences within the energy community regarding 
what energy security actually means; however, as of yet, there has been relatively little 
attempt in the literature to explore the perspectives of energy stakeholders. Therefore this 
thesis carries out an empirical exploration of the diversity of perspectives on energy 
security amongst key energy policy stakeholders. In this way, instead of simply stating that 
‘energy security means different things to different people’, this thesis aims to generate an 
in-depth and transparent discussion which does not seek to close down the diversity of 
views, but instead seeks to open them up to debate and to policy attention. Following from 
this, a further objective of this thesis is to analyse the possible implications of different 
perspectives on the results of the security assessment. This thesis provides the first study of 
this kind to actively incorporate multiple perspectives on energy security into an indicator 
assessment.  
 
In order to meet the objectives outlined in the preceding paragraphs, three research 
questions have been identified, as follows: 
 
i.  “What indicators are appropriate for assessing the security of low-carbon 
transition pathways in the UK, and what are the results of such an assessment using 
a set of existing pathways?” 
 
ii. “What are the reactions of energy stakeholders to the proposed set of indicators, 
and what does this tell us about the diversity of perspectives in the UK energy 
community?” 
 
iii. “What impact do stakeholders’ perspectives have on the results of the security 
assessment and on their preferred options for improving electricity security?” 
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1.3.2 Overview of methodology 
In order to answer these research questions, this thesis undertakes an analysis of the future 
security of the UK electricity system for a selection of low-carbon transition pathways. To 
do this, the thesis develops a set of indicators for assessing the security of possible long-
term national electricity futures. A distinction is made between those indicators applied to 
the specific case of UK low carbon scenarios, and those potentially applicable to other 
countries. Indicators are a fairly ubiquitous means of assessing energy security; in fact, the 
majority of the literature on measuring or assessing energy security does not even discuss 
alternatives to indicator approaches, but instead discusses which indicators or 
combinations of indicators are most appropriate and how best to use them. For the 
purposes of this thesis, indicators are used because they capture the multidimensional 
nature of energy security and reflect the fact that an assessment of energy security may be 
grounded in multiple overlapping disciplines (Cherp and Jewell 2011; Sovacool 2011). An 
indicator approach allows for the empirical assessment of a broad suite of energy security 
aspects, using a mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators according to their suitability 
for different aspects. As well as facilitating comparison between different scenarios for a 
future electricity system, this approach can also allow for comparison between the security 
of current and possible future systems. 
 
The identified set of indicators is then used as the basis for an in-depth discussion with UK 
energy stakeholders on low-carbon electricity security, using a number of one-to-one semi-
structured interviews. Previous studies by Sovacool et al (2012), Knox-Hayes et al (2013) 
and Blumer et al (2015) have shown that security concerns map very clearly onto 
contextual and national concerns (as suggested by the wider literature, e.g. Ang et al 2015; 
Bielecki 2002; Blumer et al 2015; Knox-Hayes et al 2013; Pasqualetti 2011; Toke and 
Vezirgiannidou 2013), and also that there are distinct differences between energy 
consumers and energy experts in how energy security is conceptualised, particularly 
involving differences in the timescales of reference being drawn upon (Blumer et al 2015). 
Therefore the exploration of perspectives carried out in this thesis will focus on one 
national context (the UK), and will focus on energy stakeholders, in order to explore the 
views of those who a) have existing knowledge of energy and energy security and the 
complexities therein, and b) may have some influence on policy processes, either through 
direct involvement or through participation in research and consultations. The aim of these 
interviews is to find out more about the diversity of views on energy security, and to 
understand how different perspectives might impact the results of the empirical 
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assessment and whether certain perspectives would lead to certain pathways or technology 
options being preferred. In this way, the results from the initial assessment can be viewed 
in the context of multiple different perspectives and preferences (Stirling 2008a). 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 reflects in detail upon the current state of the academic literature on energy 
security and outlines the academic context in which the thesis will be situated. The chapter 
begins with an overview of historical conceptualisations of energy security, and then moves 
on to introduce some of the more recent explorations of the energy security concept from 
the existing literature. The chapter finds that conceptualisations of energy security have in 
some cases broadened to include issues such as social and environmental sustainability and 
the demand-side, and argues that incorporating such broader issues can help to address 
emerging risks to energy systems. This chapter also introduces conceptualisations of 
security and ‘risk’ from the existing literature, and highlights the subjective and contingent 
nature of experts’ claims to knowledge. The chapter then focuses in more detail on the 
imperative to reduce energy-related greenhouse gas emissions, and introduces some ideas 
from energy and climate change literatures regarding the trade-offs and synergies which 
could occur in the context of a transition to a low-carbon energy system. Finally, this 
chapter provides some background information necessary for understanding electricity 
systems and the challenges of balancing supply and demand.  
 
Chapter 3 builds on the risk frameworks in the previous chapter, and on existing 
frameworks from the energy security literature, to propose an analytical framework for the 
assessment of electricity security. The chapter explains the ‘dashboard’ approach used in 
this thesis, and conceptualises risks to energy systems in terms of short-term ‘shocks’ and 
long-term ‘stresses’. These foundations are used to propose that an analytical framework 
comprising four key dimensions of energy security: ‘availability’, ‘reliability’, ‘affordability’ 
and ‘environmental sustainability’, is most suitable for assessing the electricity security of 
low-carbon transition pathways. The chapter also introduces the literature on futures 
studies, and sets out the basis for the choice of low-carbon transitions pathways which will 
be used for applying the analytical framework.  
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Chapter 4 describes and justifies the methodology used in the thesis. The chapter firstly 
explores ideas of transitions and futures studies, and justifies the selection of three 
transition pathways which were used as the basis for the security assessment. The chapter 
uses the analytical framework outlined in chapter 3 to propose a set of indicators for the 
assessment of the security of these transition pathways, and lays out the methods used for 
each indicator. This chapter then goes on to describe the methods for interviewing 
stakeholders which will be used to explore perspectives on energy security, and the 
methods which will be used to explore the impact of stakeholders’ perspectives on the 
results from the initial security assessment.  
 
Chapter 5 is the first of two results chapters; it presents the results which answer the first 
research question: ““What indicators are appropriate for assessing the security of low-
carbon transition pathways in the UK, and what are the results of such an assessment using 
a set of existing pathways?”3 The chapter presents detailed results from the security 
assessment of the three transition pathways using the set of indicators developed in 
chapter 4, for the year increments 2010 (using historical data), 2030 and 2050.  
 
Chapter 6 is the second of the two results chapters. It presents the results which answer 
the second research question: “What are the reactions of energy stakeholders to the 
proposed set of indicators, and what does this tell us about the diversity of perspectives in 
the UK energy community?”4 This chapter explores the data from 25 interviews which were 
carried out with UK stakeholders from policy, academia, think tanks, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), utilities and network companies. This chapter presents the results of 
a thematic coding analysis of this interview data, which identifies five key themes which 
were found to cut across multiple respondents and multiple security dimensions.  
 
The discussion chapter, Chapter 7, brings the results from chapters 5 and 6 together in 
order to answer the final research question: “What impact do stakeholders’ perspectives 
have on the results of the security assessment and on their preferred options for improving 
electricity security?” The responses from the stakeholder interviews are applied to the 
security assessment results, in order to highlight key security concerns for the low-carbon 
                                                          
3 Some of the results from this chapter, and the corresponding research design, have been published as a 
working paper (Cox 2016a), and have been submitted to the journal Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 
4 Some of the results from this chapter, and the corresponding research design, have been published as a 
research article in Energy Research and Social Science (Cox 2016b). 
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transition pathways using a combination of indicator assessment results and stakeholder 
interviews.  
 
The final chapter, Chapter 8, summarises the main conclusions derived from the empirical 
findings in chapters 5, 6 and 7, and presents the contributions to knowledge which this 
thesis has made. The chapter also discusses the main limitations of the research and 
highlights some areas in which further research could be beneficial. Finally, the chapter 
offers policy recommendations (primarily for the UK) based on this research, in particular 
highlighting areas which should be the focus for policies which aim to improve electricity 
security in the UK in the context of a transition to a low-carbon electricity system.   
32 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
The literature on energy security has blossomed in recent years, in line with the rise of 
energy security up the political and public agendas in the UK and Europe. The existing 
literature therefore offers a rich basis for the study of energy security, which will be 
outlined in this chapter. This chapter finds that despite an extensive and ongoing debate on 
conceptualisations, meanings and measurements, there have thus far been relatively few 
attempts in the literature to assess empirically the security of an energy system in a low-
carbon context. Although some conceptual literature discusses some of the synergies and 
trade-offs which could emerge between various objectives in a transition to a low-carbon 
energy system, there is very little literature which seeks to assess these synergies and 
trade-offs in a systematic and empirical manner; this thesis aims to address this gap in the 
literature. There have also been few attempts to assess the security of possible future 
energy systems over a long time-period; this thesis addresses this gap by exploring energy 
security in the context of the UK’s long-term carbon targets out to 2050. This chapter also 
discusses approaches which have been used to assess energy security in the existing 
literature, and notes that conceptualisations of energy security have broadened out in 
some of the literature to include societal and environmental concerns. This chapter 
suggests that this broader approach can be used as the basis for assessing the security of an 
energy system in a low-carbon context. Furthermore, it is found that previous energy 
security literature has displayed a prevalent focus on the supply-side; this thesis aims to 
address this gap by taking a whole-systems approach which incorporates the demand-side 
more fully into a security assessment. This chapter also introduces conceptualisations of 
security and ‘risk’ from the existing literature, and highlights the subjective and contingent 
nature of experts’ claims to knowledge. 
 
It is worth emphasising that the focus of this thesis is on the security of the electricity 
system; however, for the purposes of reflecting upon the state of current research, this 
literature review focuses more broadly on energy security in general. Existing work on 
energy security can provide much of the theoretical basis for this thesis. However, the main 
empirical focus will be on the security of the electricity system, therefore this chapter also 
provides some background information on the security of electricity systems which will be 
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useful to understand some of the unique issues faced, with a focus on the challenges of 
balancing electricity supply and demand in the context of a low-carbon transition. 
 
Section 2.1 of this chapter summarises existing conceptualisations of energy security, and 
examines broader notions of the term which begin to take environmental and societal 
aspects into account. Section 2.2 then looks at theories on ‘risk’, and introduces some 
frameworks for addressing the plural and conditional nature of energy security and risks to 
energy systems. Section 2.3 then introduces discussions about low-carbon transitions in 
which this thesis is situated, and looks in more detail at some of the synergies and trade-
offs which could result from the pursuit of a secure, affordable and low-carbon energy 
system. Finally, section 2.4 provides useful background information on the security of 
electricity systems. 
 
2.1 Energy security: what does it mean? 
2.1.1 Conceptualising energy security 
The term ‘energy security’ has become commonplace in both academic and policy 
discussions. As the focus of this thesis is on energy security in the UK, it is useful to note 
that the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) produced an Energy Security 
Strategy in 2012 which provides an operational definition of energy security. The opening 
paragraphs of the Strategy state:  
There is no perfect definition of energy security. When discussing 
energy security the Government is primarily concerned about 
ensuring that consumers have access to the energy services they 
need (physical security) at prices that avoid excessive volatility 
(price security) (DECC 2012a: 5).5  
 
However, as shall become clear throughout this chapter (and as acknowledged in the quote 
above), despite much literature on the subject the term ‘energy security’ resists a 
commonly-accepted definition. As Sovacool (2011) points out, energy itself is a politicised 
and multifaceted topic, with occasionally incommensurable views rooted in diverse 
disciplines such as physics, economics, engineering, sociology and politics. The numerous 
available conceptualisations of energy security are thus also commonly grounded within 
                                                          
5 It is also important to note that the Energy Security Strategy was produced by the previous government 
administration, a fact which is emphasised in the official policy archives. As explained in section 1.2.3, the 
Strategy has not been actively replaced, yet many of the policies therein have undergone significant change. 
34 
 
specific academic disciplines (Cherp and Jewell 2011; King and Gulledge 2013; Månsson et 
al 2014a). 
 
Many of the most commonly-cited definitions of energy security focus simply on two main 
components of ‘availability’ and ‘affordability’; the same two components which feature 
prominently in the UK Energy Security Strategy definition above. They stipulate that the 
energy required for an economy or jurisdiction must be physically available, at reasonable 
prices (Bielecki 2002; IEA 1985; Yergin 2006). As noted by Hoggett et al (2014), there is a 
common tendency within the literature to focus on supply-side dynamics (see for example 
Bielecki 2002; Bohi and Tohman 1996; Bordhoff et al 2010; Lefèvre 2010; Winzer 2013), in 
some cases becoming even more specific and concentrating on the physical fossil fuel 
resources alone (Bradshaw 2010; Frondel and Schmidt 2014). This is partly owing to 
industrialised nations’ shared history of reliance on hydrocarbon resources (Axon et al 
2013), and perhaps also due to the fact that the majority of energy security literature 
originates from import-oriented regions such as the EU and US (Jonsson et al 2013; King 
and Gulledge 2013). The IEA states that ‘‘energy security always consists of both a physical 
availability component and a price component, (but) the relative importance of these 
depends on market structure’’ (IEA 2007: 32). Additionally, Chester (2010) and Cherp and 
Jewell (2014) note that there is a common bias in the energy security literature towards 
issues concerning fossil fuels, especially oil (largely due to the fact that energy security has 
its roots in the oil shocks of the 1970s), despite the fact that electricity now represents an 
equally significant (and growing) proportion of energy use. 
 
The supply-side bias sometimes manifests itself in a perception that energy security is 
equivalent to reducing dependence on fuel imports. For example, the literature often refers 
to ‘reducing control’ by others, or to limiting the ability of fuel-exporting nations to gain 
political leverage through their exports (Bordhoff et al 2010; Greene 2010; Umbach 2010). 
However, there is no clear empirical correlation between reducing imports and reducing 
energy disruption (Chaudry et al 2011; Francés et al 2013; Stern 2004; Watson 2010). It is 
noted by Jonsson et al (2013) that although import dependence is one of the most 
commonly-cited energy security issues in the existing literature, there is relatively little 
research on the potential security benefits of mutual dependency.  It is therefore argued by 
some that in a globalised economy, complete independence from imports is essentially 
neither foreseeable nor desirable (Energy and Climate Change Committee [ECCC] 2011; 
Pascual and Zambetakis 2010; Yergin 2006). 
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Others point out that security is not just about reducing risks to energy systems, it also 
entails improving their resilience to threats; the combination of these two factors is often 
termed ‘vulnerability’ (Cherp and Jewell 2014). Many therefore point out that diversity of 
supply can act as a hedge against supply and price disruptions (Cooke et al 2013; Hoggett 
2013; Urciuoli et al 2014; Watson 2007; Watson and Scott 2008). It is even argued by some 
that the uncertainties surrounding energy security are so pervasive that the only sure way 
of maximising energy security is to maximise diversity (Bradshaw 2010; Grubb et al 2006; 
Stirling 1994; 1998). However, as shall be evident throughout this thesis, diversification is 
but a single facet of a far more complex subject; an amount of diversity may well be a 
necessary feature of a secure energy system, but it is not sufficient to ensure energy 
security by itself (Cherp and Jewell 2014; Christoff 2011; Gracceva and Zeniewski 2014; 
Ranjan and Hughes 2014; Stirling 2010).  
 
2.1.2 A broader view 
In some of the energy security literature, there has been a broadening of the energy 
security discussion. Increasing awareness and scientific consensus around climate change 
has led to an emerging new dimension of ‘sustainability’ and ‘environmental stewardship’. 
It is widely accepted that there is a fundamental imperative to substantially reduce energy 
sector emissions in order to avoid the worst effects of anthropogenic climate change, and 
emissions-reduction legislation is in place in the UK and EU (European Union 2009; HM 
Government 2008). According to Symons (2011), it appears that energy studies must begin 
to take account of environmental externalities. In 2007, the Asia Pacific Energy Research 
Centre argued that energy security consists of four dimensions – availability, affordability, 
accessibility, and acceptability, with acceptability referring to environmental and societal 
concerns (APERC 2007).6 Kruyt et al (2009) then pointed out that the vast majority of 
metrics and indicators for assessing energy security still relate to availability and 
affordability, and argued that a broadening of the scope of study into issues relating to 
‘accessibility’ and ‘acceptability’ would lead to a more comprehensive view of energy 
security. In 2011, the IEA extended its definition of energy security to “the uninterrupted 
physical availability [of energy] at a price which is affordable, while respecting environment 
concerns” (IEA 2011) (although it is interesting to note that the IEA later removed the 
                                                          
6 The APERC definition was actually borrowed from the public health literature; see Cherp and Jewell (2014) for 
a detailed critique of this categorisation. 
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environmental component, and it does not appear in their current definition on their 
website [IEA 2017]). Elkind (2010: 128-9) wrote that traditional definitions now need to be 
broadened to include environmental sustainability, for three reasons: 
- “Energy infrastructure is long-lived, [meaning that] current decision-making is 
creating the environmental reality that will shape people’s lives for decades to 
come… 
- “Promoting energy security without including sustainability will promote the use of 
technologies that will exacerbate climate change… 
- “Climate change will affect systems profoundly.” 
 
This broadened perspective has been used widely in the more recent energy security 
literature (see Ang et al 2015), and as the basis for a number of empirical assessments (e.g. 
Francés et al 2013; Gnansounou 2011; Hughes 2012; Mitchell et al 2013; Sovacool and 
Brown 2010). Moreover, it is supported by qualitative studies into global perspectives on 
energy security, which find that among both elites and the general public there is 
widespread concern for both environmental and societal sustainability, and that people 
generally perceive sustainability to be one of the key dimensions of a secure energy system 
(Sovacool et al 2012; Sovacool and Mukherjee 2011). 
 
This broader perspective has been challenged by some who argue that the energy security 
agenda should not be broadened to include environmental sustainability; for instance, Luft 
et al (2011) suggest that this would “open the floodgates” to far too many second-order 
effects. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the benefits and drawbacks of 
including aspects such as GHG emissions into conceptualisations of energy security: many 
studies view environmental impacts as a separate issue, perhaps to be considered 
alongside energy security but not as part of the concept itself (e.g. Cherp and Jewell 2011; 
Froggatt and Levi 2009; Jewell et al 2014; Pfenninger and Keirstead 2015). However, as 
pointed out in Elkind’s third point above, climate change may itself become a fundamental 
facet of energy security as the result of climate change impacts such as floods, heatwaves 
and storms. For example, in late 2015 many parts of the UK experienced significant 
disruption to electricity supplies due to flooding caused by several consecutive storms. One 
storm alone caused loss of power to several tens of thousands of homes after a substation 
was flooded; importantly, it was reported that researchers had calculated that this storm 
severity was made approximately 40% more likely by climate change (Pidd et al 2016; Vidal 
2015). Previously, storms in December 2013 caused around 750,000 homes across the UK 
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to lose power; around 500 households were without supply for more than five days 
(Macalister 2014; RAEng 2014). Warmer temperatures in summer could also be a risk in the 
future for the UK’s generation and network infrastructure: the severe blackout in North-
east America in 2003 was caused by transmission lines sagging in the heat, and some power 
stations in Europe have experienced problems caused by rising temperatures of cooling 
water (RAEng 2014; McDermott and Nilsen 2012). Additionally to the physical impacts of 
climate change, the practicalities of complying with environmental legislation mean that 
any aspect of energy should now take environmental impacts into account. The UK is one of 
the only industrialised nations with a unilateral legally-binding emissions target (HM 
Government 2008), and is also subject to EU climate legislation (European Union 2009). For 
policy-makers who are legally committed to carbon reduction targets, it may be unwise to 
examine ‘security’, ‘affordability’ and ‘environmental sustainability’ separately, because the 
future energy system must meet all these aims. As pointed out by Logan and Venezia (2007: 
1):  
“We would beneﬁt by reconsidering what energy security means 
to us today. The traditional deﬁnition of sufﬁciency, reliability, 
and affordability now seems incomplete. Environmental 
sustainability, geopolitical factors, and social acceptability are 
clearly elements that need to be added to our energy security 
calculus.” 
 
2.1.3 A slippery concept… 
It is becoming clear that energy security is complex and resists a commonly accepted 
definition. In an analysis of existing definitions and conceptualisations of energy security, 
Chester finds that: 
“An examination of explicit and inferred definitions finds that the 
concept of energy security is inherently slippery because it is 
polysemic in nature, capable of holding multiple dimensions and 
taking on different specificities depending on the country (or 
continent), timeframe or energy source to which it is applied.” 
(2010: 887) 
 
The ‘slipperiness’ of the concept means that it is open to exploitation by interest groups 
(Löschel et al 2010a). Energy security is an arena in which different voices seek to 
‘securitize’ their particular understanding of key risks and threats (Buzan et al 1998). As 
pointed out by Joskow: 
“There is one thing that has not changed since the early 1970s. 
If you cannot think of a reasoned rationale for some policy based 
on standard economic reasoning then argue that the policy is 
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necessary to promote ‘energy security’” (Joskow 2009, cited in 
Winzer 2011: 2).  
 
Compounding this is the fact that perspectives on energy security are highly context-
dependent (Ang et al 2015; Bielecki 2002; Sovacool et al 2012). Cross-national surveys and 
studies have found that demographic and national characteristics have a very significant 
role to play, and that energy security concerns are strongly correlated with national energy 
policies and state imperatives (Knox-Hayes et al 2013; Pasqualetti 2011; Sovacool et al 
2012; Toke and Vezirgiannidou 2013). Moreover, it has been shown that energy security 
concerns are dynamic and evolve as circumstances change over time, reflecting dominant 
discourses and political economic trends (Ang et al 2015; Dannreuther 2015; MacKerron 
2009); as noted by Dannreuther, “The broader context of the global political economy has a 
determining effect on which particular securitization of energy assumes dominance” (2015: 
467).  
 
Clearly, energy security means different things to different people. As well as mapping onto 
national concerns, perspectives may be shaped by the sector or organisation for which 
people work. The idea that people’s views are usually correlated to the sector in which they 
work is often referred to as “where you stand depends on where you sit”, or Miles’ Law, 
after the Truman-era bureaucrat who coined the phrase (Encyclopædia Brittanica 2015). 
Influential work by Allison (1969) suggested that,  
“Where you stand depends on where you sit… 
Horizontally, the diverse demands upon each player 
shape his priorities, perceptions, and issues. For large 
classes of issues, the stance of a particular player can be 
predicted with high reliability from information 
concerning his seat” (1969: 711).  
 
Several empirical studies corroborate Miles’ law, with reference to a diverse range of fields 
(see Berman et al 1985; Vest et al 2010; Wilcher 1986). However, Bryan (2003) suggests 
that it is also necessary to conceptualise where people ‘sit’ as not just a person’s 
professional position but also the wider context, for instance a person’s emotional ties and 
previous experience (an idea which is also alluded to by Allison himself [Allison 1969]). Von 
Borgstede and Lundqvist (2006) surveyed a large number of public and private officers 
regarding their views on different aspects of the climate issue, and found that acceptance 
of climate policy measures depends on a) where you sit (i.e. organisational affiliation) and 
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b) what you do (i.e. professional role), but that “Professional roles have an influence over 
and above organizational affiliation” (2006: 279, emphasis added).  
 
For example, the term ‘energy security’ would mean different things to, say, an economist 
and an engineer (Bielecki 2002). Cherp and Jewell (2011) identify three perspectives 
amongst the academic and policy literatures, which have emerged from three distinct 
academic disciplines (illustrated in figure 2.1): the ‘sovereignty’ perspective (rooted in 
security studies and international relations), the ‘robustness’ perspective (rooted in 
engineering and physical sciences), and the ‘resilience’ perspective (rooted in economics 
and complexity science). This highlights the fact that perspectives on energy security still 
operate to some extent in disciplinary silos, which are operationalised and reinforced by 
the academic disciplines within which they reside (Jonsson et al 2013). This means that 
assessments of energy security will generally be subject to the underlying or stated 
preferences of the author (Cherp and Jewell 2011; Mitchell and Watson 2013b; Valentine 
2011). Any choice of indicators or framework will be subject to numerous interpretations 
and assumptions; therefore the best practice for the researcher is to attempt to be explicit 
about these assumptions (Axon et al 2013; Löschel et al 2010b; Mitchell and Watson 2013b; 
Valentine 2011). Following from this, Axon et al developed their idea of ‘indicators derived 
for a set purpose’: 
“It is evident that different stakeholders, having different 
objectives, will find different meanings of energy security are 
appropriate for their own particular needs, and thus best served 
by their own particular set of indicators. This idea of ‘indicators 
derived for a set purpose’ is important since it shows us that 
there is no such thing as a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer.” (2013: 209)  
 
Therefore it is important to bear in mind that any choice of framework or indicators will be 
specifically designed for the purposes set out in this thesis, and also that there is not 
necessarily any such thing as a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer. As pointed out by Cherp and Jewell 
(2014), vital systems and their vulnerabilities are not just objective phenomena; they are 
also political constructs which are defined and prioritised by different social actors. It is the 
contention of this thesis that a cogent approach to assessing energy security will take into 
account not only the assumptions and preferences of the author, but also the opinions of a 
range of other actors, in an attempt to discover the impact of these on the way that the 
energy security of a system is assessed and improved. 
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This review of the extensive literature on conceptualising and defining energy security 
illustrates that some of the literature has broadened out to include environmental and 
societal issues in concepts of energy security, although there is still debate on this matter. 
Moreover, this review has shown that there has hitherto been a focus on supply-side 
dynamics, therefore it appears that the demand-side should now be incorporated more 
fully (Hoggett et al 2011; 2013; Jansen and Seebregts 2010; Pye et al 2014). For this reason, 
the commonly-used phrase ‘security of supply’ will be rejected in favour of ‘energy security’ 
or ‘electricity security’.  
 
 
Figure 2-1: Three perspectives on energy security (Cherp and Jewell 2011: 2007) 
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2.2 ‘Security’ and ‘risk’ 
2.2.1 Conceptualising risk 
Energy security cannot be easily or directly measured; therefore most literature focuses on 
risks to the energy system, treating energy security and energy risk as two sides of the same 
coin (Francés et al 2013). In this sense, the issue of energy security is situated within a rich 
theoretical literature on risk. Dominant concepts of risk as we know it probably emerged 
from mathematical theories on probability in the 17th and 18th Century, which attempted to 
forecast the future on the basis of past observations; in fact, the modern risk analysis 
techniques employed by insurance companies and market analysts today have barely 
changed from these early origins (Dannreuther and Lekhi 2000). It was only in the 1920s 
that discussions on risk turned towards its social qualities, when Frank Knight (1921) sought 
to explain how individual entrepreneurs and managers were able to gain a profit from the 
capricious social elements of their markets and competitors. Yet Frank Knight still saw risk 
as a purely technical, rationalist matter, based within neoclassical economic theories of 
market equilibrium. Later theorists began to see risk as socially constructed and relating to 
perceptions which are informed by society and culture (Douglas and Wildavsky 1981; Royal 
Society Study Group 1992). According to these theories, decisions to minimise risk are 
usually made not by rational utility-maximisation, but rather in response to rules and norms 
that constrain and inform appropriate actions (Granovetter 1985; March and Olsen 1984; 
Meyer and Rowan 1991).  
 
Following from this, ‘risk’ is defined as “the possibility that human actions or events lead to 
consequences that harm aspects of things that human beings value” (Hohenemser et al 
1983; Kates and Kasperson 1983). Risk is therefore both an analytic and a normative 
concept; perceptions of risk will depend on the preferences and values of those seeking to 
measure it, and the process of evaluation will depend on the type of risk (Klinke and Renn 
2002). In this way, clear parallels begin to become apparent between the literature on risk 
and on energy security. Risk perception is subject to politics, and decision-makers tend to 
have subjective viewpoints (Kristensen et al 2006); as noted by Renn and Klinke, “As risk 
analysis and risk management get increasingly caught up in political debates, a new way of 
looking at and defining the risks of modern technologies becomes necessary” (2004: S41).  
Many dimensions of risk are “irreducibly qualitative in nature”, because different groups of 
actors place different levels of importance on different aspects of risk (Stirling 1999; 
2008b). Stirling sums this up nicely by saying: 
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“Different disciplinary perspectives, institutional interests, 
cultural values and economic priorities will typically influence 
the interpretation of evidence and analysis in different ways… 
Contrasting social commitments will thus yield divergent 
prescriptive bases for governance interventions.” (2006: 230).  
 
As pointed out by Stirling (1999), it is generally accepted in the field of risk management 
that Risk=Probability*Impact Magnitude; however, most issues (including energy security) 
operate on multiple dimensions, making the delineation of ‘probability’ and ‘impact’ highly 
problematic. Bruijne et al (2010), Renn and Klinke (2004) and Urciuoli et al (2014) all show 
that conventional risk management approaches fail to deal with what Taleb (2007) 
nicknamed ‘Black Swans’; that is, events with a low probability but high impact, such as the 
nuclear disaster at Fukushima power station in March 2011. As such, it can be seen that a 
broader and more critical conceptualisation of risk and how to manage it is required in 
order to encapsulate the multifarious issues in assessing the security of an energy system. 
The preceding sections have demonstrated that despite the clear challenges in approaching 
a concept as slippery as energy security, decisions still must be made about the future 
direction of energy systems, especially in the context of a challenging transition to 
decarbonisation. Policy decisions are being justified on the basis of energy security 
concerns, and therefore it is crucial to work towards a way of assessing what this means in 
a manner which attempts to take into account multiple subjectivities.  A balance must be 
struck between assuming that different aspects of security can be easily quantified and 
weighted using composite indices (which can be inaccurate and misleading), and on the 
other hand, assuming that security cannot be measured and therefore either adopting 
overly-simplistic approaches (such as the reduction of energy security into single metrics 
such as diversity or import dependence), or simply avoiding measuring it altogether (which 
leaves the concept open to capture by vested interests). The following sections therefore 
introduce a theoretical framework on risk and uncertainty from the existing literature, 
which can be used as a lens through which to approach the assessment. 
 
2.2.2 A risk framework 
Stirling (1999; 2008b) provides a useful framework for approaching these issues. He points 
out that conventional risk management relies on sufficient knowledge about the probability 
and likely impact (or in Stirling’s terminology, ‘possibilities’) of an event; however, this 
knowledge is sometimes severely limited. A number of alternative situations may therefore 
arise, in which knowledge about probability, impacts, or both is problematic. These 
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situations are defined by Stirling as areas of ‘uncertainty’, ‘ambiguity’ and ‘ignorance’, and 
are illustrated by the Uncertainty Matrix in figure 2.2. This framework provides a means of 
looking at security which takes multiple dimensions and uncertainties into account. 
Moreover, it explicitly addresses the fact that, as pointed out in section 2.1.1, much energy 
security literature does not focus only on ‘risks’, but also reducing ‘vulnerability’, for 
instance by improving the resilience of the system (Cherp and Jewell  2014).  
 
As shown in the illustration, various approaches to analysing risks and vulnerabilities can be 
seen as falling within different parts of this framework. Conventional risk management 
approaches usually fall within the top left-hand corner of the quadrant; these approaches 
tend to encourage single, deterministic policy responses, which is clearly why they are most 
popular with policy-makers (Stirling 2010). The other approaches discourage single 
‘definitive’ results and interpretations. Therefore, Renn and Klinke (2004) advise that 
analysis of risk should be broadened out so that risk and vulnerability can be assessed 
under a diverse range of criteria. As an example of this, Gracceva and Zeniewski (2014) note 
that diversity provides a good means of minimising risk under conditions of ‘ignorance’, but 
that many other dimensions of energy security extend beyond diversity, and that therefore 
it is important to address multiple aspects of the Uncertainty Matrix in an assessment of 
energy security.  
 
This framework can provide a useful starting point for the development of a set of 
indicators which can take multiple dimensions of risk into account. However, there is an 
important linguistic issue which arises and is worth clarifying to avoid confusion. The top 
left-hand corner of the uncertainty matrix is labelled ‘risk’, in order to reflect the fact that 
the approaches within this quadrant are based on conventional risk management 
techniques. However, the term ‘risk’ is also often used in its broader sense, to denote all 
four quadrants of the uncertainty matrix, including vulnerability, and viewing ‘energy 
security’ and ‘energy risk’ as two sides of the same coin. Throughout the remainder of this 
thesis, the term ‘risk’ will be used in this broader sense unless otherwise stated. 
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Figure 2-2: The Uncertainty Matrix (Stirling 2010) 
 
2.2.3 Plural conditionality 
Following from this, Stirling (2008b) argues that many empirical approaches take an 
approach in which multiple complexities are reduced to simple parameters of magnitude 
and probability, and then aggregated across highly diverse dimensions. However, it should 
be clear from the literature outlined in this section that measuring risk and vulnerability is 
highly contingent. As pointed out by Scrase and Ockwell (2010) and Millstone (2015), 
understandings of problems and solutions are always based upon experiences, 
interpretations and value judgements, which in turn are shaped by social interactions; this 
holds true for experts, scientists and policy-makers. Thus knowledge is inherently plural and 
conditional (Stirling 2010). Indeed, as shown in Nobel prize-winning work by Arrow (1963; 
1974), it is impossible to definitively aggregate preferences across a diverse and plural 
society. This is especially true for a slippery concept such as energy security, which may 
engender a number of competing knowledge claims. Therefore the contention of this thesis 
is that the measurement of energy security and energy risk in a system should take an 
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approach which recognises that no empirical analysis, no matter how rigorous, is capable of 
discovering the ‘one scientific truth’, and that the ‘right’ answers and solutions depend on 
the framings of the questions and problems (Stirling 2006).  
 
Instead of continually attempting to reach a consensus of divergent views, it would be far 
better to accept the inevitability of at least some level of plurality (Stirling 2010). This has 
been developed by Stirling (2006; 2013) into the approach which he terms ‘plural 
conditionality’, as illustrated in figure 2.3. The two quadrants on the bottom row show the 
dichotomy between the naïve positivist ideal of obtaining the ‘one scientific truth’, and the 
caricature constructivist rejection of the whole notion of scientific truth. These approaches 
can both be rejected at once, because although security and risk are clearly socially 
constructed and contingent, it cannot be suggested that all claims to knowledge are equally 
valid – some claims are just simply wrong! The usual response to this falls into the top left-
hand corner, which suggests that one knowledge claim will be ‘approximately right’. 
However, this generally sees science as unitary, without the existence of competition over 
the ‘right’ answer. Therefore to address these shortcomings, the approach in the top right-
hand corner suggests that several competing claims may be equally valid. Elements of this 
approach can be found in the energy security work by Cherp and Jewell, who state that 
“Both vital energy systems and their vulnerabilities are not only objective phenomena, but 
also political constructs defined and prioritized by various social actors” (2014: 419). 
Drawing on this context, therefore, suggests that an assessment of energy security should 
acknowledge the multiple issues surrounding the quantification of risk. These assumptions 
can be used as the basis for a more reflexive approach, which takes into account the 
realities of multiple competing and disparate preferences and assumptions. 
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Figure 2-3: Plural conditionality (Stirling 2013) 
 
This thesis aims to assess the future security of an electricity system in a low-carbon 
context, in order to identify the main risks, trade-offs and synergies which may emerge 
between different objectives in a transition to a low-carbon electricity system. As such, the 
following section explains why this thesis takes the low-carbon agenda into account when 
analysing energy security, and introduces the low-carbon context focusing especially on the 
synergies and trade-offs which could occur between various objectives. There is a relative 
lack of literature which seeks to assess these synergies and trade-offs in a systematic and 
empirical manner, especially in the context of a national electricity system; this thesis aims 
to address this gap in the literature. 
 
 
2.3 Energy security in a long-term carbon reduction context 
2.3.1 Carbon reduction and the energy ‘trilemma’ 
As part of a response to the threat of climate change, the UK has set a legally-binding target 
of 80% GHG reduction on 1990 levels by 2050 (HM Government 2008), and the EU has 
made a commitment to reduce overall GHG emissions from its 28 member states by 20% on 
1990 levels by 2020 (European Union 2009). Energy is a primary source of GHGs; in the UK 
in 2011, around 40% of CO2 emissions were from the energy supply sector (Froggatt et al 
2013). Therefore in order to mitigate climate change, the way energy is produced and 
consumed will need to change entirely within a generation, and eventually the energy 
47 
 
sector in the developed world will need to produce close to zero carbon emissions (Froggatt 
and Levi 2009). Therefore understandings of energy security in the future will likely need to 
exist within this emerging new paradigm. This has led to the development of the energy 
‘trilemma’, illustrated in figure 2.4, which suggests that energy systems need to balance the 
three elements of security, cost, and carbon reduction (Boston 2013; E.ON 2008). The 
trilemma illustrates the importance of looking at the climate-security nexus, rather than 
approaching the two areas in isolation, and of exploring possible synergies and trade-offs 
between the three objectives (Criqui and Mima 2012; Pfenninger and Keirstead 2015; 
Sovacool and Saunders 2014). As argued by Ang et al,  
“In policy discussions, energy security should not be considered 
in isolation. Instead, it should be considered in the larger context 
of the energy trilemma and sustainability to avoid formulating 
short-sighted policies which address energy security in the short-
run but contribute to longer-term problems.” (2015: 1090) 
 
It was suggested in section 2.1 that when considering energy security in the long-term, the 
physical and legislative impacts of climate change on future energy systems necessitates a 
broad view of energy security which incorporates the carbon reduction objective as well as 
societal objectives, demand-side objectives and non-carbon environmental objectives. By 
taking this broad view, numerous synergies and trade-offs may emerge between different 
objectives of energy security; furthermore, it allows the thesis to explore the implications of 
such a broad view of energy security, both on the results of a security assessment and on 
the ways in which different stakeholders view and conceptualise energy security. The 
following paragraphs will explore some ideas of where these synergies and trade-offs could 
lie; as becomes evident, they are potentially very numerous. This reinforces the need for a 
broader empirical approach which moves beyond simple conceptualisations of energy 
security as relating simply to physical supply; there is a rationale to incorporate 
environmental sustainability, society and the demand-side in an assessment of energy 
security, in order to illustrate and analyse the trade-offs which may emerge between 
different objectives.  
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Figure 2-4: The Energy Trilemma (Boston 2013) 
 
2.3.2 Some potential synergies 
If security objectives are pursued without mitigating climate change, the negative effects of 
climate change may actually cause security to diminish in the longer-term (Mayer and 
Schouten 2011). As shown by Falk, “Energy security bought at the cost of an increasingly 
chaotic climate may buy neither economic nor social stability” (2011: 248). Therefore it is 
already apparent that there are potential synergies between objectives; policy-making in 
Europe and the UK has already begun to explore the potentially large advantages to be 
gained from exploiting such synergies (Bollen et al 2010; Vogler 2013). Societies in the 
developed world are highly dependent on fossil fuels; this may create an assortment of 
risks and vulnerabilities, such as dependence on volatile regions, resource depletion, the 
safety risks of unconventional fossil extraction such as shale gas or deepwater oil, health 
and safety hazards associated with mining, and price volatility (Adelle et al 2009; Criqui and 
Mima 2012; Kuzemko and Bradshaw 2013; Logan and Venezia 2007).  
 
It is suggested that certain measures could offer ‘win-win’ solutions. For instance, pursuing 
energy efficiency and demand reduction measures would reduce the amount of energy we 
use, thereby for example reducing GHG emissions whilst reducing the risk of physical 
depletion of resources, and potentially even reducing energy costs for consumers (Adelle et 
al 2009; Berk et al 2006; Froggatt and Levi 2009; Greenpeace 2010a; Hoggett et al 2013; 
Pye et al 2014). On the supply side, it is argued that a greater share of renewable energy 
sources (RES) in the energy mix would improve energy security by reducing reliance on 
fossil fuels and increasing the geographical dispersion of energy supply resources; 
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moreover, a portfolio using several different types of RES would likely improve diversity 
(Adelle et al 2009; Berk et al 2006; Brown and Huntingdon 2008; Diesendorf 2011; Froggatt 
and Levi 2009; Johansson et al 2014; Månsson 2015; Wicks 2009). Furthermore, non-fuel-
related measures could potentially provide win-win solutions; for instance, it is argued that 
improving international agreements and pursuing cross-border energy flows could greatly 
improve system resilience and could also lower costs (Francés et al 2013; Wicks 2009). 
Greenpeace (2010a) and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Ladislaw et al 
2009) have both produced roadmaps which give examples of how a low-carbon, low-cost 
and secure energy system can be achieved: following the logic of win-win solutions, both 
roadmaps advocate a diverse portfolio with a strong emphasis on renewable sources and 
on reducing overall energy demand. 
 
2.3.3 Some potential trade-offs 
Alongside these potential synergies, it is important to accept that there may be unavoidable 
trade-offs; examining and acknowledging trade-offs can be far more useful for improving 
energy systems than trying to avoid them altogether (Sovacool and Saunders 2014). In 
practice, attaining the synergies outlined above is extremely challenging. For example, it 
has been suggested that the most practical solution for physical security of UK energy 
supplies would be to mine and burn more domestic coal, as this would reduce reliance on 
imports and would allow the continued use of existing infrastructure (Bollen et al 2010; 
Chaudry et al 2011; Froggatt and Levi 2009). However, coal has extremely high carbon 
emissions, emitting upwards of 850gCO2/kWh, compared to around 400gCO2/kWh for a 
modern Combined-Cycle Gas Turbine [CCGT] gas plant (ECCC 2010). On the other hand, 
further switching from coal to gas in the UK could potentially reduce emissions, but would 
also potentially reduce diversity of fuel sources and increase the supply risks associated 
with a lack of investment in gas storage in the UK (ECCC 2011; Froggatt and Levi 2009; 
Jewell 2012). The use of CCS technology would allow for the continued use of coal without 
the associated high emissions; however, CCS is very costly, and it reduces the efficiency of 
coal power plants which increases coal supply requirements (Diesendorf 2011; Froggatt 
2013; Froggatt and Levi 2009; Johansson et al 2014). CCS is also being developed for gas-
fired generation; however, the issue is linked to longer-term risks of resource depletion, 
and some argue that CCS could potentially lock the energy system into using non-
renewable resources such as gas which may become depleted (Greenpeace 2008; Vergragt 
et al 2011). The use of unconventional fossil fuels could mitigate the issue of resource 
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depletion; however, unconventional fuels such as shale gas and oil sands bring their own 
risks, such as increased emissions and various risks to human and environmental safety (see 
for example Shale Gas Information Platform 2015; Wykes and Heywood 2010). 
 
As shown in the previous section, RES can in theory generate synergies between objectives, 
yet they also come with their own sets of issues and trade-offs. They are generally not yet 
cost competitive with thermal generation (if costs of externalities are not factored in), and 
they still require large amounts of investment both in generation and the networks; these 
costs will eventually be passed onto consumers, possibly leading to higher energy bills (Berk 
et al 2006; ECCC 2011; Froggatt and Levi 2009; Pudjianto et al 2013). Many of the most 
advanced RES technologies are intermittent, meaning that the electricity may not be 
available when it is required; this could lead to increased costs, lower levels of spare 
capacity and increased reliance on backup generation (ECCC 2011; Jewell 2012; Johansson 
et al 2014; Ofgem 2013a; RAEng 2013). The complications of integrating intermittent RES 
into the existing electricity grid are manifold, and will be discussed at greater length in 
section 2.4. Moreover, policies designed to stimulate investment in RES, such as a carbon 
price, would have the effect of increasing the costs of conventional generation in the short-
term and may therefore push overall energy prices up (King and Gulledge 2013). 
 
Other low-carbon energy sources could also potentially result in trade-offs. For instance, 
nuclear power is low-carbon and uranium stocks are relatively plentiful (World Nuclear 
Association 2014). However, nuclear power is also associated with risks: for example, 
despite government support in the UK, new nuclear power has been subject to delays and 
uncertainty caused by the challenges of securing investment for projects with high capital 
cost in a liberalised energy market (Blyth et al 2014; Ellenbeck et al 2015; Mitchell et al 
2014). Another option for fuel switching is biomass, a term which applies to a diverse range 
of fuel sources including wood pellets, agricultural residues, energy crops, and biogenic 
waste from landfill, sewage and farming. Biomass is both renewable and non-intermittent, 
and could therefore provide a useful backup to intermittent RES (Deloitte 2013). However, 
the climate impacts are highly disputed, especially because (depending on the feedstock 
used) widespread use of biomass could lead to large-scale land-use change (Frogatt and 
Levi 2009; IEA 2007; Thornley 2012a; 2012b). Biomass is also subject to a number of other 
issues, such as competition for agricultural land, concerns over deforestation, and the 
effects of large-scale export-based monocropping on ecosystems and local communities 
(Bai et al 2012; Coath and Pape n.d.; Thornley 2012a).  
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The discussion thus far has focused on various fuels and specific practical trade-offs 
between objectives. Yet there is also a wider, and potentially more intractable, problem. 
Climate change is a global issue, and therefore suffers from a severe collective action 
problem. States which reduce emissions unilaterally could potentially put themselves at risk 
of increasing their energy costs and thereby reducing their competitiveness on 
international markets (Berk et al 2006; Symons 2011). States will tend to prioritise national 
physical security and lower fuel prices because the effects are more directly felt within their 
jurisdiction, meaning that physical security and affordability imperatives will tend to trump 
environmental issues (Dryzek et al 2003; Huntingdon and Brown 2004; Toke and 
Vezirgiannidou 2013). This tendency is compounded by the issue of timescale: most of the 
risks and impacts of climate change occur on yearly or decadal timescales, and are 
therefore much more long-term than the technical issues faced when seeking to maximise 
the reliability of an electricity system, many of which occur every second (Boston 2013; King 
and Gulledge 2013). States may actually have an imperative to prioritise shorter-term 
objectives. There is therefore a real need to address empirically the potential trade-offs and 
synergies in moving to a low-carbon electricity system. The work by Cherp et al (2013) and 
Jewell et al (2013; 2014) goes some way towards addressing this gap, by assessing the 
security of a large number of low-carbon transition pathways for the global energy system, 
while a more recent paper by Pfenninger and Keirstead (2015) assesses the security 
implications of three idealised scenarios involving renewables, nuclear and fossil fuels for 
the UK electricity system. However, these papers display an empirical reliance on diversity 
and import dependence as the core indicators of energy security, and as shown in section 
2.1.1, these indicators are not sufficient. The recent work by Jonsson et al (2015) goes a 
step further, pointing out that there is a real need for a broader framing of energy security 
which includes qualitative aspects such as social and political dynamics; their paper 
introduces a more comprehensive suite of energy security aspects and applies them in a 
low-carbon context. However, their work does not attempt to provide a means for 
assessing such broader aspects of energy security in a systematic and empirical manner. 
Thus the requirement for a broader empirical approach is reinforced; environmental 
sustainability, cost and the demand-side should be incorporated in order to get a grasp on 
the potential synergies and trade-offs between objectives. As noted previously, any 
measurement of energy security will be ‘derived for a set purpose’; therefore there is an 
opportunity to develop a specific set of indicators for systematically and empirically 
assessing the long-term security of an electricity system in a low-carbon context. There 
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have been few attempts in the literature to assess the security of possible future energy 
systems over a long time-period.  
 
As explained in the previous chapter, this thesis focuses on the security of the UK electricity 
system. The following section of this chapter provides some important background 
information on this topic, particularly relating to the challenges of balancing electricity 
supply and demand whilst attempting to reduce GHG emissions. Electricity is an interesting 
case because it encompasses a wide range of timescales over which energy security can 
operate: system balancing occurs over very short timescales, whereas stresses such as 
climate change occur over much longer timescales. By assessing the security of electricity 
systems over the long time-period of the UK’s carbon-reduction targets (out to 2050), this 
thesis explicitly addresses this range of timescales, as will be discussed in more detail in 
section 3.2. 
 
2.4 Electricity security: background information 
2.4.1 Balancing electricity supply and demand 
Electricity is difficult and costly to store, meaning that electricity markets are unique in that 
they require constant and instantaneous balancing of supply and demand (Creti and Fabra 
2007; IEA 2004; Roscoe and Ault 2010). This means that electricity security needs to be 
thought of in terms of different timescales: supply and demand must be balanced over very 
short timescales to ensure that the electricity is immediately available when and where it is 
required, as well as securing sufficient overall supplies when averaged over the longer-term 
(Bolton and Hawkes 2013; Boston 2013; REKK 2009). It must be remembered that most UK 
citizens are accustomed to constant access to electricity; supply shortfalls in the UK may 
result in welfare losses and potentially severe consequences for the perceived political 
legitimacy of the government (de Nooij et al 2007; RAEng 2014). Therefore the system is 
carefully balanced in order to ensure that supply meets demand at all times. Consumers’ 
patterns of working and living mean that the electricity system frequently experiences large 
pickups in demand, for instance on winter evenings when most people come home from 
work and switch the lights and kettle on.7 Thus electricity security involves ensuring both 
‘system adequacy’, i.e. the ability of the system to meet normal variations in demand such 
                                                          
7 The largest of these was in 1990, when the end of the World Cup semi-final penalty shootout between England 
and Germany imposed a 2800MW pickup, equivalent to around a million kettles being switched on! (BBC 2006). 
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as those caused by seasons and working patterns, and ‘system resilience’, i.e. the ability of 
the system to deal with disturbances such as unexpected spikes in demand or sudden 
losses of supply (IEA 2004; Nedic et al 2005). As well as this, the system must also be able to 
attract sufficient longer-term investment to ensure that there will be adequate generation, 
transmission and distribution capacity in the future (Bolton and Hawkes 2013; Creti and 
Fabra 2007).  
 
2.4.2 Balancing a low-carbon electricity system 
Reducing GHG emissions adds additional challenges to the difficulties of balancing the 
system (Barnacle et al 2013).  Some of the most advanced sources of low-carbon electricity 
such as wind and solar are intermittent, meaning that they cannot be relied upon to be 
available when they are required. This intermittency means that RES cannot act as a direct 
watt-for-watt replacement for fossil fuels; in a system with high levels of renewable 
generation, more resources may need to be available to meet balancing challenges, as 
explained in more detail in section 2.4.3 (Davis et al 2013; Nedic et al 2005; Ofgem 2012; 
Paulus et al 2011). Conventional plants may be required to operate at reduced output as 
they will mainly be used for backup and peaking power (Nedic et al 2005; Paulus et al 2011; 
Roscoe and Ault 2010). This is illustrated through the use of capacity factors – a capacity 
factor is the actual power produced over a period of time, expressed as a percentage of the 
power that could have been produced if the station or array was running at full power for 
that period of time (for both conventional and intermittent generation). Increased 
penetration of intermittent sources reduces the capacity factor of the overall electricity 
mix; as the capacity factor decreases, the average cost of conventional plant increases, and 
the efficiency of the plant decreases (Paulus et al 2011). These supply-side issues, combined 
with the challenge of increased overall demand (and possibly higher peak demand) for 
electricity due to electrification of heat and transport, will represent a significant challenge 
for balancing the system and integrating high levels of low-carbon capacity. 
 
These difficulties have the effect of reducing the amount of spare capacity which is 
projected to exist on the system in the future. In 2012, Ofgem suggested that increasing 
demand and intermittent supply, alongside the closure of some old power stations, could 
lead to a significant reduction in the overall capacity margin (de-rated to account for 
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intermittency)8 of the UK electricity system, from around 14% now to around 4% in 2016 in 
their base case (Ofgem 2012). The Government’s 2012 Energy Security Strategy (DECC 
2012a) also noted a tightening of de-rated capacity margins, to around 3% in 2030 in their 
base case,9 although the report asserts that a tightening of margins is to be expected in a 
market such as the UK which has in the past had an oversupply of electricity. A recent 
report by National Grid warns that UK winter capacity margins will be tighter in 2015/16 
than they were in previous years, meaning that additional contingency measures (such as 
those suggested in section 2.4.3) may be required (National Grid 2015a). However, despite 
several consecutive years of capacity margin warnings and often some rather hyperbolic 
media reports of a looming ‘capacity crunch’, there have not yet been any instances of 
supply shortfalls for consumers. 
 
As well as reducing the spare capacity available, increasing demand and intermittent power 
generation can put a strain on the transmission and distribution networks. Despite all the 
discussion around primary energy supply, it is pointed out by Boston (2013) and Jamasb 
and Pollitt (2008) that the vast majority of actual blackouts are caused by failures on the 
transmission and distribution networks.  There are currently bottleneck areas on the UK 
transmission grid (for instance, between England and Scotland), and dealing with this in the 
context of increased load on the system could require a reorganisation of how power is 
produced and distributed (Hammond and Pearson 2013; Martínez-Anido et al 2013). 
Increased flexible and distributed generation could assist in easing these bottlenecks and 
reduce the need for network reinforcement (Jamasb and Pollitt 2008; Pudjianto et al 2013; 
Shaw et al 2009; see section 2.4.3); however, this would require a large-scale 
reconfiguration of the grid (Hammond and Pearson 2013). Overall, it is important to 
recognise that the key negative effect of network reinforcements will be felt via the cost of 
electricity: network reinforcements or reconfiguration are possible but costly, and the costs 
will eventually be passed on to the consumer. If the UK is serious about meeting its 
decarbonisation objectives, these challenges will need to be addressed. As this section has 
sought to illustrate, the scale of the balancing challenge means that it is imperative to 
assess the implications of a low-carbon transition on the overall security of the electricity 
system. 
                                                          
8 The de-rated capacity margin is the capacity margin adjusted to take power availability into account, specific 
to each type of generation (DECC 2011a). 
9 The DECC projections are slightly higher because of differences in assumptions regarding imports and exports 
from Continental Europe. 
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2.4.3 Dealing with the balancing challenge 
Numerous options are available to help deal with the challenge of balancing supply and 
demand in a low-carbon electricity system. Overall, these options are termed ‘flexible 
balancing technologies’, a broad group which comprises flexible generation, storage, 
interconnection, and Demand-Side Response (DSR) (Strbac et al 2012a). 
 
2.4.3.1 Flexible generation 
Flexible generation can be provided using any fuel which can be switched on and off 
relatively quickly and cheaply. At present, the flexible generation in the UK is mostly 
provided by gas-fired CCGT and OCGT plants, along with some old oil-fired plants. Because 
of the challenges of intermittent power generation the government suggests that the UK 
could see the need for between 26 and 37GW of new gas capacity by 2030 (DECC 2012c). 
However, CCGT plants produce between 380gCO2/kWh and 450gCO2/kWh (ECCC 2010), 
whereas the UK Committee on Climate Change (2013) recommend that the average 
emissions intensity of electricity generation needs to decrease to 50gCO2/kWh. It is 
therefore clear that the gas-fired proportion of the electricity mix will either need to be 
scaled back significantly, or CCS will be required in the near future. However, CCS is still not 
operational in the UK, and still does not offer a zero-carbon source of electricity (Froggatt 
2013; IPCC 2005). Instead of relying overly on gas, biomass could represent an additional or 
alternative option for flexible and reliable generation; however, there are numerous issues 
and questions surrounding the sustainability of biomass production, especially on the sort 
of scale that would be required to meet a significant proportion of UK energy needs. 
 
2.4.3.2 Storage and Interconnection 
Therefore, other options may need to be considered. Electricity storage would assist in 
ensuring that power can be accessed when required to deal with system peaks. The UK 
already has four pumped storage facilities in operation for the storage of electricity; 
currently, these can only generate at full capacity for short periods of time, but in a context 
of increased renewable penetration they may need to move towards longer running cycles 
in the future (SSE 2013). Furthermore, newer forms of electricity storage (such as batteries) 
can assist significantly in integrating intermittent RES and improving system adequacy; 
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however, although the cost of these technologies has decreased significantly in recent 
years they are still relatively expensive (Fuchs et al 2012).  
 
Interconnection with Continental Europe and Ireland could also provide a useful means of 
balancing the electricity system. The UK has three operational interconnectors, with France, 
the Netherlands and Ireland, with a combined capacity of 3500 Megawatts (MW). Further 
interconnection is planned or under construction with France (2000MW) and Norway 
(1400MW), and National Grid is also consulting on plans to connect the UK to Denmark and 
Iceland. The UK’s interconnectors earn their revenue by auctioning electricity capacity, 
based on price differences at each end of the interconnector; thus when additional supply 
is needed in the UK, the price should be higher, meaning that electricity will flow from one 
or more of the other markets to make up the supply shortfall (National Grid 2013a). 
However, interconnectors have high capital costs, and there is often high uncertainty over 
whether the benefits of a proposed interconnector will outweigh its initial costs (Turvey 
2006). Moreover, the scale of potential interconnection in the future is highly sensitive to 
assumptions regarding fundamental supply-demand conditions in neighbouring economies 
(Strbac et al 2012a). 
 
2.4.3.3 Demand-Side Response 
Thus far, various mechanisms for providing flexible supply have been discussed. But one of 
the most potentially powerful balancing mechanisms exists on the demand side, in the form 
of flexible demand and load shifting, otherwise known as Demand Side Response (DSR). 
Managing demand could reduce peak load and thus reduce the requirement for backup 
generation (Lockwood 2014; Strbac et al 2012a). This can be done by giving consumers the 
ability to shift their demand away from times when national demand is high. Smart Meters, 
which communicate consumers’ meter readings directly to the supplier, are due for mass 
roll-out in the UK from now until 2020 (DECC 2012d; HM Government 2011). In the future, 
automated systems connected to a ‘Smart Grid’ could mean that devices such as washing 
machines can automatically shift their use to times of low demand; this tool could 
theoretically become even more powerful with electrification of heating and transport, for 
instance by allowing electric vehicles to charge at times of low demand (Greenpeace 
2010b). Various studies have suggested that DSR could significantly reduce system peaks, in 
turn reducing the costs of managing surplus supply and reducing pressure on the networks 
(Pudjianto et al 2013; Roscoe and Ault 2010; Strbac et al 2012a). However, the 
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implementation of DSR for residential and public sectors will rely on either widespread 
active consumer participation for manual shifting, or automated shifting using technology 
which is not yet commercially available (such as Smart appliances) and a willingness from 
consumers to allow computerised control of their home devices. Therefore the use of DSR 
at scale could open up a raft of ethical and practical concerns (Hoggett et al 2013; Owen et 
al 2013; Richards and Fell 2013; Stop Smart Meters 2015).  
 
Overall, changes on the demand-side could provide a powerful tool, but cannot provide a 
panacea. As pointed out in the diversity literature, no single measure is likely to prove 
sufficient to tackle the trilemma; a portfolio approach, which makes use of a broad range of 
supply-side and demand-side measures, will be required (Awerbuch 2004; DECC 2012e; 
Francés et al 2013; Kennedy 2013). For this reason, it is important to look at electricity 
security from a whole-systems perspective; whilst individual measures and technologies on 
both the supply and demand side are interesting and important, the full security picture 
only emerges when a holistic approach is taken.  
 
2.5 Summing up chapter 2 
 
This chapter has introduced the existing literature on energy security, outlining the 
academic context in which this thesis will be situated. Existing conceptualisations of energy 
security were introduced, along with a look at some of the broader notions which have 
emerged more recently to include environmental and societal concerns. This chapter has 
argued that despite normative and legal imperatives to reduce carbon emissions, there has 
thus far been a lack of empirical effort to assess the security of a future national electricity 
system in a low-carbon context. There are numerous synergies and trade-offs which could 
emerge as policy-makers attempt to balance various objectives of energy security; some 
level of compromise between objectives may be unavoidable, and therefore there is a real 
need to understand exactly where these compromises may lie. In order to examine these 
synergies and trade-offs, this thesis builds upon existing assessment frameworks from the 
energy security literature to propose and apply a specific analytical framework for assessing 
the security of future electricity systems which is designed to incorporate the broader 
notions of energy security suggested by some of the literature. 
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This chapter has also provided an introduction to some of the theoretical concepts which 
will be drawn upon throughout this thesis. Different conceptualisations of ‘security’ and 
‘risk’ from the existing literature were discussed, and it was found that many aspects of risk 
cannot easily be measured or quantified, and that experts’ claims to knowledge tend to be 
subjective and contingent. Therefore the chapter introduced a theory which suggests that 
there are four dimensions of risk, depending on the level of knowledge of probability or 
impacts; the majority of risk assessments tend to focus on areas where this knowledge is 
less problematic. The chapter also introduced the ‘plural conditionality’ approach which 
suggests that instead of continually attempting to reduce or to aggregate divergent views, it 
would be far better to accept at least some level of plurality: there may be several different 
answers to a problem, all of which may be ‘approximately right’. This context therefore 
suggests that an assessment of security should acknowledge the multiple issues 
surrounding the quantification of risk and vulnerability, and should attempt to take into 
account the realities of multiple competing and disparate preferences and assumptions.  
 
As a means of bounding the area of study, and as outlined in chapter 1, this thesis will focus 
on the security of the UK electricity system in the context of the UK’s carbon reduction 
targets. This chapter has provided some essential background information for 
understanding the challenges of electricity security in the UK. This chapter has found that a 
portfolio of both supply-side and demand-side measures will be necessary for the 
development of a secure, low-carbon electricity system; this means developing a holistic 
approach to a security assessment which can be used to analyse the whole electricity 
system, rather than just individual component parts. The following chapter proposes an 
analytical framework for such a holistic approach to assessing security in a low-carbon 
context.  
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3 Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter builds on the literature introduced in the previous chapter to propose an 
analytical framework for the assessment of electricity security which explicitly addresses 
issues of risk, uncertainty and subjectivity. Section 3.1 firstly explores issues surrounding 
the accurate communication of complex data, and introduces and explains the ‘dashboard’ 
indicator approach used in this thesis. Section 3.2 then conceptualises risks to energy 
systems in terms of short-term ‘shocks’ and long-term ‘stresses’, and uses these 
foundations to propose an analytical framework comprising four key dimensions of energy 
security. Finally, section 3.3 introduces the literature on futures studies, and sets out the 
basis for the choice of low-carbon transitions pathways which will be used for applying the 
analytical framework.  
 
3.1 The dashboard approach 
 
As shown in the preceding chapter, any assessment of energy security or electricity security 
will be based upon numerous assumptions and subjectivities. Stirling (2010) argues that too 
often, security assessments assume that knowledge about probabilities and impacts are 
unproblematic. Whilst accepting this line of argument, it is nonetheless important to 
consider that such conventional risk-based assessments still have some validity, and when 
used correctly they can yield illuminating information about some of the more quantifiable 
aspects of energy security. The challenge, then, is to move towards a broader assessment 
which can incorporate more quarters of the Uncertainty Matrix and thus cover a broader 
range of possible methods.  
 
As pointed out by Jewell et al (2014: 755), it is necessary to use multiple indicators in order 
to portray an “integrated picture of energy security”. However, they also point out that too 
much data can cause confusion, which could be problematic when analysing or 
communicating results and could thus affect the policy impact of an assessment. Cherp and 
Jewell (2013) explore three strategies which are often used in the energy security literature 
for tackling this issue: interpreting individual indicators; aggregating indicators together 
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into indices using composite metrics; and, presenting indicators either individually or jointly 
in a manner which facilitates the assessment. 
 
The first option (interpreting individual indictors) can be useful for security assessments of 
discreet issues, for example ‘customer minutes lost’. But it is less useful for addressing a 
broader range of risks and vulnerabilities in an integrated way; instead, it is preferable to 
offer a range of indicators. 
 
The second option (aggregation of indicators) requires more careful consideration. Cherp 
and Jewell (2013) point out in their paper that even individual indicators often require 
some level of aggregation. Diversity metrics are a good example of this – for instance, they 
require decisions over how best to group different fuels, which impacts the results (see 
indicator 2a, sections 4.4.1.2 and B.2.1). However, aggregated indices go one step further 
and combine information from multiple diverse security issues into a single number, often 
using complex mathematics. This can greatly assist in communicating results, especially 
when seeking to devise a numerical index for comparisons across diverse contexts; 
however, the complex manipulations of indicators required for aggregation always involves 
a lot of assumptions, and leads to a risk that they might conceal, rather than highlight, 
important information (Cherp and Jewell 2013; Jewell et al 2014). Moreover, aggregated 
indices and rankings are found to frequently give conflicting results (Jonsson et al 2013; 
Narula and Reddy 2015). Jonsson et al (2013) argue that the energy security literature often 
takes an approach in which the impacts of competing preferences and biases are ignored in 
favour of definitive indices which are then aggregated and compared across diverse spatial 
contexts; as was discussed in section 2.2, this approach makes it challenging to incorporate 
the inherently plural and conditional nature of knowledge claims, especially regarding a 
topic as ‘slippery’ as energy security. 
 
As can be seen, a careful balance must be struck between over-simplification of a complex 
issue, and problematic complexity in analysing and communicating outcomes. Hence the 
potential usefulness of the third option: presenting indicators either individually or jointly in 
a manner which facilitates the assessment. As one possible means of navigating this 
balance, Mitchell and Watson (2013b) propose that a ‘dashboard’ of indicators is used: by 
this, they mean a type of indicator approach involving a manageable number of indicators 
which are not weighted or consolidated into composite indices. If one area of the 
dashboard flags up potential problems (i.e. ‘flashes red’), more information can be 
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gathered where necessary and action can be taken. The ‘dashboard’ can thereby provide an 
overview of a range of different measures of security, which can be especially helpful to 
policy-makers (Mitchell and Watson 2013b). Importantly, this approach also removes the 
need for aggregation of diverse indicators, and enables the identification of important 
trade-offs between different indicators and thus different objectives for energy security; as 
noted in section 2.3.3, it is not possible to completely avoid trade-offs and therefore it is 
vital to attempt to identify them (Sovacool and Saunders 2014). It is important to strike a 
balance between complexity and reductionism (Jewell et al 2014; Mitchell and Watson 
2013b); for this reason, the number of indicators should be carefully managed to ensure 
that a broad range of issues are covered without becoming unmanageable. 
 
As well as considering the issues above, taking such a holistic approach to the development 
of an energy security assessment also necessitates recognition of the importance of 
timescales. The following section looks in more detail at timescales, and conceptualises 
risks to the electricity system in terms of short-term ‘shocks’ and longer-term ‘stresses’. 
These ideas are then combined with ideas from the literature outlined in this chapter and in 
chapter 2, in order to propose an analytical framework for the assessment of UK electricity 
security in a low-carbon context. 
 
3.2 Shocks and Stresses 
 
It should be evident from Chapters 1 and 2 that one of the important aspects to bear in 
mind when considering energy and electricity security is that much depends on the 
timescale of reference (Boston 2013; Mitchell and Watson 2013a; REKK 2009; Sovacool and 
Saunders 2014). In fact, there is a marked divide in the literature between perspectives 
which focus on the long-term, and those which focus on the short-term. On the one hand, 
perspectives on energy security often take a very large-scale, long-term view, focusing on 
issues such as geopolitics, resource depletion and climate change (e.g. Bielecki 2002; 
Bordhoff et al 2010; IEA 2007; Kruyt et al 2009; Martchamadol and Kumar 2013; Müller-
Kraenner 2007; Yergin 2006); these perspectives are usually rooted in social science 
disciplines such as economics and international relations (Cherp and Jewell 2011). 
Meanwhile on the other hand, perspectives on electricity security often take a micro-scale, 
short-term view, focusing on issues such as system adequacy, capacity margins and hour-
by-hour grid balancing (e.g. Chaudry et al 2011; Creti and Fabra 2007; Jamasb and Pollitt 
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2008; Ofgem 2011; Paulus et al 2011); these perspectives are usually rooted in physical 
science disciplines such as engineering (Cherp and Jewell 2011). It is worth emphasising 
that these perspectives are not mutually exclusive, and that there are sometimes overlaps 
between the fields of literature in which they are discussed; nevertheless, this broad 
differentiation provides a useful basis for the exploration of energy security which explicitly 
takes timescales of reference into account. 
 
3.2.1 Towards an analytical framework for empirical analysis 
The differentiation between long and short term approaches can be conceptualised as a 
differentiation between gradual ‘stresses’, such as resource depletion or geopolitical 
tensions, and sudden ‘shocks’, such as a technical fault at a plant or a powerline failure 
(Dawson et al 2010; Hoggett et al 2011; Hoggett et al 2014; Hughes and Ranjan 2013; 
Jewell et al 2014; Kiriyama and Kajikawa 2014; Mitchell and Watson 2013a; Stirling 2014). 
Conceptualising electricity security in terms of long-term stresses and short-term shocks 
can be linked to the literature on defining and measuring energy security; linking these 
strands of literature can then be used as the basis for an analytical framework for a broader 
empirical assessment of the security of an electricity system. The ability to withstand 
longer-term stresses can be thought of in terms of electricity availability, encompassing 
aspects such as geopolitical tensions, internal politics and fuel supply source; this 
dimension is mainly rooted in the social sciences and international relations literature. 
Meanwhile the ability to respond to short-term shocks can be thought of in terms of system 
reliability, encompassing aspects such as capacity margins, hour-by-hour system adequacy, 
and short-term system resilience; this dimension is crucial to electricity systems, and is 
mainly rooted in the physical sciences and engineering literature. Further to this, it is 
important to consider a price dimension, which (as shown previously) is widely recognised 
as being fundamental to the pursuit of energy security; this can be thought of as 
affordability. The term ‘affordability’ is more useful than ‘price’, because it raises the 
question ‘affordable to whom?’ (Cherp and Jewell 2014), and thus encompasses issues such 
as consumer bills and fuel poverty. Finally, the extensive discussion in chapter 2 regarding 
climate and environmental concerns suggests that a fourth dimension should be added, 
that of environmental sustainability. It is worth noting that the term ‘sustainability’ can 
mean many different things and its definition is the subject of debate, therefore it is 
important to define how it shall be used in this thesis. In terms of long-term energy 
security, the main risk areas are climate change (as discussed in 2.1.2), and the depletion of 
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necessary resources for power production such as fuel stocks and water (as discussed in 
2.3.3).  
 
Thus it is proposed that an analytical framework of four key dimensions – ‘availability’, 
‘affordability’, ‘reliability’ and ‘environmental sustainability’ (GHG emissions and resource 
depletion) – is most suitable for assessing the security of low-carbon electricity pathways. 10 
This analytical framework could be applied to energy security assessment of any 
industrialised country, provided that the raw data is available. These four dimensions were 
first proposed by Elkind (2010). The methodology chapter to follow will demonstrate how 
this analytical framework can be operationalised using a detailed set of indicators, thus 
building on existing indicator frameworks from the energy security literature (for example, 
Jewell et al 2013; 2014), with particular focus on proposing a set of indicators which is 
suitable for assessing the long-term security of national electricity scenarios.  
 
The ‘risk’ framework outlined in section 2.2 suggests that the methods chosen for assessing 
security should attempt to provide a mix between ‘risk’, ‘ambiguity’, ‘uncertainty’ and 
‘ignorance’ (as illustrated in the ‘uncertainty matrix’ in figure 2.2).11 As shown in section 2.2, 
many indicators of energy security fall into the top left-hand quadrant of this matrix; 
however, it is also possible to employ qualitative or societal indicators, as well indicators 
which can hedge against uncertain risks (for instance by maximising diversity or flexibility). 
It is also important to carry out sensitivity tests where appropriate, again in 
acknowledgment of the fact that the required information about risks and their impact is 
sometimes more or less problematic. Further to this, it is important to continually 
emphasise the fact that preferences and assumptions affect the way in which energy 
security is assessed and analysed; different actors will have different views on improving 
security and minimising risk, and it has been argued in the previous chapter that several 
answers may all be ‘approximately right’. Therefore it would be desirable to look at the way 
energy security is perceived by different actors and to test the impact of different 
stakeholders’ perspectives on preferred options for improving energy security. As stated by 
Cherp and Jewell (2014: 220), “The point of conceptualizing a difficult political concept is 
                                                          
10 It should be emphasised that these dimensions sometimes overlap. In particular, the ‘availability’ and 
reliability’ dimensions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, some international relations 
literature is concerned with short term impacts on prices, whereas some engineering literature is concerned 
with longer term issues of investment in electricity generation capacity. 
11 Note again the complications caused by the term ‘risk’. For the purposes of clarity and simplicity, the rest of 
this thesis will use the term ‘risk’ in its more generic form, to refer to a ‘risk’ in the sense of a hazard; in other 
words, the opposite of ‘security’. 
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not to eliminate different interpretations but rather to enable their meaningful analysis, 
comparison and dialogue”. 
 
3.3 Low-carbon transition pathways 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the security of possible future low-carbon electricity 
systems; in order to do this, there needs to be an idea of what a low-carbon electricity 
system in the UK might look like. In recent years, a large number of studies in the energy 
field and elsewhere have sought to take a ‘futures-based’ approach, outlining what the 
future might look like (Dixon 2011). These analyses can take many forms: McDowall and 
Eames (2006), in a study on methods used in the field of hydrogen, identified six 
overlapping types of futures study. These types are shown in table 3.1, which has been 
adapted to make it relevant to low-carbon energy studies. The distinction between a 
‘normative’ and ‘descriptive’ method is important. ‘Descriptive’ methods take today’s 
system as their starting point, and seek to elaborate how the system might evolve in a 
variety of plausible directions; for example, studies which offer a range of scenarios, some 
of which may not meet climate change mitigation targets. ‘Normative’ approaches on the 
other hand focus on reaching a desired goal or ‘vision’, and seek to elaborate how best to 
get there; for example, studies which focus on meeting a specific carbon reduction target. It 
should be emphasised however that the elements of these six types of futures study are 
overlapping and not always clear, and that the language is often used interchangeably; for 
instance, the EU Roadmap 2050 project (European Climate Foundation 2010) states that its 
aim is to “provide analysis of pathways to achieve a low-carbon economy in Europe” 
(European Climate Foundation 2015; emphasis added). The overlapping nature means that 
it is not always possible to precisely label a particular approach or study, and some studies 
use a combination of several approaches.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to identify which of these approaches to use, 
in order to inform the choice of transitions studies which will form the basis for the security 
assessment. The purpose of the thesis is to assess the security of a low-carbon electricity 
system; therefore it makes sense to choose futures studies which achieve a low-carbon 
target. For the purpose of this thesis, ‘low-carbon’ is defined as meeting (or at least 
attempting to meet) the UK’s legally-binding target of an 80% emissions reduction by 2050. 
For this reason, normative approaches would be more suitable, because of the existence of 
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a set end-goal, and the ‘pathways’ approach is overall probably the most suitable approach 
for this thesis. Several normative studies take a ‘roadmap’ approach, in which a single 
‘ideal’ route for decarbonisation is mapped out in detail; these are less suitable for the 
purposes of this thesis, because one of the main objectives of this thesis is to identify 
synergies and trade-offs, therefore it is more useful to make comparisons between a range 
of possible options. Using a set of different pathways from the same source also allows 
interesting comparisons to be made, whilst avoiding inaccuracies arising from using raw 
data from more than one source. The methodology for choosing a set of pathways from the 
numerous possible options is outlined in the next chapter, in section 4.2. 
 
Table 3-1: Types of futures study. Adapted from McDowall and Eames (2006) 
Character Type Description Example 
Descriptive 
Forecast Uses formal quantitative extrapolation and 
modelling to predict likely futures from 
current trends 
IEA World Energy Outlook 
(IEA 2014) 
Exploratory 
scenario 
Explores possible futures, emphasising 
drivers; does not specify a predetermined 
desirable end state 
Mountains and Oceans 
(Shell International 2013) 
Technical 
scenario 
Explores possible future technological 
systems, emphasising the technical 
feasibility and implications of different 
options, rather than exploring how 
different futures might unfold 
‘Sustainability Without the 
Hot Air’ (MacKay 2009) 
Normative 
Vision Describes a desirable and (more or less) 
plausible future, emphasising the benefits 
of a low-carbon transition rather than the 
pathways through which a low-carbon 
transition might be achieved 
World Resources Institute 
(WRI) Roadmap for a 
Secure, Low-Carbon 
Economy (Ladislaw et al 
2009) 
Pathway Starts with a predetermined end point (i.e. 
a desirable and plausible future), and 
investigates possible pathways to that point 
DECC 2050 Pathways 
Analysis (DECC 2010a) 
Roadmap Describes a sequence of measures designed 
to bring about a desirable future  
WRI Roadmap for a Secure, 
Low-Carbon Economy 
(Ladislaw et al 2009) 
 
 
Using ‘pathways’ rather than an alternative futures approach can help to address some of 
the drawbacks inherent in other approaches. For instance, Hughes et al (2009) suggest that 
‘scenarios’ are problematic because they often fail to give adequate recognition of the way 
in which technology interacts with social, cultural and political systems, and fail to identify 
actors and key social networks which engender change. ‘Pathways’ on the other hand seek 
to focus on the co-evolution of actors and technologies in transition processes (Hargreaves 
and Burgess 2009; Hughes et al 2009). Building on transitions literature, pathways 
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recognise the fact that technologies exist as part of a wider socio-technical network of 
interlinked and interdependent actors, markets, products, institutions and behaviours, and 
that transitions entail not only a new technology, but also changes in this wider socio-
technical network (Berkhout 2002; Bijker 1995; Geels 2002; 2004; Hughes 1987).  
 
It is recognised that it is not possible to predict the future, and as such, transition pathway 
studies do not aim to accurately model the future system. However, despite the 
inevitability of such drawbacks, achieving a low-carbon electricity system necessitates a 
clear direction and early action to move in that direction, because decisions made today 
will impact upon the electricity system for a long time to come (DECC 2010a). Immediate 
choices must be made on the basis of a long-term understanding of the development of the 
system and the challenges and trade-offs involved. Thus transition pathway studies aim to 
contribute to an ongoing discussion between policy-makers, researchers and stakeholders, 
in order to better inform the debate about the ways in which the energy system might 
evolve as we move towards decarbonisation. As such, the use of transition pathways in this 
thesis does not aim to accurately predict the systems of the future. Rather, the pathways 
can be used as the basis for a discussion and an illustration of some of the key issues faced 
in transitioning towards a low-carbon electricity system. 
 
3.4 Summing up chapter 3 
 
This chapter has used the concepts from the existing literature which were outlined in 
chapter 2 as the basis for an analytical framework for the assessment of the security of low-
carbon electricity systems. It was argued that the use of a dashboard approach can 
facilitate the use of multiple diverse indicators (both quantitative and qualitative) in a 
transparent manner without the need for aggregation. This approach also allows the reader 
to focus in on certain indicators and potentially to apply them to other contexts. It was 
noted that risks to energy systems can be conceptualised in terms of short-term ‘shocks’ 
and longer-term ‘stresses’; this differentiation was used to develop a four-way framework 
for a security assessment which explicitly addresses the issues of the energy trilemma and 
the importance of timescales of reference – electricity should be ‘available’, ‘reliable’, 
‘affordable’ and ‘environmentally sustainable’ (with ‘sustainability’ referring to GHG 
emissions and resource depletion). Finally, this chapter has noted that assessing security in 
a low-carbon context necessitates an idea of what a low-carbon electricity system might 
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look like; as such, the chapter argued that using ‘pathways’ (as opposed to forecasts, 
scenarios, or roadmaps) would be most suitable for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
Having set out the theoretical basis for assessing the security of a low-carbon electricity 
system, the following chapter sets out the methodological approach and the detailed 
research methods which will be used for this thesis. The next chapter uses the four-way 
analytical framework outlined here to propose a set of indicators from the existing 
literature, and sets out the methods used for the systematic application of these indicators 
to a set of existing low-carbon transition pathways for the UK electricity system. The next 
chapter also sets out the methodology for engaging with energy stakeholders, in order to 
explore the diversity of perspectives amongst stakeholders and to test the impact of these 
perspectives on the results of the security assessment. 
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4 Methodology 
 
This chapter sets out the methodology for the thesis. Section 4.1 reiterates the research 
questions and gives an overview of the general methodological approach. Section 4.2 then 
sets out the choice of existing transitions pathways which will be used as the basis for the 
security assessment. Section 4.3 explains the methodology for answering the first research 
question: the development of a set of indicators for the assessment of the security of low-
carbon transition pathways. Section 4.4 describes the detailed methods used for calculating 
or assessing each individual indicator. Section 4.5 then moves on to describe the 
methodology for answering the second and third research questions: the stakeholder 
interview method is explained, and the methods used for the analysis of this data. Finally, 
the last part of section 4.5 sets out the methodology for answering the final research 
question, by explaining the way in which the results from the stakeholder interviews are 
applied to the results from the security assessment. 
 
Additionally to this chapter, further details on the methods used are available in the 
appendices at the end of this thesis. Appendix A shows the initial ‘long list’ of potential 
indicators for assessing the security of a low-carbon transition pathway for the electricity 
system (see section 4.3, later on in this chapter). Appendices B to E show the detailed 
methods for each indicator in turn, including data sources, main assumptions, calculations 
where applicable, and details of sensitivity tests which were carried out for some of the 
indicators. Appendix B gives the methods for the indicators in the ‘availability’ dimension, 
appendix C for ‘affordability’, appendix D for ‘environmental sustainability’, and appendix E 
for ‘reliability’. Appendix F shows the estimated unit costs which were used to calculate 
offshore connection costs. Appendix G is a copy of the briefing note which was sent out to 
interviewees (see section 4.5). Finally, appendix H gives more detail of the results from the 
application of stakeholder responses to the security assessment results (see sections 4.5.4 
and 7.2). 
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4.1 Research questions and methodology overview 
4.1.1 Reiteration of research questions 
As explained in section 1.3.1, the overarching aim of this thesis is to assess the future 
security of the UK electricity system in a low-carbon context, in order to identify the main 
risks, trade-offs and synergies which may emerge between different objectives in a 
transition to a low-carbon electricity system. As part of this, this thesis also aims to actively 
incorporate multiple stakeholders’ perspectives on energy security into an indicator 
assessment, in order to explore the impacts that different perspectives can have on 
preferred options for improving energy security. In order to meet these objectives, the 
research questions that this thesis will answer are as follows: 
 
i. “What indicators are appropriate for assessing the security of low-carbon transition 
pathways in the UK, and what are the results of such an assessment using a set of 
existing pathways?” 
 
ii. “What are the reactions of energy stakeholders to the proposed set of indicators, 
and what does this tell us about the diversity of perspectives in the UK energy 
community?” 
 
iii. “What impact do the stakeholders’ perspectives have on the results of the security 
assessment and on their preferred options for improving energy security?” 
 
 
4.1.2 Methodology overview 
In order to answer the research questions, this thesis undertakes a whole-systems analysis 
of the future security of the UK electricity system, under a selection of low-carbon 
transition pathways. The aim is to develop a set of indicators for assessing the security of 
possible electricity futures, with a selection of indicators which can be applied to low-
carbon transition pathways. A variety of indicators is used in order to capture the 
multidimensional nature of energy security and to reflect the fact that an assessment of 
electricity security should where possible be grounded in multiple overlapping disciplines. 
An indicator approach, especially the ‘dashboard’ indicator approach recommended by 
Mitchell and Watson (2013b), allows for the empirical assessment of a broad suite of 
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energy security aspects, using a mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators according to 
their suitability for different aspects.  
 
The indicator set is developed to provide ‘indicators derived for a set purpose’ (Axon et al 
2013), with indicators chosen on the basis of their suitability for application to low-carbon 
pathways and for analysing electricity security into the future. Using this indicator set, the 
thesis carries out an analysis of the UK electricity system in the context of a transition to 
decarbonisation. A set of 22 quantitative and qualitative security indicators is applied to 
three existing low-carbon transition pathways for the UK electricity system for the years 
2010, 2030 and 2050.  
 
The results from the security assessment are then used as the basis for an in-depth 
discussion via interviews with stakeholders on low-carbon electricity security. Stakeholders 
are selected on the basis of their knowledge of energy issues and their involvement with 
organisations which may have some influence on UK policy processes, either through direct 
involvement or through participation in research and consultations. The aim of these 
interviews is to find out more about the diversity of views on electricity security that exists 
in the UK energy community, in order to create a representation of how different 
stakeholders think about electricity security. This information is then used to understand 
how different perspectives might impact the results of the empirical assessment, and 
whether certain perspectives lead to certain pathways or technology options being 
preferred.  
 
4.2 Choosing transition pathways 
4.2.1 Methodology for choosing transition pathways  
The process of developing a robust futures study, especially in the context of a complex, 
large-scale and interlinked network such as the UK electricity system, is extremely time 
consuming; therefore, this thesis utilises an existing set of pathways from the literature 
instead of opting to develop an entirely new set. Section 3.3 outlined the rationale for 
basing the security assessment of a low-carbon electricity system on pathways, rather than 
forecasts, scenarios, visions or roadmaps. This acts as a useful means of limiting the 
enormous number of existing futures studies. For the purposes of this thesis, the pathways 
studies to be used should have four main characteristics: 
- They should be to some extent publicly available (i.e. not confidential) 
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- They should continue at least up to 2050 (in accordance with the generally-
accepted timeframe for significant decarbonisation of the energy sector) 
- They should aim for an 80% reduction in UK GHG emissions by 2050 (in accordance 
with the UK’s legally-binding emissions reduction targets) 
- There should be a set containing more than one indicative future system, so that a 
comparison can be made between two or more potential pathways and between 
the current and potential future systems. 
 
Initially, a set of 31 existing futures studies was identified from a review of the existing 
literature. These were then appraised on the basis of the above criteria. This first selection 
process eliminated all but six of these existing futures studies. These six were then assessed 
on the basis of a further three criteria, which were deemed highly desirable (if not 
absolutely crucial) for the purposes of this thesis:  
- Do the pathways show a temporal progression (i.e. do they include several points in 
time between the present day and 2050)? 
- Do the pathways give a range of technological choices (i.e. not focusing exclusively 
on one technological option such as CCS, wind etc.)? 
- Do the pathways include both the supply-side and the demand-side?  
This process of elimination left four potential pathways as viable options. These were: the 
DECC 2050 pathways calculator (DECC 2010a; 2010b); the Transition Pathways to a Low-
Carbon Economy (Barton et al 2015; Foxon 2013); the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) 
‘Pathways to a low-carbon economy’ (Anandarajah et al 2008; Strachan et al 2008), and the 
UK Committee on Climate Change ‘Building a low-carbon economy’ report (UK Committee 
on Climate Change 2008).  
 
The following stage of the selection process involved looking in more detail at these four 
remaining possibilities. These four sets of pathways all have relative merits, and would all 
have been suitable for the purposes of this thesis, but it was decided that the Transition 
Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy would potentially yield more interesting results, for 
the reasons given in the following section. It should be noted that the set of security 
indicators developed in this thesis is designed to be applicable in a range of situations, and 
in theory could be used for any set of pathways, provided that the underlying data is 
available; therefore it would be a very welcome addition to this research if the analysis 
were carried out for a different set of pathways. 
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4.2.2 Transition Pathways to a Low-carbon Economy 
The Transition Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy consortium 
(www.lowcarbonpathways.org) is a network of researchers from the Universities of Bath, 
Cardiff, Imperial, Loughborough, East Anglia, Leeds, Strathclyde, Surrey and University 
College London. The consortium aimed to develop their pathways by drawing upon 
theoretical work from the field of innovation studies, specifically historical transitions in 
socio-technical networks (see Foxon 2013). This set of pathways sought to move away from 
a purely technocratic view of the development of the electricity system, and to look instead 
at the socio-technical, political and economic drivers for a transition to take place, with 
theoretical foundations which build on the transitions theories of Berkhout (2002), Geels 
(2002; 2004) and Hughes (1987). In this way, the Transition Pathways study explicitly 
addresses one of the key drawbacks of scenario approaches which is identified by Hughes 
et al (2009) – the fact that often, there is little recognition of the way in which technology 
interacts with social, cultural and political systems, and that there is often a failure to 
identify actors and key social networks which engender change. The Transition Pathways 
project recognises that the process of making technological choices and actualising a 
system transition is messy and political, and inherently bound up in the preferences and 
interests of the actors involved; they therefore fit very well with the overall approach of 
this thesis, which stresses the importance of actors and policies as well as technologies and 
markets.  
 
The Transition Pathways consortium asked what kinds of socio-political governance systems 
could emerge over the next 40 years, and how the overriding ‘governance logic’ of the 
system could affect the pathways taken. The ‘governance logic’ “represents the actors’ 
assumptions underlying the governance of the energy system, including the relative roles of 
regulation and market frameworks, and the relative importance attached to the objectives 
of carbon reduction, energy security and affordability in the energy ‘trilemma’” (Foxon and 
Pearson 2013: 8). From this, the consortium developed three pathways, each of which 
corresponds to a different dominant governance logic:12 
 Market Rules: this pathway envisages continued dominance of a market-led system 
in the UK. Landscape pressures on incumbent regime actors lead to market actors 
making carbon reductions. The main decisions are made by market actors operating 
                                                          
12 It should be noted that the overriding governance logic in each pathway is not absolute – each pathway 
involves elements of several different governance logics, but they differ in terms of which one is most prevalent. 
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freely within a high-level policy framework; the system is dominated by large-scale 
supply-side technologies which are deemed the most economical to build. 
 Central Coordination: this pathway envisages that landscape pressures lead to a 
much stronger role for central government to deliver carbon reductions. The 
government exerts direct control over the energy system and key actors, working 
closely with large utilities; the main decisions are made by national government 
bodies. The system is dominated by large-scale centralised supply technologies and 
centrally-supported demand reduction measures. 
 Thousand Flowers: this pathway envisages a growing influence of civil society, 
which leads to a bottom-up transition. Landscape pressures lead to small-scale low-
carbon technologies emerging in niches. The main decisions are made by civil 
society, community groups and citizens. Widespread engagement with energy 
issues leads to behaviour change. The system is dominated by small-scale, 
distributed supply technologies and demand reduction measures. 
 
Figures 4.1 to 4.3 give a technological overview of each pathway, showing the electricity 
generation mix according to total output, and thus also the level of electricity demand. For 
more detailed technical and socio-political information on the pathways, see Barton et al 
(2015) and Foxon (2013).  
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Figure 4-1: Generation mix in the Market Rules pathway in TWh/year, 2008 to 2050 
 
Figure 4-2: Generation mix in Central Coordination pathway in TWh/year, 2008 to 2050 
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Figure 4-3: Generation mix in the Thousand Flowers pathway in TWh/year, 2008 to 2050 
 
It should be noted that none of the three pathways shown above represents a ‘Business-As-
Usual’ (BAU) case, i.e. what the future electricity system might look like in the absence of 
marked efforts to reduce GHG emissions by 80% by 2050. A BAU pathway was not available 
from the pathways modellers, and therefore was unavailable for the security assessment in 
this thesis; this means that it will not be possible to draw conclusions based on comparing 
the outcome within the pathway to what might have happened in the absence of policies to 
meet statutory carbon reduction goals. However, the approach taken in this thesis does 
allow for comparison between the 2010 baseline and the future systems envisaged in the 
Transition Pathways, thus facilitating comparison between the security of possible low-
carbon electricity systems and the existing higher-carbon system. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Transition Pathways model uses 2008 as the 
baseline (as shown in the graphs above); however, the security analysis in this thesis is 
carried out for 2010, 2030 and 2050. There will therefore be some slight differences 
between the 2010 figures in the results, and the actual electricity system situation in 2010. 
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The installed gas capacity was around 1% lower in 2010 than in the figures for the three 
pathways, and nuclear capacity was also 1% lower, whilst wind was 1.5% lower, hydro 1% 
higher and biomass 1% higher. These differences are small enough to make little difference 
to the results of the analysis. 
 
4.3 Development of the indicator set 
 
Having set out the transition pathways which will be used for the security assessment, this 
section now explains the methodology for designing a set of indicators which can be used 
to assess the security of these (and potentially other) pathways.  
 
4.3.1 Indicator set overview and aims 
As shown in Chapter 3, conceptualising electricity security in terms of long-term stresses 
and short-term shocks can be used as the basis for an analytical framework for assessing 
the security of low-carbon transition pathways. This framework, which builds upon 
assessment frameworks from the existing energy security literature (e.g. Elkind 2010; Jewell 
et al 2014), comprises four dimensions which posit that in order to be secure, electricity 
should be available, reliable, affordable and environmentally sustainable.13 These four 
dimensions can then be operationalised via the use of a more detailed set of indicators, 
outlined in section 4.4. The results of the assessment are not designed as an attempt to 
predict the future; rather, the results are intended as an illustration of the synergies and 
trade-offs which could emerge. The set of indicators avoids using or creating complex 
composite indicators (as recommended in section 3.1), and uses both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Wherever possible, quantitative methods are used, because when 
used correctly such methods can be succinct, clear and empirically rigorous. However, there 
are several aspects of energy security which simply cannot be quantified in any meaningful 
manner; for instance, those relating to politics or society. The majority of indicator 
approaches simply ignore these aspects (Gracceva and Zeniewski 2014); however, it is the 
contention of this thesis that they have a valuable role to play, and therefore some more 
qualitative or descriptive indicators will be included alongside the quantitative data. This 
thesis therefore builds on the work of Jonsson et al (2015), who introduce a more 
                                                          
13 As explained in section 3.2.1, ‘sustainability’ in this thesis is used to refer to GHG emissions and resource 
depletion. For brevity, ‘sustainability’ will be used henceforth. 
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comprehensive suite of energy security aspects and make some initial observations 
regarding their implications in a low-carbon context. Their paper argues that there is a need 
for a broader framing of energy security which includes qualitative aspects such as social 
and political dynamics; this thesis attempts to build on this observation by providing a 
means of assessing such broader aspects systematically and empirically. 
 
Drawing on the basis laid out in Chapter 3, the indicator set developed for the purpose of 
this thesis has the following aims: 
 To offer a range of indicators which captures the multidimensional nature of energy 
security (the ‘dashboard’ approach) 
 To focus on the transition to a low-carbon electricity system, and to devise 
indicators fit for this purpose 
 To be capable of assessing the security of future electricity system pathways, in 
order to show the possible security choices which may be made in the future  
 To use both quantitative and qualitative indicators 
 To illustrate some of the key synergies and trade-offs which may emerge between 
different aspects of the energy policy trilemma 
 To capture both short-term shocks and long-term stresses. 
 
The indicator set is primarily designed to be applicable to the electricity system in the UK, 
although many of the indicators would also applicable to other nations and jurisdictions, 
particularly in Western Europe, provided that the raw data is available for that jurisdiction. 
Again, herein lies an advantage of using a dashboard approach; it may be that some 
indicators are of limited utility in other countries, or that data for some is unavailable, and 
therefore it is useful to be able to choose the indicators best suited for the purpose; the 
choice of indicators, and their applicability to non-UK jurisdictions, is covered in more detail 
in section 4.4 and in Appendix A. The exercise of application of the indicator set to other 
countries is outside the scope of this thesis; however, it is intended that the set can be used 
in further research to assess the security of other low-carbon electricity systems, 
particularly in Western Europe.  It is worth noting that the relatively high level of 
integration of the European electricity networks in many ways makes Europe a unique case: 
the European electricity system involves considerable (and growing) cross-border 
transmission, and the EU is developing an integrated market for electricity, additionally to 
all the existing fiscal, political and legislative arrangements within the EU. Therefore it is 
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important to bear in mind that analysis based in Europe may have limited applicability 
elsewhere in the world, especially for developing country contexts.  
 
4.3.2 Developing a set of indicators 
Initially, indicators were identified from the list of 372 security indicators provided in 
Sovacool and Mukherjee (2011: 5347-5352). This was used to generate a ‘long-list’ of 
potential security indicators (shown in Appendix A). This list can then be narrowed down 
considerably due to data constraints; the challenge of working with low-carbon transition 
pathways and with projections of a future energy system is that data availability and 
granularity is usually far more limited than it would be for the assessment of a present-day 
energy system. Furthermore, the indicators can be narrowed down to exclude those which 
do not relate to the electricity system, because of the electricity focus of this particular 
study. The indicators are chosen to reflect as much as possible the advice for choosing 
indicators given by Jewell et al (2014). According to their paper, indicators should meet the 
following criteria: 
 They should be relevant to current / historical energy concerns 
 They should be sufficiently generic to apply to future systems which are radically 
different from those of today 
 They should be possible to calculate from the data available 
 They should provide information which is additional to that provided by the other 
indicators 
 They should reflect key vulnerabilities of vital energy systems 
 They should clarify policy trade-offs. 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the four-dimensional analytical framework with the individual indicators 
therein. The selection of individual indicators and the methods used to calculate/assess 
each indicator is explained and justified on a case-by-case basis in section 4.4; see also 
Appendix A for more details regarding the selection process. In order to further organise 
the indicators within each dimension (and in order to make the methods and results easier 
to follow), the 22 indicators have been grouped into 9 sub-dimensions; these are shown in 
table 4.1. Table 4.1 also gives the relevant literature for each indicator – this refers both to 
literature in which the indicator is proposed (either as a stand-alone energy security 
indicator or as part of a set), and to literature which discusses, measures or otherwise 
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operationalises the indicator. Further detail on data sources for each indicator is given in 
table 4.2 at the very end of section 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Dashboard of indicators for the assessment of a low-carbon electricity system 
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Table 4-1: Table showing dimensions, sub-dimensions and indicators, including literature for each indicator 
 Sub-dimension Indicator Literature in which this indicator is proposed or measured 
“A
va
il
ab
il
it
y”
 
Likelihood of 
domestic disruption 
to electricity 
availability 
1a. Public approval ratings Axon et al (2013); Demski et al (2013); Falk (2011); Hayashi and Hughes (2013); 
Whitmarsh et al (2011) 
1b. Land requirements Axon et al (2013); Batel et al (2013); Burningham et al (2006); Cherry et al (2014); 
Cohen et al (2014); Devine-Wright (2005); Devine-Wright et al (2009); Greenberg 
and Truelove (2011) 
1c. Public participation in 
decisions 
Barton et al (2015); Bell et al (2005); Cohen et al (2014); Fast and Mabee (2015); 
Johansson (2013); Jones and Eiser (2009; 2010); Sovacool et al (2012); Warren and 
McFayden (2010) 
Likelihood of non-
domestic disruption 
to electricity 
availability 
2a. Diversity of fuel types in 
generation mix 
Axon et al (2013); DECC (2012a); Grubb et al (2006); Jewell et al (2014); Lehr 
(2009); Pfenninger and Keirstead (2015); Stirling (1998) 
2b. Dependence on fuel imports Axon et al (2013); Frondel and Schmidt (2014); IEA (2011); Jewell et al (2014); Kruyt 
et al (2009); Le Coq and Paltseva (2009); Pfenninger and Keirstead (2015); POST 
(2012); Umbach (2010); Victor et al (2014) 
2c. Diversity and stability of fuel 
exporting nations 
Axon et al (2013); DECC (2012a); European Commission (2014); Frondel and 
Schmidt (2014); IEA (2007); Jewell et al (2014); Jonsson et al (2015); Kruyt et al 
(2009); Le Coq and Paltseva (2009); Lilliestam and Ellenbeck (2011); Neumann 
(2007) 
“A
ff
o
rd
ab
il
it
y”
 Cost to the system 
3a. Generation cost Centrica (n.d); DECC (2012a; 2013d); Greenleaf et al (2009); Hayashi and Hughes 
(2013); Kruyt et al (2009); Mott MacDonald (2010); Pfenninger and Keirstead (2015) 
3b. Cost of transmission upgrades Bolton and Hawkes (2013); Boston (2013); ENSG (2012); Jamasb and Pollitt (2008); 
National Grid (2011; 2013b); Strbac et al (2014) 
3c. Cost of distribution upgrades Bolton and Hawkes (2013); Boston (2013); Greenpeace (2005); Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2008); Pudjianto et al (2013) 
Cost to the 
consumer 
4a. Annual retail electricity bills Centrica (n.d.); DECC (2013e); Elkind (2010); Hughes (2012); IEA (2007); Kruyt et al 
(2009); Sovacool (2011); Sovacool et al (2012); Sovacool and Brown (2010) 
4b. Impact on levels of fuel 
poverty 
Axon et al (2013); Barton et al (2015); Hills (2012); Mitchell and Watson (2013b); 
Sovacool (2011); Sovacool et al (2012); Sovacool and Brown (2010) 
 
“S
u
st
ai
n
ab
i
li
ty
” 
GHGs 
5a. GHG emissions and intensity Axon et al (2013); Elkind (2010); Gnansounou (2011); Hughes (2012); Kruyt et al 
(2009); McCollum et al (2011); Sovacool et al (2012); Sovacool and Brown (2010); 
Sovacool and Mukherjee (2011); Winzer (2011) 
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Resources 
6a. Primary fuels depletion Asif and Muneer (2007); Axon et al (2013); Capellan-Perez et al (2014); Kruyt et al 
(2009); Kuzemko and Bradshaw (2013); Mitchell and Watson (2013b); Nuttall and 
Manz (2008); POST (2012); Sovacool (2011); Sovacool et al (2012); Watson (2010); 
Winzer (2011) 
6b. Secondary materials 
depletion 
Gholz (2014); Humphries (2013); Krishna-Hensel (2012); Moss et al (2011); Speirs et 
al (2014); Stegen (2015); Umbach (2012)  
Water 
7a. Water usage for cooling and 
for biomass feedstock production 
Carrillo and Frei (2009); Davies et al (2013); King et al (2008); Koch and Vögele 
(2009); Kyle et al (2013); McDermott and Nilsen (2012); Sovacool et al (2012); Van 
Vliet et al (2012) 
“R
el
ia
b
il
it
y”
 
System Adequacy 
8a. De-rated capacity margins DECC (2011a; 2012a); Greenleaf et al (2009); House of Lords (2015); National Grid 
(2012); Newbery and Grubb (2014); Ofgem (2011; 2012); RAEng (2013) 
8b. Capacity factors and 
Oversupply 
 
Barnacle et al (2013); Barton et al (2013) 
8c. Electricity storage and 
interconnection 
European Council (2011); Grünewald (2012); House of Lords (2015); IMechE (2012); 
National Grid (2013a); Newbery et al (2013); Strbac et al (2012a; 2012b); World 
Energy Council (2008) 
Resilience to sudden 
and unexpected 
changes in the 
supply/demand 
balance 
9a. Frequency response 
capability 
EirGrid/SONI (2011); Kiriyama and Kajikawa (2014); National Audit Office (2014); 
National Grid (2011); Ruttledge and Flynn (2015); Strbac et al (2012a) 
9b. Short-term Operating Reserve 
(STOR) and black-start capability 
EirGrid/SONI (2011); National Audit Office (2014); National Grid (2011); Strbac et al 
(2012a) 
9c. Response and Reserve 
requirements 
EirGrid/SONI (2011); National Audit Office (2014); National Grid (2011); Ruttledge 
and Flynn (2015) 
9d. Flexible demand Bolkesyø et al (2014); DECC (2012a); Drysdale et al (2015); Dudeney et al (2014); 
E3G (2014); ECCC (2011); Mitchell and Watson (2013b); Nistor et al (2015); Strbac 
et al (2012a) 
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4.4 Detailed methods for each indicator 
 
This section gives an overview of the methods employed to assess each indicator, as well as 
providing a justification of the choice of individual indicators.  For each indicator, bullet points 
show whether the indicator is quantitative, qualitative or mixed, and the units which are used. 
For each indicator, the extent to which the indicator may be potentially applicable to energy 
security assessments of other countries and in other contexts is also shown. Table 4.2 at the 
end of the section gives an at-a-glance overview of the methods used, including the major data 
sources used and the additional details given in the bullet points for each indicator in this 
section. Detailed mathematical methods, data sources and assumptions are given in 
Appendices C to F 
 
4.4.1 Availability 
4.4.1.1 Sub-dimension 1: Likelihood of domestic disruption to energy availability 
Constraints upon system transitions are often related to socio-political issues, such as the 
acceptability of various technological options (Parkhill et al 2013; Pidgeon and Demski 2012). 
This sub-dimension therefore takes public levels of acceptance of various forms of energy 
generation as a proxy for the likelihood of risk of disruption arising domestically in the UK. This 
sub-dimension of the security assessment views the mitigation of domestic disruption as 
potentially a three-way strategy – improving overall support, reducing opposition to specific 
aspects of the energy system or specific new additions, and increasing participation.  
 
Indicator 1a. Public approval ratings 
 Quantitative indicator  
 Calculates amount of generation mix (in GW and %) which would be ‘approved of’ by 
the general public 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
 
Public approval ratings are taken from a nationally-representative survey carried out by 
UKERC, which shows levels of support and of opposition to technologies for power generation 
(Demski et al 2013). The data from this survey is supported by a literature review of academic 
and grey literature into public opinions of various forms of energy, carried out by Whitmarsh 
et al (2011). The results of the survey are applied to the pathways, to calculate the amount of 
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generation in the pathway (in GW and %) which is likely to be approved of by the general 
public, and the amount which is likely to be actively opposed. It is worth noting that some 
technologies are opposed on certain aspects apart from generation; for example, CCGT is 
generally fairly ambivalent, but extracting the gas by fracking is unpopular. These aspects are 
covered in the next section, which focuses on direct opposition. The ‘public approval ratings’ 
indicator would be relevant for assessing the energy security of a wide range of pathways, 
including countries other than the UK; however, application to other contexts would require 
additional data because the survey results used here are specific to the UK context. 
 
Indicator 1b. Land requirements (as a proxy for likelihood of disruptive opposition) 
 Three distinct metrics (not aggregated) 
 Metric 1: Land area required for new and additional generation infrastructure, 
measured in m2 
 Metric 2: Onshore transmission infrastructure required, using onshore transmission 
upgrade costs (see indicator 3b) as a proxy, measured in £bn 
 Metric 3: Domestic extraction of fuel resources, using data on import proportions as a 
proxy, measured in TWh/y 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
 
High levels of general public support don’t always mean that specific projects are approved of, 
and many installations which have high national approval ratings fail to gain support at the 
local level, sometimes resulting in the failure of the project (Batel et al 2013; Cherry et al 2014; 
Cohen et al 2014; Devine-Wright 2005). Therefore it is necessary to include an indicator which 
reflects the possibility that risk could occur due to direct opposition to infrastructure.  This 
indicator would be relevant for assessing the energy security of a wide range of pathways, 
including industrialised countries other than the UK. 
 
Disruptive opposition often occurs due to protests over new infrastructure. People are far 
more likely to protest against new installations, and communities which live close to older or 
existing sites are shown to be more supportive than national polls report (Greenberg and 
Truelove 2011; Pidgeon and Demski 2012). Proximity is important; although people protest 
against infrastructure for a variety of reasons, one of the most common types of opposition 
occurs amongst communities who will be directly affected by the infrastructure installation, 
especially because local communities sometimes experience (or perceive that they are 
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experiencing) disproportionate costs in terms of disruption, inconvenience, aesthetic impacts 
etc. (Batel et al. 2013; Devine-Wright 2005).  
 
Therefore, the amount of land required for new electricity system infrastructure can be used 
as a proxy for risk of disruptive opposition to new installations. It should be noted that the 
type of generation or infrastructure is fairly irrelevant: a long tradition of local protests shows 
that all new installations are in danger of incurring some sort of opposition. This indicator 
comprises three distinct metrics for infrastructure land requirements, which are used as 
proxies for likely levels of disruptive opposition: amount of new generating infrastructure 
required, amount of new transmission infrastructure required, and amount of domestic 
extraction of resources. As explained previously, the use of a dashboard approach avoids the 
aggregation of distinct metrics, therefore these three metrics are kept separate in the analysis. 
 
For generation infrastructure, the additional capacity required is multiplied by the power 
output per unit of land area for each generation type, to give an approximation of the total 
area of land required (in m2). This is then weighted according to whether the installation is on 
land or out at sea (70-30 weighting) to reflect the fact that land installations are more likely to 
be the subject of local protests (Jones and Eiser 2010).  
 
For transmission infrastructure, the cost data on transmission upgrades required is used as a 
proxy. This indicator assumes that the transmission at risk of local opposition will be on land 
(i.e. underground or overhead High-Voltage Direct Current [HVDC] cables), and therefore uses 
onshore transmission costs only. 
 
The final metric focuses on domestic extraction of resources (including mining and using 
agricultural land for biomass); some of the most disruptive protests in recent years have been 
over domestic extraction, for instance the anti-fracking movement. This indicator uses the 
pathways data on domestic availability of resources (gas, coal and biomass) in TWh/y as a 
proxy for risk of disruption to domestic extraction. 
 
It is worth reiterating the fact that acceptability and opposition are highly complex, and are 
driven by numerous socio-economic, demographic and psychological factors (Bell et al 2005; 
Burningham et al 2006; Cherry et al 2014; Devine-Wright et al 2009). For example, location is 
an extremely important variable; however, strong attachment to a location can create either 
positive or negative sentiment towards a new installation, depending on how the project is 
85 
 
perceived and framed (Cohen et al 2014; Devine-Wright 2011; Fast and Mabee 2015; Moula et 
al 2013). However, a detailed appraisal of the likelihood of opposition is not possible without 
considerably detailed data on people, attitudes and contexts; therefore the proxies described 
above are a necessary simplification of a complex issue. For this reason, it is important that 
this indicator is viewed alongside the other ‘domestic disruption’ indicators, as all capture 
slightly different aspects of this issue. 
 
 
Indicator 1c. Public participation in decisions 
 Qualitative indicator 
 Assesses potential levels of public participation in energy and infrastructure decisions, 
on a high/medium/low scale 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
 
Increasing people’s participation in energy projects can reduce opposition, because people are 
more likely to object if they feel that energy solutions are being ‘imposed’ on them from 
outside (Jones and Eiser 2009). Bell et al (2005) also suggest that a democratic deficit in the 
planning of generation sites could be to blame for much so-called NIMBYism. As such, 
pathways which incorporate higher levels of citizen participation in the decisions being made 
will be assumed to militate against some of the acceptability issues outlined in the previous 
indicators. This indicator uses the overarching logic of the pathway storylines to gauge the 
levels of public participation in the energy decisions being made. High levels of participation 
result in low levels of risk for this indicator. The ‘public participation’ indicator would be 
relevant for energy security assessments in a variety of other contexts, including in countries 
other than the UK; however, data is challenging to obtain and is not usually included in 
electricity mix pathways. 
 
 
4.4.1.2 Sub-dimension 2: Likelihood of non-domestic disruption to electricity 
availability 
Whereas the previous sub-dimension focused on risks emerging within the UK, this sub-
dimension turns the focus toward risks emerging in global markets and supply chains. This sub-
dimension includes diversity, which can act as a hedge against unknown and unpredictable 
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risks, a benefit which is especially important when dealing with the enormous uncertainties 
involved in identifying risks emerging in global energy markets and in international relations.  
 
Indicator 2a. Diversity of fuel types in electricity mix 
 Quantitative indicator 
 Measures the diversity of the fuel types in the electricity mix, calculated using the 
Shannon-Wiener diversity index: -∑ Pi*(Ln(pi)) 
 Diversity index gives a result from 0 (not diverse) upwards 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
 
The Shannon-Wiener (SW) diversity index is commonly used in energy research (Lehr 2009; 
Pfenninger and Keirstead 2015; Stirling 1998). The SW index increases as both the richness and 
the evenness of the generation mix increases. The highest possible SW index result depends on 
the data (see below), but a score of 3 upwards would usually be considered very diverse. It 
should be noted that this is also an indicator of the resilience in the system which could also 
help to hedge against domestic disruptions and weather events. This indicator is commonly 
used in energy security assessments in a variety of contexts, and therefore would be relevant 
for non-UK-based assessments. 
 
It should be noted that this index is dependent on the level of aggregation used for the 
different fuel types (Grubb et al 2006) (for example, whether or not to group ‘coal’ and ‘coal 
with CCS’ together). Increased disaggregation will result in a higher diversity score. Therefore 
absolute values from the index are insufficient on their own, and the index is best when used 
for comparison. The methods and assumptions for the aggregation used are shown in 
Appendix B. 
 
Indicator 2b. Dependence on fuel imports  
 Quantitative indicator 
 Measures how dependent the pathway is on imported sources of fuel 
 Calculated by the proportion of total fuel supply which comes from imported sources, 
in TWh/y and %, using pathways data which indicates the proportion of imports in the 
future 
 Potentially applicable to other countries. 
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Gas and coal import proportions are given in the pathways data. Uranium import levels are not 
shown in the pathways data, but uranium is easy to stockpile and stockpiles are generally 
maintained at ‘secure’ levels, therefore uranium imports use BAU figures for 2030 and 2050. 
For biomass, import amounts are not given in the pathways data, but they do indicate the 
biomass potential for the UK at 19TWh/y, which is split equally between electricity, heating 
and transport and used to indicate the level of biomass which could require imports. Oil 
imports are not included as the pathways use negligible amounts of oil generation. As noted 
elsewhere in this thesis, imports are not insecure per se, and much of the likely level of 
disruption to these imports is dependent on the diversity and stability of exporting nations; 
therefore this indicator should be viewed in conjunction with indicator 2c. This indicator is 
commonly used in energy security assessments in a variety of contexts, and would be relevant 
for non-UK-based assessments. However, vulnerability to risks arising from unstable or non-
diverse imports depends on certain contextual factors, including import stability and diversity 
(see indicator 2c) and access to options such as fuel stockpiles and interconnection; therefore 
its relevance could vary from country to country. 
 
Indicator 2c. Diversity and stability of fuel imports 
 Mixed quantitative / qualitative indicator 
 Quantitative indicator used for 2010 data 
 2010 figures show the diversity of fuel imports using SW index (see 2a) and the 
stability of fuel imports using NSW1, which appends the SW index with a stability 
parameter. 
 For 2030 and 2050, qualitative statements made about possible areas of risk for the 
pathways 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
 
For diversity of imports in 2010, the origins of existing imports of major fuels (gas, coal, 
uranium, biomass and electricity imports) are collated to show the proportion of imports and 
of overall fuel use (in TWh/y) from each country. These are then used to create the diversity 
measure for 2010, for each of these fuels, in order to illustrate those which currently 
experience higher diversity. 
 
Additionally to diversity of imports, it is crucial to take into account the stability of the 
exporting nation (Lilliestam and Ellenbeck 2011; Neumann 2007). To calculate the stability of 
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major exporting nations in 2010, this indicator uses existing data on the origins of major fuels. 
The import diversity data is appended with information regarding the political stability of the 
exporting countries, from the Fragile States Index 2014 (Foreign Policy 2014). This is done by 
including a parameter ‘b’ representing stability into the SW index outlined above, using the 
Neumann Shannon-Wiener Index (NSW1) (Neumann 2007):  
NSW1= -∑ Pi*(Ln(pi))*b 
 
For 2030 and 2050, there is no information available about fuel imports. The source of imports 
depends on a number of factors which are impossible to assess, including geopolitical relations 
between states, trade agreements and markets in each individual country and worldwide. It is 
also not possible to know the stability of exporting states out to 2030 or 2050. The Arab Spring 
acted as a timely reminder that attempting to project the future political climate of any state is 
a futile task. Therefore, qualitative statements are all that can be made regarding the situation 
in 2030 and 2050, based on the calculations for each fuel for 2010. 
 
It is the contention of this research that a more thorough assessment of the energy security of 
transition pathways would need to be able to make assessments of the likelihood of disruption 
to imports, either due to a lack of diversity or due to stability problems in the exporting 
nations. Therefore, if pathways are to be deemed ‘secure’, it is imperative that they 
incorporate information about global fuel markets and trade routes, and about global 
geopolitical trends.  
 
The ‘import diversity and stability’ indicator would be relevant for assessing the energy 
security of a wide range of pathways, including countries other than the UK. However, 
vulnerability to risks arising from unstable or non-diverse imports depends on certain 
contextual factors, including overall import dependence and access to options such as fuel 
stockpiles and interconnection; therefore its relevance could vary from country to country. 
 
 
4.4.2 Affordability 
4.4.2.1 Sub-dimension 3: Cost to the System 
This sub-dimension carries out quantitative analysis of the costs of realising the three 
pathways. These costs are assessed separately for each of the major three parts of the energy 
system: generation, transmission, and distribution. 
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Indicator 3a. Cost of Electricity Generation 
 Quantitative indicator 
 Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE), measured in £/Megawatt-Hour (MWh) 
 Total annual generation costs, measured in £bn 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
 
LCOE uses a widely recognised calculation for the cost of electricity generation. The calculation 
includes Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) costs (i.e. pre-development and construction), fixed 
Operating Expenditure (OPEX) costs (i.e. fixed operation and maintenance, insurance and 
connection charges) and variable OPEX costs (i.e. variable operation and maintenance and 
fuel). Component data is taken from DECC (2013d) and Mott Macdonald (2010). The 
calculation takes into account the capacity and load hours of each type of generation. CAPEX is 
discounted at a rate of 10%. This is then used to show total annual generation costs for the 
pathways in £bn. The ‘cost of electricity generation’ indicator would be relevant for assessing 
the energy security of a wide range of pathways, including countries other than the UK; 
however, application to other contexts would require additional data because the cost figures 
used here are specific to the UK context. 
 
 
Sensitivity analyses are carried out to show the impact of: 
 - Different discount rates (DR Sensitivity) 
 - Decreasing CAPEX costs due to learning and economies of scale (LC Sensitivity) 
 - Changes in CAPEX costs based on DECC estimates (CAP Sensitivity) 
 - Fuel costs 
 - Carbon price 
 
Indicator 3b. Transmission upgrade costs 
 Quantitative indicator 
 Calculates costs of necessary additional and upgraded transmission infrastructure, in 
£bn 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
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This indicator estimates the cost of upgrading or adding to the transmission network in order 
to absorb the electricity generation of the pathways. Transmission upgrade costs for offshore 
wind are calculated using unit costs and existing data about the likely unit requirements of all 
the Round 2 and Round 3 wind farms (data from National Grid 2013c). Interconnector offshore 
costs are calculated using unit and cable costs for planned interconnectors (National Grid 
2013c; 2013d) and data on individual interconnectors from the websites of the individual 
projects. Onshore costs are calculated using the estimates of network upgrades that will likely 
be required for different amounts of new generation, from the Electricity Networks Strategy 
Group (ENSG 2012). For onshore wind and nuclear, these onshore transmission estimates are 
weighted according to likely locations of onshore infrastructure, using locations of existing 
nuclear generation sites and siting estimates of current and future wind installations, from 
National Grid system maps and projections (National Grid 2012). For all other onshore 
generation, locations are weighted according to current generation sites (National Grid 2012). 
This indicator would be relevant for assessing the energy security of a wide range of pathways, 
including countries other than the UK; however, application to other contexts would require 
additional data because the cost figures used here are specific to the UK context. 
 
 
Indicator 3c. Distribution upgrade costs 
 Quantitative indicator  
 Calculates costs of necessary additional and upgraded distribution network 
infrastructure, in £bn 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
 
Distribution network costs are estimated on the basis of a paper by Pudjianto et al (2013), 
which carries out detailed spatial modelling of the distribution networks for the Transition 
Pathways through to 2050. This indicator would be relevant for assessing the energy security 
of a wide range of pathways, including countries other than the UK; however, application to 
other contexts would require additional data because the cost figures used here are specific to 
the UK context. 
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4.4.2.2 Sub-dimension 4: Cost to the Consumer 
This sub-dimension utilises the information from the previous affordability indicators to 
estimate the eventual cost to the consumer. This is done both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Firstly, a quantitative analysis is conducted of the annual household retail electricity bills of the 
three pathways. Secondly, this information is used as the basis for a qualitative assessment of 
the important question ‘affordable to whom’ (Cherp and Jewell 2014), focusing on fuel poverty 
and the affordability of the pathways to the most vulnerable groups in society. 
 
Indicator 4a. Annual retail electricity bills 
 Quantitative indicator 
 Calculates future annual electricity bills to domestic consumers, in £/y 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
 
Annual retail electricity bills are calculated using the wholesale price and a ‘consumer uplift’ 
based on an estimated breakdown of an average household bill. This breakdown consists of 
19% of the bill for supplier costs and margins, 9% for social and environmental policies, 20% 
for network charges, and 5% for Value-Added Tax (VAT). The annual bills are calculated 
without VAT; this is a standard method which makes it easier to compare between countries. 
 
Wholesale prices are calculated by defining the price-setting technology using hourly demand 
data for the whole year. The load duration curve is first split into horizontal stacks according to 
the capacity of each fuel, and the estimated merit order as given in the pathways data. The 
year is split into four time periods: summer and winter peak, and summer and winter off-peak. 
This is used to calculate the number of hours during the year for which each fuel is setting the 
electricity price. The LCOE data for total variable costs is then used to show the cost of 
electricity generation for the price-setting fuel. These prices are multiplied by the number of 
hours in the year for which each fuel is setting the price, giving an overall wholesale price of 
electricity. 
 
The wholesale price estimates are then used to estimate the annual electricity bills to 
consumers. The baseline estimate is calculated using the same consumer uplift as today. 
Sensitivity tests are then carried out to show the impact of: 
- Increasing price of generation for each major fuel by 20% (coal, gas, nuclear, 
biomass) 
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 - Changes in the merit order of dispatch 
 - Impact of assumptions r.e. price of imported electricity 
 - Impact of assumptions r.e. carbon price in 2030 and 2050 
 - Changes to social and environmental programmes 
 - Different estimates of wholesale price 
 - Different network charges (based on transmission and distribution costs, see 3b and 
3c) 
 - Population growth 
 - Economies of scale 
 - Changes to the EMR 
 - Utility profit margins and rent-seeking. 
For more detail on all the sensitivity analyses carried out, including the rationale behind each, 
see Appendix C. 
 
The ‘annual bills’ indicator would be relevant for assessing the energy security of a wide range 
of pathways, including countries other than the UK; however, application to other contexts 
would require additional data because the cost figures used here are specific to the UK 
context. 
 
 
Indicator 4b. Impact on levels of fuel poverty 
 Qualitative indicator 
 Uses annual bills data and pathways storylines to assess risk of heightened levels of 
fuel poverty, on high/medium/low scale 
 Variable / limited relevance to other countries. 
 
In the absence of detailed information on future incomes which would be required for a 
quantitative assessment of fuel poverty, a qualitative analysis is carried out using the ‘annual 
bills’ results, existing information on fuel poverty (Hills 2012) and the pathway storylines. The 
combination of annual bill data and qualitative analysis allows the identification of ‘high risk’ 
and ‘low risk’ pathways; more detail is given in Appendix C and in the results in section 5.4.3. 
Fuel poverty is a particularly prevalent issue in the UK, mainly because of ageing, poor-quality 
housing stock (compared to some other industrialised countries), combined with cold winters 
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and relatively high income inequality. Therefore this indicator would be of variable or limited 
relevance to energy security assessments of other industrialised countries. 
 
 
4.4.3 Long-term environmental sustainability 
4.4.3.1 Sub-dimension 5: GHGs 
Indicator 5a. GHG emissions and intensity of the generation mix  
 Quantitative indicator 
 Calculates UK GHG electricity emissions in MtCO2e/y 
 Calculates life-cycle GHG intensity of electricity generation in gCO2e/kWh 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
 
This indicator measures UK electricity emissions in MtCO2e/y, and the GHG intensity of the 
electricity generation mix per kWh of electricity generated. Both measures are calculated for 
all GHGs, expressed as carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). This indicator would be relevant for 
assessing the energy security of a wide range of pathways, including countries other than the 
UK. 
 
GHG emissions data is taken directly from the pathways data, and used to show year-on-year 
and cumulative GHG emissions for the UK energy system. Life-cycle carbon intensity of 
electricity generation is calculated by adding together recognised carbon intensities of the 
fuels used, using data from the IPCC (Moomaw et al 2011) (again, note that ‘carbon intensity’ 
is used here and in the IPCC data as short-hand for carbon dioxide equivalent). 
 
4.4.3.2 Sub-dimension 6: Resources 
This sub-dimension focuses on the long-term availability and depletion of fuels and other 
materials used in power production. Unlike the ‘external disruption’ sub-dimension (which 
focuses on markets and supply chains), this sub-dimension focuses on possible future physical 
constraints on resources. 
 
Indicator 6a. Primary fuels depletion 
 Qualitative indicator 
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 Uses existing literature to assess depletion risk of major fuels, and relevance to the 
fuel mix in the pathways 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
 
The considerable uncertainties in calculating global fuel resources into the future mean that it 
is outside the scope of this thesis to assess fuel depletion quantitatively. Information from the 
existing literature is used to assess the risk of depletion of the four primary fuels (coal, gas, 
uranium and biomass) through to 2050. The pathways are then assessed qualitatively for their 
level of reliance on depletable fuels. This indicator would be relevant for energy security 
assessments in other countries. It is particularly suited for security assessments over longer 
timescales. 
 
Indicator 6b. Secondary materials depletion 
 Qualitative indicator 
 Uses existing literature to assess depletion risk of major fuels, and relevance to the 
fuel mix in the pathways 
 Potentially applicable to other countries. 
 
As with primary resource depletion, this indicator uses a qualitative method using information 
from the existing literature to assess the level of risk of depletion of secondary materials used 
in electricity generation, and explores the extent to which the pathways are reliant on these 
generating technologies. This indicator would be relevant for energy security assessments in 
other countries. It is particularly suited for security assessments over longer timescales. 
 
4.4.3.3 Sub-dimension 7: Water 
This sub-dimension focuses on the water required for the cooling of power generation 
facilities, an aspect which is frequently overlooked and yet is likely to become increasingly 
important in the longer-term. Water requirements are assessed both in terms of overall 
requirements and intensity. 
 
Indicator 7a. Water usage for cooling and biomass feedstock production 
 Quantitative indicator 
 Calculates water consumption and water withdrawals for power generation in m3/y 
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 Water usage for biomass production not possible to calculate because of lack of 
available data 
 Variable relevance to other countries. 
 
The amount of water required by different types of power generation is given in the literature 
(Davies et al 2013; Kyle et al 2013; Van Vliet et al 2012). Figures are available for water 
withdrawals and for water consumption, in m3/MWh. These figures are weighted according to 
the type of cooling used for the plant, taken from projections by Kyle et al (2013). This is then 
multiplied by power outputs (in TWh/y) to show water withdrawal and water consumption in 
m3/y.  
 
The results are then weighted 70-30 to reflect the greater impact of freshwater use vs 
seawater use, using sites of existing and planned power stations (from National Grid 2012). 
Sensitivity tests are carried out to show the impact of different assumptions regarding 
land/sea weighting; more detail of these tests is given in Appendix D. 
 
It is important to emphasise that this is not a life-cycle analysis into the water usage of fuels 
such as crop-based biomass, or of extraction of fuels such as coal. Data on life-cycle water 
usage is especially important for biomass, and there are models which are designed to 
calculate life-cycle water requirements (for example, the FAO-Penman-Monteith model 
[Zotarelli et al 2009]). However, life-cycle analysis of the Transition Pathways would be 
hindered considerably by a lack of information about biomass feedstock types and country of 
origin. For a more in-depth analysis of water impacts, it would be desirable to include a life-
cycle water assessment; for this, detailed information on feedstocks, fuel types (e.g. brown 
coal vs lignite, conventional vs unconventional fossils), and country of origin would be 
required, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
This indicator would be relevant for assessing energy security in a variety of contexts; 
however, its applicability would vary between different countries, because some countries are 
much more prone to water supply problems than others. 
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4.4.4 Reliability 
4.4.4.1 Sub-dimension 8: System adequacy 
This sub-dimension focuses on ensuring that the system is adequate to meet demand with the 
available supply, at all times of the year. The pathways have all been designed with hour-by-
hour system adequacy in mind, and all are modelled to meet the UK reliability standard of 3 
hours Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) per year (see section 5.8.1). However, there are other 
important factors in ensuring system adequacy, including maintaining a secure capacity 
margin, maintaining adequate capacity factors for dispatchable generation, and providing 
flexible two-way capacity options such as electricity storage and interconnection with 
neighbouring countries. 
 
Indicator 8a. De-rated capacity margins 
 Quantitative indicator 
 Calculates % of generating capacity which could reasonably be expected to be 
available at time of peak demand 
 Potentially applicable to other countries 
 
De-rated capacity margin (DRCM) measures the amount of electricity generating capacity 
which can reasonably be expected to be available at times of peak demand, and which 
therefore can be ‘relied upon’ to be available for meeting system peaks, taking into account 
planned and unplanned outages and intermittency. Assumed de-rated capacity margins for 
each fuel (‘capacity credit’) are given in the National Grid 10-year statement (National Grid 
2012: 30). Pathway DRCM is calculated using the following equation (RAEng 2013): 
 
 
This indicator would be relevant for assessing the energy security of a wide range of pathways, 
including countries other than the UK. However, alternative data may be required, as the 
capacity credit figures used here are specific to the UK context. 
 
 
Sensitivity tests are carried out to show the impact of changing assumptions regarding: 
- Capacity credit of imports (0%, 50% and 100%) 
- Capacity credit of wind (5%, 8%, 20%, 40%) 
- Capacity credit of CCS (68%, 89%, 110%) 
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Details of the assumptions underlying these sensitivity tests are shown in Appendix E. 
 
Indicator 8b. Capacity factors and oversupply 
 Mixed quantitative / qualitative indicator 
 Uses data from the FESA model to show capacity factors for each generating 
technology in the pathway, in % 
 Qualitative analysis is then made of likely areas of risk for oversupply and for 
investment in dispatchable generation 
 Variable / limited applicability to other countries. 
 
As well as ensuring that there is enough generation capacity available to meet demand peaks, 
an electricity system must also ensure that during times of low demand there is not severe 
oversupply of electricity. To do this, the capacity factors of each type of generation are 
adjusted by the FESA model which is used to generate the supply and demand mixes in the 
Transition Pathways. Barnacle et al (2013) and Barton et al (2013) note that a key issue for the 
pathways could be the high amounts of spare capacity required to back up the high 
penetrations of intermittent RES in the generation mix of the pathways. A significant reduction 
in capacity factors could be a risk, because it risks making the initial investment in this type of 
generation capacity economically unviable because of the economic unattractiveness to 
generators of operating their plants at such low capacity factors.14 Countries other than the UK 
may experience different levels of risk arising from oversupply, for instance due to differences 
in market structure and availability of capacity sharing options such as transnational Grid 
systems; therefore this indicator would have variable applicability to non-UK contexts. 
 
Indicator 8c. Electricity storage and interconnection 
 Mixed quantitative / qualitative indicator 
 Calculates total electricity storage + total electricity interconnection in GW nameplate 
capacity 
 Qualitative assessment made of the level of ambition shown in the pathways 
 Variable applicability to other countries. 
 
                                                          
14 The UK has recently introduced a Capacity Mechanism to attempt to deal with this problem (see DECC 2013c; 
National Grid 2014a); however, the first out-turn year is in 2018, and therefore it is too early to tell how effective or 
efficient this mechanism will be. 
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Storage and interconnection both represent forms of flexible, dispatchable power, which can 
in theory be called on when required (for instance, at a time of high demand), in order to help 
incorporate intermittent generation and to help reduce the necessary levels of spare capacity 
of conventional generation on the system. 
 
The amount of electricity storage and interconnection (in GW) in the pathways is added 
together. The figures for interconnection are taken from the nameplate installed 
interconnector capacity, and thus assume 100% imports to the UK during stress periods. The 
results are then compared against a potential range of interconnection and storage potential 
suggested in the literature. For example, does the pathway include a significant amount of 
electricity storage options such as distributed and Grid-level storage? Does the pathway build 
any new interconnectors? How ambitious are the plans for interconnectors? 
 
This indicator would potentially be applicable to countries other than the UK, but only in 
certain cases, and may not be applicable to all industrialised country contexts. For some 
countries, interconnection may be less relevant, either because a transnational Grid system is 
already in place, or because they are geographically isolated enough to make interconnection 
unattractive. Furthermore, for some countries with abundant dispatchable low-carbon energy 
supplies (e.g. hydro-power), storage and interconnection may be less important for Grid 
balancing. 
 
4.4.4.2 Sub-dimension 9: Shock resilience 
This sub-dimension focuses on system resilience, especially resilience to sudden and 
unexpected changes in the supply/demand balance. No matter how secure the system, it is 
impossible to completely remove the risk of sudden shocks caused by unpredictable events 
such as geopolitical tensions, price shocks, or technical faults such as power station failures 
and line trips. Therefore, an important aspect of system security lies in ensuring that supply-
side and demand-side aspects of the system can quickly respond to and recover from such 
shocks (Kiriyama and Kajikawa 2014).  
 
Indicator 9a. Flexible supply: Frequency response capability 
 Quantitative indicator 
 Calculates potential maximum and average Frequency Response capabilities of the 
generation mix, in MWh 
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 Potentially applicable to other countries. 
 
This indicator uses the capability of the generation mix to provide Frequency Response 
services to the System Operator as a proxy for the flexibility and responsiveness of the 
generation mix. Frequency Response (FR) is the ability of the system to react to short-term 
changes in the frequency (Hz) of supply, over timescales of less than 30 seconds. FR 
capabilities are calculated by extrapolating from power station data given by National Grid 
(available on request). From this data it is possible to calculate an average and a maximum FR 
capability for each type of power station; this is used alongside the recorded unit sizes to 
calculate FR capability per Megawatt (MW), which is then applied to the generation mix of the 
pathway. The results show average and maximum primary and secondary FR capabilities, in 
MWh. 
 
It is important to note that DSR can provide an important source of both Frequency Response 
and Short-term Operating Reserve (STOR) (Ofgem 2013b). However, as explained in Indicator 
9d, it is much more challenging to calculate the potential for DSR in the pathways due to lack 
of data. For this reason, ‘flexible supply’ and ‘flexible demand’ are assessed separately. 
Frequency Response and STOR capabilities are used as proxies for flexible supply only.  
 
In the future, the requirements of the system for FR may change; this important consideration 
is covered in indicator 9c. This indicator would be relevant for assessing the energy security of 
a wide range of pathways, including countries other than the UK, although again the possibility 
of changing FR requirements should be taken into account. Alternative raw data would be 
required, as the FR availability figures used here are specific to the UK context. 
 
Indicator 9b. STOR and black-start capability 
 Quantitative indicator 
 Calculates the proportion of the nameplate generating capacity on the system which 
could potentially be used to provide STOR and black-start capability, in % 
 Potentially applicable to other countries. 
 
FR covers the system if generation is suddenly lost. However, for the system to return to 
normal, reserve power then needs to come online. STOR is delivered within a maximum of 4 
hours (National Grid 2011). All conventional generation can in theory provide STOR; however, 
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some types of plant cannot come online quickly if they are switched off at the time of the 
STOR request. Therefore this indicator shows results for short-term STOR (within around 45 
minutes) and long-term STOR (45 minutes to 4 hours). The results show what percentage of 
capacity in the pathway would be capable of providing short-term and long-term STOR. 
 
Black-start capability is used in the event of a blackout over a large geographical area. Small 
off-grid generators (usually liquid fuel) are used to daisy-chain power to start larger 
generators, until the main plant turbines can be started. In theory, all conventional thermal 
generation (not including nuclear) can provide black-start power. The indicator shows the 
proportion of each pathway which would in theory be capable of providing black-start 
capability, if all compatible plants were fitted with this.  
 
As with FR, requirements for STOR and for black-start may change in future; this is covered in 
indicator 9c. This indicator would be relevant for assessing the energy security of a wide range 
of pathways, including countries other than the UK, although again the possibility of changing 
STOR requirements should be taken into account. 
 
 
Indicator 9c. Response and Reserve requirements 
 Quantitative indicator, to be used alongside indicators 9a and 9b 
 Calculates potential increases or decreases in FR requirements (in MWh) and STOR 
requirements (in %). These are compared with the capabilities calculated in 9a and 9b 
 Potentially applicable to other countries. 
 
The requirements for both FR and STOR may increase in a low-carbon electricity system. 
Requirements may increase due to decreasing system inertia (FR), increasing wind generation 
and wind forecast error (STOR), and increasing size of the largest generating unit on the 
system (FR and STOR) (National Grid 2011).  
 
Inertia: when a turbine spins, it creates a build-up of kinetic energy. If the plant stops 
generating unexpectedly, the turbine does not stop immediately, and the kinetic energy can be 
used to provide inertia which decreases the need for FR. A shift towards wind and solar power 
would decrease the amount of natural inertia on the system (Ulbig et al 2014). Increasing FR 
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requirements due to decreases in inertia are calculated using the proportion of generation 
which provides natural inertia. 
 
Wind generation: inaccuracies in wind forecasts mean that with more wind on the system, 
there is increasing need for STOR to cover these inaccuracies. The increasing STOR 
requirements due to wind generation are calculated using National Grid data (National Grid 
2011) which shows the increases in STOR required for certain levels of wind generating 
capacity; this is then applied to the wind generating capacity in the pathways. 
 
Increasing unit size: if the biggest unit on the system is of a larger size, the potential loss of 
power in the event of a unit trip increases, thus increasing the requirements for both FR and 
STOR to cover this loss. The increasing FR and STOR requirements due to larger unit sizes are 
calculated using National Grid modelling which assumes the connection of two 1800MW units 
at Hinkley C within the next decade (National Grid 2011). Sensitivity tests are carried out for 
the two centralised pathways, to show the potential impact of even larger units than this on 
the system in 2030 and 2050. 
 
This indicator would potentially be applicable to other countries, especially as requirement 
levels for FR and STOR may change across different contexts, and are crucial for understanding 
the level of risk arising from insufficient FR and STOR capacity. However, alternative raw data 
would be required, as the requirements figures used here are specific to the UK context. 
 
Indicator 9d. Flexible demand 
 Mixed quantitative / qualitative indicator 
 Calculates technically and realistically shiftable potential for 2010 (in GW); estimates 
realistically shiftable potential for 2030 and 2050 in % and GW 
 Also uses data on electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps as a proxy for demand 
flexibility. Results given in TWh/y and in % of total demand 
 Potentially applicable to other countries. 
 
Flexible demand helps to improve resilience by offering increased flexibility and reducing peak 
load. Reducing the peak means that less generation capacity is required to meet peak demand, 
meaning that there is potentially less requirement for the types of shock resilience measures 
described above (Drysdale et al 2015). Moreover, an effective system for flexible demand can 
102 
 
help the system to respond to shocks, by offering an option for response or reserve from the 
demand-side rather than the supply-side, and thus mitigating the impact of declining response 
and reserve capabilities on the supply-side (Nistor et al 2015).  
 
Data on flexible demand is not given in the pathways. Current data from the literature (AECOM 
2011; Dudeney et al 2014; Element Energy 2012; Palmer et al 2013) is used to estimate 
technically shiftable potential and realistically shiftable potential for 2010. This is used 
alongside peak demand data in the pathways to estimate the reduction in peak demand which 
could be achieved with conservative and ambitious percentages of shiftable demand.  
 
Pathways data on heat pumps and electric vehicles (EVs) is then used as a further proxy for 
levels of flexible demand in the pathways. EVs and heat pumps both represent relatively large 
shiftable electrical loads, especially compared to other appliances which could be used to load-
shift such as fridges; therefore they can be used as a rough proxy for flexible demand as a 
whole. 
 
The ‘flexible demand’ indicator would be relevant for assessing the energy security of a wide 
range of pathways, including for countries other than the UK. It is particularly relevant for 
assessing or comparing the security of low-carbon pathways or pathways undergoing major 
transition, as these could be particularly vulnerable from risks arising from insufficient 
flexibility.
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Table 4-2: Overview of indicators with brief description of methods       
‘Details’ key: 
QN: Quantitative. QL: Qualitative. M: Mixed 
 : Indicator is potentially applicable to other countries 
Dime
nsion 
Sub-
Dimension 
Indicator Overview of methods Details 
A
v
a
il
a
b
il
it
y
 
Likelihood 
of domestic 
disruption to 
electricity 
availability 
Approval ratings of 
generation mix 
Results from a nationally-representative public survey (Demski et al 2013) are applied to the 
generation mixes of the pathways, to show proportion of the mix (in GW and %) which is 
‘approved’ and ‘opposed’ by the general public 
QN  
Land requirements (proxy 
for disruptive opposition) 
The reasons people protest are complex (e.g. Devine-Wright et al 2009), and data is limited; 
therefore 3 proxies are used on the basis that increased proximity is more likely to result in 
opposition (Batel et al 2013; Devine-Wright 2005): land required for generation infrastructure 
(weighted 70-30 for onshore-offshore); additional onshore transmission infrastructure required; 
domestic extraction of primary fuel resources 
QN  
Participation in decisions 
Qualitative indicator, uses pathways storylines to assess the level of public participation in energy 
provision and in decision-making 
QL  
Likelihood 
of non-
domestic 
disruption to 
electricity 
availability 
Diversity of fuel types in 
the electricity mix 
Shannon-Wiener diversity calculation: -∑ Pi*(Ln(pi)), as used by Lehr (2009); Pfenninger and 
Keirstead (2015); Stirling (1998). 
 
QN  
Dependence on fuel 
imports 
Pathways data used to show % of fuel mix from imports for coal, gas and oil 
Uranium estimates from current stockpile data 
Biomass estimates using total indigenous biomass potential (estimate from pathways data) 
QN  
Diversity & stability of 
fuel imports 
Current (2010) fuel import diversity is measured using Shannon-Wiener index 
2010 fuel import stability measured by adding a stability parameter (Neumann 2007): NSW1= -∑ 
Pi*(Ln(pi))*b , where ‘b’ represents a stability parameter, derived from the Fragile States Index 
(Foreign Policy 2014) 
Insufficient data in pathways for quantitative analysis; therefore qualitative statements made about 
possible future diversity and stability 
M  
A
ff
o
rd
a
b
il
it
y
 
Cost to the 
system 
Generation costs 
Calculates LCOE using CAPEX (pre-development, construction), fixed OPEX (O&M, connection 
charges, insurance), variable OPEX (variable O&M, fuel, carbon price) (e.g. Pfenninger and 
Keirstead 2015) 
Cost data from DECC (2013d) and Mott Macdonald (2010) 
QN  
Transmission upgrade 
costs 
Onshore upgrade costs calculated using Electricity Networks Strategy Group estimates of 
upgrades required for different levels of new capacity (ENSG 2012) 
QN  
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Offshore upgrade costs calculated using estimated unit costs (from National Grid 2013c) 
Distribution upgrade costs 
Distribution upgrade costs for the pathways modelled by Pudjianto et al (2013) 
 
QN  
Cost to the 
consumer 
Annual retail electricity 
bills 
Wholesale electricity prices calculated using hourly demand data (from Transition Pathways 
modelling; see also Barton et al 2013) used to create Load Duration Curves; price-setting fuel 
defined by merit-order stacks; LCOE data used to give average yearly wholesale price; demand 
weighted seasonally 
Wholesale prices added to a ‘consumer uplift’: 19% of bill for supplier costs and margins, 9% 
social and environmental policies, 20% network charges. VAT (5%) not included in estimate. 
QN  
Impact on fuel poverty 
Qualitative analysis carried out using annual bills estimates, existing literature on levels of fuel 
poverty in the UK (especially Hills 2012), and the pathways storylines 
QL  
S
u
st
a
in
a
b
il
it
y
 
GHGs 
GHG emissions and 
intensity 
Electricity system GHG emissions taken directly from pathways data (see also Foxon et al 2013) 
Life-cycle carbon intensity (in CO2e) of electricity generation types taken from High, mid and low 
estimates from IPCC global power station data (Moomaw et al 2011) 
Total carbon intensity = Fuel-type intensity * (fuel-type generation TWh/y / Total generation 
TWh/y) 
QN  
Resources 
Primary fuels depletion 
Qualitative method using information from the existing literature to assess depletion risk of 
primary fuels. Pathways assessed qualitatively for their reliance on depletable fuels.  
QL  
Secondary materials 
depletion 
32 crucial materials are identified from Moss et al (2011) and Speirs et al (2014) and listed from 
‘highly critical’ to ‘not critical’ according to risk of depletion 
Pathways assessed qualitatively for their reliance on depletable materials. 
QL  
Water 
Water consumption & 
withdrawals 
Data on water withdrawals and water consumption of different types of power generation from 
Davies et al (2013). Projections on types of cooling to be employed in UK thermal powergen in 
future from Kyle et al (2013). These are applied to the generation mix to show water consumption 
and withdrawals in m3/y 
Baseline results weighted 70-30 to show greater environmental impact of freshwater vs seawater. 
Water usage for biomass feedstock production not possible to calculate because of lack of 
available data 
QN  
R
el
ia
b
il
it
y
 System 
adequacy 
De-rated Capacity 
Margins 
Indicative fuel-type margins from National Grid (2012: 30) are applied to the generation mix. Fuel 
type margin is weighted according to generation mix, and subtracted from peak demand 
Capacity margin (%) = ((total available capacity-peak demand) / peak demand) * 100 (RAEng 
2013) 
QN  
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Capacity factors & 
oversupply 
Capacity factors (from the Transition Pathways data) and capacity margins (see above) are used to 
highlight areas of oversupply 
M  
Electricity storage & 
interconnection 
Electricity storage and interconnection nameplate capacities summed together; also compared to 
plausible storage and interconnection developments 
M  
Resilience to 
sudden and 
unexpected 
changes in 
the supply-
demand 
balance 
Flexible supply: 
Frequency Response 
capability 
Power station data from National Grid (available on request) is used to calculate average FR 
capability of different generation types; this is applied to the fuel mix in the pathways. Maximum 
and mean FR capability shown for primary FR (<30 seconds) and secondary FR (30 seconds to 30 
minutes) 
QN  
Flexible supply:  
Short-term Operating 
Reserve & black-start 
capability 
Calculates percentage of generation mix which would be capable of providing STOR and black-
start capability (see National Grid 2011).  
STOR results shown for short-term STOR (<45 minutes) and long-term STOR (45 minutes to 4 
hours) 
QN  
Response & Reserve 
requirements 
Increasing requirements for FR and STOR are calculated on the basis of decreasing system inertia, 
increasing impact of wind forecasting error, and increased credible in-feed loss due to increase of 
unit size. All data from National Grid (2011) 
QN  
Flexible demand 
Calculates technically and realistically shiftable potential for 2010 (in GW), using data from 
Sustainability First (Dudeney et al 2014); estimates realistically shiftable potential for 2030 and 
2050 in % and GW 
Also uses data on electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps as a proxy for demand flexibility. 
Results given in TWh/y and in % of total demand 
M  
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4.5 Stakeholder interviews 
4.5.1 Why analyse stakeholders’ perspectives? 
One of the challenges of energy security policy lies in the fact that there are significant 
differences amongst different stakeholders regarding what energy security actually means. 
However, as of yet, the diversity of views remains rather vague and intangible. The set of 
indicators developed in the preceding sections offers a useful basis for exploring the 
perspectives of energy stakeholders, and can provide a starting point for an in-depth and 
transparent discussion which does not seek to close down the diversity of views, but instead 
seeks to open them up to debate.  
 
Stakeholder interviews are used to answer the second and third research questions. These 
interviews enable us to find out more about the diversity of views on energy and electricity 
security in the UK energy community. Respondents are encouraged to give their perspectives 
on the choice of indicators, and to give their views on possible additional dimensions and 
indicators which were not initially included in the set. As noted in Chapter 2, the ‘slipperiness’ 
of the energy security concept means that a significant diversity of views may be expected 
between different actors, even amongst actors who are all experts in the field of energy 
security. A number of factors may influence perspectives, including potentially the contention 
by Allison (1969) and others that “where you stand depends on where you sit” (see section 
2.1.3). The purpose of the interviews is not to attempt to generate an agreed-upon definition 
or set of indicators for measuring energy security (which, as shown in Sovacool and Mukherjee 
[2011] runs the risk of generating an unmanageably large set of issues and indicators). Rather, 
the purpose is to recognise and clarify the preferences and priorities of different actors and to 
explore their implications.  
 
The results from the interviews are used to find out what impact stakeholders’ views have on 
the results of the indicator assessment. It may be that certain perspectives, if carried forward 
into a security assessment, would lead to certain pathways or technology options being 
preferred. Stakeholder interviews thus allow us to open up the assessment of low-carbon 
electricity security to the wider energy community. If certain stakeholders feel that a certain 
indicator or group of indicators is especially important, and one of the pathways or a certain 
technology scores very badly for this indicator, there is certainly value in flagging this up as an 
addition to the initial indicator assessment. Similarly, if a certain indicator is generally felt to be 
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unimportant by stakeholders, it is worth noting this for pathways or technologies which 
appear to be particularly risky for this indicator. 
 
4.5.2 Interview methodology 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with UK energy stakeholders, selected using non-
probability sampling. Non-probability sampling refers to sampling techniques which do not 
select participants on the basis of statistically random samples; studies using non-probability 
sampling cannot therefore be used to draw generalisations about an entire population. Yet 
non-probability sampling is commonly used in qualitative research, because it is particularly 
suited to understanding complex issues relating to human behaviour; it also recognises that 
some members of the population may be more likely to provide insight into a particular topic, 
for instance because of their existing expertise (Marshall 1996). For this thesis, stakeholders 
were selected on the basis of their direct involvement with energy issues (e.g. through their 
job title or their organisation), and their involvement with organisations which may have some 
influence on UK policy processes, either through direct involvement or through participation in 
research and consultations.  Initially, purposive sampling was used to contact respondents 
from a number of pre-defined target organisations (for example, government departments 
involved in energy security issues). Secondly, snowball sampling was used to fill in any gaps in 
organisations or sectors where purposive sampling failed to get a response from the desired 
individual or organisation. 
 
The aim of the interviews was to speak to stakeholders from a range of different types of 
organisation within the energy sector, in order to gather a range of views from across the 
spectrum of potentially influential stakeholders. Six desired types were identified as follows: 
1. Utilities (e.g. major energy suppliers, smaller suppliers, industry groups) 
2. NGOs and civil society (e.g. environmental / consumer interest organisations, energy 
co-ops)15 
3. Think tanks and consultancies 
4. Government and regulatory bodies (e.g. government departments, Ofgem) 
5. Electricity network companies (e.g. National Grid, the Distribution Network Operators) 
6. Academia (e.g. universities, research groups) 
                                                          
15 It should be noted that some of the respondents are from energy co-ops, which could technically be viewed as 
either ‘NGOs’ or ‘utilities’. However, in light of the fact that employees of energy co-ops are often ideologically 
driven, and frequently work as volunteers for many years without earning a wage from the organisation, it was 
decided that they have more in common with NGOs than with the utilities, and are therefore listed as group 2.  
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From each of these organisations, a number of desired individuals were identified on the basis 
of their existing knowledge of energy security issues; these were contacted using purposive 
sampling. Where these individuals were not available, alternatives were identified using 
snowball sampling. This meant that a number of experts from each type of organisation could 
be interviewed. Because of the small number of energy experts in the UK, it was not possible 
to target experts with particular roles within each type of organisation.  In total, 25 
stakeholders were interviewed; table 4.3 gives anonymised details regarding their position in 
their organisation and relevant background experience where available. By choosing 
individuals specifically from a range of different types of organisation, it may be expected 
(according to Miles’ law, discussed in section 2.1.3) that individuals from the same type of 
organisation would share similar perspectives. On the other hand, perspectives could also be 
shaped by other contextual factors such as respondents’ background experience, personal ties 
etc., and this could have a stronger influence over peoples’ views than the organisation for 
which they work.  
 
Table 4-3: interviewee details 
 Type of 
organisation 
Position Background / experience 
A Think tank/ 
advisory body 
Head of Policy 8 years’ experience as energy policy advisor (public and 
private sector). PhD in maths. 
B Academia Senior researcher 12 years’ experience as energy/environment researcher in 
various universities (UK). PhD in energy policy. 
C NGO Policy director 15 years’ experience as policy advisor and campaigner for 
environmental NGOs. 
D Think tank/ 
advisory body 
Senior researcher 7 years’ experience as environmental/energy consultant 
(private sector). Previously sales. 
E Think tank/ 
advisory body 
Senior researcher 15 years’ experience as environment/energy consultant 
(public and private sector). 
F Utility Head of policy 7 years’ experience as energy/environment policy advisor 
and consultant (public and private sector). Previously 
journalism. 
G Utility Head of policy 15 years’ experience as policy advisor and energy 
strategist (private sector). 
H Academia Professor Over 20 years’ experience as energy/ environment 
researcher in various universities (UK and global). PhD in 
energy policy. 
I NGO Chief Economist Over 20 years’ experience as energy/environment 
researcher and economist (public and private sector). 
J Academia Senior researcher 8 years’ experience as energy/environment researcher in 
various universities (UK). PhD in energy economics. 
K Academia Research fellow 11 years’ experience as energy/environment researcher in 
various universities (UK). PhD in energy policy. 
L Utility Strategy director Over 20 years’ experience as energy policy advisor 
(private sector). 
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M Think tank/ 
advisory body 
Consultant 7 years’ experience as energy/environment researcher 
(public, private and NGO sectors). Previously 
environmental campaigner. 
N Policy & 
Regulation 
Associate partner 11 years’ experience as energy researcher and policy 
advisor (public sector). Previously law. 
O NGO Strategy director 15 years’ experience as consultant and analyst in the 
energy sector (public and private sector). 
P Think tank/ 
advisory body 
Senior policy 
officer 
5 years’ experience as environmental campaigner and 
policy advisor (private and NGO sector). MPhil in 
philosophy. 
Q Policy & 
Regulation 
Civil servant 7 years’ experience as civil servant (energy and 
environment). Previous unknown. 
R Think tank/ 
advisory body 
Executive analyst 13 years’ experience as energy/environment researcher 
and analyst (public, private and education sector). PhD in 
physics. 
S Network 
company 
Head of policy 14 years’ experience as policy advisor and public affairs 
manager in the energy sector (private sector). Previously 
politics. 
T NGO Director 8 years’ experience as energy NGO director. Previously 
journalism. 
U Policy & 
regulation 
Department head 9 years’ experience as policy and communications advisor 
in the energy sector (public sector). PhD in chemistry. 
V Policy & 
regulation 
Civil servant 11 years’ experience as director for various energy 
organisations (public and private sector). PhD in 
engineering. 
W Network 
company 
Department head Over 20 years’ experience in various roles for network 
companies (UK and US). 
X NGO Director 8 years’ experience as director of energy NGO. Over 20 
years’ experience as energy policy advisor (public sector 
and self-employed). 
Y Utility Strategy director 11 years’ experience as strategy and technology director 
in energy sector (private sector). Previously chief engineer 
(private sector). 
 
About one week before each interview, respondents were sent a 2-page briefing note (see 
Appendix G). The briefing note consisted of an introduction and overview of the thesis 
research, and the indicator set. The indicators were given to interviewees in a list, rather than 
the graphical framework image shown in figure 4.4. The reason for this is that the aim of the 
graphic is to show a broad and balanced view of multiple different dimensions of energy 
security; offering interviewees this image in advance could thus have resulted in framing 
effects whereby they became more conscious of this approach than they would have been 
otherwise, and may have based their opinions accordingly. This thesis aims to identify areas of 
imbalance, therefore indicators were provided in a list. Apart from the briefing note shown in 
Appendix G, no additional information was provided to respondents; for example, respondents 
were not made aware of the methods used for calculating indicators, or of the specific set of 
transition pathways used. All interviews were roughly one hour long, and all were conducted 
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face to face. All interviews were recorded using a Dictaphone and transcribed in full. 
Interviewees were kept anonymous. 
 
The hour-long face-to-face interviews were structured thus: 
1. The first part of the interview elicited opinions on each indicator. Respondents were 
asked to give a rating of 1 to 5 for each indicator in terms of its importance for 
assessing electricity security in a low-carbon context. During this process, interviewees 
were asked why they had made certain decisions.  
 
2. Interviewees were asked whether they felt that there were any important indicators 
missing from the list.  
 
3. Interviewees were asked which measures, policies or technologies they felt are crucial 
for improving UK electricity security, in both the short-term and the long-term. They 
were also asked to identify what they see as the main risks to UK electricity security, 
again over a range of timescales. 
 
It is worth noting that the purpose of the interviews was not to focus on the detail of methods 
or calculations for individual indicators. If a respondent were to suggest an entirely new 
dimension or indicator, then this was important to include in the analysis, but the overall focus 
was on the broad view and perceptions of energy and electricity security. The interviews were 
carried out during the period January to April 2015. Interviews were conducted after the 
finalisation of the indicator set; as such, the interviews were not intended to contribute to the 
development of the indicator set, but rather to explore the diversity of actors’ views using the 
indicator set as a basis. 
 
4.5.3 Methods for analysing the results of the interviews 
The interview transcripts were coded in accordance with recognised methods for thematic 
coding analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006; Burnard et al 2008; Hsieh and Shannon 2005). The 
transcripts were first coded according to all key words and topics. These were then grouped in 
order to find areas of commonality, contention or repetition, and finally the main topics were 
grouped together into sets of core themes. The transcripts were revisited repeatedly during 
this process, in order to ensure that important information was not missed and that the main 
themes were identified. Finally, the respondents were anonymised in the written analysis. 
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Where respondents have been paraphrased or quoted, the respondents were contacted 
directly in order to check the information and to avoid misunderstanding or 
misrepresentation. 
 
4.5.4 Exploring the impact of stakeholders’ perspectives on the results of the 
security assessment 
As well as being used to explore the diversity of perspectives in the UK energy community, the 
data from the interviews can be used to answer the final research question: ““What impact do 
stakeholders’ perspectives have on the results of the security assessment and on their 
preferred options for improving energy security?” In order to do this, the results from the 
interviews (presented in Chapter 6) are applied to the results from the security assessment of 
the three Transition Pathways (presented in Chapter 5), in order to identify the impact of 
major cross-cutting themes and different emerging views of security on areas of high risk for 
the pathways. The outcomes and analysis are presented in Chapter 7. Doing this explicitly 
addresses the plural and conditional nature of energy security, by acknowledging the fact that 
multiple stakeholders will have competing knowledge claims which should be taken into 
account where possible when presenting the results from a security assessment. 
 
Furthermore, this process examines in detail some of the indicators which were suggested by 
respondents as missing from the initial set, to explore whether including them would have 
been possible or practical, and to ask what impact including them might have had on the 
overall results of the security assessment. As noted previously, the interviews were conducted 
after the indicator set had been finalised, therefore the purpose of exploring ‘missing’ 
indicators was not to contribute to the construction of the indicator set, but rather to test the 
set and provide potentially useful insights for further development of the indicator set in 
future research. 
 
 
4.6 Summing up chapter 4 
 
This chapter has set out the methodological approach and the detailed research methods 
which have been used for the empirical work in this thesis. Building on the literature 
foundations laid out in the preceding chapters, this chapter selected a set of indicators which 
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can be used to assess the security of low-carbon transition pathways, with a case study focus 
on pathways for the UK electricity system. The chapter selected three existing low-carbon 
transition pathways to be used as the basis for the application of the set of indicators. This 
chapter then described in detail the methods which will be used for the application of each 
individual indicator, including demonstrating the rationale for the choice of each indicator and 
the literature from which each was drawn. The final part of the chapter then explained the 
methods for discussing the indicator set with stakeholders in the UK energy community, in 
order to explore the perspectives of stakeholders on energy security and to explore the impact 
of stakeholders’ perspectives on the results from the initial security assessment. 
 
The following chapter is the first of two results chapters, both of which use the methodology 
outlined here to carry out empirical research into the security of the UK electricity system in a 
low-carbon context. The next chapter presents the results from the application of the set of 
indicators to the three low-carbon transition pathways for the UK electricity system, in order 
to systematically explore some of the risks, trade-offs and synergies which may occur when 
attempting to achieve energy security objectives. 
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5  Results I: Results of the security 
assessment 
 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis of the security of three selected low-
carbon pathways, in order to answer the first research question: “What indicators are 
appropriate for assessing the security of low-carbon transition pathways in the UK, and what 
are the results of such an assessment using a set of existing pathways?” The analysis was 
carried out using the set of indicators developed in Chapter 4, and has applied this set of 
indicators to the three low-carbon pathways developed by the Transition Pathways to a Low-
Carbon Economy Consortium, for the years 2010 (baseline), 2030 and 2050. This chapter 
presents the results one sub-dimension at a time. Further results from sensitivity tests are 
presented in the appendices. 
 
As noted in chapter 4, the pathways being assessed do not include a Business-as-Usual (BAU), 
for reasons which are explained in section 4.2.2. Therefore it is worth reiterating that 
comparisons are made purely between the three pathways, and are not intended to make any 
comparisons with any hypothetical BAU pathway. Furthermore, it should be noted that for all 
indicators, the 2010 results tend to differ only very slightly between the different pathways. 
This is an artefact of the FESA model which was used to construct the Transition Pathways: the 
model used 2008 data as the baseline, and therefore shows very slight differences between 
the pathways in 2010. However, these differences are not great enough to make a significant 
difference to the overall results, and it should be emphasised that the focus of this assessment 
is very much on the longer-term transition rather than security of supply in the immediate 
term.  
 
5.1 Availability Results: domestic disruption 
 
Indicator Overview of methods 
Approval 
ratings of 
generation mix 
Results from a nationally-representative public survey (Demski et al 2013) are applied to 
the generation mixes of the pathways, to show proportion of mix (in GW and %) which 
is ‘approved’ and ‘opposed’ by the general public 
 
Land 
requirements 
The reasons people protest are complex (e.g. Devine-Wright et al 2009), and data is 
limited; therefore 3 proxies are used on the basis that increased proximity is more likely 
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(proxy for 
disruptive 
opposition) 
to result in opposition (Batel et al 2013; Devine-Wright 2005): land required for 
generation infrastructure (weighted 70-30 for onshore-offshore); additional onshore 
transmission infrastructure required; domestic extraction of primary fuel resources 
Participation in 
decisions 
Qualitative indicator, uses pathways storylines to assess the level of public participation 
in energy provision and in decision-making 
 
 
5.1.1 Public approval ratings 
Figure 5.1 shows the approval ratings of the generation mix, in Gigawatts (GW) and % of total 
capacity. Public approval improves greatly on 2010 levels for all pathways, reflecting higher 
penetration of Renewable Energy Sources (RES): approval tends to be much higher for RES 
than for fossils, which is reflected in the high score for the Thousand Flowers (TF) pathway. The 
approval ratings of the Market Rules (MR) and Central Coordination (CC) pathways also 
continue to improve. However, as noted in the previous chapter and discussed further later on 
in this section, public acceptability is complex and much depends on the interaction between 
approval, opposition and engagement. Moreover, a crucial uncertainty arises from the fact 
that it is not possible to assess how public opinion will change over time. Therefore more 
detailed work would probably be required to analyse the public approval levels of the 
pathways, and care should be taken when drawing conclusions based on the results from this 
indicator. 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Public approval ratings of the pathways, in GW and in % of total fuel mix 
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5.1.2 Land requirements (proxy for disruptive opposition) 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the results from the three indicators showing land requirements of 
the electricity system, which are used as proxies for levels of risk of public opposition (see 
section 4.4.1.1). As explained previously, the use of a dashboard approach avoids the 
aggregation of distinct metrics, therefore these three metrics are kept separate in the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Land requirements: generation and transmission infrastructure 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that the pathways are actually fairly similar in terms of additional land 
requirements for new generation infrastructure. The CC pathway has the highest additional 
land requirements in 2030, driven by large amounts of wind generation; however, the MR 
pathway has the highest additional requirements in 2050, driven partly by wind energy again, 
but also driven by the fact that the MR pathway adds its infrastructure slightly more slowly 
than the other two pathways. Additional capacity in all three pathways is driven 
overwhelmingly by new additions of wind and solar, due to the extremely low power output 
per m2.  
 
The level of onshore transmission additions required (figure 5.2 secondary axis) suggests that 
the TF pathway will be least vulnerable to opposition against new transmission infrastructure, 
due to lower electricity demand which leads to a lower requirement for transmission 
upgrades, and also a large amount of decentralised generation which generally connects to the 
distribution network. The CC pathway requires the greatest amount of onshore transmission 
additions in 2030; by 2050, the transmission requirements for the CC pathway have decreased, 
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but this suggests that the general public will need to get used to a quicker transition to more 
transmission lines, which could result in more disruption due to unpopularity of the pace of 
change. 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Land requirements: domestic extraction of resources 
 
The graph in figure 5.3 shows that domestic extraction of fuels (coal, gas and biomass) 
decreases significantly for all the pathways. Extraction levels are actually very similar for the 
pathways, despite the emerging differences in fuel mixes; this is because the MR and CC 
pathways both experience some domestic extraction of gas and coal required for the fossil CCS 
penetration in these pathways, whilst the TF pathway has much higher biomass requirements. 
It could be that the unfamiliarity of large-scale domestic biomass production leaves the TF 
pathway more vulnerable to disruption from opposition to resource extraction, or to local 
conflicts with non-state actors (Månsson 2015). However, the recent protests against fracking 
illustrate that although gas and coal themselves are very familiar, new extraction techniques 
are emerging which are highly vulnerable to disruption. Therefore it is difficult to differentiate 
between the pathways for domestic extraction. 
 
5.1.3 Participation and engagement in decisions  
Table 5.1 shows the level of public participation in decisions being made, under the 
assumption that greater levels of participation usually lead to higher levels of public 
acceptance (Bell et al 2005; Cohen et al 2014; Fast and Mabee 2015; Johansson 2013; Jones 
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and Eiser 2009). People currently perceive the government as having the core responsibility for 
undertaking the transition to a low-carbon energy system (Butler et al 2013). There are very 
low levels of trust in energy companies, and people don’t perceive that the private sector is 
capable of delivering transition aims in an equitable or effective manner.  
 
Table 5-1: Levels of public participation (from pathways storyline) 
MR CC TF 
Low Medium High 
 
It is not possible to generate detailed results using the information provided in the pathways, 
and these results simply reflect the general storyline. The MR and CC pathways are both 
organised according to a centralised model in which decisions are mostly taken top-down, with 
less participation from the general public than the TF pathway. This could create risks, because 
a system which fails to allow the public to feel that they have a stake in the decisions being 
made could be more vulnerable to acceptability problems (Fast and Mabee 2015). The TF 
pathway on the other hand is organised around bottom-up, local and civil-society led 
decisions, in which people will often have a direct route to the decision-making process for 
individual plans and choices around energy, and in which citizens will often have a direct stake 
in their electricity supply via microgeneration or community energy projects (Barton et al 
2015). People are generally more likely to accept something if they have been directly involved 
in the process from the start or if they have a direct stake in the project (Barton et al 2015; 
Fast and Mabee 2015; Warren and McFayden 2010). However, these results are based on a 
number of assumptions which are not really possible to test with just the information available 
in the pathways, and considerable uncertainties arise, meaning that care should be taken 
when drawing conclusions based on the results from this indicator. 
 
5.1.4 Domestic disruption results: key uncertainties and limitations 
The results presented in this section don’t attempt to predict whether opposition will occur, 
but rather attempt to measure the likelihood of opposition due to factors such as proximity to 
new infrastructure. There is one critical uncertainty which arises from all the analyses in this 
section: there is no way of assessing how public opinion or the opinions of opposition and 
protesters will change over time. The survey results could only capture one moment in time (in 
2012), and the results simply reflect historical trends, leading to significant uncertainties. A 
number of particular issues are worthy of note: 
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 Will the availability of CCS result in higher approval ratings for coal and gas 
generation? 
 Will safety advances by the nuclear industry globally ever manage to allay people’s 
fears in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, and what impact will opposition to nuclear in 
Europe have on the nuclear industry in the UK? What impact will unresolved issues 
around the disposal of nuclear waste have on public acceptance of nuclear generation 
in the future? 
 Will renewables such as wind and solar (currently the most popular forms of 
generation) become less popular, for instance due to increasing visual impact, rising 
costs, or perceptions of decreasing grid stability as is currently being experienced in 
Germany (Mengewein 2014)? 
 The debate over fracking is gathering speed in the UK, and the government has 
recently changed the law to make it easier to gain planning permission for exploratory 
drills (HM Government 2015). If fracking goes ahead in the UK on any sort of scale 
(which may or may not happen), will the popularity of gas decrease as people 
associate it more with an unpopular form of extraction; or will political framings of the 
benefits of gas generation succeed in increasing its popularity? 
 Could opposition arise against some forms of imports, for instance if biomass imports 
were perceived to be environmentally problematic? 
 
5.2 Availability Results: non-domestic disruption 
 
Indicator Overview of methods 
Diversity of fuel 
types in the 
electricity mix 
Shannon-Wiener diversity calculation: -∑ Pi*(Ln(pi)), as used by Lehr (2009); 
Pfenninger and Keirstead (2015); Stirling (1998) 
 
Dependence on 
fuel imports 
Pathways data used to show % of fuel mix from imports for coal, gas and oil 
Uranium estimates from current stockpile data 
Biomass estimates using total indigenous biomass potential (estimate from pathways 
data) 
Diversity & 
stability of fuel 
imports 
Current (2010) fuel import diversity is measured using Shannon-Wiener index 
2010 fuel import stability measured by adding a stability parameter (Neumann 2007): 
NSW1= -∑ Pi*(Ln(pi))*b where ‘b’ represents a stability parameter, derived from the 
Fragile States Index (Foreign Policy 2014) 
Insufficient data in pathways for quantitative analysis; therefore qualitative statements 
made about possible future diversity and stability 
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5.2.1 Diversity of fuel types in the electricity mix 
The pie charts in figure 5.4 show the generation mix in the pathways. These pie charts are 
useful because they provide a good overview of the most prevalent fuels in the pathways in 
2030 and 2050. The pathways are all roughly the same in 2010, therefore just one graph is 
presented for 2010 to provide comparison. 
Figure 5-4: Generation mix in the pathways 
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As shown in the pie charts, the prevalence of coal and gas decreases in the future in all the 
pathways, increasing diversity. The MR and CC pathways both remain reliant on just three or 
four generation types in 2030 and 2050, although the balance shifts towards increased reliance 
on wind. The TF pathway on the other hand shows a greater diversity of more minor fuels, but 
by 2050 is highly dependent on biomass, which makes up a third of its generation mix. This 
could make the TF pathway vulnerable to disruptions in the biomass supply chain. 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the fuel diversity results using the Shannon-Wiener diversity index. A higher 
number indicates higher diversity (see section 4.4.1.2). Diversity increases for all pathways, 
with the CC pathway experiencing the greatest increase in diversity. The TF pathway scores 
lower than the other two for diversity, reflecting a considerable reliance on biomass as a back-
up for intermittent sources.  
 
TF 2050TF 2030
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Figure 5-5: Fuel mix diversity: Shannon-Wiener index results 
 
 
5.2.2 Fuel imports: dependence, diversity and stability 
5.2.2.1 Import dependence 
The graphs in figure 5.6 show the dependence of the pathways on imports of each major fuel 
type. It is important to note that imports are not necessarily less secure than domestic supplies 
(Johansson et al 2014; Performance and Innovation Unit 2002; Watson and Scott 2008): 
diversity and stability must also be taken into account, as high dependence on non-diverse or 
unstable imports could indicate a risk of external disruption to supplies (Jonsson et al 2015).  
 
The total amount of electricity (in TWh/y) which comes from imports increases in all the 
pathways. The MR pathway sees the greatest increase in imports, driven by rising demand and 
dependence upon imported coal and gas. The TF pathway, despite achieving reductions in 
electricity demand, also sees steep increases in import dependence; this is driven mainly by 
reliance on imported biomass, as suggested by the pathways data (see Appendix B). These 
results show that a low-carbon system does not necessarily result in reductions in fuel imports. 
 
When viewed as a percentage, the MR and CC pathways appear less reliant on imports than 
the TF pathway, due to rising demand in these pathways. The CC pathway actually sees its 
proportion of import dependence remain roughly stable through to 2050. The TF pathway 
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experiences a steadily increasing dependence on imports; this is driven solely by reliance on 
imported biomass. These graphs illustrate the importance of viewing results both as absolute 
values (for example, in TWh/y) and relative values (for instance, in %). For example, the MR 
pathway relies on imports for a smaller percentage of its overall mix, yet also requires a higher 
volume of imported fuels, which could increase the potential for disruption to these sources.  
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5.2.2.2 Diversity and stability of fuel imports 
Figure 5.7 shows the results from the calculations for fuel import diversity and stability for 
2010, for each of the major fuels (coal, gas, uranium and biomass), as well as electricity 
imports. This method generates lower scores for stability than for diversity across the board 
(see Neumann 2007). The results for the current (2010) situation show that the imports of 
major fuels are reasonably diverse; a score of near zero or below 0.5 would indicate 
vulnerability. Biomass is the most diverse source, and coal also scores well. This implies that 
pathways with high proportions of biomass and coal would be least vulnerable to disruption 
due to lack of diversity of imports. Uranium is shown to be the least diverse; however, it 
should be noted that uranium risks are mitigated by increased stability from stockpiles (see 
section 5.2.3).  
 
Coal experiences some issues with stability, with a very significant gap between its diversity 
and stability results; this is to some extent the same with biomass, but the extremely healthy 
diversity score for biomass helps to mitigate vulnerability. Gas is in general fairly diverse and 
also fairly stable. Uranium and electricity imports are both less diverse, but have fairly high 
stability scores, suggesting that vulnerability to external disruption can be mitigated for these 
fuels. Overall, these results suggest that pathways with large amounts of coal could experience 
risk and vulnerability caused by lack of stability of exporting nations.  
 
 
Figure 5-7: Results from Shannon-Wiener diversity index and import stability index 
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to project future trends of fuel import diversity or stability to 
2030 and 2050. There are a vast number of variables which could influence where the UK 
sources its fuels from in the future, most of which are impossible to project. It is the 
contention of this research that wherever possible, an assessment of the energy security of 
transition pathways should be able to make better projections of the likelihood of disruption 
to imports. Therefore, if pathways are to be deemed ‘secure’, it is imperative that they 
incorporate more information about sources of imports and routes of transit. 
 
It is clear from the results that certain fuels are currently more diverse than others, and that 
certain fuels could be more vulnerable to instability in exporting nations. From this, it is 
possible to point out some potential risks and vulnerabilities which could lie within the 
pathways; however, this is highly conjectural. 
 
5.2.2.2.1 Coal 
Coal imports are currently very diverse, and therefore coal imports could potential be a 
reliable and diverse source of fuel for the pathways with lots of coal (MR, and to a lesser 
extent CC). The results from the NSW1 index (diversity plus stability) suggest that coal imports 
are currently less stable than gas imports, probably driven by reliance on countries such as 
Russia and Colombia; however, this has not proved to be a problem for securing coal imports 
in the past, and could also be mitigated in future by increasing coal imports from other areas 
such as the US and Canada (driven by the shale gas boom), South Africa, Australia or South-
East Asia. Unlike gas, coal does not rely on new infrastructure such as terminals to support 
new trade flows, thus making diversification of suppliers simpler. Overall, it is likely that the 
key constraint upon UK coal consumption and global coal production will be climate policy, 
rather than import disruption (von Hirschhausen et al 2010). 
 
5.2.2.2.2 Gas 
The majority of the UK’s gas comes from Europe; the number of supplier countries is fairly low 
and not particularly diverse, but most are very stable. However, this supply is likely to diminish 
in the future, as European Continental Shelf reserves deplete and Norwegian reserves 
stagnate. The graphs in figure 5.8 show National Grid projections of gas supply to 2034 for 
their four energy scenarios (National Grid 2015b). The graphs show that import dependency is 
expected to increase in all but one scenario, even if overall gas consumption decreases. They 
also show that if gas consumption remained stable (‘no progression’ scenario), imports from 
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both the Continent and as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) would need to grow in order to meet 
demand. As such, this is a vulnerability concern for the pathways which are dependent on gas 
(MR and CC), because gas supplies would potentially be reliant on less stable areas such as the 
Middle East. It is also worth noting that security analysts often express concern about the 
notorious transit choke points of the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandab and the Suez Canal 
(US Energy Information Administration [EIA] 2012), and that although this has mainly been a 
concern for oil in the past, increasing reliance on LNG from the Middle East could increase the 
exposure of the UK gas supply to problems at transit choke points (Emmerson and Stevens 
2012). There is no guarantee that new sources of LNG, for instance from US shale, would head 
to Europe instead of to other markets such as in Asia; the eventual destination of gas supplies 
is determined by consumers’ willingness to pay, projections of which to 2030 and 2050 are 
outside of the scope of this analysis. The National Grid projections also show that import 
dependency could be mitigated by domestic shale gas in the longer-term, and this represents a 
key uncertainty over the future of UK gas supplies. However, only one of National Grid’s 
scenarios projects a significant amount of domestic shale gas, and this scenario is not carbon-
constrained; moreover, the results for the import dependence indicator suggest that none of 
the three Transition Pathways utilises significant amounts of domestic shale. 
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5.2.2.2.3 Uranium 
There is an understandable lack of transparency regarding uranium imports, but the UK is 
currently listed as having uranium trade arrangements with only 3 countries: Australia, Canada 
and South Africa (Good Energy 2012; World Nuclear Association 2014). Many uranium deposits 
are in relatively unstable areas such as Kazakhstan, Niger and Namibia (World Nuclear 
Association 2014), meaning that an increase in diversity could potentially result in a decrease 
in stability. Although uranium is generally considered to be a highly secure fuel, the CC 
pathway which is highly dependent on nuclear could be vulnerable if the uranium trade with 
any of the three exporting nations were to fail, for instance due to a change of policy in the 
exporting nation or a spike in price. 
 
5.2.2.2.4 Biomass 
Biomass imports are currently very diverse. There are opportunities to grow biomass in most 
countries worldwide, meaning that diversity is unlikely to become an issue in future. In terms 
of stability, at present it is likely that the UK will source much of its biomass feedstock for 
electricity generation from highly stable areas such as Canada, Scandinavia and the US, 
Figure 5-8: Gas supply projections to 2034 showing import dependency (National Grid 2015b) 
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meaning that stability risk is currently low (Hogan 2013). Nevertheless, the TF pathway relies 
on a huge amount of imported biomass; this could be vulnerable if other countries were to 
pursue similarly ambitious biomass plans, or if other sectors such as heating were to become 
more reliant on bioenergy (Genus and Mafakheri 2014; Welfle et al 2014a). In general, the 
biomass supply chain is unclear in the future, and there is little information about possible 
future resource flows (Johansson 2013; Welfle et al 2014a). The large biomass conversion 
project at Drax power station may provide some clues in the near future about emerging 
biomass supply chains: Drax is likely to source the vast majority of feedstock from the US 
(Lovell 2013), and in fact has started to construct two new Drax-owned pellet mills in 
Mississippi and Louisiana and dedicated feedstock import infrastructure in the UK (Drax 
Biomass 2015). However, concerns have been raised already that the upstream supply chain 
for industrial wood pellets in the US could be at risk of over-development (Rivers 2013). Much 
of the uncertainty over future biomass supply stems from the fact that biomass represents a 
fairly small proportion of the UK’s energy mix at present; this uncertainty represents a risk for 
the TF pathway.  
 
5.2.2.2.5 Electricity 
Electricity imports are currently not particularly diverse, but they are very stable. The UK 
currently has electricity interconnection with France, the Netherlands and the Republic of 
Ireland. The three pathways all include a similar level of electricity imports in the future, 
probably involving additional connection with France, Ireland, Belgium and possibly Norway. 
This will increase diversity and also maximise electricity imports from a selection of highly 
stable nations; as such, there is very little vulnerability for any of the pathways in this area. 
 
5.2.3 Storage and stockpiles 
It is worth noting that vulnerability to fuel supply risks is dependent on how easy fuels are to 
store. For example, uranium was noted in section 5.2.2 to have very low import diversity; 
however, uranium is generally considered ‘secure’, because it is cheap and easy to stockpile.16 
Coal requires more space and is therefore more expensive to store; however, large amounts of 
coal can be stockpiled easily (all it requires is a field and a fence). Gas is more complicated and 
expensive to store, and a history of easy access to North Sea gas along with a lack of incentives 
to build storage in the UK have led to comparatively low levels of gas storage (Le Fevre 2013; 
                                                          
16 According to the Nuclear Energy Institute (2015), a single uranium fuel pellet the size of a fingertip contains as 
much energy as 17,000 cubic feet of natural gas or 1,780 pounds of coal 
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Watson 2010). Although new gas storage sites have been proposed, many potential projects 
are on hold or have been cancelled due to unfavourable economics (National Grid 2013e). 
Finally, biomass generally has very low energy density per m2 (MacKay 2009); this means that 
more space is required to store it, which increases the cost of stockpiling. Moreover, 
feedstocks such as plant residues and wood pellets need to be dried and kept free of residual 
moisture build-up; this is not the case for other fuels, and adds significantly to the cost (Ikonen 
et al 2013).  
 
5.2.4 External disruption: key uncertainties and limitations  
The uncertainties in this sub-dimension are extremely high, as it is not possible to assess with 
any degree of robustness the areas where the UK might source its fuel in several decades’ 
time. However, this means that in many ways the primary focus here is not of the results per 
se, but of the emerging uncertainties which this indicator has helped to highlight. Each of these 
uncertainties point to areas of security risk, and help to highlight areas in which policy can 
mitigate risks. 
 
The key uncertainties (in no particular order) are: 
 Biomass: how much biomass can the UK source indigenously? Where is the rest going 
to come from, and how secure are the supplies and the supply chains likely to be? 
(Mainly applies to the TF pathway). 
 Shale gas: will the US export significant volumes of LNG, and will these supplies come 
to Europe? Is it likely that significant amounts of UK gas could be sourced through 
domestic fracking in future? (Applies to all pathways, but less so for the TF pathway in 
2050). 
 The Middle East: how will ongoing political situation in the Middle East evolve? Is 
there any danger of tensions impacting supplies, especially at important transit choke 
points? (Mainly applies to gas imports, which is more relevant for the MR and CC 
pathways). 
 New gas pipelines: will planned pipelines to transport gas into Western Europe be 
built, and if so what is the likely timescale? Will these pipelines help to make UK gas 
supplies more secure? (Again, mainly applies to gas imports, which is more relevant for 
the MR and CC pathways). 
 Policies on fuel storage and stockpiling: will policy create incentives to increase 
storage capacity and stockpiles of key imported fuels (especially gas and, in the future, 
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biomass), and how much will this add to the cost of the fuels? (Applies to all 
pathways). 
 
5.3 Affordability Results: cost to the system 
 
Indicator Overview of methods 
Generation 
costs 
Calculates LCOE using CAPEX (pre-development, construction), fixed OPEX (O&M, 
connection charges, insurance), variable OPEX (variable O&M, fuel, carbon price) (e.g. 
Pfenninger and Keirstead 2015) 
Cost data from DECC (2013d) and Mott Macdonald (2010) 
Transmission 
upgrade costs 
Onshore upgrade costs calculated using Electricity Networks Strategy Group estimates 
of upgrades required for different levels of new capacity (ENSG 2012) 
Offshore upgrade costs calculated using estimated unit costs (from National Grid 2013c) 
Distribution 
upgrade costs 
Distribution upgrade costs for the pathways modelled by Pudjianto et al (2013) 
 
 
5.3.1 Generation costs 
Figure 5.9 shows the central estimate of the generation costs for the three pathways, in 
Levelised Cost of Electricity generation (LCOE) and total annual costs (the range is discussed 
below). Generation costs increase significantly for all the pathways in 2030 and 2050. The TF 
pathway has the highest total costs in both 2030 and 2050; in 2050, total annual costs for this 
pathway are a full £25bn more than for CC. The main reason for this is not because the plants 
are more expensive; in fact, as shown in the £/MWh results, the TF pathway actually has lower 
costs per MWh than the other two pathways. Rather, it is because the TF pathway has large 
amounts of spare capacity (explained in more detail in section 5.8.3); this means that much of 
the power generation is only running for limited hours throughout the year, which increases 
the total generation costs. As such, it can be seen that the backup for the decentralised, 
dispersed and intermittent RES in the TF pathway may come at high cost. 
 
It should be noted that these calculations do not go into detail about other system costs such 
as the cost of capacity reserve and the cost of balancing. Capacity reserve (i.e. the capacity 
needed to back up intermittent renewables) is factored into the whole-systems modelling of 
the pathways, and therefore the cost of capacity reserve is included in the calculations 
(including the cost implications of reduced running hours for conventional generation used for 
backup; see Appendix C). System balancing requirements are covered in section 5.9; modelling 
the costs of this balancing are outside the scope of this thesis, although this could be an 
interesting area for further research. 
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Figure 5-9: Cost of electricity generation in £k/MWh, and £bn annual cost 
 
 
 
There are large uncertainties in these estimates, mainly because of a lack of publicly available 
and reliable data. Therefore, several sensitivity analyses were carried out, to show the impact 
of assumptions regarding discount rates, learning curves, CAPEX estimates, fuel costs, and 
carbon price. Full details of the methods used and results of these tests are given in Appendix 
C. The graphs in figure 5.10 show the range of results from the sensitivity tests, illustrating the 
median, 25th and 75th percentiles (boxes), the upper and lower range of estimates (whiskers), 
and the mean (blue marker). The graphs show that the range for the TF pathway is 
considerably greater than the range for the other two pathways, mainly reflecting the 
uncertainty which accompanies the more ‘radical’ nature of the generation mix in this 
pathway. However, the MR and CC pathways both have an outlier far above the normal range 
of the results, representing the outcome which would occur due to a doubling of the discount 
rate for all generation technologies. Higher discount rates could leave the MR and CC 
pathways vulnerable to CAPEX increases. Nevertheless, the results from the sensitivity 
analyses demonstrate that the TF pathway is highly likely to be more expensive than the other 
two pathways. 
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Figure 5-10: Sensitivity analyses of £bn annual generation cost, 2030 and 2050 
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5.3.2 Network costs 
 
 
 
 
 
The graphs in figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the estimated costs to upgrade the transmission and 
distribution networks in order to connect the supply capacity of the pathways to the grid. As 
can be seen, network upgrade costs increase for all three pathways. The MR and CC pathways 
both experience high transmission upgrade costs, driven by high electricity demand, 
centralised power generation, and high proportions of wind and nuclear in both pathways. 
Transmission costs for the TF pathway are significantly lower, because of lower electricity 
demand and decentralisation. Despite decentralisation, the TF pathway also experiences lower 
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distribution upgrade costs, because of lower levels of demand in this pathway, which reduces 
network loading and thus reduces the necessity for upgrades. These graphs show that 
decentralisation and reductions in electricity demand can be an extremely effective means of 
reducing required network upgrade costs.17 The low network costs for the TF pathway 
contrasts with the high generation costs for this pathway shown in the previous section. A key 
challenge for transition pathways should be to attempt to realise the network gains of having 
more distributed power, whilst avoiding the high levels of spare capacity which lead to such 
high generation costs. This could potentially be achieved through flexible demand (discussed in 
more detail in section 5.9.4), or through better linking of distributed systems, for instance by 
increased use of larger-scale flexibility measures such as interconnection or a national smart 
grid. 
 
5.3.3 Cost of the system: key uncertainties and limitations 
Assessments of future energy costs tend to be so dogged by uncertainties that time and time 
again they have proven to be inaccurate. As such, it is best to view the results presented above 
as a high-level overview of some of the key factors which could affect the costs of different 
pathways to a low-carbon transition, rather than as actual projections of costs in the future. 
 
Some of the core areas of uncertainty are outlined below. For all of these core areas of 
uncertainty, the sensitivity tests explore the implications of different assumptions (see 
Appendix C). 
 Raw data: the LCOE analysis uses publicly available data from DECC (2013d) and from 
Mott Macdonald (2010). However, this raw data is subject to its own sets of 
assumptions and uncertainties. 
 Discount rates: as shown in the sensitivity tests in Appendix C, different assumptions 
regarding discount rates can have a large impact on generation cost results. However, 
real-world discount rates vary and tend to be highly commercially sensitive, and 
therefore there is no public data available. 
 Learning curves: some technologies experience learning curves, in which costs come 
down as the technology becomes more mature (Barreto 2001; Gross et al 2013; IEA 
2000). On the other hand, other technologies (such as nuclear) have been shown to 
experience the opposite effect (Grubler 2010). There are big uncertainties over the 
                                                          
17 Note: currently, offshore generators pay for their own cables, they are not paid for by National Grid (Strbac et al 
2014). However, costs will probably still be passed onto consumers. 
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extent (and direction) of learning curves, which differ for different technologies, and 
learning curves are heavily influenced by technology policy both in the UK and 
internationally (Gross et al 2013). Further detailed research would be required to 
refine the affordability results in relation to detailed analysis and projection of learning 
curves, which is outside of the scope of this thesis. 
 Fuel costs: projections of fuel costs are generally inaccurate. For example, the most 
recent EIA Annual Energy Outlook Retrospective Review (EIA 2015a) shows that 
forecasts of crude oil and natural gas prices are often wrong by a margin of upwards of 
70% (even in some cases just a few years in advance). Fuel costs are highly susceptible 
to disruptive events such as financial crises or the shale gas boom, which energy 
analysts in the past have generally failed to predict. 
 Carbon price: the future carbon price is determined by policy, and recent UK reforms 
have increased the uncertainties (HM Revenue and Customs 2014). Unlike the other 
uncertainties herein, this uncertainty could be significantly reduced via consistent and 
transparent carbon pricing policy. 
 
5.4 Affordability Results: cost to the consumer 
 
Annual 
retail 
electricity 
bills 
Wholesale electricity prices calculated using hourly demand data (from Transition 
Pathways modelling; see also Barton et al 2013) used to create Load Duration Curves; 
price-setting fuel defined by merit-order stacks; LCOE data used to give average yearly 
wholesale price; demand weighted seasonally 
Wholesale prices added to a ‘consumer uplift’: 19% of bill for supplier costs and margins, 
9% social and environmental policies, 20% network charges. VAT (5%) not included in 
estimate. 
Impact on 
fuel 
poverty 
Qualitative analysis carried out using annual bills estimates, existing literature on levels of 
fuel poverty in the UK (especially Hills 2012), and the pathways storylines 
 
5.4.1 Wholesale prices 
In order to calculate the cost to the consumer, it is first necessary to calculate the wholesale 
price of electricity for the generation portfolio. This is not the same thing as the LCOE, as it 
depends on the price-setting technology. The technology which sets the price is determined by 
the market, and as such the uncertainties are enormous. Therefore, the graphs in figure 5.13 
show the results from a set of sensitivity analyses which are further discussed in Appendix C. 
The results illustrate considerable uncertainties for the TF pathway, mostly stemming from 
biomass cost uncertainties. This represents increased vulnerability for this pathway, as there is 
still relatively little concrete information regarding the likely wholesale price of biomass 
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generation in the future. There are also concerns that vulnerability could result from price 
volatility of feedstock imports (Genus and Mafakheri 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-13: Range of results from wholesale price sensitivity analyses, 2030 and 2050 
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5.4.2 Annual retail electricity bills 
The graphs in figure 5.14 show the range of results for the estimation of annual household 
electricity bills, including the range returned by the sensitivity analyses (for full methods and 
results see Appendix C). The high, median and low results in table 5.2 are taken from the upper 
quartile, median and lower quartile values obtained from the various sensitivity tests. It should 
be noted that this calculation does not include any discounts consumers may receive for 
buying their gas and electricity from the same supplier. 
 
Table 5.2 shows that the pathway with the lowest annual bills in 2050, taking into account all 
the assumptions and caveats discussed previously, is likely to be the TF pathway; this is also 
the pathway which was found to have the highest generation costs. This is because of the 
impact of reductions in demand in the TF pathway: electricity demand in this pathway remains 
stable despite considerable electrification of heating and transport, driven by increased 
consumer engagement and behaviour change (Barton et al 2015; Foxon 2013). The results 
from this indicator clearly show the importance of demand reductions in mitigating bill 
increases (for more on demand, see section 5.9.4). However, this places a lot of pressure on 
the TF pathway to achieve ambitious demand reductions, which could require broader changes 
in social attitudes (Foxon and Pearson 2013). Finally, it is worth emphasising that there is 
significant overlap within the range of all three pathways; therefore although the TF pathway 
is found to have the lowest annual bills in 2050, changes to certain assumptions could make 
this result less definitive.  
 
Table 5-2: Annual bills (£/year, not including VAT) 
 2010 2030 2050 
 Baseline Median High Low Median High Low 
MR £415.68 £912.75 £1073.66 £699.69 £1146.91 £1349.45 £940.30 
CC £392.65 £825.76 £1009.65 £594.82 £1115.82 £1344.99 £678.50 
TF £390.64 £869.51 £983.27 £624.12 £896.85 £1015.02 £470.35 
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5.4.3 Fuel poverty 
Table 5.3 shows the annual bill median figures, along with an approximation of the level of fuel 
poverty risk from the pathway storylines, from the pathways ‘storylines’ elaborated in the 
Figure 5-14: Range of results from annual bills sensitivity analyses, 2030 and 2050 
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following paragraph. In common with the other affordability indicators, it shows that the CC 
pathway is the least risky in the medium-term, whereas the TF pathway is the least risky in the 
long-term.  
 
Calculating the impact of bill increases on levels of fuel poverty in the pathways would 
necessitate projections of future incomes and income distribution, as well as detailed 
information on government policies to mitigate fuel poverty. This information is not available 
in the Transition Pathways data, therefore all that can be done is to look at the pathways 
storylines and comment on what these might mean for levels of fuel poverty in the future. It is 
argued by the Hills review (Hills 2012) that redistributive government policies could balance 
out the impact of rising annual bills, therefore the government control in the CC pathway could 
potentially counter the impact of rising fuel prices through government policies aimed at 
reducing the impact on the poor. The free-market logic of the MR pathway, on the other hand, 
is probably less likely to incorporate these kinds of redistributive policies, meaning that the 
higher bills in the MR pathway could result in high levels of fuel poverty. 
 
The supporting literature regarding the pathways ‘storylines’ (published by the TPLCE 
consortium) suggests that the TF pathway could potentially be expected to mitigate against 
fuel poverty, for several reasons: 
- Lower demand and a focus on energy efficiency leads to people using less, and 
therefore being less vulnerable to higher prices (Foxon 2013) 
- An increase in micro-generation and self-consumption may result in lower vulnerability 
to price rises (Barton et al 2015) 
- Barton et al (2015) state that the Municipal Energy Services Companies (MO-ESCos) in 
the TF pathway would have a statutory duty to address fuel poverty and ensure that 
questions of equity are considered in energy provision. 
 
However, there may be caveats to several of these claims. For instance, poor households may 
still be vulnerable to higher prices, because they might be less likely to be able to invest in 
microgeneration and energy efficiency measures. In general, it appears that drawing any 
conclusions for this indicator based on the information available in the pathways is highly 
challenging, because of the lack of necessary information in the raw pathways data (e.g. 
income data), as well as a number of additional uncertainties which are explained in the 
following sub-section. The pathways storylines can offer a preliminary overview of some of the 
fuel poverty risks which might be experienced in the pathways, but cannot really provide 
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robust analysis, and considerable detailed modelling work would be required to calculate fuel 
poverty impacts which is outside the scope of this thesis. Moreover, it is clear from table 5.3 
that there is little to differentiate the results below from the results from the ‘annual bills’ 
indicator. Therefore, whilst fuel poverty may be an important aspect of energy security, 
especially from an equity perspective, care should be taken when drawing conclusions based 
on the results from this indicator. 
 
Table 5-3: Fuel poverty risk 
 2030 2050 
 Bills median Storyline Bills median Storyline 
MR £913 Most risk £1147 Most risk 
CC £826 Least risk £1116  
TF £870  £897 Least risk 
 
 
5.4.4 Cost to the consumer: key uncertainties and limitations 
As shown in section 5.3.3, projections of future costs have a consistent tendency to be 
inaccurate (for example, see EIA 2015a). Moreover, it should be noted that the uncertainties 
inherent in cost analysis tend to cascade, so that one result may be dependent upon a whole 
host of assumptions, both within this analysis and within the raw data. Therefore once again it 
is best to view the results presented above as a high-level overview of some of the key risks 
which could emerge under various routes to a low-carbon transition. The multiple sensitivity 
tests (explained and analysed in more detail in Appendix C) aim to highlight some of the key 
uncertainties and to show the sensitivity of the conclusions to various assumptions.  
 
Some of the core areas of uncertainty are:  
 The uncertainties in the LCOE and network costs analysis: the uncertainties described 
in section 5.3.3 will cascade into the annual bills projections. 
 Social and environmental programmes: the scale and direction of social and 
environmental policies in the UK in the future is highly uncertain; policies have 
sometimes been subject to change at short notice. The results above are calculated 
without general tax (VAT), which reduces some of the uncertainty regarding 
programmes which are paid for out of general taxation. Therefore if the government 
decided to move some social and environmental programmes out of energy bills and 
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into general taxation, this would affect the amount that consumers would have to pay 
on top of their electricity bill for social and environmental programmes. 
 Population growth: the annual bills calculations are highly dependent on future 
population assumptions. However, this uncertainty could be mitigated if data on 
household energy use was available in the pathways; at present, the pathways only 
include demand data for the UK as a whole. 
 Electricity demand: an important uncertainty which emerges on both an empirical and 
a conceptual level is that of how consumers use electricity in future. The calculations 
here are based on the idea that the way consumers use electricity remains similar to 
today, although the pathways do presuppose the development of a smart grid for the 
shifting of electrical load. However, the annual bills calculations are still based on the 
average seasonal demand for the whole of the residential sector, which is highly 
simplified. The way in which consumers use electricity is likely to change significantly 
over the next 40 years, with the possible development of smart appliances and remote 
technology which enables demand-shifting from a distance, and the possibility of 
affordable home electricity storage solutions and electric vehicles. It would also be 
necessary to factor in the cost of smart grid infrastructure, which is out of the scope of 
the estimates given here. For a more comprehensive assessment, patterns of demand 
would need to be included in the pathway development. This would require explicit 
model inputs including smart appliances, consumer behaviour, and potential rebound 
effects. 
 
Finally, one of the major uncertainties to emerge from this analysis is the question of ‘who 
pays’, and the issue of incentivising investment in generation capacity and networks. Market 
and investment structures in the UK are currently under pressure, because the main utilities 
are suffering from a combination of high corporate debt, low wholesale prices, and reductions 
in electricity demand (Blyth et al 2014; Deane et al 2015; Mitchell et al 2014). In fact, most 
countries in the EU are facing debates about whether they are managing to attract enough 
investment to maintain security of supply (Ellenbeck et al 2015), although proposed Capacity 
Mechanism arrangements in many member states are hoped to alleviate this somewhat (DECC 
2013c; Linklaters 2014; Pototschnig and Godfried 2014). Moreover, there are key uncertainties 
caused by the path dependencies which result from investments in infrastructure with long 
life-spans, such as power stations and cables (Usher and Strachan 2012).  
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There is also lot of discussion in the UK at present over the extent to which energy bills should 
include charges for social and environmental policies such as support for low-carbon 
generation or help for the fuel poor (a debate which was made notorious by comments 
attributed to Prime Minister David Cameron in 2013 that he wanted to “get rid of all the Green 
Crap” from energy bills [Groves and Robinson 2013]). Paying for these charges out of energy 
bills is naturally regressive, because energy bills are not proportionate to income (Garman and 
Aldridge 2015; Howard and Frayne 2015); moreover, paying for an expensive low-carbon 
transition through energy bills may be contentious and thereby may risk losing support for the 
entire transition plan (Garman and Aldridge 2015).  
 
A key risk for all the pathways is that the electricity sector will struggle to secure the level of 
finance required to realise the transition. The MR pathway, if predicated on current market 
structures, may struggle to secure finance, particularly because it relies on high-CAPEX, risky 
projects such as offshore wind, nuclear and CCS (Foxon and Pearson 2013). The CC pathway 
could cover costs using public funding, although it is not entirely clear whether this would be 
paid out of energy bills or general taxation, and could generate risks if the public were not 
accepting of higher costs (Foxon et al 2013). The CC pathway could also encounter investment 
risk if the government were seen to be exercising more control than market actors were willing 
to tolerate (Foxon and Pearson 2013). Finally, the lower levels of demand in the TF pathway 
would squeeze margins for producers, unless compensation were available (from a source 
which is not elaborated in the pathways storylines) or unless the retail price per unit were far 
higher. It is plausible that increased participation in energy generation could mean that people 
are willing to pay more for their electricity, but this would increase fuel bills and increase risks 
of unaffordability and fuel poverty. Hall et al (2014) and Barton et al (2015) suggest that 
realising the TF pathway may require new forms of localised finance to become available, for 
instance through small-scale banks or local credit unions. 
 
5.5 Sustainability Results: GHG emissions 
 
Indicator Overview of methods 
GHG 
emissions and 
intensity 
Electricity system GHG emissions taken directly from pathways data (see also Foxon et al 
2013) 
Life-cycle carbon intensity (in CO2e) of electricity generation types taken from High, mid 
and low estimates from IPCC global power station data (Moomaw et al 2011) 
Total carbon intensity = Fuel-type intensity * (fuel-type generation TWh/y / Total 
generation TWh/y) 
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Figures 5.15 and 5.16 show the baseline estimates for UK GHG emissions and the carbon 
intensity of the electricity generation mix of the pathways. Both calculations measure GHGs 
(i.e. not just carbon dioxide), and are therefore expressed in carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). 
It should be noted that the MR pathway only reduces UK CO2e emissions by 72%, meaning that 
this pathway actually misses the 80% target by a margin of nearly 80Mt (the Transition 
Pathways consortium carried out additional work later on to make the MR pathway achieve an 
80% reduction, by means of an advanced hydrogen economy and negative emissions from 
biomass CCS). Figure 5.15 also helps to illustrate the cumulative emissions over this period as 
well as the end target (i.e. the area under the curve); this is crucial, because cumulative 
emissions are what determines the impact on the climate (Anderson and Bows 2011). The 
cumulative GHG emissions for the MR pathway for the period 2010 to 2050 are 2810 MtCO2e, 
for the CC pathway 2385 MtCO2e, and for the TF pathway 2170 MtCO2e. Therefore the 
cumulative GHG emissions of the TF pathway are only 77% those of the MR pathway and 91% 
those of the CC pathway.  It is worth noting that these figures are estimates, because the 
emissions data in the pathways is only given in 5-year increments. 
 
Figure 5-15: GHG emissions 
 
 
 
The graph in figure 5.16 shows the range of results of the life-cycle emissions intensity of the 
electricity generation mix, using a range of emissions estimates from the IPCC (Moomaw et al 
2011). These results show clearly the enormous level of ambition which would be required to 
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realise these pathways. The MR pathway appears to have the highest emissions intensity in 
general (although for 2050 the mid-range estimate indicates that the CC pathway has a slightly 
higher emissions intensity); however, the MR pathway also has the highest electricity demand. 
Higher demand leads to greater imperatives to reduce carbon intensity, and should in theory 
create more opportunities for improvements in energy efficiency; the results for the MR 
pathway suggest that it does not fully capitalise on these opportunities. The TF pathway has 
the lowest carbon intensity throughout, meaning that less CO2e is released per unit of 
electricity produced; this could be argued to be especially ambitious, as the low levels of 
demand in this pathway mean that opportunities for efficiency savings are more restricted. 
Therefore, these results seem to suggest that such low carbon intensity, combined with such 
low demand, is achieved largely because of increased engagement and behaviour change on 
the part of consumers. 
 
All three pathways show considerable uncertainty between estimates, with the TF pathway in 
particular returning estimates which differ by orders of magnitude. The uncertainty for the TF 
pathway is largely driven by biomass, which in theory if aligned with CCS technology in the 
future could generate significant negative emissions; however, for these gains to be realised, 
there will need to be significant improvements in biomass power generation and in the 
production and transport of biomass feedstock.  The results show that if the maximum life-
cycle estimates are used, all three pathways could generate life-cycle emissions of above 100g 
CO2e/kWh in 2050; this is well above the 50g target recommended by the UK Committee on 
Climate Change (2013). The MR pathway consistently has the highest emissions intensity, due 
to coal and gas generation; even with CCS, coal and gas have high emissions from plants and 
from mining and transportation of fuel. It is important to note the distinction between the 
GHG emissions shown in figure 5.15 and the life-cycle emissions intensity shown in figure 5.16: 
the life-cycle emissions estimates include GHGs emitted outside of the UK (for instance, via the 
mining or transportation of resources), whereas the pathways GHG data shown in figure 5.15 
only includes emissions released in the UK. Both are important – the UK has a statutory duty to 
meet targets for UK-only emissions, but mitigation of climate change will necessitate reduction 
of overseas emissions as well. As shown in figure 5.16, calculating life-cycle emissions intensity 
entails greater uncertainty.  
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Figure 5-16: Carbon intensity range of estimates, gCO2e/kWh 
 
 
5.6 Sustainability Results: Resources 
 
Indicator Overview of methods 
Primary fuels 
depletion 
Qualitative method using information from the existing literature to assess depletion 
risk of primary fuels. Pathways assessed qualitatively for their reliance on depletable 
fuels.  
Secondary 
materials 
depletion 
32 crucial materials are identified from Moss et al (2011) and Speirs et al (2014) and 
listed from ‘highly critical’ to ‘not critical’ according to risk of depletion. 
Pathways assessed qualitatively for their reliance on depletable materials. 
 
5.6.1 Primary fuels 
The following sections show the results from a qualitative review of the literature concerning 
depletion of the main primary fuels in the pathways: coal, gas, uranium and biomass.  
 
5.6.1.1 Coal 
In general, it is accepted that coal reserves are plentiful for the foreseeable future, because 
the main factor which is likely to influence coal production and consumption is the impact of 
carbon reduction policies rather than depletion of the physical resource (von Hirschhausen et 
al 2010). Global reserves of coal could last in excess of 100 years (IEA Clean Coal Centre 2014). 
Coal is still more at risk of depletion than renewable non-depletable fuels, but is generally not 
considered at risk of global depletion through to 2050.  
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5.6.1.2 Gas 
Gas represents a more serious risk than coal, although there are considerable uncertainties 
regarding global economically extractable reserves of gas, especially in the context of potential 
new sources of unconventional gas. The Energy Information Administration calculates that 
global proven reserves of natural gas at the end of 2014 stood at 197 trillion cubic metres 
(tcm) (EIA 2015b). BP estimates that this is enough to meet around 55.1 years of global 
demand under BAU demand scenarios (BP 2013). Global resources of unconventional gas are 
estimated at an additional 327tcm, but reserve assessments for unconventional gas are 
complicated and highly uncertain (IEA 2013).18  As shown in figure 5.17, although global gas 
demand has been steadily increasing, the amount of gas held in proven reserves has also 
increased significantly. The world is unlikely to ‘run out’ of gas by 2050; however, tighter 
supply and increasingly concentrated resources could result in higher prices through to 2050. 
On the other hand, economists such as Helm (2011) argue that a tighter market will simply 
lead to increased exploration and thus more reserves coming on-line. 
 
Figure 5-17: Global proved gas reserves, 1993 to 2013 (BP 2013) 
 
 
 
5.6.1.3 Nuclear 
Uranium is plentiful and very easy to store. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency suggests that 
“the uranium resource base… is more than adequate to meet projected requirements for the 
                                                          
18 It is vital to distinguish between resources (the amount of gas in the ground), and technically / economically 
recoverable reserves. Typically, a maximum of around 20% of shale gas is recoverable in ideal conditions (Lee 2012). 
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foreseeable future” (2014: 15). There are probably no serious risks regarding uranium 
depletion through to 2050, although the analysis still needs to reflect the fact that it is a non-
renewable fuel. 
 
5.6.1.4 Biomass 
The highly ambitious proportion of biomass generation in the pathways could result in issues 
relating to the land required for growing feedstocks. Biomass is more complex than non-
renewable resources, because it is renewable but can still be depleted. Unlike the wind and 
the sun, biomass feedstock availability is limited by the land available for growing crops and by 
the complex relationship between availability of land and water for food and energy 
production. Intensive or poorly-managed production of feedstock can also reduce soil quality, 
resulting in declining yields (IRENA 2014). Furthermore, unlike most renewables which only 
provide electricity, biomass feedstock is also used for cooking, heating and transport, giving 
rise to competition with other sectors for the resource. As noted in section 5.2.2, it is also 
possible that many other nations will be competing for biomass feedstocks.  
 
Because of the complex relationship between land for food and land for bioenergy, estimates 
of future global biomass resource availability are dependent on numerous difficult 
assumptions, such as population growth, how much land is required to grow food, meat 
consumption, rates of deforestation, rates of building and urban sprawl, and how much land is 
left wild or protected. Depending on these assumptions, a report by UKERC (Slade et al 2011) 
suggests a mid-estimate of global biomass potential between 100 to 600 Exajoules (EJ) per 
year, for all energy requirements (i.e. heating and transport as well as electricity). To put this in 
context, the World Energy Council estimates that total global primary energy supply will grow 
to 879 EJ in 2050 (World Energy Council 2013). In terms of the pathways, the TF pathway 
suggests that in 2050 41% of electricity consumption will be from biomass, with only 7% from 
natural gas. If other countries were to pursue similarly ambitious biomass strategies, this could 
put serious strain on land availability globally, and could result in constraints on biomass 
feedstock availability or potentially trade-offs between biomass and other land uses such as 
agriculture. 
 
5.6.2 Secondary materials 
A growing concern for the sustainability of a low-carbon transition is the supply of secondary 
materials used in the electricity system, such as specific metals and Rare Earth Elements 
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(REEs). A review of the evidence by UKERC (Speirs et al 2014) noted that demand for these 
materials is likely to increase considerably in the future, especially in the context of increasing 
penetration of low-carbon technologies such as wind turbines, solar photovoltaic (PV) panels 
and battery-powered vehicles. There has been particular concern over REEs, because their 
supply is currently limited to relatively few localities: China produces by far the largest 
quantities of REEs, which raises concerns over potential bottlenecks in the supply chain 
(Stegen 2015; Umbach 2012). Other important metals are also worth flagging up as potentially 
risky: table 5.4 shows several metals which are considered to be ‘critical’, along with the low-
carbon technologies for which they are required. 
 
Table 5-4: List of critical metals and low-carbon technologies (Speirs et al 2014: 3) 
 
 
Moss et al (2011) looked in detail at the metals used in energy technologies, and came up with 
a list of the 32 most significant materials for energy generation in the EU through to 2030 
under a low-carbon trajectory. They then assessed the criticality of supply of these 32 
materials, on the basis of potential supply-chain bottlenecks which could occur under BAU 
conditions, resulting from both geopolitical and market-based dynamics.  As shown in table 
5.5, the most critical materials are the REEs dysprosium, europium, terbium, yttrium, 
praseodymium and neodymium, as well as the metals gallium and tellurium. 
 
As shown in table 5.4, several of these materials are used in low-carbon generating 
technologies, most notably wind and solar. Some are also used in other generating 
technologies, such as in the superalloys used in new fossil fuel power plants (Moss et al 2011). 
From this it is possible to draw up a list of the most critical secondary materials (table 5.6), 
according to the red, amber and yellow categories. It is worth noting that this analysis focuses 
solely on metals and REEs; constraints in other materials, for instance used in other parts of 
the supply chain, were not assessed.  
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Table 5-5: Criticality of 32 materials for low-carbon energy 
 
 
Table 5-6: Secondary materials depletion for different generation types 
Technology Red materials Amber Yellow 
Coal  Rh Co; Ta 
Gas  Rh Co; Ta 
CCS  Rh Co; Ta; Va; Nb 
Biomass   Co 
Nuclear  Ha; In  
Wind  Dy; Nd; Pr   
Solar19 Te; Ga Ger, In Sn 
Hydro     
Marine    
Electricity Storage   Co; Cr 
Combined heat & 
power 
   
Electric vehicles Nd   
 
 
5.6.3 Resource depletion results for the pathways 
 
From the information given in the previous two sections, it is possible to assess the level of risk 
in the pathways to resource depletion, according to their fuel mixes. It is not really possible to 
carry out precise calculations of risk of resource depletion without in-depth modelling of global 
resource availability (which is outside of the scope of this thesis); this could be an interesting 
area for detailed modelling work in future research. 
 
All three pathways generally reduce their reliance on fossil fuels in 2030 and again in 2050, as 
they transition towards increased reliance on renewable fuels which are not generally at risk of 
                                                          
19 For solar, the materials listed apply to existing solar generation technologies, rather than potential future solar 
technologies. 
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fuel depletion. The MR pathway does, however, remain reliant on gas throughout the 
transition, with gas-fired electricity providing around 20% of electricity output in 2030 and 
around 15% in 2050. Coal also remains somewhat important in this pathway, although again 
the coal-fired proportion decreases on 2010 levels. It is also important to note that CCS 
generation gradually replaces unabated generation; whilst this is beneficial for reducing 
emissions, it also uses more fuel because adding CCS tends to reduce the efficiency of the 
power plant, thus meaning that more fuel is required for each unit of power generated. The 
MR pathway also has the highest electricity demand of the three pathways, meaning that 
more fuel is used overall. Therefore in general, it can be seen that the MR pathway may be at 
risk of primary fuel depletion, especially of gas. 
 
The CC pathway, similarly to the MR pathway, remains somewhat reliant on gas in 2030 and 
2050, and also switches to CCS. However, the CC pathway is much less dependent on gas and 
coal than the MR pathway, and therefore is probably less at risk of depletion of these fuels. 
The CC pathway is more reliant on nuclear power, which as shown in section 5.6.1.3 is still a 
non-renewable resource, but is less at risk of depletion because global uranium reserves are 
probably plentiful for the next several decades. The CC pathway also has lower electricity 
demand than the MR pathway. 
 
The TF pathway has much lower electricity demand than the other two pathways, which 
significantly reduces the fuel use and thereby reduces the risk of fuel depletion. The TF 
pathway also almost completely phases out fossil fuel use by 2050, meaning that it is not really 
at risk of depletion of gas or coal. However, the TF pathway is heavily reliant on biomass, 
which as shown in section 5.6.1.4 is potentially at risk of depletion, because even though it is a 
renewable resource it is potentially depletable, especially if land use is managed poorly. 
However, assessing the risk of biomass depletion for the pathway presents significant 
challenges, because of the large number of important and unknown variables. Moreover, 
biomass is renewable yet depletable, therefore it constitutes a flow variable (i.e. it indicates 
change over a period of time), which cannot be compared directly to stock variables (i.e. those 
which measure quantity at any one time) such as coal, gas or uranium resources. Nevertheless, 
most energy system models include a biomass constraint to account for the depletable nature 
of this resource. As explained in section 5.6.1.4, the TF pathway is potentially at risk of biomass 
feedstock depletion.  
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Regarding secondary materials depletion, the relatively high levels of coal and gas generation 
in the MR pathway, nuclear in the CC pathway, and biomass in the TF pathway, could actually 
help to mitigate the risk of secondary materials depletion, because the most vulnerable 
generation technologies to this kind of depletion are renewables such as wind and solar. 
Nevertheless, all three pathways involve increasing amounts of wind and solar generation 
through to 2050, and therefore may experience increasing risk of depletion of Dysprosium, 
Neodymium, Praseodymium, Tellurium, Gallium, Germanium and Indium. The increasing 
electricity demand of the MR pathway may make it more at risk of materials depletion; 
however, the CC pathway is more at risk of depletion of Hafnium and Indium used in nuclear 
power. It is important to note that secondary materials are more likely to be substitutable than 
primary fuels, and recycling of materials could also contribute to the mitigation of secondary 
materials depletion, although there is considerable uncertainty over whether substitution or 
recycling can keep pace with growing demand for some of these materials, and there is some 
concern about potentially long lead times for substitutes (Speirs et al 2014; Stegen 2015).  
 
5.7 Sustainability Results: Water 
 
Indicator Overview of methods 
Water 
consumption 
& withdrawals 
Data on water withdrawals and water consumption of different types of power 
generation from Davies et al (2013). Projections on types of cooling to be employed in 
UK thermal powergen in future from Kyle et al (2013) 
These are applied to the generation mix to show water consumption and withdrawals in 
m3/y 
Baseline results weighted 70-30 to show greater environmental impact of freshwater vs 
seawater. 
Water usage for biomass feedstock production not possible to calculate because of lack 
of available data 
 
Figure 5.18 shows both the water withdrawals (i.e. water taken from the source and then 
replaced) and water consumption (i.e. water that is not replaced) of the generation mix in the 
pathways. This is an important distinction, especially when considering water-based 
generation such as hydro, which has virtually no water withdrawals but some water 
consumption mainly due to evaporation from the lakes created by dams (Mekonnen and 
Hoekstra 2011).  
 
151 
 
Figure 5-18: Total water withdrawals and consumption for electricity generation (million m3) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.18 shows that the MR pathway has the highest water usage, due to the prevalence of 
thermal power generation. The CC pathway has the lowest water usage in 2030, and the TF 
pathway has the lowest in 2050, although the results for these two pathways are very similar. 
It is crucial to note that the low figure for the CC pathway is influenced heavily by the 
weighting of freshwater vs seawater, because the CC pathway is reliant on nuclear which in the 
UK mostly uses seawater. For this reason, sensitivity analyses have been carried out to show 
the impact of different weightings; more detail is given in Appendix D. The results for water 
consumption and water withdrawals are broadly similar, largely because of low penetration of 
hydro.  
 
It is important to note that these results only show primary water use for power generation, 
for instance in cooling thermal plant; they do not show secondary water requirements such as 
irrigation for biomass or water for fossil extraction, because this would require data on 
extraction locations, methods and biomass feedstock types, none of which is available in the 
pathways data. A life-cycle water usage analysis is therefore outside the scope of this thesis. 
This is a crucial distinction because all three pathways become increasingly reliant on biomass 
in order to transition away from fossil fuels, in particular the TF pathway for which biomass is 
the most prevalent fuel in 2050. This means that the lack of ability to calculate water 
requirements for biomass feedstock production could have a significant impact on the results, 
potentially making the TF pathway appear less risky than it actually is. For this reason, robust 
conclusions are challenging to draw for this indicator without carrying out modelling based on 
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data which is not available. Care should be taken when drawing conclusions based on this 
indicator, 
 
5.7.1 Sustainability results: key uncertainties and limitations 
The three sub-dimensions in the sustainability dimension (carbon, resources and water) 
highlight considerable uncertainties surrounding biomass. The TF pathway in particular is 
highly dependent upon biomass, which provides a valuable source of renewable yet flexible 
generation. However, it is extremely challenging to make accurate estimates of the 
sustainability of the biomass resources used in this pathway, because of a lack of data 
regarding the feedstocks used and their location. There is also high uncertainty around levels 
of global availability of land for biomass, especially considering that other sectors (e.g. food, 
agriculture, transport, tourism) may be in competition for the same land resource, and also 
considering that a considerable proportion of the sustainability impact of biomass feedstock 
will depend on how well the land is managed (see Månsson et al 2014b; Welfle 2014a; 2014b).  
 
There are similar uncertainties regarding water requirements of unconventional fossil fuels. 
Unconventional fuels can delay conventional fossil fuel depletion; however, they sometimes 
also use large amounts of water, especially when methods such as fracking are employed 
(POST 2011), thus possibly illustrating a trade-off between water usage and resource 
depletion. The uncertainties arise because there is no detail in the pathways data regarding 
whether primary fuels are conventional or unconventional. Finally, the uncertainty around 
unconventional fossil fuels could lead to a trade-off between affordability and fuel depletion; if 
the price of electricity increases, this makes it more economical to extract more challenging 
reserves, thus mitigating resource depletion whilst at the same time increasing affordability 
risks. Again, this is impossible to calculate because of the lack of fuel type granularity in the 
raw data. 
 
 
5.8 Reliability Results: System adequacy 
 
Indicator Overview of methods 
De-rated 
Capacity 
Margins 
Indicative fuel-type margins from National Grid (2012:30) are applied to the generation 
mix. Fuel type margin is weighted according to generation mix, and subtracted from peak 
demand 
Capacity margin (%) = ((total available capacity-peak demand) / peak demand) * 100 
(RAEng 2013) 
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Capacity 
factors & 
oversupply 
Capacity factors (from the Transition Pathways data) and capacity margins (see above) are 
used to highlight areas of oversupply 
Electricity 
storage & 
interconne
ction 
Electricity storage and interconnection nameplate capacities summed together; also 
compared to plausible storage and interconnection developments 
 
 
5.8.1 Loss of Load Expectation 
One means of assessing the adequacy of the electricity system is by Loss of Load Expectation 
(LOLE) (DECC 2013f; Ofgem 2013a). The LOLE is the reliability standard which is set by the 
Secretary of State and implemented by the regulator, using a probabilistic method to 
represent the number of hours per year in which the System Operator will be required to take 
additional measures to ensure that power is not lost. The LOLE in the UK is 3 hours per year. It 
is worth emphasising that this is a not a measure of the actual loss of power which will be 
experienced by consumers – the actual number and duration of load losses will vary yearly and 
regionally, and the vast majority of losses of a certain level of load will be managed by the 
System Operator with no impact on power availability to consumers. 
 
The FESA model used for the Transition Pathways creates generation mixes for the three 
pathways, which can meet peak demand on a yearly and hourly basis (Barnacle et al 2013; 
Barton et al 2013). The pathways have all been modelled with hour-by-hour system adequacy 
in mind, therefore all can be assumed to meet the national reliability standard. 
 
5.8.2 De-rated capacity margins 
 
Figure 5.19 shows that both the MR and CC pathways see de-rated capacity margins (DRCM) of 
close to zero in 2030 and negative in 2050. A tight margin suggests that the system could 
struggle to meet peak demand if the system were to experience an unexpected change in the 
supply-demand balance, for instance due to a fault at a large power plant or an unexpectedly 
cold winter. This appears to contradict the fact that the pathways meet the LOLE standard, 
therefore it is worth looking in more detail at the possible reasons for this. Firstly, the 
Transition Pathways data shows that the pathways do not take unexpected outages into 
account. As shown in section 4.4.4.1, the DRCM calculation does take unexpected outages into 
account (which is one of the reasons why conventional plant, imports and storage are all rated 
at below 100%); this is important because it could have a big impact on the ability of the 
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system to meet peak demand under stress conditions. Secondly, these results suggest that the 
pathways may have been overly optimistic in their assumptions regarding peak generation of 
intermittent sources; it is difficult to assess whether this is the case from the raw data, but this 
would explain why the de-rated capacity margins are so low. As explained in Appendix E, the 
peak time availability of renewables is subject to numerous uncertainties and assumptions. 
These results therefore emphasise the benefits of using more than just one metric for 
assessing the ability of the power system to meet demand peaks, because all metrics are 
dependent upon multiple assumptions. Including a calculation of DRCM into the modelling of 
electricity system pathways would therefore be highly beneficial, and model outputs should be 
adjusted accordingly if the DRCM is shown to be insecure, especially if the DRCM is below zero. 
 
The low DRCM in the MR and CC pathways may be explained by the large amounts of wind and 
solar power in these pathways. The CC pathway has increasing penetrations of solar power in 
the longer term, which is the main driver for the very low DRCM in this pathway in 2050. The 
TF pathway on the other hand has an extremely high margin, driven by large amounts of 
dispatchable biomass generation. This high margin suggests that there may be a large amount 
of electricity which is generated but not required, especially during times of low demand. This 
may result in the curtailment of renewable capacity. While RES curtailment is not a security 
indicator in its own right, it impacts the cost of power generation. 
 
Figure 5-19: De-rated capacity margins (base case) 
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5.8.2.1 DRCM Sensitivity analyses 
Putting a figure on the capacity credit20 of each generation type is not an exact science. Figures 
vary, especially for RES, and are impacted by issues such as weather forecasting and the 
geographical dispersion of generation infrastructure. For example, the ‘traditional’ capacity 
credit of wind was 5%; however, the National Grid figures (National Grid 2012: 30) raise this to 
8% in order to reflect the increasing geographical dispersion of wind arrays.  
 
Because of this, sensitivity analyses have been carried out to show the impact of assumptions 
regarding the capacity credit of wind, imports, and CCS, full details of which are given in 
Appendix E. The graphs in figure 5.20 show that the MR and CC pathways are very similar in 
2030 and 2050; in fact, their results overlap to the extent that it is not possible to identify 
conclusive differences between these pathways. Both the MR and CC pathways have an 
extremely low bottom value for 2030 and 2050, which may represents a vulnerability. This 
illustrates that, depending on assumptions regarding wind power, imports and CCS, these 
pathways may not be able to meet peak demand. The TF pathway, on the other hand, shows 
no overlap with the other two pathways, and has a generally secure DRCM. 
                                                          
20 Capacity credit = the de-rated capacity margin for each type of generation, or ‘fuel-type margin’ 
156 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-20: Range of results from DRCM sensitivity tests, 2030 and 2050 
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5.8.3 Capacity factors and oversupply 
As well as ensuring that there is enough generation capacity available to meet demand peaks, 
the pathways must also ensure that supply is reduced during times of low demand in order to 
avoid system overload. To do this, the FESA model adjusts the capacity factors of each type of 
generation (Barnacle et al 2013; Barton et al 2013). In order to accommodate increased 
penetration of intermittent capacity, the remaining dispatchable generation must 
accommodate this variability, resulting in a decrease in average capacity factors.  
 
The graphs in figures 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23 show the evolution of capacity factors for each type 
of generation for the three pathways. They show that today’s large-scale generators (unabated 
gas and coal) would have to reduce their capacity factors from an average of between 45 and 
60% today, down to zero as they fall down the merit order and are replaced by power plants 
with CCS or new renewables. New low-carbon thermal generators (gas and coal with CCS, and 
biomass) will come online with very high capacity factors, but as time passes and more 
renewable generation is built they will need to reduce their capacity factors also. In the TF 
pathway, by 2050 the capacity factors of abated gas and coal have fallen to around 20%. 
Barnacle et al (2013) and Barton et al (2013) suggest that even if large amounts of demand-
side flexibility are introduced, the expected nameplate surplus in the TF pathway may be 
extremely large. 
 
Low capacity factors could mean less of an incentive to invest in power generation capacity, 
especially in circumstances where high capacity factors are not available for a sufficient period 
of time to pay back the initial capital investment of the installation. Figures 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23 
indicate that this may be particularly problematic for gas CCS, because its capacity factors 
begin high and then rapidly fall significantly, which may not give the investors enough time to 
pay off their capital costs. This is an issue for all the pathways. 
 
To counter these problems, intermittent generation of thermal plants would need to be built 
into the plans to realise the pathways; the introduction of the UK Capacity Mechanism 
(National Grid 2014a) is an attempt to address this issue. The main outcome would be on cost; 
for this reason, the affordability dimension, and especially the generation costs results (shown 
in section 5.3.1) illustrate this issue more fully, and the impacts of oversupply can be clearly 
seen in the extremely high total generation costs for the TF pathway. In terms of reliability, the 
reduction in capacity factor does not represent a risk. However, there is an issue here with the 
viability of the TF pathway (and also the MR and CC pathways to a lesser extent): the risk lies in 
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the possibility that some of the flexible low-carbon thermal generation needed to balance the 
pathways would not be built, because of the economic unattractiveness to generators of 
operating their plants at such low capacity factors. It should be noted that the ‘oversupply’ 
indicator is very much the other side of the coin to DRCM: the TF pathway with its very high 
DRCM also has the lowest load factors and the most oversupply. 
 
Figure 5-21: Generation-type capacity factors in the Market Rules pathway (Barnacle et al 2013) 
 
 
 
Figure 5-22: Generation-type capacity factors in the Central Coordination pathway (Barnacle et al 
2013) 
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Figure 5-23: Generation-type capacity factors in the Thousand Flowers pathway (Barnacle et al 2013) 
 
 
 
5.8.4 Electricity storage and interconnection 
Storage and interconnection can both enable flexibility in electricity production/consumption, 
and can therefore in theory be called on when required (for instance, at a time of high 
demand), in order to reduce the necessary levels of spare capacity or conventional generation 
on the system. Increased flexibility means that the system can incorporate more intermittent 
sources such as renewables without requiring as much backup for times when the renewable 
in-feed is low. 
 
Figure 5.24 shows the amount of storage and interconnection in the pathways, both as a 
relative value (% of the total generation mix) and as an absolute value (in GW). The results for 
the three pathways are remarkably similar. This can be explained by the fact that all three 
pathways only include pumped storage, and only include interconnectors which are already 
built or planned. These pathways therefore experience risk through not fully exploiting the 
storage and interconnection options which could be available to them. The pathways creators 
note that they did not explore storage options in any detail, mainly because of concerns about 
cost (Foxon 2015). In the case of interconnection, the pathways don’t seem to consider the full 
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potential of interconnectors to Scandinavia, which is surprising because National Grid is 
proposing to build a new UK-Norway interconnector for operation in 2020 (National Grid 
2013d).  
 
Figure 5-24: Storage and interconnection. Note: CC result in GW is the same as TF result 
 
 
It is important to note a potential caveat around the reliability of interconnection for providing 
balancing services to National Grid. This indicator assumes that interconnection can provide a 
source of flexible supply at times of stress and can provide a useful means of offloading 
electricity to mainland Europe at times when supply exceeds demand (European Council 2011; 
House of Lords 2015; National Grid 2014b; Newbery et al 2013; Strbac et al 2012a). However, 
there is an active debate on this at present, with considerable uncertainty over what happens 
when connected countries experience simultaneous stress moments. Some argue that there is 
the possibility that power could actually flow out of the UK at times of high demand, especially 
if a large weather system led to low RES in-feed and high demand in several countries at once 
(House of Lords 2015). In theory, measures could be taken to avoid this happening, although 
there is uncertainty at present over what these measures might actually look like in practice. 
 
5.8.5 System adequacy: key uncertainties and limitations 
The major uncertainty and area for further research which emerges out of these indicators is 
the question of whether or not sufficient investment is available to realise the ambitious 
transition envisaged in these pathways. This issue also arose within the affordability dimension 
(see section 5.4.4). The most important factor that determines whether or not the required 
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investments are available is the underlying business case, i.e. the fundamentals of the 
electricity market and the details of any subsidy regimes (Blyth et al 2014). It therefore 
appears that one of the key outcomes of the assessment as a whole is that one of the major 
risks lies within the political and economic feasibility of realising ambitious transition 
pathways, rather than the (technical) security of the pathways themselves. 
 
 
5.9 Reliability Results: Shock resilience 
 
Indicator Overview of methods 
Flexible supply: 
Frequency 
Response capability 
Power station data from National Grid (available on request) is used to calculate 
average FR capability of different generation types; this is applied to the fuel mix in 
the pathways. Maximum and mean FR capability shown for primary FR (<30 
seconds) and secondary FR (30 seconds to 30 minutes) 
Flexible supply: 
Short-term 
Operating Reserve 
& black-start 
capability 
Calculates percentage of power generation which would be capable of providing 
STOR and black-start capability (see National Grid 2011).  
STOR results shown for short-term STOR (<45 minutes) and long-term STOR (45 
minutes to 4 hours) 
Response & 
Reserve 
requirements 
Increasing requirements for FR and STOR are calculated on the basis of decreasing 
system inertia, increasing impact of wind forecasting error, and increased credible 
in-feed loss due to increase of unit size. All data from National Grid (2011) 
Flexible demand 
Calculates technically and realistically shiftable potential for 2010 (in GW), using 
data from Sustainability First (Dudeney et al 2014); estimates realistically shiftable 
potential for 2030 and 2050 in % and GW 
Also uses data on electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps as a proxy for demand 
flexibility. Results given in TWh/y and in % of total demand 
 
5.9.1 Flexible supply: Frequency response capability 
This indicator uses the Frequency Response capability of the generation mix in the pathways as 
a proxy for the flexibility and responsiveness of supply. The graphs in figures 5.25 and 5.26 
show the mean and maximum frequency response (FR) capability of the generation mix in the 
pathways (in MWh). The graphs show the capability of both primary FR (0-30 seconds) and 
secondary FR (30 seconds to 30 minutes) for the highest probable frequency deviation given by 
National Grid (0.8Hz for primary, 0.5Hz for secondary), thereby illustrating the ability of the 
system to respond to shocks of significant magnitude.  
 
All three pathways show significant reductions in FR capability through to 2050. In general, 
primary FR shows a greater decrease, suggesting that the system’s ability to respond to very 
short-term deviations in the supply-demand balance is decreasing as a result of increasing 
penetration of intermittent RES which generally cannot provide any kind of FR. The MR 
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pathway includes large amounts of gas and coal (with CCS), both of which are able to provide 
FR in much the same way as today; as such, the MR pathway has the greatest FR capability, but 
it still shows a sharp decline, driven by increasing penetration of RES and of nuclear. Nuclear 
can provide FR, but the raw National Grid data used for this indicator (available on request) 
suggest that nuclear provides much lower levels of FR per MW than coal or gas; nuclear tends 
to be more suited to providing baseload (House of Lords 2015).The generation mix in the TF 
pathway is less capable of providing FR in 2050 than it is in 2030; this reflects the increasingly 
rapid phase-out of thermal generation, to be replaced by intermittent small-scale RES. It 
should be noted that there are large uncertainties caused by lack of data on the Frequency 
Response capability of dedicated or co-fired biomass generation. The 2011 data used for this 
indicator only offers data for one biomass plant (at Tilbury), therefore the averages used for 
biomass are assumed to be the same as coal. This is a significant assumption which is made 
necessary by lack of data, and is discussed further in section 5.9.6. 
 
Figure 5-25: Mean Frequency Response capability, primary and secondary (MWh) 
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Figure 5-26: Maximum Frequency Response capability, primary and secondary (MWh) 
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considering that the TF pathway largely phases out gas and coal generation and therefore has 
far less of what might be thought of as ‘conventional’ flexible supply, but the result may reflect 
the large amount of biomass generation in the TF pathway versus the large amount of wind 
generation in the CC pathway.  
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Figure 5-27: Short-term STOR, long-term STOR, and black-start capability in % of total generation mix 
which is capable of offering these services 
 
 
The CC pathway has the lowest capability for both FR and STOR, reflecting the extremely large 
amounts of wind power and nuclear power on the system in the CC pathway. Nuclear power 
cannot provide black-start power, and it cannot provide STOR if the station is switched off at 
the time of the request, for example for routine maintenance; as explained in Appendix E, this 
factor is taken into account in the calculations. Wind and solar power cannot provide response 
or reserve. For all three pathways, the decline in short-term STOR capability is especially 
pronounced. All pathways show a decline in short-term STOR from around 40% today, to less 
than 20% in 2050. This could mean that even if the system manages to deal with a short-term 
shock by restoring the frequency, there may not be enough reserve capability to restore the 
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generation comes onto the system (National Grid 2011).21 Therefore, this section assesses the 
requirement for response and reserve services in the Transition Pathways, and compares this 
to the capability of the system for offering these services which was explored in the preceding 
sections. 
 
5.9.3.1 Response (FR) requirements 
 
Table 5-7: Increase in response (FR) requirement (% increase, compared to 2010) 
 2030 2050 
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary 
MR 
Low (inertia only) 1.71% 1.71% 10.11% 10.11% 
High (incl. unit size increase) 77.99% 77.99% 92.69% 67.37% 
CC 
Low (inertia only) 7.82% 7.82% -7.39% -7.39% 
High (incl. unit size increase) 88.68% 88.68% 62.07% 40.77% 
TF 
Low  (inertia only) -7.84% -7.84% -3.45% -3.45% 
High (incl. unit size increase) -7.84% -7.84% -3.45% -3.45% 
 
Table 5.7 shows the increase in FR requirements which could be expected in the three 
pathways. As such, the higher the number, the higher the risk. The table illustrates the 
enormous influence that an increase in potential unit size (see Appendix E) could have on the 
FR requirement of an electricity pathway. Including this variable introduces enormous 
uncertainty to the conclusions. As such, it is recommended that the unit sizes would not be 
increased without consideration of the impact that this would have on FR requirements, and 
would therefore probably not occur in the manner shown here. Therefore, the most important 
conclusions are the ones which consider increases in FR requirement due to declining inertia 
capabilities, which will be focused on for the rest of this section. 
 
 
                                                          
21 It is worth noting that improvements in wind forecasting in the future could potentially help to reduce forecasting 
error. However, it is still unlikely that it will become possible to accurately predict wind speeds on the short 
timescales required for system balancing. Importantly, even if forecasting errors become less common, the impact 
of such forecasting errors will increase as more wind generation comes onto the system. 
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Figure 5-28: FR requirements and capabilities 
 
 
 
Table 5.7 and figure 5.28 show that the MR and CC pathways both experience very slight 
increases in FR requirements. The TF pathway actually experiences a reduction in 
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experiences the largest disparity in 2050. It is worth emphasising that these results simply 
indicate percentage changes (which are in actual fact fairly small), and that therefore it is 
difficult to infer from this that the reduction in FR capability would necessarily be large enough 
to cause security problems. However, the divergence illustrated in figure 5.28 indicates that 
this could represent a potential security risk for the pathways, and that therefore this area 
would benefit from more research to improve understanding of how severe these risks could 
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Table 5.8 shows that all the pathways experience significant increases in STOR requirements in 
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Table 5-8:  Increase in reserve (STOR) requirement (% increase, compared to 2010) 
 Wind capacity increase Incl. unit size increase 
 2030 2050 2050 
Market Rules 23.55% 40% 48% 
Central Coordination 43.8% 70% 83.92% 
Thousand Flowers 32.5% 47.21% 47.21% 
 
Figure 5.29 compares these changes in STOR requirements with the changes in STOR capability 
described in section 5.9.2. The STOR capability results show the long-term STOR capability, 
because this is an overall value which incorporates short-term STOR. As with the FR indicator 
in section 5.9.1, the unit size increase is not considered here. The graph shows that, similarly 
to Frequency Response, there is a considerable capability gap in all the pathways between 
decreasing capability to provide STOR, and the increasing requirement for STOR due to 
increasing penetration of wind power. The CC pathway has the biggest capability gap, although 
the other two pathways also have a fairly significant gap. 
 
This indicator suggests that all three pathways could experience difficulties in responding to 
shocks, i.e. unexpected short-term changes in the supply-demand balance.  It should be noted 
that possible future increases in reserve requirements due to solar forecasting errors are not 
included, as there is currently no data available which calculates the impact that this could 
have. It is feasible that by 2050, solar penetration could be high enough in some of the 
pathways for this to warrant further consideration. 
 
Figure 5-29: STOR requirements and capabilities 
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5.9.4 Flexible demand 
The preceding ‘shock resilience’ indicators have shown that the short-term flexibility of 
electricity generation is likely to decline in a transition to a low-carbon electricity system. 
Therefore, it would be desirable to make up this flexibility somewhere, and one of the most 
promising options is DSR. Unfortunately, the demand data in the pathways is limited, and 
therefore it is very difficult to estimate flexible demand capability. Therefore this indicator 
examines possible technical potential for demand shifting, and to what extent this might be 
realisable for the three pathways. 
 
5.9.4.1 Flexible demand in the current UK electricity system 
The majority of DSR in the UK is currently undertaken by large industrial and commercial 
consumers who have interruptible contracts, although DSR only accounted for 1% of the 
successful bids into the first round of Capacity Market auctions in 2015 (Hatchwell 2014). A 
three-year project by Sustainability First (Dudeney et al 2014) set out to assess the potential 
for DSR in the current UK electricity sector. The project found that the technical shiftable 
potential across all sectors today may be up to ~18GW on a January weekday winter evening, 
and up to ~10 GW on an August weekend evening. However, the amount that is realistically 
shiftable is unclear, but is certainly much less. Consumers may be willing to accept some 
interruption of some household appliances for financial benefit; however, Dudeney et al 
(2014) note that there might be a limited match between what currently contributes to peak 
demand (lighting, TV, heating, cooking) and most of the shiftable appliances (washing 
machines, dishwashers etc.). There may be some scope for the 0.5 million households 
currently using on-peak electric heating to install insulation and shift their heating use to off-
peak. 
 
There have been a number of other useful studies into load-shifting potential in the present-
day UK electricity system: 
 Element Energy and De Montfort University (commissioned by Ofgem) found peak 
load-shifting potential in non-domestic buildings of 8 to 30% (Element Energy 2012) 
 Smart meter trials have indicated that 7 to 10% of residential load could be shifted 
without any automation (AECOM 2011) 
 Palmer et al (2013) found that there is some potential to shift peak household loads 
using controls on washing machines, tumble dryers and dishwashers. However, 
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replacing appliances with more efficient ones would do more to reduce the peak than 
DSR at present (Dudeney et al 2014). 
 
5.9.4.2 Peak load and shiftable potential in the pathways in 2030 and 2050 
The level of peak demand in the pathways offers some indication of the amount of load which 
may technically be shiftable, although it is not possible to say which specific appliances this 
load consists of. The peak and minimum load for the pathways are shown in table 5.9. The 
larger the difference between peak and minimum load, the greater the assumed potential for 
load-shifting. The MR pathway, which has high levels of electrification but low levels of energy 
efficiency and demand reduction, has the greatest potential for load-shifting. However, there 
is a clear trade-off here between demand reduction and potential for DSR. DSR could provide 
valuable services to National Grid in the event of a shock; however, lower peak demand (as 
evidenced in the TF pathway) would create far fewer challenges for the system in meeting this 
peak.  
 
Table 5-9: Peak and minimum load 
 Market Rules Central Coordination Thousand Flowers 
 Peak Minimum Peak Minimum Peak Minimum 
2010 61.44 23.08 61.75 22.87 61.58 22.77 
2030 86.36 26.20 78.76 23.10 60.58 19.78 
2050 103.33 30.64 87.23 22.30 59.28 18.85 
 
 
Figure 5-30: Peak demand. Error bars show 20% reduction of peak due to shifting 
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If 10% of the electricity load were realistically shiftable (to take a relatively conservative 
estimate based on the figures from AECOM [2011] and Element Energy [2012] shown above), 
the MR pathway would still have higher peak demand in 2050 than the other two pathways. 
The error bars in figure 5.30 show the impact of a reduction of 20% of peak demand: even 
under this more optimistic assumption, neither the MR nor the CC pathway reduce their peak 
demand to the same level as the TF pathway. This corroborates the conclusion from Dudeney 
et al (2014) which suggests that greater gains may be made from reducing overall demand, 
rather than load-shifting. 
 
5.9.4.3 Could consumers in the pathways be encouraged to shift their demand? 
There exist various financial, regulatory and behavioural barriers which could make it 
challenging to realise the optimistic 20% load-shift scenario outlined above (see Owen et al 
2013). The three pathways might encounter specific issues: 
- Market Rules: it is possible that market-based mechanisms, if they developed the right 
kinds of incentives and removed some of the existing regulatory barriers, could be 
beneficial; however, this would require the introduction of a clear market incentive for 
suppliers and DNOs to get involved (Owen et al 2013). 
- Central Coordination: government-led mechanisms, such as the UK smart meter roll-
out (see DECC 2012d), could incentivise some load-shifting. However, government-led 
schemes would likely benefit just as much at the moment from regulating to reduce 
overall demand (Dudeney et al 2014).  In the future, the government could mandate 
load-shifting to be achieved via automation; however, potential might be limited by 
the fact noted above that peak load is often comprised of less-shiftable services such 
as cooking.  
- Thousand Flowers: Dudeney et al claim that “local energy schemes are where 
personal energy, drive and commitment sit to transform the energy sector to low-
carbon” (2014:25). Barton et al (2015) suggest that ESCos will be critical for achieving 
demand shifting and overall demand reduction: it is demonstrated by Fang et al (2012) 
that ESCos may be able to deliver demand reductions of between 22 and 35% 
compared to BAU, which would be crucial for realising the demand reductions in the 
TF pathway. Automated load-shifting may be used widely by local energy companies in 
this scenario. 
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5.9.4.4 Electric Vehicles and Heat Pumps as a means of shifting peak demand 
Electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps represent very large loads on the system, and therefore 
represent significant potential for load-shifting, especially because they do not necessarily use 
power during peak times (other large loads such as cooking are far less shiftable). Figure 5.31 
shows that the CC pathway has a higher percentage of EVs and heat pumps than the MR 
pathway, and also lower peak demand (figure 5.30). The TF pathway has much lower potential 
for shifting using EVs and heat pumps, but the low peak demand in this pathway suggests that 
the system would not be as stretched to meet peak demand anyway. 
 
Figure 5-31: Electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps 
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system will be less vulnerable to a large loss of in-feed, for instance such as that caused by a 
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balancing. It is also likely that a shift towards electrification of heating and transport will 
involve significant load clustering, which in a decentralised system would need to be managed 
locally (Barton et al 2015). DNOs do not currently have the experience of managing complex 
power flows in the same way as National Grid – in order to manage a decentralised system, 
the DNOs would need to become much more active in managing their networks (House of 
Lords 2015; Lockwood 2014). If the interaction between the distribution and transmission 
systems is not managed adequately during this transition, the uncertainties experienced by the 
transmission operator could become worse (UKERC 2014).  
 
There is also somewhat mixed evidence from mainland Europe: it has been argued that 
decentralisation can cause problems because of lack of coordination between different 
network operators (Castle 2006), but on the other hand the large scale of the European 
transmission system means that a fault in one area can easily cascade into a serious 
widespread loss of load (RAEng 2014),22 and therefore decentralisation could actually act as a 
hedge against more serious cascading outages (UCTE 2006). The debate within the UK is still 
very much open, as demonstrated by the evidence collected by the electricity resilience 
enquiry conducted by the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee (House of Lords 
2014). This debate seems to point to a possible trade-off between increased overall resilience 
to the risk of large-scale events, and increased local resilience to the risks of poor system 
management. 
 
5.9.6 Shock resilience: key uncertainties and limitations  
The key uncertainty for this dimension is the role of flexible demand in the pathways. There 
are multiple variables at work – for example, interruptible contracts for industrial and 
commercial users, the effectiveness of institutional arrangements, and the behaviour of 
consumers. It is very difficult to know how resilient a system is to shocks without knowing the 
capability of that system to shift demand when required.  Therefore, in order to fully 
understand the reliability of a low-carbon electricity system, it would be highly desirable for 
the pathway or scenario to include detailed data on interruptible contracts, appliances, 
consumer behaviour, and institutional arrangements for flexible demand. 
 
                                                          
22 For example, in 2006, a trip fault which started in Germany led to blackouts in 8 countries and cases of lines 
tripping as far afield as Tunisia and Morocco (RAEng 2014) 
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There are considerable uncertainties surrounding future FR and STOR capabilities. The 
assumptions regarding the FR and STOR capability of plant types comes from data on existing 
power stations; however, this might change considerably in the future. It is highly likely that 
response and reserve requirements will increase as more renewables come on-line, and as 
such, the rest of the power system will probably change to accommodate these requirements. 
The current system is built so that there is enough response and reserve capability, and it is 
probable that this would be maintained.  All three pathways contain some kinds of responsive 
generation (in particular gas, coal and biomass), therefore in theory it may be possible to 
ensure that the response and reserve capability of new plants are maximised in order to 
accommodate additional requirements. 
 
Finally, similarly to several of the other dimensions examined throughout this thesis, the 
‘shock resilience’ indicators reveal significant uncertainties surrounding biomass generation, in 
particular the role of biomass for providing Frequency Response and STOR. For instance, the 
2011 National Grid data used for the Frequency Response indicator (available on request) only 
offers data for one biomass plant (at Tilbury). Because of this, the averages used for biomass 
are assumed to be the same as coal; however, it is uncertain whether this would be the case, 
especially where CHP is concerned. It is therefore important that the response capabilities of 
biomass power are better understood and that any new biomass and CHP plant is built with 
response and reserve requirements in mind. This will ensure that the system can respond to 
changes in the supply-demand balance, which in turn will help the system to become more 
flexible and to support the increased penetration of intermittent renewable generation. 
 
 
5.10 Summing up chapter 5 
 
This chapter has presented the results of an empirical assessment of the security of three low-
carbon transition pathways for the UK electricity system. The set of indicators designed in 
Chapter 4 was applied to the supply and demand data of the Transition Pathways to a Low-
Carbon Economy Consortium, for the time increments 2010, 2030 and 2050. In chapter 7, 
these results will be used to create dashboard analyses of the pathways which flag up areas of 
risk; the analysis of results and their implications will also take place in Chapter 7. 
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The following chapter is the second of two results chapters, which uses the indicator set which 
was applied here as the basis for a discussion on energy security with stakeholders in the UK 
energy sector. The aim of the following chapter is to identify the key themes which arose from 
these interviews, in order to understand the diversity of perspectives in the UK energy 
community, and to elucidate the key areas of commonality and contention. Later, in Chapter 7, 
the results from these interviews will be applied to the results from the security assessment, in 
order to explore the impacts that these perspectives have on stakeholders’ preferred options 
for managing electricity security. Operating in the knowledge that energy security is a complex 
and contested term (as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3), it is important to attempt to 
understand the possible implications of different perspectives on the results shown here. 
Instead of seeking to ‘close down’ the diversity of views around a simple and uncontested set 
of results, the following chapters of this thesis seek instead to open them up to debate. 
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6  Results 2: Results from the 
stakeholder interviews 
 
This chapter presents and analyses the results from the 25 interviews which were conducted 
with key stakeholders in the UK energy sector, in order to answer the second research 
question: “What are the reactions of energy stakeholders to the proposed set of indicators, 
and what does this tell us about the diversity of perspectives in the UK energy community?” 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the key themes which arose from these interviews 
and to elucidate the key areas of commonality and contention, in order to understand the 
diversity of perspectives amongst UK energy stakeholders. Later on, Chapter 7 will go on to 
cover the final research question, to explore the impacts that these perspectives have on 
preferred options for improving electricity security. 
 
Section 6.1 presents an overview of the importance which respondents placed on each 
indicator, from the ratings given for each indicator on a scale of 1 to 5. Sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 
and 6.5 then move on to presenting the qualitative outputs of the interviews within each 
security dimension: availability, affordability, sustainability and reliability. Some of these 
comments from respondents refer directly to specific indicators; however, several are 
overlapping, and therefore they are presented according to dimension rather than according 
to indicator. Finally, section 6.6 uses these outputs to identify five major cross-cutting themes 
which emerged from the interviews. 
 
6.1 Results from Likert-scale ratings of indicators 
 
Respondents were asked to rate the indicators on a Likert scale according to how important 
they felt each indicator to be for electricity security in a low-carbon context (with 1 denoting 
minimal importance and 5 denoting critical importance). The results are shown in figure 6.1, in 
which each ‘bubble’ represents an indicator, the size of which denotes the mean score for that 
indicator across all respondents; the larger the bubble, the more important the indicator was 
felt to be on average. It should be noted that these numbers do not necessarily reflect the 
complexities and nuances contained within the respondents’ answers (these are analysed in 
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more detail in sections 6.2 to 6.5); however, they can provide a useful overview of the patterns 
which emerged from the group of stakeholders as a whole.23 
 
Respondents were asked to rate indicators for the medium-term (2030) and the long-term 
(2050). However, the interviews were not particularly successful at eliciting differences 
between the two time-frames; most of the results are very similar for 2030 and 2050, and no 
clear patterns emerged.  This could be for a number of reasons. It could be that respondents 
were unable to consider how things might change over such long timeframes because of the 
inherent uncertainty. It might also be because the interview format was not well designed for 
eliciting considered responses on the differences over timeframes, because the semi-
structured format sought to allow for digressions and therefore did not always stick rigidly to 
discussing each indicator in turn. There was significant variability between the willingness of 
respondents to differentiate between the two time-frames, but a majority of respondents 
reported no differences between their ratings for 2030 and 2050. For brevity, and in order to 
acknowledge the possibility that respondents may have been unable to consider how things 
might change over very long timeframes, the results are only shown for 2030. 
 
As can be seen from figure 6.1, the ‘availability’ and ‘reliability’ indicators were felt to be the 
most important, whereas most of the ‘sustainability’ indicators received lower scores. Many 
respondents felt that the sustainability dimension should be thought of as separate to security, 
whereas many were in agreement that the more traditional security dimensions of availability 
and reliability are integral to electricity security (again, it is worth noting that ‘sustainability’ is 
used in this thesis to refer to GHG emissions and resource depletion, and will likely have been 
viewed in the same way by the respondents, as they were only provided with the list of 
indicators and not the names of the four dimensions). However, within these dimensions, not 
all indicators were felt to be critical to electricity security; notably, ‘import dependence’, which 
is often used as an indicator of energy security in the literature (see for example Bordhoff et al 
2010; Cherp et al 2013; European Commission 2001; Greene 2010; Jewell et al 2014; 
Pfenninger and Keirstead 2015; Umbach 2010) was felt to be relatively unimportant. For the 
‘affordability’ dimension, again many respondents felt that affordability issues should be 
thought of as separate to security; however, the affordability indicators received higher scores 
on average than the sustainability indicators. This was partly due to a high number of mid-
range responses in the affordability dimension, especially relating to transmission and 
                                                          
23 Note: only 24 out of 25 respondents agreed to rate the indicators on a Likert scale. 
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distribution costs, and also partly due to a number of low scores for the ‘resource depletion’ 
and ‘water’ indicators. Four of the highest average scores were for indicators relating to the 
flexibility of the system (response-and-reserve, flexible demand, storage and interconnection). 
This is interesting because these indicators relate to the ability of the system to respond to 
threats or insecurity; however, a comprehensive literature review by Jonsson et al (2013) 
found that most of the energy security literature focuses on measures which are thought to 
reduce causes of insecurity, such as minimising exposure to imports. The possible reasons for 
these results, and the nuances within the responses, are explained in more detail in sections 
6.2 to 6.6. It should be emphasised that these results are useful simply as an overview of 
respondents’ views; because  participants were selected using purposive rather than 
probabilistic sampling, it is not possible to conduct a robust statistical analysis of the ratings 
given.
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Figure 6-1: Ratings of indicators by interviewees, 2030 
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6.2 Interview responses: Availability 
6.2.1 Acceptability, engagement and opposition 
The majority of respondents felt that public acceptability and support is integral to a 
successful, secure transition. It was noted that actors and decision-makers need a mandate to 
operate and that the transition needs to be ‘politically affordable’ (respondents F; G; J; L; O; V, 
X), and that a lack of public support could create insecurity because infrastructure may not get 
built in a timely manner (A; D; K; U). One respondent (F) said: 
In order to meet the UK’s renewable targets, you are talking about 
a quite dramatic change in the landscape of the country…. and you 
are already starting to see the politics get difficult, with the 
Conservatives essentially trying to block onshore wind 
developments… And of course the bottom line is, if people do not 
accept it the politics gets too hard and it won’t happen.  
 
However, some respondents argued that public acceptability doesn’t seem integral to the 
concept of energy security, for instance because public opinion doesn’t necessarily drive 
decision-making (E; Q; V; Y), and that it would always be possible to build what is needed, it 
just might cost more without the public on-board (N; W). It was also noted by many that public 
approval, engagement and opposition are complex, indirect and non-static measures of 
electricity security (A; I; N; P; Q; W; Y).  
 
One common theme which emerged was the idea that the transition will mean making difficult 
choices (E; H; I), a fact which may be poorly understood by the public (C; O; T). It was 
suggested that there needs to be better public engagement around the challenges of 
developing a secure, affordable and low-carbon energy system (F; J), but that at the end of the 
day, it all comes down to the extent to which the public accept the trade-offs which may need 
to be made, for instance if they might need to pay more for a secure system (G; U). It was 
noted that if people aren’t accepting, it would be far more likely that the carbon targets would 
be the area of the trilemma to suffer (K). Several respondents pointed out that public 
acceptability is complicated by a widespread fear of letting the ‘lights go out’ (C; Q; T), and that 
this makes it politically very difficult to challenge conventional ideas about how electricity is 
generated and consumed (T). 
 
Several respondents suggested that a secure, low-carbon system with no participation or 
engagement from the public would be technically feasible, but would reduce the options 
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available and would make low-cost interventions such as demand reduction more challenging, 
thus probably resulting in a more costly transition (A; O; R; U). This is linked to themes around 
the co-benefits of participation, such as behaviour change and empowerment for consumers 
(G; O; T). Some argued that decentralisation is the best means of improving public engagement 
and buy-in, thus perhaps improving the overall acceptability of the energy mix (B; T; X). One 
respondent (X) argued that: 
For me, public participation and engagement doesn’t really do it as a 
term, because it conjures up impressions of the sort of consultation 
process that you go through when you develop any kind of energy 
project. For me, that is by many leagues insufficient. What we should 
be looking for is a mixture of community ownership, control, and 
leadership. 
However, others pointed out that there is no research consensus on whether or not a 
decentralised system would be more secure (E; J; U; V). The UK has a highly centralised market 
system, which could mean that the lessons from the Continent could be difficult to replicate 
here, and increased decentralisation could result in fragmentation and some consumers 
getting ‘left out’ (B; J). One respondent (Y) said: 
There are lots of people who believe in localism, and to some 
extent that’s true, that the more local it is then the more 
ownership people have. But how much of a premium are people 
willing to pay for that ownership? People readily accept that some 
things need to be centralised. 
Participation becomes more crucial for electricity security if the system is decentralised, 
because in a centralised system power production can often take place in remote locations (D; 
H; V); this underlines some of the challenges for attempting to create a generalisable set of 
indicators for the assessment of multiple transition pathways, because the importance of 
certain indicators depends on the technology mix.  
 
There was disagreement around the impact of direct opposition on security. 10 respondents 
argued that opposition is highly important, and can have a seriously detrimental impact on 
security; it was argued that opposition not only impacts on timing, cost and feasibility, but also 
on the general political dynamics and the political legitimacy for the transition (C; E; J; R; Y). 
Fracking, onshore wind and nuclear were all mentioned frequently on this subject (D; F; L; O; P; 
S), although it was also pointed out that the impact of opposition depends on who is doing the 
opposing (B; E; Y):  
I think that governments listen more to the middle-classes who 
don’t want turbines near their houses than they do to other forms 
of opposition. If you think of people who’ve lived near coal-fired 
power stations their entire lives, generally people who are less well 
off in big cities, and who’ve had it pumping over them for decades 
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and decades. It depends on who’s opposing, as to how important it 
is. 
On the other hand, 10 respondents raised questions over whether opposition would have a 
material impact on the security of the electricity system. Several respondents said things along 
the lines of ‘with all due respect, protests in the UK never actually stopped anything’ (H; S; V; 
W). One respondent (W) stated that:  
Protesting about existing power stations all seems very totemic, it 
doesn’t actually do a lot… At worse, you have to consult with local 
opposition about new infrastructure and you don’t have to agree 
with them, and the ultimate decision is taken by the relevant 
authorities, which is the Secretary of State. I’ve yet to meet a 
Secretary of State who would put local opposition over security of 
supply. They’d probably try to find a way to keep both happy. 
It was pointed out that opposition might increase the cost slightly, but developers generally 
just find a more acceptable way of getting things built or seek redress from the law (D; H; L; M; 
P; Q). It was also widely noted that there will never be a consensus amongst the public (E; K; N; 
Q; R). Some respondents argued that opposition is malleable, especially if local people see 
economic or community benefits from the project (G; J; O; U).  
 
Finally, several respondents picked up on the link between acceptability, engagement and 
demand-side participation.  At the moment, the majority of people act as passive consumers in 
the UK’s top-down system, and only really engage if prices go up dramatically or if someone 
tries to build infrastructure next to their house (M; P; U; V). However, whichever route to 
transition is taken, it is highly likely that changes will need to be made on the demand-side: 
even the two centralised pathways both include large amounts of demand reduction and a 
smart grid. As noted above, this could bring co-benefits to consumers; however, there was 
concern amongst the respondents over whether the public would accept this (G; P; V; Y). 
Concerns were raised that opposition is not just about protests and blocking of planning 
permission; it’s also about a general resistance to the idea of changing behaviour (R; W; X): 
Opposition, I think, also affects the way that we think about 
electricity use, and so there’s a strong, almost ideological 
opposition to the idea that we should think about anything to do 
with our demand – we pay our electricity supplier for our electricity, 
and that instils a sense of a right to use as much as we feel we need. 
That fundamental assumption, I think, we have to challenge.  
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6.2.2 Diversity and imports 
One of the most commonly-cited indicators for the security of an energy system is diversity. 
However, the interviews revealed significant levels of disagreement over the importance of 
diversity as an indicator of electricity security. Numerous respondents suggested that it is 
‘prudent’ to have a range of options to spread the risk, and that the benefits of a ‘portfolio’ 
approach have been well recognised, especially in the context of increasing intermittent 
generation (D; G; K; I; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; V; X; Y). Respondent V stated: 
To me, this is the nub of the debate. We can’t plant the whole of 
the decarbonisation agenda on one technology, only to find out it 
can’t be deployed or we’ve misunderstood public acceptability, or 
we can’t get cost reduction. 
On the other hand, many respondents expressed scepticism about the importance of the 
diversity indicator (A; C; E; F; I; J; O; U; Y). Some argued that is a useful but not sufficient 
indicator, whereas others felt that it is generally not a particularly important factor, as 
expressed by respondent A: 
It’s one of these dogmas at the minute, that everyone says, “future 
system - diverse, diverse, diverse”. I’m less sure about that. I look at 
France for example, that has what seems to be a very secure 
system, has been for years and years, and it’s about as un-diverse a 
system as you could get.  You need a mix that works… 
Several respondents picked up on this point that one technology could in theory simply be 
more secure than all the others (C; E; J; O; U), with four respondents mentioning the example 
of France (A; F; J; U). It was argued that at some stage, it will be necessary to narrow it down to 
technologies which are more mature and more cost effective (A; O); as stated by respondent O: 
It can seem intuitive that you would want a wide range of 
technologies and a wide range of fuels in order to sort of hedge your 
risk to supply shocks, but I always have some concerns about that 
argument because I think it can be used to kind of dissuade oneself 
from making tough choices… You can end up if you like coming up 
with a logical construct to support bonkers projects just because we 
don’t have one of those and if we have one of those we will be more 
diverse. 
 
Many of the respondents noted that the importance of diversity depends very much on the 
context. The electricity mix in the UK is currently very diverse, and many of the respondents 
found it unlikely that diversity would ever be an issue for the UK (F; M; U; W); in fact, the 
results in chapter 5 (section 5.2.1) support this. Moreover, the importance of diversity as an 
indicator of security depends on the technology mix; for instance, if cost effective storage and 
widespread DSR are successfully developed, diversity could become much less important as a 
strategy for integrating intermittent renewables (B; H; W). 
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A common opinion was that reducing dependence on imports is not an important factor for 
improving electricity security. It was noted that in the context of a global market, imports are 
probably a good thing; it will always be possible to get hold of the fuels and materials required 
as long as the price is paid, and imports can help to reduce costs (F; G; I; J; V; W; Y). Some 
respondents rejected the rhetoric of not getting fuels from abroad (R; W): 
To say ‘we can’t rely on those pesky foreigners’ is an attitude that’s 
kind of dodgy anyway, it assumes every other country in the world 
is ganging up against us, basically paranoia. 
Several respondents said that as long as imports are diverse, the overall level of dependence on 
imports, and the stability of the exporting nation, is of less importance. The exact balance of 
the three ‘import’ indicators was not agreed upon, but almost 50% of respondents were 
explicit about the fact that gains in one of these ‘import’ indicators can make up for shortfalls 
in others (A; C; D; G; J; K; M; P; S; U; V; W; Y).  
 
Conversely, it was noted that import dependence is what people traditionally think about when 
they think of energy security (P). It was also noted that politicians in particular see minimising 
imports as beneficial because they have more control over what happens within the UK (D; Y). 
As one respondent (T) said: 
Well it's a risk isn't it? It just adds to your risk. You can't control what 
another country's going to do. So you're increasing risk by relying 
on imports. And from a business point of view, you want to mitigate, 
to minimise the risk. So I suppose you're increasing instability by 
getting it abroad, to various degrees. 
This issue is highly linked with concerns over fossil resource dependency, and several 
respondents argued that reducing reliance on fossil fuels would have a double benefit for 
electricity security by improving environmental sustainability and decreasing dependence on 
imports (I; O; Q; T; X). In this respect, a decrease in import dependence was seen as somewhat 
‘inevitable’ as the transition is made to a low-carbon economy (H; K; L; O; Q); this is interesting, 
considering that the results from the security assessment (section 5.2.2) do not support this 
assumption.  
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  Figure 6-2: Indicator ratings: 'availability' dimension Figure 6-2: Indicator ratings: 'av ilabili y' dimension 
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6.3 Interview responses: Affordability 
6.3.1 Costs to consumers and to the system 
When analysing the ‘affordability’ indicators, a divide immediately became apparent between 
those respondents who felt that affordability is integral to electricity security, and those who 
felt that affordability is a separate or second-order issue. Clearly, everyone was in agreement 
that affordability in and of itself is an important goal; however, the question arises over 
whether this dimension should be included as part of an assessment of electricity security. 
 
Several respondents stated that if people can’t pay for their power, they do not have a secure 
supply (H; N; Q; X; Y). It was also noted that keeping energy affordable is a fundamental part of 
the wider economy, and that energy security involves “hopefully not screwing the economy by 
the way that you do this” (Q), and maintaining “economic sustainability” (O). On a similar line, 
it was also noted that affordability is closely linked to acceptability, and that high prices could 
cause political instability, which would negatively impact security (C; H; I; L; M; N; O; S). 
Respondent N said: 
If supply costs get so high that people can’t pay their bills then that 
is going to have a negative impact on security of supply and you will 
also end up with political things happening that will then destabilize 
things. 
However, it was also pointed out that consumers often don’t notice short-term variations in 
price, and there is probably still room for bills to go up before it creates a serious acceptability 
risk (D; F; L; M; U; Y). It may not be the price itself which drives insecurity, but rather people’s 
reactions to prices and to the pace of change (C; Y): 
But in and of themselves, I don’t think affordability drives system 
security. I think it’s the reactions to it that drives levels of system 
security. Cutting the ‘Green Crap’ was a choice about where 
politicians felt they should go; and the political framing around that 
was coloured by the way some parts of the right wing of the political 
system have approached the whole issue of climate change, for 
reasons that are beyond the remit of your immediate project, I 
suspect. So the affordability has affected system security negatively 
in the long term. 
 
However, contrary to all this, many respondents argued that affordability is not integral to the 
concept of electricity security. Affordability was often seen more as a second-order issue (A; D; 
E; V), or as a trade-off against security, because measures to improve security could result in 
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increased costs (K; P; V) and because security of supply is the one thing that people appear to 
be prepared to pay higher energy prices for (E; K). As stated by respondent A: 
Annual electricity bills fall squarely into the ‘cost’ side of the 
trilemma. Now obviously everything’s connected in the system, so 
if bills go up, that might be a sign that the system is getting less 
secure, but it’s a second order sort of impact. 
It was suggested that high prices could potentially impact security, for the reasons detailed 
above, but that they don’t tell you very much about the security of the system itself and are 
therefore not a particularly effective direct indicator of electricity security (A; G; U). Security is 
seen as ‘trumping’ both affordability and carbon from a political perspective (C; K; V; W), which 
could mean that high prices would result in a loss of political consensus for climate mitigation 
(D; K; P; W). As one respondent (V) said: 
You’re not going to not keep the lights on because things are more 
expensive, ultimately. That would be a very bizarre political 
decision. But the impact might be more on the rate of 
decarbonisation more than security. In a political reality, you’d 
probably sacrifice decarbonisation first. 
This makes it important to emphasise the distinction between ‘a secure system’ and ‘a secure 
low-carbon system’; one respondent suggested that affordability is integral to the concept of 
energy security when talking about a low-carbon transition because of public acceptability 
issues, whereas when talking about security of supply per se, affordability is not integral to the 
concept (P). Another common perspective was that it is important to keep prices efficient and 
reflective, rather than simply keeping them low. The correct price signals are vital for ensuring 
that investors have the right incentives to build electricity infrastructure (J; M; N; S; T; U; Y). 
Respondent U said: 
So the security issues comes more to me in terms of price signals 
that's telling the market in the long-term to get things built, to get 
the right sort of things built in the right sort of way. 
 
Finally, fuel poverty was one of the most contentious issues. Some respondents argued that 
fuel poverty is critical because it can have knock-on impacts right across the board, on demand 
reduction, energy efficiency, government popularity and public acceptability; fuel poverty can 
have a wider impact on the general direction of policy, and as a moral argument the issue has 
considerable potential to engage the public (F; I; J; M; N; O; Q; R; S; X). It was also pointed out 
that reducing fuel poverty is a sensible strategy for electricity security anyway, because it puts 
the emphasis on reducing demand and improving energy efficiency, both of which are in 
theory ‘win-wins’ for security, affordability and carbon (R). On the other hand, a large number 
of respondents felt that although reducing fuel poverty is important from a normative 
perspective, it doesn’t have much political salience or material impact on electricity security 
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(C; D; E; G; H; K; L; P; U; V), especially because the lower end of the income spectrum tends to 
get ignored by politicians (C; D; H). One respondent (C) said: 
Well the thing about fuel poverty is, it’s actually shown almost no 
ability to influence the politics of energy over quite some time.  I 
mean there’s quite a lot of pious commentary about it, but very 
little real kind of gritty attack on it.  I suspect it’s because a lot of 
those people who are genuinely fuel poor don’t vote. 
Interestingly, it was also suggested that higher energy prices could actually be beneficial for 
electricity security, by encouraging people to reduce waste and to improve energy efficiency; 
electricity is probably not expensive enough at the moment to really provide an incentive for 
non-fuel-poor consumers to cut their demand (B; R; T). 
 
6.3.2 Networks and network costs 
Despite the fact that network costs are included in the security assessment as part of the 
annual bills calculations, there are numerous interconnected issues to do with network 
upgrades, several of which relate to network adequacy and the reliability of the electricity 
system. Therefore the networks are considered here under a unique section; several of the 
issues raised will also be relevant for the ‘reliability’ dimension, covered in section 6.5. 
 
Transmission and distribution networks are critical to security; as noted earlier in this thesis, 
they are the component of the electricity system on which outages generally occur (C; O; W). 
However, respondents pointed out that unlike the rest of the electricity system, the networks 
are a heavily regulated monopoly, meaning that there is less risk of failing to attract private 
investment (L; U; W). Respondent U said: “The cost component attributed to networks I don't 
feel is going to be a game changer unless it's done really badly, which so far history shows that 
it hasn't been.” The regulated nature of the networks means that cost efficiency is the most 
crucial aspect for the networks to achieve; expenditure and upgrades will be required, and the 
challenge is not so much in keeping these low per se, as in keeping them as efficient as 
possible to maintain the desired level of reliability (G; N; Q; R; S; U; Y). One respondent (S) 
stated that keeping costs down is “at the heart of what networks do”, and that they have seen 
significant cost cuts since privatisation: 
Network companies are absolutely regulated economically. They 
are allowed to spend a certain amount; they are given the 
parameters of their ability to invest. Therefore [cost efficiency] is 
kind of built-in to the whole process. What we’ve seen since 
privatisation in 1990 was… about a 50% real reduction in the cost of 
the industry due to massive ‘squeezing of the lemon’. 
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The problem with using network costs as an indicator of electricity security is that is doesn’t 
tell you anything about whether the system is the most effective or efficient that it could be 
(G). At the same time though, it is important to prevent network costs from becoming 
prohibitively high, because this could present a barrier to the willingness of government and 
consumers to pay for necessary upgrades, which could cause insecurity (C; G; K; L; M; O; S). 
However, several respondents noted that public acceptability of high costs might not be a 
particular problem for the networks, because they only make up a small percentage of the bill 
(D; K; L; R; U; V; W). Several respondents suggested that decentralisation could be a critical 
factor in determining the potential future risk to the networks, and that the distribution 
network is where the greatest changes are likely to be seen in the future (J; L; O; S; V).  
 
Figure 6-3: Indicator ratings: 'affordability' dimension 
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6.4 Interview responses: Sustainability 
6.4.1 Carbon 
The question of whether the carbon emissions from electricity generation should be seen as an 
indicator of the security of an electricity system generated considerable contention amongst 
the respondents. As shown in the responses from many of the other indicators thus far, the 
imperative to mitigate climate change is one of the main driving forces behind many of the 
changes underway in the UK electricity system; however, this also means that many of the 
measures which could theoretically be used to create a secure electricity system are less useful 
when trying to create a secure low-carbon electricity system. It is worth noting that the entire 
framing of the interviews was based around assessing the security of transition pathways, in 
fact the title on the interview briefing note is ‘assessing security in a low-carbon context’, 
which creates a framing effect whereby respondents will have instinctively thought about their 
responses in the context of cutting emissions. 
 
A considerable number of respondents referred to mitigating climate change as a central ‘aim’ 
or ‘driver’ (B; E; I; J; L; Q; R; U; X; Y). One respondent said simply, “We’d rather not fry the 
planet!” (Q). As one respondent (U) pointed out: 
…if we are still committed to carbon targets but delay action then 
also there's a security issue in that you have to work a lot faster and 
harder thus spending a lot more money more quickly and not 
necessarily having a considered view of the energy system you're 
trying to build. And that could have knock-on impacts into diversity, 
into dependence on imports… 
On the other hand, many respondents argued that climate change and energy security are two 
separate issues, and that carbon emissions should be viewed not as an indicator, but as a 
parallel objective, trade-off or complicating factor (E; F; H; J; K; M; V; W). Several respondents 
noted that it would be possible to have a very secure system which had very high emissions (A; 
G; J; K). Respondent W said: 
…ultimately when people make decisions about the trilemma, this 
[emissions] is the one that gives up in preference to security of 
supply. But this is the one that we actually have a legal obligation to 
do, whatever that means... 
One issue which was raised repeatedly regarding carbon emissions was the potential for future 
climate policies to result in stranded assets for the industry (C; D; T; U). The main issue raised 
here was the future uncertainty, because a secure system will need to attract investments for 
infrastructure which has very long lifetimes. 
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An important limitation of this sub-set of interview results concerns the difference between 
‘carbon emissions’ and ‘GHG emissions’. The briefing provided to the interviewees (Appendix 
G) stated that the indicator under discussion refers to ‘carbon emissions’ (thus implicitly 
omitting discussion of other GHGs such as methane); however, the security assessment 
calculations were for CO2e, which includes other GHGs (the UK carbon targets also relate to 
CO2e). The distinction between carbon emissions and GHGs was not mentioned by any of the 
interviewees, and it is possible that the interviewees may have been using the word ‘carbon’ 
as short-hand for all GHGs: carbon dioxide is the primary greenhouse gas, accounting for more 
than 80% of UK GHG emissions (DECC / National Statistics 2015), and it is not uncommon for 
policy discussions to conflate carbon and GHGs. However, this was not discussed with the 
interviewees during the conversations, therefore this represents an oversight and limitation of 
this part of the thesis. 
 
6.4.2 Resources 
The sub-dimension of ‘resource depletion’ was probably the area of least concern for the 
group of respondents as a whole. Regarding primary fuels (gas, coal, uranium, biomass), 
numerous respondents said that resource depletion is not an issue; resources can be made 
available at a price (C; E; G; H; I; L; O; P; R; U; V; Y). A common theme was that fossil fuels need 
to stay in the ground, because burning all possible reserves would result in catastrophic 
climate change (E; H; I; O; P; R; U; V; Y); this is linked to concerns about stranded assets, with 
one respondent saying “if carbon targets are met then in the longer-term it won’t be possible 
to give [fossil resources] away!” (U). There was some scepticism about peak oil: one 
respondent stated that “we haven’t yet scratched the surface in terms of fossil fuel 
exploration” (P), another stated that “peak oil is mainly nonsense” (L), and four said that the 
peak oil argument hasn’t changed in 40 years despite the fact that (in their view) the Club of 
Rome got it wrong (C; H; L; P). In general, most of the respondents assumed that there are too 
many fossil fuels in the ground, rather than too few. However, respondent E also noted that 
this is still an open debate: 
People sit in different places on resource depletion. Even on our 
team we disagree. I’m not a peak oil person, basically. Partly 
because I don’t think it’s likely that we’re going to run out before 
we kill the climate, and now it’s obvious that we have enough to kill 
the climate. I think we can definitely dig more than enough out of 
the ground to kill ourselves three times over.  
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It was also noted that the importance of resource depletion depends on the pathway and the 
technology mix (a common recurring theme for many of these indicators). There was some 
disagreement over gas: some respondents stated that resource depletion could be an issue for 
gas because of its status as a transition fuel (Q; R; S; T; V; W), although others argued that the 
diversity of potential global gas suppliers means that the UK would always be able to find gas 
from somewhere (F; J), and that shale gas has somewhat undermined peak gas arguments (O). 
Respondent O said: 
I am relatively sceptical of peak oil and peak gas arguments simply 
because I think that over time we are quite a cunning ape, we tend 
to come up with ever more complex ways of getting at things. I 
mean shale is used as quite an easy and possibly slightly lazy 
example of this, but nonetheless it is an example of some relevance. 
I don’t think it is sustainable but I don’t actually think we have got a 
problem finding them.  
 
Regarding secondary materials (Rare Earth Elements etc.), there was slightly more 
disagreement between the respondents. Some respondents suggested that depletion could be 
an issue for batteries and for several renewable technologies (G; J; M). However, it seemed 
that the main concern was not so much depletion of these resources, as access to resources 
which are currently highly concentrated (E; I; S; U; Y). However, others argued that the 
concerns around Rare Earths have been ‘overblown’ (E; L; C), and that there is potential for 
finding alternatives (R; V; X). One respondent (C) said: 
Depletion of fuel is a non-issue. Depletion of resources, yes 
potentially, I think some of the Rare Earths might be impacted. But 
I think back to the  Club of Rome and how they got that wrong, and 
actually people haven’t tried looking for Rare Earths that much, and 
haven’t tried that hard to separate them out, and I think market 
signals will increasingly be important in delivering material 
availability outcomes. 
 
6.4.3 Water 
Many respondents stated that they were not aware of any security risks concerning water 
supply in the UK (A; L; T). The example of France was used to illustrate the fact that the 
importance of water availability and water temperature as a risk factor depends very much on 
location (A; E; S); the UK is a fairly damp place with plenty of access to coastline, and water-
intensive generation such as nuclear tends to be positioned on the coast (C; D; E; G; I; S). This is 
an important point for the development of a security assessment, because in theory it would 
be desirable for any assessment framework to be applicable to other countries and systems.  
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On the other hand, a number of respondents suggested that water could be an increasing risk 
factor because of climate change (A; R; S; U; V; Y). One respondent (U) said: 
I don't think the UK is in any danger of running out of water. But the 
temperature of that water, if you've got any sort of thermal plant 
taking it out of a river and putting it back, could become 
problematic. There are new power stations that are already 
suffering with that, or rather failing to adapt to it would be a better 
expression. 
It was also noted that the level of risk for water, similarly to many other indicators, depends on 
the technology mix (H; W), especially in the case of high-CCS or high-shale scenarios (J; R) 
(although one respondent said that after speaking to people throughout the water sector, he 
no longer felt that there was a serious risk of water shortages due to fracking (P)). Finally, it 
was noted that decentralised thermal CHP could affect local choices and could potentially 
create more localised water constraints (C; J); this shows that the importance of water as an 
indicator depends on the level of decentralisation in the pathway. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5 Interview responses:  Reliability 
6.5.1 System adequacy: capacity margins and oversupply 
Clearly, having a reliable system is important, not just for security per se, but also because it 
links closely with public acceptability for the transition (I; O; S). However, several respondents 
raised questions over current perceptions of ‘adequate reliability’, asking whether 
expectations of a system in which supply always follows demand should remain sacrosanct 
Figure 6-4: Indicator ratings: 'sustainability' dimension 
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during the transition (B; N; O; T). The public tend to perceive of a continuous supply of 
electricity as a “basic human right” (H); however, as the UK transitions to more intermittent 
renewable sources of generation, and especially if heating and transport become electrified, it 
will become more and more challenging to maintain this. As respondent B said: 
I just think that you can organise your electricity system in different 
ways, so that you don’t have to be so far in excess of that peak. I 
suppose because I’m old enough to have lived when the lights went 
out from time to time, I lit a candle and read a book. But 
governments have to be concerned about the public’s response, 
and the public is not used to power cuts anymore. We’re all spoilt, 
aren’t we? 
 
This debate over what constitutes ‘adequate’ supply was very apparent in the participants’ 
responses regarding the capacity margin. Several of the respondents felt that maintaining a 
healthy De-Rated Capacity Margin (DRCM) is absolutely fundamental to electricity security: if 
you don’t have the capacity then you don’t have the supply (F; G; K; L; O; Q; T). It was also 
noted by a large number of respondents that DRCM is the standard metric at the moment, and 
is a very direct indicator of electricity security (A; D; E; Q; R; V; W). However, DRCM is also a 
very ‘blunt’ measure, which fails to capture numerous important nuances about the electricity 
system, including potential ‘hidden margin’ which could be available from flexible demand and 
additional balancing services if the system were truly under stress (A; C; G; K; N; O; V; W). 
There was clearly concern that DRCM is frequently used as an indicator of security without any 
consensus on what constitutes a ‘healthy’ margin (E; F; J; N; S). It was also pointed out that the 
value of DRCM as an indicator in the future would be highly dependent on future availability of 
electricity storage, which could have a significant impact on the de-rating factors of 
intermittent sources in the future (F; H; K; U; X).24 It was therefore suggested that DRCM will 
continue to be important, but that the actual calculation itself may have to evolve in order to 
capture the changing nature of the electricity system (A; D; K; O; W; Y). As one respondent (K) 
put it: 
De-Rated Capacity Margins is an odd one because I don’t know how 
much further it’s going to be a particularly useful calculation to do. 
Like, for example, if there is a load of storage, if there’s a real 
breakthrough in storage then do you still de-rate wind to 20% or 
less? Or do you say with storage it’s effectively 50%? 
                                                          
24 It is worth noting that Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE), which in many ways is more statistically robust than DRCM 
and which manages to capture hour-by-hour fluctuations far better than DRCM (respondent N) is included in the 
security analysis, because all the pathways are created for adequacy on an hourly basis and in theory all meet the 
LOLE standard (see section 5.8.1). 
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It was even suggested that a high DRCM could signal poor electricity security, because it could 
suggest that the system is not efficient or well-balanced (R; X). Many respondents pointed out 
that minimising oversupply could be crucial for ensuring that there are adequate incentives for 
investors to build capacity, and for avoiding the risk of stranded assets (E; J; V; X). Respondent 
J said: 
Minimising oversupply is extremely important. When you make 
investments, people would assume that you’re using that piece of 
kit. Why else would you make that investment? 
Again, this is linked to the public acceptability issue: a common criticism of intermittent 
generation is the backup required, which could be expected to run at very low load factors (J; 
N; O). However, respondents also pointed out that policy could intervene to provide incentives 
for plant owners to run at low load factors (such as the capacity mechanism), and therefore 
that the risk of oversupply could probably be managed in the longer-term (D; V; Y). As pointed 
out by respondent W: 
If you don’t have enough [capacity], you have to build something 
and it takes four years. If you have too much, your option is to turn 
something off, which might upset people and cost a lot of money, 
but fundamentally you can do it. 
One of the main areas of contention seemed to revolve around whether minimising 
oversupply is integral to the concept of electricity security. Many felt that oversupply is an 
issue of cost rather than of ensuring that the lights stay on, and therefore not everyone felt 
that it should be viewed as a part of ‘security’ (A; F; G; K; I; M); this is similar to many of the 
indicators in the ‘affordability’ dimension. One respondent (D) said: 
Oversupply is a problem if you need marginal plant and the market 
doesn’t support their operation. But again, there are quite a few 
things you can do. I think those risks have been overplayed… I think 
security works best when it is thought of as more of a physical 
interruptive thing. Economic factors are murky, and there are many 
things you can do about them. 
 
 
6.5.2 Flexibility: response-and-reserve, flexible demand, storage and 
interconnection 
The last set of indicators which were posed to the respondents all related to different options 
for providing flexibility to the system: flexible generation (response-and-reserve), flexible 
demand (DSR), electricity storage and electricity interconnection. These were the least 
contentious of all the indicators: the majority of respondents agreed that flexibility options are 
important for electricity security, especially in a low-carbon context (J; K; P; T; W). Flexibility is 
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seen as crucial for managing the peaks in demand, which could become much more 
problematic in future if heating and transport are electrified (B; Q; S; Y). Concerns were raised 
that the UK system does not currently reward flexibility enough on an ongoing basis (B), and 
that regulatory barriers could prevent cost-effective flexibility from being realised in a timely 
manner (U). A majority of respondents mentioned the balance between the different options 
for flexibility. Many suggested that any level of flexibility gives you more options for keeping 
the system secure, and that therefore it would be good to pursue many different flexibility 
options simultaneously (A; D; G; N; O; Q; U; Y). However, the balance of the options depends 
on their relative costs and feasibility (C; D; G; H; I; J; K; M; W; X).  
 
Flexible generation (for which the indicator set uses response-and-reserve capability as a 
proxy) was felt by many respondents to be critical for avoiding supply shortfalls and therefore 
for maintaining public acceptability, especially because it is more controllable and predictable 
than flexible demand (A; H; I; J; O; S; V; X). One respondent stated that losing response-and-
reserve capability would be ‘catastrophic’ for security (A), and another (S) said: 
If you don’t have [response-and-reserve], then there will be more 
outages. If there are more outages, if the lights go out, the public 
won’t accept the policies going forward. They’ll say that’s a failure 
of policy, and then you’re gonna have to change radically, and some 
of those changes could fundamentally contradict the direction 
you’re currently taking. 
This discussion is connected to the theme of how conventional perceptions on electricity 
system management might change in the context of a low-carbon transition. It was posited 
that flexible generation is thought of as necessary, but only because of a commonly-held 
perception that a secure system is one in which you have to maintain a certain level of output 
at all times (T). Respondent P said:  
“The traditional model of having a certain amount of 
baseload and then you top it up, I’m not sure that’ll be as 
relevant in future. I think we’ll move towards more variable 
supply with strategic reserves.”  
 
Regarding flexible demand, several respondents saw this as a massive area of opportunity, 
although concerns were also raised about its viability on a large-scale. DSR is seen as a priority, 
partly because the UK already has very active supply-side flexibility whereas the demand-side 
has been somewhat neglected in the past (I; C; E; M; X). Respondent M said: 
We’ve had this very active supply side since the beginning of the 
utility industry; what’s been idle is the demand side. If management 
of demand gets more involved, I think that’s the key. So as a priority, 
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I would say the demand side, cos we pretty much already have all 
the tools on the supply side. 
Concerns were raised that consumers aren’t currently engaged enough for widespread DSR to 
be realisable, and that automation would be crucial for getting a smart grid to work because 
consumers can’t be relied upon to ramp their demand up and down over very short 
timeframes (G; J; Y). However, others suggested that DSR could in theory bring all kinds of co-
benefits to consumers, such as helping them to improve their efficiency and mitigate the 
impact of rising costs (O; X), and creating a more ‘constructive’ engagement between 
consumers and the energy sector (O; T).  
 
Regarding storage, several respondents suggested that it would be desirable for electricity 
security in theory, but that it was unlikely to become a reality unless the economics become 
more favourable (A; F; J; L; M; O; P; Q; W).25 From this, it can be seen that relying on storage 
too much for future system security could present a risk in the event that the price remained 
high. On the other hand, several respondents suggested that there are reasons to believe that 
the price of storage would come down due to continuing innovation in the field (C; P; T; U). 
Two respondents suggested that a system with large amounts of storage could be indicative of 
a very inefficient system which was failing to adequately utilise cheaper flexibility options on 
the demand-side (A; G). Respondent A said: 
Certainly there’s arguments to say that a system that is relying on 
storage for its security is not a very efficient system, and if you 
compare to “just in time” supply chains, they take all the storage 
out of it because it’s seen as an inefficiency. But then again, [taking 
out all the storage] reduces massively your resilience. 
 
Finally, the importance of electricity interconnection as a solution for improving electricity 
security was also somewhat contentious. Many respondents suggested that to some extent, 
interconnection would be beneficial for security: it is reliable and proven at scale (F; G; J; R), it 
allows the value of investment to be spread across borders (O), and it could allow access to 
renewable resources from Scandinavia and Germany (E; N; Q). However, it was also argued 
that interconnection brings risks as well as benefits (H; K; L; M; Y). Respondent L said: 
Politicians talk as if it’s a panacea. It probably helps at the margin, 
but it can create as many problems as it solves. Germany is 
massively interconnected with neighbouring countries, but all the 
neighbours in the east complain massively that when the wind 
drops in Germany they’ve got huge problems running their grids. 
                                                          
25 Note: no-one suggested that the UK’s existing pumped storage facilities are undesirable or unaffordable; 
however, the UK is almost completely fully exploited for large-scale pumped storage, and the discussion here 
centres on an expansion of new electricity storage capacity, for instance using batteries. 
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Concerns were raised about what might happen if numerous interconnected countries 
experience a stress moment simultaneously, especially because wind speeds in Western 
Europe are quite correlated, and it was pointed out that there is a need for some protection so 
that power doesn’t all flow out during times of stress (G; L; Q; V; W). As stated by respondent 
W: 
Interconnection is really about economics rather than security of 
supply. In theory it makes life more secure and provides more 
diversity, but then the market responds to that, and the worry is 
you become more dependent on your imports, and when everyone 
gets their simultaneous peak and supply crunch you might have a 
moment where you realise it would have been better to be a 
glorious island! 
Finally, several respondents stated that the value of interconnection for electricity security 
depends on the market price and fuel mix of the connected country (M; O; P; T; Y). Concerns 
were raised over the impact of interconnection on carbon reduction; for instance, if the UK 
were to connect to Germany and import lots of coal-fired power during a stress moment, what 
impact this might have on the carbon intensity of the UK’s power mix (C; P; T). It is worth 
noting that although this concern was raised by three respondents, interconnection would 
probably not affect UK emissions unless there was a shift from a production-based emissions 
accounting system to a consumption-based one; however, none of the respondents 
mentioned this. 
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6.6 Interview results: Major cross-cutting themes emerging 
 
From the interview responses presented in the preceding sections, a number of key themes 
emerge. These themes were identified because they were mentioned by several respondents 
in relation to a number of different indicators and different dimensions, and therefore cut 
across the four security dimensions covered in the preceding four sections. This section also 
relates these themes directly to the literature which was introduced in chapters 2 and 3, so 
that it can be seen to what extent ideas from the energy security literature are evident in the 
interview responses. The identification of these themes is useful for more than just the 
exploration of stakeholders’ perspectives; later on, in section 7.2, these themes will be applied 
to the results from the security assessment, in order to establish the impact that respondents’ 
perspectives have on the results. 
 
6.6.1 Theme 1: How broad is too broad? 
The analysis of the interview evidence highlighted the fact that there are major challenges in 
assessing the security of an energy system, because of considerable disagreement over what is 
Figure 6-5: Indicator ratings: 'reliability' dimension 
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necessary for ensuring electricity security. This factor is further complicated by the addition of 
the carbon reduction imperative. The interview questions were framed around the set of 
indicators outlined in chapter 4, which deliberately includes affordability and sustainability 
indicators as well as availability and reliability ones. However, there was considerable 
disagreement amongst the respondents as to what actually constitutes electricity security, 
with roughly half of the respondents believing that affordability and sustainability are integral 
to electricity security, whilst the others believed that affordability and sustainability are 
separate issues and should be thought of as trade-offs. Importantly, there seemed to be no 
discernible alignment between experts’ perspectives on this issue and the type of organisation 
for which they work, which goes against the idea that ‘where you stand depends on where you 
sit’, as introduced in section 2.1.3.  It is interesting to compare this result to debates in the 
literature: opinions are still somewhat divided over whether environmental sustainability 
should be viewed as an aspect of energy security (described in detail in section 2.1), but the 
majority of widely-cited definitions include the affordability dimension (e.g. Bielecki 2002; IEA 
1985; IEA 2007; Yergin 2006). For several of the indicators and dimensions discussed (for 
instance storage, interconnection, demand-side response, public acceptability, network 
upgrades etc.), many respondents suggested that it would be possible to have a secure system 
without them, but it would be much more challenging to have a secure low-carbon system 
without them. This is an interesting assertion when compared to the literature, much of which 
does point out the complications caused by including a carbon reduction imperative (see 
section 2.3.3), but much of which also argues that decarbonisation would bring multiple co-
benefits for security such as an ‘inevitable’ reduction in reliance on imports and depletable 
materials (see section 2.3.2). A small number of respondents did refer to these ‘inevitable’ co-
benefits, but the emphasis from the respondents was very much on the trade-offs and 
complications caused by the carbon reduction imperative. It is also interesting to compare this 
to the results from the security assessment in chapter 5, which suggest that imports may 
increase as we transition (section 5.2.2), and that dependence on depleting resources could 
also be an issue, driven by REEs for renewables (section 5.6.2). This debate underlines the 
importance of differentiating between an assessment of electricity security, and an 
assessment of low-carbon electricity security, and therefore also reinforces the importance of 
designing ‘indicators derived for a set purpose’, as explained in section 2.1.3.  
 
This disagreement over what is important or material for assessing security manifested itself 
noticeably in considerable contention over the majority of the indicators. The analysis revealed 
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that participants seemed to be using different criteria for deciding what is important for 
security. Two common viewpoints were:  
a) The important indicators are those which we have an imperative to address, either for 
normative reasons or because they represent a current or future risk (according to the 
subjective viewpoint of the respondent) 
b) The important indicators are those which are simple, direct and/or quantifiable. 
 
These different viewpoints were especially apparent in discussions regarding the more 
contentious indicators, for instance the affordability indicators and domestic disruption 
indicators. A good example can be found in the responses regarding the most contentious 
indicator: ‘fuel poverty’ (see section 6.3.1). Respondents who felt that fuel poverty is critically 
important for security mostly felt that it represents a severe risk for the UK, and therefore felt 
that improving security will necessitate mitigating fuel poverty. On the other hand, several 
respondents stated that fuel poverty is too indirect and complex to be much use as part of a 
conceptualisation or assessment of energy security. Again, there seemed to be no clear 
pattern between the type of organisation for which respondents work, and which of these 
viewpoints they supported; for example, as can be seen in section 6.3.1, proponents of the 
two viewpoints with regard to the ‘fuel poverty’ indicator were fairly evenly spread across all 6 
types of organisation. This split between different criteria being used as the basis for 
viewpoints was also apparent in discussions regarding a large number of other indicators, 
particularly in the affordability and sustainability dimensions. Meanwhile simplicity and 
directness were commonly given as key reasons for the inclusion of traditional indicators such 
as de-rated capacity margins (DRCM), diversity and import dependence, with proponents of 
each viewpoint once again spread in each case between respondents from different types of 
organisation. 
 
6.6.2 Theme 2: ‘Traditional’ energy security indicators 
This second theme also relates to respondents’ views regarding how to conceptualise energy 
security. Two indicators which have often been used in the literature to assess energy security 
are dependence on imports, and diversity (e.g. DECC 2012a; Frondel and Schmidt 2014; IEA 
2011; Jewell et al 2014; Kruyt et al 2009; Pfenninger and Keirstead 2015; Victor et al 2014). 
The literature often refers to ‘reducing control’ by others, or to limiting the ability of fuel-
exporting nations to gain political leverage through their exports (Bordhoff et al 2010; Greene 
2010; Umbach 2010). Others in the literature suggest that diversity acts as a vital hedge 
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against supply and price disruptions (Bradshaw 2010; Cooke et al 2013; Grubb et al 2006; 
Hoggett 2013; Stirling 1994; 1998; Urciuoli et al 2014; Watson 2007; Watson and Scott 2008). 
However, there is also considerable scepticism in the literature over the security benefits of 
minimising imports (Chaudry et al 2011; Francés et al 2013; Stern 2004; Watson 2010). The 
literature also notes that a degree of diversity may well be a necessary feature of a secure 
energy system, but that it is not sufficient to ensure energy security by itself (Christoff 2011; 
Gracceva and Zeniewski 2014; Ranjan and Hughes 2014; Stirling 2010). Several respondents 
echoed the idea that these indicators are necessary but not sufficient to capture all the 
important aspects of energy security, whilst several respondents went a step further and 
stated that these indicators are not important at all. However, there was disagreement on this 
point, with many respondents stating that aspects such as import dependence and diversity 
are some of the major things which spring to mind when they consider energy security; several 
respondents also spoke of the need to hedge against unpredictable risks by reducing 
dependence or by increasing diversity. As shown in the responses presented in section 6.2.2, 
there was no clear pattern between respondents’ perspectives on this matter and the type of 
organisation for which they work. It is interesting to note that both these indicators are in the 
‘availability’ dimension, primarily referring to physical supplies of electricity and/or fuels. 
Therefore the disagreement over these ‘traditional’ indicators suggests the need to look 
beyond this dimension, for instance towards indicators relating to reliability and flexibility. The 
‘reliability’ indicators, especially those relating to flexibility and responsiveness of supply and 
demand, were generally felt to be much more important than indicators relating to imports 
and diversity (for instance, as shown in figure 6.1). Stakeholders felt that it is important to 
improve system resilience by focusing on measures which can respond to threats or insecurity 
(for instance by increasing flexibility), rather than necessarily focusing on reducing causes of 
insecurity (for instance by reducing reliance on imports). 
  
6.6.3 Theme 3: Economic and political feasibility 
One of the most common cross-cutting issues emerging from the analysis of the interviews 
was the importance of securing adequate investment. A majority of respondents noted this as 
one of the most critical aspects of ensuring energy security on all timescales, and there were 
concerns that the UK (and in fact most of the EU) is currently at risk of a lack of investment in 
energy infrastructure. This issue is raised in Blyth et al (2014); Deane et al (2015); Ellenbeck et 
al (2015); Mitchell et al (2014) and Usher and Strachan (2012). There was general consensus 
that in order for this investment to happen, investors must have confidence that their 
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investments will pay off. This is connected to themes of political feasibility of the transition. 
There was a common perception that there is currently a lack of political certainty, especially 
over whether to prioritise certain parts of the trilemma and the fate of the UK’s 
decarbonisation targets as the transition becomes more challenging. Some respondents went 
a step further and suggested that this political feasibility would only be achievable in the 
context of ‘social feasibility’, and that there is a fundamental need for a ‘social contract’ for the 
transition; this idea is well grounded in the existing literature, for example Ekins et al (2011); 
Foxon (2012); Mancebo and Sachs (2015); Messner (2015); WGBU (2011). Stakeholders were 
mostly in agreement with each other regarding the importance of economic and political 
feasibility. This means that it will be useful to view the security assessment results of the 
pathways in light of this issue (for instance, by exploring whether any of the pathways perform 
particularly well or badly for these aspects); this analysis will be carried out in the following 
chapter, in section 7.2.3. 
 
6.6.4 Theme 4: Context 
Another major cross-cutting theme which emerged from the analysis was that of the 
importance of context. Again, there was broad agreement on this across the different 
stakeholders, meaning that this theme provides a useful basis for the further analysis of the 
security of the three pathways, to be carried out in the following chapter. Spatial context was 
very important to many of the respondents, because many measures can potentially improve 
electricity security in certain locations, but can generate insecurity if located in the wrong 
places (such as electricity storage, interconnection, network upgrades etc.). This is especially 
the case for the reliability and availability dimensions, and several respondents echoed the 
need for increased locational information in modelling pathways and scenarios, as suggested 
in chapter 5.26 It is interesting to compare this to a tendency in the literature to attempt to 
make security assessment frameworks as universal as possible (see for example Deane et al 
2015; Gracceva and Zeniewski 2014; IEA 2007; Jewell et al 2014; World Energy Council 2012). 
The results from the interviews therefore raise questions over the extent to which it is 
desirable or practical to create generalisable indices for comparing the security of energy 
systems across different spatial contexts, especially when attempting to achieve 
generalisability on a global scale.  
 
                                                          
26 It should be noted here that respondents were not given details of the specific set of transition pathways 
analysed in this thesis; this point relates to models and pathways in general. 
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Furthermore, a number of respondents felt that the level of decentralisation of the electricity 
system is critical for security and for the relative importance of the indicators. In particular, the 
level of decentralisation of the system was stated to be a major determining factor in the 
importance of indicators relating to public acceptability and participation, and the four 
‘flexibility’ indicators.  This is interesting, because the respondents were not made aware that 
the set of transition pathways under discussion includes a highly decentralised pathway, thus 
reinforcing the fact that this is an important line of enquiry for future electricity security. There 
was no consensus on the relative security merits of centralised vs decentralised systems, and 
although many respondents made it clear that decentralisation could bring numerous benefits, 
many others pointed out that lack of experience with widespread decentralisation in the UK 
could bring unprecedented risks; this issue is covered in more detail in section 5.9.5.  
 
6.6.5 Theme 5: The demand side 
In the literature introduced in section 2.3.2, flexible demand, demand reduction and energy 
efficiency are commonly cited as win-wins for the trilemma, because in theory they can reduce 
costs and emissions at the same time as making it easier to keep the system secure. This was 
echoed by the majority of respondents, who mentioned the importance of demand reduction 
and demand flexibility in relation to a number of indicators. The most important issue to the 
respondents seemed to be the potential co-benefits of measures to reduce demand. For 
example, increasing attention to the demand side can in theory improve reliability, availability, 
affordability and sustainability, ideas which are reflected in the literature (see for example 
Adelle et al 2009; Berk et al 2006; Froggatt and Levi 2009; Greenpeace 2010a; Hoggett et al 
2013; Pye et al 2014). Similarly to the other themes covered in this section, there was no 
pattern which emerged between those respondents who spoke strongly in favour of the 
importance of the demand-side, and the type of organisation for which they work. As shall be 
elaborated on in the following chapter (section 7.2.5), it is interesting that this emerged as a 
cross-cutting theme on which the stakeholders were generally in agreement with each other, 
especially when viewed in light of the results from the security assessment which suggest that 
demand reduction can bring about multiple co-benefits in a number of security dimensions.  
 
6.6.6 Does ‘where you stand depend on where you sit’? 
As can be seen from the discussion above, the results from the interviews do not support the 
idea that ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’ (Miles’ law). However, the reason for 
this may be found in the contentions of Allison (1969) and Bryan (2003) discussed in the 
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literature review in section 2.1.3 – the idea that people’s perceptions are also determined by 
the ‘baggage’ that they inevitably bring to their role (emotional ties, previous experience, 
sensitivity to certain issues etc.). The fact that the stakeholders interviewed for this study did 
not conform to Miles’ law may simply suggest that there were other contextual factors – other 
aspects of ‘where they were sitting’ – which were having a more controlling influence over 
their decisions than the organisation for which they work. It may be because all the 
stakeholders chosen for this study possess extensive experience and in-depth knowledge of 
energy issues, and therefore possess complex, nuanced and widely differing opinions; the 
qualitative data support this (see sections 6.2 to 6.5). However, it should be emphasised that 
due to the small number of stakeholders interviewed for this thesis, and therefore the small 
number of individuals chosen from each organisation, further research with a greater number 
of participants would be necessary to explore this idea in more depth. 
 
6.7 Summing up chapter 6 
 
This chapter, the second of two results chapters, has presented the analysis of the results from 
25 interviews which were carried out with stakeholders from the UK energy community. 
Respondents were asked to discuss the set of indicators which was developed in chapter 4 and 
applied in chapter 5, in order to get a grasp on what aspects or dimensions of electricity 
security are felt to be most important for assessing and ensuring electricity security in a low-
carbon context. The interviews also sought to discover the underlying concepts which are used 
by stakeholders when making or justifying these choices. In this way, this chapter has 
generated an in-depth and transparent discussion which has not sought to close down the 
diversity of views, but instead has sought to open them up to debate.  
 
This chapter has presented the results from a thematic coding analysis of the 25 interview 
transcripts, which identified five major themes which cut across multiple respondents and 
multiple security dimensions. The results presented in this chapter show that there is a real 
need to accept the existence of multiple perspectives and at least attempt to take them into 
account when discussing energy security, instead of focusing down on a small number of 
simple quantifiable indicators. These results demonstrate that energy security is highly 
context-specific, and that therefore the challenges of attempting to create generalisable 
indicator sets are huge. This chapter has shown that some stakeholders focused upon what 
they perceived to be current risks to the system or areas in which policy has an obligation to 
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act, leading to a preference for indicators such as public acceptability and fuel poverty; 
meanwhile, others focused on indicators which are simple and direct or more easily 
quantifiable, leading to a preference for indicators such as diversity and capacity margins. 
However, certain measures were widely suggested as being sensible for improving energy 
security by a significant and cross-cutting range of participants: for example, realising the 
potential co-benefits of measures such as demand reduction and consumer participation; 
ensuring adequate investment in infrastructure by maximising long-term policy stability and 
planning;  and improving flexibility on both the supply-side and the demand-side, thereby 
improving system resilience by focusing on measures which can respond to threats or 
insecurity rather than necessarily focusing on reducing causes of insecurity. Finally, the results 
indicated that there is no clearly discernible alignment between the type of organisation for 
which people work (e.g. supplier, NGO, academia etc.), and the importance which they place 
on different indicators of electricity security.  
 
The following chapter brings together the results presented here with the results presented in 
chapter 5. The major themes and additional indicators identified in this chapter will all be 
applied to the results from the original security assessment in order to discover the 
implications of different stakeholders’ perspectives on what are perceived to be the main 
security risks and trade-offs for the three Transition Pathways. In this way, the next chapter 
explicitly addresses the need to open up discussions of security to incorporate multiple 
perspectives, and aims to take these different perspectives into account when assessing the 
main risks, trade-offs and synergies which may occur between different objectives in a 
transition to a low-carbon electricity system. 
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7 Discussion 
This chapter brings together the results presented in chapters 5 and 6, in order to answer the 
third and final research question: “What impact do the stakeholders’ perspectives have on the 
results of the security assessment and on their preferred options for improving electricity 
security?” The aim of this chapter is to discuss the results from both the security assessment of 
the three Transition Pathways and the results from the interviews, by applying the results from 
the interview analysis to the results from the initial security assessment. The security of the 
pathways is also examined in the light of major cross-cutting themes and different emerging 
views of security, with a focus on key areas of commonality and contention amongst the 
interviewees, in order to flag up significant areas of high risk / vulnerability (henceforth simply 
termed “risks”) for the pathways which may be echoed by UK energy stakeholders, and also to 
identify whether any areas of high risk can be regarded as ‘less important’ to a number of 
actors. In this way, the chapter highlights the key security risks for the three pathways, using a 
combination of indicator assessment and the analysis of multiple interviewee perceptions. 
 
Section 7.1 carries out a dashboard analysis of the security of the pathways based on the 
results presented in chapter 5, which can allow us to view the results for the pathways as a 
whole without the need for aggregation, and can enable us to identify key areas of security risk 
for the pathways and key trade-offs between different indicators and dimensions. In section 
7.2, these results are analysed in conjunction with the results from the interviews, focusing on 
the major cross-cutting themes which were identified in chapter 6. Section 7.3 presents the 
indicators which respondents suggested were missing from the original set of indicators, and 
examines the impact that including these might have had on the security assessment of the 
pathways (although it should be noted that the interviews were carried out after the indicator 
set had been finalised, and therefore could not contribute to indicator selection). Sections 7.1, 
7.2 and 7.3 each end with a summing-up of the key points raised in that section, and some of 
the possible implications that these could have for energy security research and policy.  
 
7.1 Overview of security assessment results 
7.1.1 Dashboard analysis 
The dashboard analysis presented in figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 are drawn from the results 
presented in Chapter 5. As shown in the key on the following page, areas of ‘high risk’ are 
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highlighted with a red flag; areas of ‘moderate risk’ with a yellow circle; and areas of ‘low risk’ 
with a green tick. Results mid-way between these categories are also indicated, using circles 
coloured half-red or half-green (as illustrated in the key next to figure 7.1). The symbols 
denoting the level of risk are based on a comparison between the results for the 2010 baseline 
and the results for either 2030 or 2050, and also a comparison between the pathways. So for 
example, a ‘high risk’ red flag denotes that the pathway has seen risks grow for this indicator 
compared with 2010, and is also riskier for this indicator compared to one or both of the other 
pathways. A ‘low-risk’ green tick indicates that the pathway is less risky for this indicator 
compared with 2010, and is less risky than one or both of the other pathways.  Moderate risk 
indicates that the risk level is similar compared to either 2010 or the other pathways. Finally, 
as indicated in the results in chapter 5, it was not really possible to draw firm conclusions for 
some of the indicators, for example due to lack of available data; these are indicated with a 
blue question-mark. The results are presented for each pathway, for 2030 and 2050.
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Figure 7-1: Dashboard analysis, Market Rules pathway
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Figure 7-2: Dashboard analysis, Central Coordination pathway 
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Figure 7-3: Dashboard analysis, Thousand Flowers pathway 
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7.1.2 Overview of dashboard results: Dimensions and trade-offs 
The dashboard analysis shows that the three pathways all have the most ‘red flags’ (denoting 
high risk) in the affordability dimension, because system and consumer costs increase in all 
three pathways compared to 2010. Conversely to this, the three pathways have fewest ‘red 
flags’ in the sustainability dimension (notwithstanding problematic levels of uncertainty in the 
‘water usage’ and ‘fuel poverty’ indicators). To some extent, this is to be expected, because 
the pathways all set out to achieve a transition to a low-carbon electricity system, which also 
appears to result in benefits (or at least, only moderate risk) for other areas of sustainability 
such as water, fuel and materials depletion. The pathways did not, on the other hand, set out 
to create the cheapest electricity system possible, meaning that the affordability indicators 
illustrate multiple high risks. This high-level overview could point to a trade-off between 
affordability and sustainability objectives, which if it were the case would have major 
implications for the UK’s ability to achieve a ‘balanced’ trilemma; however, it is worth 
emphasising that all three pathways have a fixed carbon constraint, and therefore this result 
would be in need of further testing via comparison with a non-carbon-constrained pathway 
(see also section 8.4.2). It is also worth emphasising that there are numerous uncertainties 
around this finding (see chapter 5), and that therefore this conclusion would benefit from 
further exploration in future research, for instance via stress testing of this result by asking 
‘what if’ questions about the factors that are included in the cost calculations. 
 
Within the reliability dimension, Short-term Operating Reserve (STOR) and to a lesser extent 
Frequency Response are flagged as high risk areas, because all three pathways experience 
reductions in STOR and FR capability compared to 2010. However, an increase in the capability 
for flexible demand (for instance from the residential and public sectors) could somewhat 
mitigate the security risks of declining flexible generation capabilities. There may also be a 
trade-off between de-rated capacity margins (DRCM) and generation costs: the TF pathway is 
the only pathway which doesn’t have low capacity margins, but it does this at high generation 
expense (although network costs in this pathway are lower because of demand reductions). 
Finally, the availability dimension reveals slightly complex patterns: the high energy demand 
and low public participation in the MR pathway leads to risks of domestic disruption and 
import dependence; the TF pathway succeeds in reducing land requirements for infrastructure 
and thereby potentially reducing risk of opposition, but also has high levels of imports (driven 
by biomass feedstock); finally the CC pathway appears to tread the ‘middle ground’ for this 
dimension, with mostly areas of moderate or moderate/low risk. 
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7.1.3 Pathway results  
7.1.3.1 Market Rules, 2030 and 2050 
The dashboard analysis for the MR pathway (figure 7.1) shows that this pathway has multiple 
‘red flags’ in the affordability dimension, especially in 2050: the pathway experiences 
increasing costs compared to 2010, especially network costs and annual bills. This is largely 
due to high demand in this pathway, which creates a need for extensive network upgrades and 
high bills for consumers. The MR pathway experiences high risk for both DRCM and oversupply 
in 2050, and also for reserve (STOR) capability, mostly driven by the switch to more 
intermittent electricity generation. On the other hand, it is possible that improvements in 
flexible demand could mitigate some of these risks; however, this puts a lot of pressure on the 
pathway to fully realise the benefits of flexible demand. Finally, it appears that this pathway 
has slightly fewer ‘red flags’ of high risk in the availability dimension than in the reliability 
dimension: the pathway experiences high levels of import dependence (driven by reliance on 
fossil resources while domestic resources are declining), although these risks could probably 
be mitigated by ensuring stable and diverse imports. Overall, it appears that the MR pathway 
generally becomes riskier over the longer-term, in particular within the affordability 
dimension.  
 
7.1.3.2 Central Coordination, 2030 and 2050 
The dashboard analysis of the CC pathway (figure 7.2) shows that this pathway is actually 
rather similar to the MR pathway, with many ‘red flags’ within the affordability dimension, as 
well as with DRCM, Frequency Response, STOR and oversupply. Like the MR pathway, this is 
especially apparent in the longer-term for the CC pathway. This may be partly due to demand 
projections in this pathway: the CC pathway experiences an increase in electricity demand due 
to electrification of heating and transport, but it also includes efficiency measures which 
mitigate demand increases to some extent. However, despite the energy efficiency measures, 
the CC pathway experiences increasing network costs and annual bills; this may also be due to 
a reliance on large-scale technologies (which drives up network costs) and expensive low-
carbon generating technologies such as offshore wind. The DRCM of this pathway is extremely 
low in 2050 and it also experiences oversupply in the longer-term, mostly stemming from the 
transition to increased penetration of intermittent RES alongside inflexible nuclear. The CC 
pathway has ‘red flags’ of high risk for STOR capability and moderate/high risks for Frequency 
Response capability, driven mostly by large amounts of wind power and inflexible nuclear. 
Although the pathway also sees improvements in flexible demand in the longer-term, there is 
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a concern that the pathway could struggle to maintain resilience in the medium-term if 
demand flexibility were slow to emerge. Overall, it appears that the CC pathway generally 
becomes riskier over the longer-term, in particular within the affordability dimension.  
 
7.1.3.3 Thousand Flowers, 2030 and 2050 
The dashboard analysis of the TF pathway (figure 7.3) demonstrates significant differences 
between this pathway and the other two. This pathway appears to experience fewer ‘red flags’ 
of high or moderate/high risk than the MR and CC pathways, especially in 2050, and unlike the 
other two it is not obvious whether there is an overall improvement or deterioration between 
2030 and 2050. The results suggest that one of the main problems for this pathway could be 
the ‘transitionary’ period in the medium-term. The main ‘red flags’ for this pathway are 
generation costs and oversupply; these two indicators are interlinked, because the high levels 
of spare capacity required for this system to be able to meet demand peaks is reflected in the 
high total generation cost. However, the TF pathway has lower network costs and lower 
annual bills than the other two pathways, reflecting the positive impacts of demand reduction. 
This may also have the co-benefit of improving acceptability: for instance, lower demand 
results in less requirement for new infrastructure which may reduce the risk of public 
opposition. However, the analysis also suggests that energy efficiency alone is not enough to 
generate these co-benefits: the CC pathway has high levels of energy efficiency but electricity 
demand continues to rise because of electrification of heating and transport, whereas despite 
electrification the TF pathway keeps electricity demand stable via public engagement and 
behaviour change. It is worth noting that this pathway is highly dependent on biomass and 
that there are large uncertainties around biomass for several of the indicators, which increases 
the general uncertainty over the security of this pathway (see chapter 5). Finally, it is worth 
emphasising that although the TF pathway has fewer areas of high or moderate/high risk than 
the other two pathways, especially in the longer-term, it is not really possible to infer from this 
that a decentralised low-carbon system would be more secure than a centralised one, because 
of the multiple nuances and trade-offs within the analysis, the multiple uncertainties and 
assumptions within both the pathways data and the security assessment results (as illustrated 
throughout chapter 5), and the impossibility of aggregating or weighting the indicators. 
 
7.1.4 Conclusions from the dashboard analysis 
This section has derived the following key conclusions from the dashboard analysis. These 
conclusions will be discussed further in the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
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 The three pathways all experience many ‘red flags’ within the affordability dimension, 
compared to very few in the sustainability dimension. Further research would be 
interesting to test whether this points to a potential trade-off between affordability 
and sustainability objectives, for instance via comparison with a high-carbon pathway. 
 The MR and CC pathways both experience deterioration in their overall security from 
2030 to 2050. For the TF pathway on the other hand, the most risky period could be 
the medium-term ‘transition’ period. This suggests that maintaining a centralised 
electricity system trajectory could be less risky in the medium-term, but more risky in 
the longer-term. 
 The three pathways all exhibit a reduction in flexible, responsive supply capacity. To 
some extent, this could be an artefact of the pathways analysed, although the issue 
appears to stem from increasing penetrations of intermittent and inflexible generation 
capacity. This risk could be mitigated somewhat by alternative flexibility options such 
as DSR, storage and interconnection. 
 Demand reduction generates security benefits in all dimensions; this finding supports 
the literature which suggests that demand reduction can be a win-win for lower 
emissions and for energy security (see section 2.3.2). However, in this analysis, 
demand reduction was assumed to be cost and risk free, which may not be the case in 
reality; this thesis has not explicitly investigated the costs and risks of demand 
reduction, therefore this finding would warrant further investigation in future 
research. 
 Contrary to received wisdom, dependence on fuel imports does not necessarily 
decrease as the result of a low-carbon transition. Therefore it would be wise to 
abandon the rhetoric of the supposed desirability of fewer imports, and instead focus 
on improving the resilience of the system to disruption, for instance by improving the 
diversity and stability of imports. 
 There are significant uncertainties about biomass generation, particularly regarding 
feedstock resource flows, sustainability of feedstocks, and its potential contribution to 
system flexibility (see sections 5.2.2.2, 5.6.1.4 and 5.9.6). The results for the TF 
pathway therefore exhibit high levels of uncertainty. These gaps in knowledge need 
closing down if ambitious biomass plans are to be pursued; this may require not only 
further research, but also further experimentation with existing biomass power 
generation (e.g. the large conversion project at Drax) in order to explore emerging 
supply chains.  
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7.2 Applying the interview results to the security assessment  
 
This section applies the results from the interviews (chapter 6) to the results from the security 
assessment (chapter 5), in order to establish the impact that different stakeholders’ 
perspectives have on the results of the security assessment.  This is done by exploring the 
possible implications of the five cross-cutting themes from the interviews (which were 
introduced in chapter 6) for the results of the security assessment of the three Transition 
Pathways.  
 
7.2.1 Theme 1: How broad is too broad? Affordability and sustainability 
dimensions 
One of the main themes which emerged from the thematic coding analysis of the interview 
responses was an emerging divide over one critical question: should affordability and 
sustainability be viewed as part of energy security? There was much disagreement between 
the respondents on this, as shown in chapter 6. Some respondents suggested that both 
affordability and sustainability should be thought of as separate to security, or as complicating 
factors or trade-offs. For example: 
 
A general point is that you’ve got items in the list [of 
indicators] which are about cost and also about 
decarbonisation and it seems to me that under a strict 
interpretation of the question that you’re asking me, those 
don't have a relevance to security… It seems to me that how 
much you’re prepared to pay for something is a separate 
question to whether or not something is secure… 
(Respondent K) 
 
If I think of it traditionally as ‘energy security’, I think of the 
issues I mentioned about import stability, import 
dependence etc. (Respondent P) 
 
 
It is therefore interesting to examine the impact that taking this narrower view of security 
would have on the results of the security assessment. If security were seen purely as ‘reliability 
and availability’, the MR and CC pathways would have the most areas of high risk in 2030, and 
the CC pathway would have the most areas of high risks in 2050 (assuming that the 
‘participation’ indicator, which proved to be highly problematic to assess, is not taken into 
account). The TF pathway has the fewest areas of high or moderate/high risk in both 2030 and 
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2050. These results are very similar to the results for the broader view of energy security (i.e. 
including affordability and sustainability). Most of the highest risk areas for the three pathways 
are in the affordability dimension, meaning that for stakeholders who felt that affordability is 
not an important aspect of energy security, all three pathways would appear less risky overall.  
 
This thesis has been based around a broad view of energy security which includes affordability 
and sustainability dimensions, in order to explore the implications of the broader view on both 
the results of the security assessment and on the ways in which different stakeholders view 
and conceptualise energy security. It was also posited (see section 2.1.2) that emerging 
normative and legislative imperatives to mitigate climate change mean that that it is important 
to take environmental impacts into account; for policy-makers who are committed to carbon 
reduction targets, it may be unwise to examine ‘security’, ‘affordability’ and ‘sustainability’ 
separately, because the future energy system must meet all these aims. Nevertheless, there is 
also an argument to be made to the contrary – that these broader dimensions should be 
considered to be trade-offs against security, and that securitising issues such as environmental 
sustainability adds unnecessary complications (Jewell et al 2014; Luft et al 2011; Kuik 2003; 
Winzer 2011). The interviews showed a split between both viewpoints. The results contribute 
to this literature by showing that if affordability is not viewed as integral to an assessment of 
electricity security, all three pathways would be seen to have fewer high risk areas, whereas 
the opposite is true for sustainability.27  
 
7.2.2 Theme 2: ‘Traditional’ energy security indicators 
Another major theme which emerged from the thematic coding analysis of the interview 
responses was a certain amount of scepticism over the usefulness of two indicators which are 
traditionally used in the literature to assess energy security: import dependence and fuel type 
diversity (see section 2.1.1). Therefore, it is interesting to examine the impact which removing 
these ‘traditional’ indicators of energy security would have on the results of the security 
assessment.  
 
The MR and TF pathways both have high import dependence; therefore for those respondents 
who thought this indicator unimportant, there would appear to be one fewer high risk for the 
                                                          
27 It is worth emphasising that not assessing these dimensions would not mean that the trade-offs disappear; they 
may simply move to wider discussions about other energy goals.  
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MR and TF pathways compared with the CC pathway, because the CC pathway has lower 
import dependence. The respondents suggested that this ‘traditional’ indicator of energy 
security is not of critical importance for the pathways; if a well-functioning global market 
existed for either coal and gas (MR pathway) or for biomass (TF pathway), they suggested that 
these pathways would still be secure even if they were highly dependent on imports. 
Respondent A said:  
So import dependence in and of itself, so a high level of 
imports does not necessarily mean that you’ll have low 
security. But Japan is probably the best example of that 
because they have basically no indigenous fuels, but even 
post-Fukushima they have still managed to get the stuff. 
 
It should be pointed out that there was some disagreement on this, with some respondents 
arguing that reducing import dependence is an important factor in improving energy security, 
for instance because it allows policy to operate within its “sphere of influence” (respondent D). 
Respondent G summed up two possible sides of this argument:  
Okay, well you could look at imports being a good thing in 
the sense that if you have a global market and global 
competition, imports can lower your costs... Equally from a 
security of supply perspective you could say well actually if 
we could manufacture these technologies and the supply 
chain is within the UK then you could argue that that actually 
helps with security of supply, but it might be a very expensive 
solution…  
 
Overall, however, respondents felt that import dependence is of fairly low importance for 
energy security, as shown in figure 6.1. This supports the considerable literature which argues 
that imports are not insecure per se (e.g. Chaudry et al 2011; Francés et al 2013; Jonsson et al 
2013; Stern 2004; Watson 2010). This is an important point to make, because numerous 
energy security assessments still use volume or proportion of imports as a key indicator (e.g. 
DECC 2012a; Frondel and Schmidt 2014; IEA 2011; Jewell et al 2014; Kruyt et al 2009; 
Pfenninger and Keirstead 2015; Victor et al 2014). 
 
If the ‘fuel type diversity’ indicator were not included in the overall analysis of the results, all 
three pathways would be left without one of their lowest-risk indicators. Therefore the 
inclusion of this indicator does not have a significant impact on the relative security of the 
pathways compared to each other. Increasing penetration of RES tends to increase diversity of 
electricity generation, as the system transitions away from the current reliance on coal, gas 
and nuclear (Cherp et al 2013; Grubb et al 2006; POST 2012), although it should be 
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emphasised that this is dependent on the choice of aggregation of generation types (for 
example, grouping all RES together would result in lower diversity, as noted in section 4.4.1.2). 
The TF pathway is highly dependent on biomass, meaning that it is slightly less diverse in 2050, 
but several respondents suggested that a lack of diversity in a pathway does not necessarily 
make it less secure per se. For example: 
I don’t think it’s important to have that diversity. I’m just 
looking across to France here, their electricity system is not 
diverse. No one can say it’s not secure. It is secure, full stop. 
In my view, if you have a technology that works and you’re 
pretty sure about the fuel and the supply of that technology, 
it doesn’t need to be that diverse. (Respondent J) 
 
Diversity of fuel types in the energy mix, I actually don’t think 
it’s a problem. We could have a very nuclear heavy system as 
they do in France, we could have a very renewables heavy 
system, I see that as a very low risk for transition. 
(Respondent F) 
 
It should be pointed out that a number of possible methods exist for the calculation of both 
diversity and import dependence, but that the interviewees were not provided with 
information on the specific methods used to calculate the indicators; therefore responses 
relate to import and diversity indicators in more general terms. 
 
Finally, it is worth briefly discussing another ‘traditional’ indicator, the DRCM indicator. 
Although the DRCM indicator was felt to be important by some respondents, there was also 
some contention about its continued usefulness as an indicator of energy security in a low-
carbon context, because it fails to capture dynamics such as demand flexibility, embedded 
generation and short-term intermittency (see section 6.5.1). As stated by respondent V: 
It’s a very direct indicator, isn’t it? But with a caveat… If you 
were really going to take executive control of the system 
under stress, there’s probably hidden margin that doesn’t 
emerge from just looking at de-rated margins.  
Removing the DRCM indicator would have a noticeable impact on security comparisons 
between the three pathways, because the TF pathway is at low risk for this indicator whilst the 
MR and CC pathways are both at high risk. This suggests that care should be taken not to view 
the DRCM results in isolation, and to bear in mind that positive scores for system flexibility 
would go a long way toward mitigating the low DRCM in the MR and CC pathways. This result 
supports a more general point from the literature and from this thesis overall, that indicators 
may be less useful when viewed in isolation or when aggregated together and that therefore a 
219 
 
dashboard approach is more suitable (Jonsson et al 2013; Mitchell and Watson 2013b; Narula 
and Reddy 2015).  
 
The interview results suggest that stakeholders feel that that in a context of increasing 
penetration of intermittent sources of power generation and increasingly unpredictable 
demand patterns, indicators of flexibility are becoming more important for security than some 
traditional indicators. As suggested by respondent O: 
I think in future we would need more flexible capacity and I 
think the priority of quality of flexible capacity will increase 
in the future… On de-rated capacity too we probably need to 
explore better what de-rated capacity is available on the 
demand side, in terms of both automated DSR but also in 
terms of consumer attitude in terms of price signals. 
This is interesting when viewed in light of the existing literature, because it suggests that 
increased attention should be placed on security indicators which focus on responding to 
insecurity, rather than indicators which relate to reducing causes of insecurity, despite the fact 
that the majority of studies focus on the latter (Jonsson et al 2013). If the ‘flexibility’ indicators 
of response and reserve, flexible demand, storage and interconnection are considered to be of 
primary importance, the CC pathway appears to be the most risky. This is especially interesting 
when comparing with the relatively low import dependence in the CC pathway, because it 
suggests that the use of ‘traditional’ indicators could obscure problems with flexibility that 
may, according to the stakeholders interviewed, be much more important for electricity 
security.  
 
7.2.3 Theme 3: Economic and political feasibility 
A common theme amongst the respondents was the importance of securing investment in 
infrastructure, and the idea that investment would require long-term stability of policies and 
political certainty, and that this is closely connected to public acceptability and whether or not 
decisions are ‘politically affordable’. For example: 
I think there is a social contract aspect to sustainability; if you 
can’t bring the public with you then any policy is likely to 
become at some stage slightly a liability or at risk… You do 
need to keep in mind that investors will only invest if they 
think that government will stay the course and governments 
will stay the course if it does not become a voter liability. 
(Respondent O) 
 
I would say that government driving something without 
public buy in and I think that is a problem at the moment, 
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you just have to look at the Tory party on renewables for 
instance… if the public does not buy in you won’t deliver on 
the demand side you won’t deliver on energy efficiency, so 
the whole system falls over. (Respondent G) 
 
As noted in sections 5.4.4 and 5.8.5, a key risk for all the pathways is that the electricity sector 
will struggle to secure the level of finance required to realise the transition. However, it is 
highly challenging to differentiate between the pathways in this regard, as all pathways could 
potentially engender risks in this area. There is a lack of detailed information in the pathways 
about future market design. Besides this, evidence from the literature shows that market 
design is just one determinant of investor behaviour, with an array of other socio-economic 
and behavioural factors also having an influence (Ellenbeck et al 2015). This being the case, it is 
not really possible to assess the level of investment flows in the pathways, although this issue 
will be discussed in more detail in section 7.3. 
 
7.2.4 Theme 4: Context 
The importance of spatial, temporal, technological and system context was raised repeatedly 
by the interview respondents, in relation to a number of indicators and dimensions, as shown 
in the quotes below: 
The principal problem is that when you look that long term, 
especially 2050, it’s very difficult without defining what the 
energy situation is going to be then to make a coherent 
comment on the security implications of some of these 
issues. The other thing is that I think that it really matters 
whether you assume that low-carbon is high-nuclear or low-
nuclear. (Respondent H) 
 
I think [the need for response and reserve] entirely depends 
on the system that you have. I’m not an engineer, but I could 
totally imagine that in 2050 we have a system that doesn’t 
have a lot of that and works so dynamically that we don’t 
need it. (Respondent E) 
 
[Diversity] clearly could become a bigger issue if we end up 
with an all-renewables and gas mix… It’s not necessarily an 
issue, as it depends on what else you’re doing. In that 
scenario, you might have lots of energy storage, lots of clever 
demand side. I can see some scenarios where diversity does 
matter. (Respondent W) 
This has implications for the practicality of using a generic set of indicators for assessing the 
security of different pathways or scenarios, because some indicators could be far more salient 
for certain technologies or systems than for others. The deliberate avoidance of weighting in 
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the assessment makes it difficult to alter the indicator analysis to take these context-specific 
aspects of individual pathways into account. This is a challenge for energy security assessments 
in general, because despite the difficulties of generalisation it is desirable to be able to 
compare multiple options, potentially even in multiple national contexts. 
 
One of the major contextual points raised by respondents revolved around the security 
implications of a transition to a more decentralised electricity system, as discussed in section 
6.6.4. Their responses suggest that the extent of power system decentralisation could be an 
important deciding factor in determining the future security of a low-carbon electricity system, 
and can also have a big impact on ways of measuring the security of the system. Interestingly, 
this occurred despite the fact that the interviewees were not made aware that the Transition 
Pathways used for this study include a specific decentralised pathway. For example, 
respondents said:  
I guess it depends on your strategy I would say. I think the 
centralised energy system model of big power stations, in 
fairly remote locations, doesn’t need as much public 
participation or engagement. If you are going down a 
strategy which involves more diffuse tech, such as 
renewables, wind turbines, solar and things that involve 
consumers as well so that a highly renewable system needs 
a lot of demand side response, a much better interconnected 
system. (Respondent D) 
 
It depends whether we move from this national, centralised 
system to a more distributed energy system. Public 
perception might not even be public in the national sense, as 
it’s understood now, but be public in a regional or local 
sense. (Respondent B) 
 
The results from the security assessment in chapter 5 support this contention: there are 
fundamental differences between the TF pathway and the other two pathways, whereas the 
results from the MR and CC pathways are actually fairly similar. It is also interesting to note 
that the decentralised TF pathway generally appears to have fewer areas of high risk than the 
two centralised pathways, especially in the longer-term, although it would be a bit of a leap to 
state from this that a decentralised low-carbon system would necessarily be more secure than 
a centralised one. The academic and policy literature has not gone into much detail thus far 
regarding the potential security implications of a shift to a decentralised system; possible 
impacts on system resilience and on networks have been discussed (see section 5.9.5), but to 
the author’s knowledge no previous attempts have been made to empirically assess the 
broader security implications of electricity system decentralisation in the UK, or to examine 
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what kinds of indicators would be most suitable for assessing the security of a decentralised 
pathway. This thesis makes a contribution to filling this gap in the literature by comparing 
centralised and decentralised scenarios using a range of indicators; nevertheless, this could be 
an important area for further research.  
 
7.2.5 Theme 5: The demand side 
The importance of demand reduction and demand flexibility was a common recurring theme 
throughout the interviews, as discussed in section 6.6.5. Respondents especially talked about 
the potential co-benefits of increasing attention to the demand-side, such as reducing costs, 
improving acceptability and reducing reliance on resources. This supports the extensive 
literature which has previously mentioned these co-benefits (e.g. Adelle et al 2009; Berk et al 
2006; Froggatt and Levi 2009; Greenpeace 2010a; Hoggett et al 2013; Pye et al 2014) and 
suggests that this is one of the main things which occurs to stakeholders when they think of 
how best to improve energy security. Again, it is interesting to note that stakeholders were not 
informed that the three Transition Pathways differentiate significantly in their levels of overall 
energy demand. Many of the indicators implicitly use the demand-side as part of their 
calculations: for example, the affordability indicators are all based on demand volume, several 
of the acceptability indicators are based on required levels of new capacity, and the resources 
indicators are based on resource demands, which is driven by overall energy demand. 
However, because of the importance of this aspect to the respondents, it is worth briefly 
discussing the implications of taking a more demand-side focus on the results of the security 
assessment. This is especially important considering that much of the literature on energy 
security is very supply-side focused (Hoggett et al 2013). 
 
In terms of maximising the co-benefits of demand reduction, the TF pathway is the least risky 
pathway. One of the key aspects of this pathway is the steep reductions in overall energy 
demand which are delivered via increased participation and behaviour change from energy 
users. Despite not knowing this information about the pathway, respondents stated: 
I think it will be useful to give consumers an ability to more 
directly engage with the [energy] sector and to actually see 
a financial benefit from the sector. At the moment it kind of 
feels like it’s purely something that flows out of your wallet 
to someone else… so trying to come up with a slightly more 
constructive engagement between consumers and the 
sector in the future. (Respondent O) 
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The transition to a low carbon pathway is going to require us 
to not only move our electricity system to a low carbon one, 
but also encourage people to think about how they use 
electricity, and so actually thinking about electricity 
efficiency and also demand reduction. (Respondent X) 
 
As shown in chapter 5, the steep demand reductions in the TF pathway also bring about 
benefits for many of the indicators. To a lesser extent, the CC pathway also achieves 
reductions in overall energy demand, although the impacts of this on electricity are somewhat 
taken back by the electrification of heating and transport. However, the demand reductions in 
the CC pathway are driven by top-down regulations and energy efficiency improvements, 
which respondents suggested may not bring about the same public acceptability co-benefits. 
The MR pathway, although it has relatively high levels of shiftable demand (driven by high 
uptake of electric vehicles and heat pumps), does not achieve significant demand reductions, 
and does not therefore reap the potential co-benefits. Nevertheless, the co-benefits of 
demand reduction are already reflected in the results of the security assessment: many of the 
positive results for the TF pathway (and, to a lesser extent, the CC pathway) are in fact driven 
almost entirely by demand reduction. Therefore sufficient emphasis has already been placed 
onto the demand-side in the original security assessment; the results simply reiterate the 
importance of demand reductions and demand flexibility as a priority for energy policy. 
 
7.2.6 Conclusions from the application of different stakeholder perspectives to the 
security assessment 
This section has illustrated the following key conclusions from the application of the major 
themes arising from the qualitative interview data analysis to the results of the security 
assessment: 
 The results illustrate the importance of using multiple indicators from multiple 
dimensions to assess security. The results help to identify trade-offs and priorities; 
each indicator is much less useful if taken in isolation. Therefore the results reinforce 
the importance of taking a dashboard approach which incorporates a broad range of 
indicators whilst avoiding aggregation, as argued throughout this thesis. 
 The stakeholders interviewed did not agree on whether to include affordability and 
sustainability dimensions, and they did not agree on whether to include ‘traditional’ 
indicators such as diversity and import dependence. This reinforces the rationale of 
this thesis that any assessment of energy security should attempt to ‘open up’ the 
discussion to take diverse perspectives into account.  
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 The three pathways were all less risky for several of the indicators which were said to 
be of minimal importance by the stakeholders interviewed, but more risky for others 
suggested as being highly important such as system resilience and flexibility. Transition 
pathways should therefore emphasise system resilience and flexibility in order to 
ensure energy security within the pathway. 
 The ‘traditional’ energy security indicators of import dependence and generation mix 
diversity were judged to be of relatively low importance by the stakeholders 
interviewed. Ignoring these two indicators would change the pattern of comparison 
between the pathways to make the CC pathway appear to be the least secure, because 
of poor supply-side flexibility in this pathway. This raises the possibility that previous 
attempts to assess electricity security have been focusing on certain aspects which 
could lead to a preference for systems which do well for indicators such as import 
dependence and fuel diversity but which neglect flexibility. These results therefore add 
weight to the contention that flexibility on both the supply-side and the demand-side 
should be prioritised when assessing electricity security.  
 For those respondents who did not feel that DRCM is an important indicator of 
security, the general pattern of the MR and CC pathways would appear less risky; 
however, these two pathways also have less flexibility. Therefore care should be taken 
not to use DRCM as an indicator in isolation, and to bear in mind that good results for 
system flexibility would go a long way toward mitigating the low DRCM in these two 
pathways.  
 The level of decentralisation in an electricity system is a critical factor in determining 
both the level of security risk for a number of indicators, and also the usefulness of 
several of the indicators used. This result contributes to the literature on low-carbon 
electricity security, which has thus far not gone into much detail regarding the security 
implications of significant decentralisation. This result suggests that the extent of 
decentralisation could be one of the key factors to be considered when approaching 
questions of both how to measure and how to improve electricity security in the 
future. 
 Many of the positive results for the TF pathway (and, to a lesser extent, the CC 
pathway) are driven by reductions in overall energy demand. The results therefore add 
empirical weight to the literature which emphasises the potential ‘win-wins’ of 
demand reduction. 
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7.3 Missing indicators 
 
During the interviews, respondents were asked to think about any indicators or dimensions 
which they felt were missing from the original list provided to them.28 This can help to 
highlight important areas which respondents felt had not been covered in enough depth 
during the rest of the interview. Table 7.1 shows the additional indicators which were 
mentioned, along with the number of respondents who mentioned them (No.). The codes ‘R’, 
‘L’ and ‘X’ denote the potential relevance of these additional indicators to the assessment. 
Some of those mentioned are relevant and could potentially have been included in an 
assessment (R), some are less relevant or impossible, as explained by the notes in the table (L), 
and some are already covered in either the pathways or the security assessment itself (X).  For 
the indicators marked ‘R’, this section explores the extent to which it would have been 
possible or desirable to include these additional indicators in the initial set, and also the impact 
that including them might have had on the results from the security assessment. As noted in 
chapter 4, the interviews were conducted after the indicator set had been finalised, therefore 
the purpose of the interviews was not to contribute to the construction of the indicator set, 
but rather to test the set and to explore potential additions suggested by interviewees, as well 
as providing potentially useful insights for further development of the indicator set in future 
research. 
 
                                                          
28 This question was also mentioned at the beginning of each interview, so that respondents could consider it 
throughout the discussion. 
226 
 
 
Table 7-1: Indicators suggested as missing from the original set 
Missing indicator No. Relevance Notes 
Political / institutional stability and effectiveness 5 R  
Deliberate attack 3 R  
Physical climate change impacts 3 L Challenging to assess; also partially covered in the ‘GHG emissions’ indicator 
Energy efficiency 2 R  
Incentives to invest 2 R Highly challenging to assess 
Technological innovation 2 R Highly challenging to assess 
Framings of security in political discourse 2 R Highly challenging, although obviously important, as noted throughout this thesis 
Decarbonisation of heat 2 X Already modelled in pathways 
Loss of Load Expectation 2 X Already modelled in pathways 
Opposition to participation in DSR 2 X Covered in ‘flexible demand’, although more detailed information would be beneficial, as noted in 
section 5.9.4 
Supply capacity at other end of interconnectors 1 R  
Availability of key skills (engineers etc.) 1 R  
Local pollution / air quality 1 R  
Green gas for heating 1 X Already modelled in pathways 
Impact of electrification of transport 1 X Already modelled in pathways 
Flexible generation 1 X Covered as a proxy in ‘response-and-reserve’ 
System operation in context of decentralisation 1 L Only relevant for one of the pathways 
Network reliability and bottlenecks 1 L Impossible to assess without future network maps 
Gas networks 1 L Impossible to assess without future gas network maps 
Space weather 1 L Not possible to mitigate 
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7.3.1 Applying the suggested additional indicators to the pathways 
7.3.1.1 Policy / institutional stability and effectiveness 
A common theme amongst the interview respondents was the importance of policy and 
institutional stability, which along with a long-term ‘plan’ or ‘vision’ were felt to be critical for 
the transition. This was not included as an indicator mainly because of the impossibility of 
assessing the likely levels of policy stability in the pathways: there could be arguments made 
that any of the three pathways or storylines would be more politically stable and effective.  
 
It should be noted that policy could potentially be seen as either a means of mitigating security 
risks, or alternatively as a source of security risks. Three of the five stakeholders who 
mentioned ‘policy stability’ as an additional indicator referred mainly to the latter: 
Political interference… I know these factors all go into it but 
the biggest risk to a low carbon transition for me really is 
politics and policy. So if you design bad policy showing 
inefficiency then you make it more expensive than it needs 
to be and this creates political problems (Respondent F). 
 
New governments can come in and they can tinker or totally 
change the set-up of the market and that affects investment. 
There’s a massive impact. What people are looking for is 
some stability or at least [that] they can see the direction 
(Respondent J). 
 
[A key risk is] lack of long term certainty, so that comes back 
to the investment signal and that kind of thing (Respondent 
N). 
 
Meanwhile, the other two respondents used the two views fairly interchangeably. For 
example: 
It’s one of these things that government do, they set a policy 
and don’t think about the long-term consequences of it… I 
think we need a lot more flexibility in the system than we 
have now, which does require long-term policy, which I don’t 
necessarily think we have at the moment. (Respondent M) 
 
I talked a little bit about stability and long-term signals and 
that kind of thing, but ultimately it's the absence of those 
that are driving a lot of the issues within these things…  If that 
investment is going to happen then those who are going to 
be building that infrastructure need to have the price signals 
and stability in order to do so. (Respondent U) 
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This additional indicator suggestion is interesting because most energy security assessments 
do not include any similar measure; references to ‘political stability’ usually refer to the 
geopolitical stability of key fuel exporters (e.g. Axon et al 2013). Policy and regulation are 
perhaps best viewed not so much as an indicator, but rather as an overriding process which 
has the ability to mitigate any or all of the security risks identified, or alternatively which can 
generate its own security risks. So for example, a particular pathway might have high risk 
regarding low capacity margins; policy can act to reduce this risk, for example by putting in 
extra response and reserve capability or by regulating for increased levels of demand 
flexibility; on the other hand, policy could create new risks, for instance by making sudden 
policy changes which ‘spook’ investors. 
 
7.3.1.2 Incentives to invest 
As explained in the previous section, incentives to invest are crucial for realising a transition 
pathway, regardless of the supply/demand mix. This aspect is similar in many ways to ‘policy 
stability’ – it is an overriding factor which has the potential to mitigate numerous security risks 
if done well, or to destabilise the entire transition if done badly. As pointed out by respondent 
Q: 
…And if we don’t have sufficient incentives in place for 
capacity to be built, and for all those other things, demand 
measures etc., ultimately, it’s all about investment and kit. 
Unless we can show a decent prospect of return or an 
adequate level of risk, then whatever we want just isn’t 
gonna happen. 
Interestingly, this was only mentioned as an additional indicator by two of the respondents, 
despite the fact that investment was a common cross-cutting theme throughout the 
discussions regarding the initial indicator set (as discussed in chapter 6). Similarly to ‘policy 
stability’, this suggests that ‘incentives to invest’ is perhaps best thought of as an overriding 
process which has the ability to mitigate (or maximise) any or all of the security risks identified. 
It is highly challenging to differentiate between the pathways for this aspect: all three 
pathways could be argued as providing better incentives for investment as a result of the 
storylines, but this is entirely subjective and impossible to predict in the future.  
 
It is worth noting that policy and regulation can help to mitigate many investment risks. For 
example, the UK Capacity Mechanism is designed to incentivise investment in generation 
infrastructure in the context of increasingly low load factors for conventional generation as 
backup for intermittent RES (DECC 2013c). Respondent L said: 
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The main thing I don’t see [in the indicator set] is something 
about how we incentivise thermal plant to be on the system 
when it’s almost never used. That becomes more and more 
of an issue in the long-term. Obviously we have these 
Capacity Mechanism arrangements, assuming they continue 
to work as they’re intended to. But the more intermittent 
renewable generation we have on the system, the more and 
more important it becomes. 
Again, it is highly challenging to differentiate between the pathways for this aspect, because all 
three pathways could in theory put measures in place to ensure that the required investments 
are made in an efficient manner. Once again, it is worth noting that the results from the 
interviews suggest that one of the key aspects of securing sufficient investment is the 
existence of long-term stability of policies and a ‘plan’ or ‘vision’ for the transition. 
 
7.3.1.3 Framings of security in political discourse 
To some extent, this aspect is also linked to the ‘policy stability’ aspect discussed previously. 
Framings of energy security are discussed in more detail in section 2.1. Framings of security in 
political discourse can impact upon all levels of the system: for example, they can influence 
public acceptability, they can influence infrastructure decisions and incentives to invest, they 
can influence the scale and direction of finance flows, and they can dictate the extent to which 
there is a ‘social contract’ for the transition. In this way, similarly to the ‘policy stability’ and 
‘incentives to invest’ aspects discussed previously, this could be viewed not so much as an 
indicator in its own right but rather as an overriding process which has the potential to 
mitigate or increase risks. As noted in chapter 6, an important aspect of the transition is the 
extent to which people and policy-makers agree on the importance of mitigating climate 
change; again, this can be heavily influenced by political framings. Respondent C said: 
The way in which media and public debate is framed has a 
big impact - at the moment, it tends to either be about 
moments of system failure, or about not having to pay 
foreign dictators for their hydrocarbons. The way that 
security is constructed in discourse profoundly affects the 
climate outcomes that we expect. This is especially evident 
with nuclear; importing gas from the Middle East is a major 
fear, but terrorists from the Middle East attacking nuclear 
power stations are not! This isn't the first time that 
conventional perspectives on security are leaving us a little 
bit behind. 
 
The stakeholder interviews have actively explored framings of energy security, and have 
helped to shed light on the ways in which energy security is framed and perceived by some key 
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stakeholders who may potentially have some influence on policy processes. However, despite 
the importance of this aspect for security, it is not possible to go further than this and to 
directly test the evolution of political discourse in the pathways, because there is simply no 
information available about political discourse in the future, and no way of predicting how 
political discourse might evolve in the various pathways over the next 40 years.  
 
7.3.1.4 Deliberate attack 
Three of the stakeholders mentioned that one possible cause of disruption could be a 
deliberate attack on critical infrastructure such as a power station, transmission and 
distribution networks, or control and ICT systems, for instance by criminal or terrorist 
organisations. Respondents said:  
[These indicators] haven’t gone down the counter-terror 
route… It’s linked [to cyber-security], from that critical 
infrastructure perspective. It’s not one that keeps me awake 
at night, but a lot of people worry about it (Respondent E).   
 
I can’t say anything more about this [terrorism] because I’d 
have to kill you… (laughs) You can imagine a lot going on with 
the security services, which I actually can’t tell you about. It’s 
not so much a low-carbon transition thing, but it is a factor 
in terms of security, something we spend a lot of time 
worrying about (Respondent W). 
 
Concerns about this issue have been growing in the UK, largely due to the increasing 
penetration of sophisticated information technology in the electricity system (Cabinet Office 
2011; House of Lords 2015). Increasing reliance on ICT, and the potential for this to constitute 
a security threat, was a factor mentioned by a small number of interviewees; for example, 
respondent J said: 
If these [ICT] systems break down, and they can - viruses, 
security problems, hackers, etc. etc. – that’s a big thing 
companies need to look at. If systems break down, do they 
have a backup plan or some way of restoring the system. 
 
However, it may be worth pointing out that some of the energy security literature disputes the 
importance of this category of risks. For example, Johansson (2013) suggests that deliberate 
attacks by non-state actors such as terrorists and vandals are fairly rare and aren’t likely to 
constitute a major security risk; meanwhile Burgherr and Hirschberg (2014) found that 
maximising public participation and acceptability is more important for security than focusing 
on technologies which could be at risk of deliberate attack. 
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The likelihood of disruption from deliberate attack in the pathways is not possible to assess, 
because of the absence of detailed geographical data about the size of generating units, the 
location of substations, and transmission and distribution network maps. To some extent, the 
size of the largest credible in-feed loss could be relevant (see section 5.9.3) – for instance, the 
MR and CC pathways both see an increase in the size of the largest generating unit on the 
system, which could increase short-term balancing requirements in the event of the loss of a 
unit due to an attack (National Grid 2011). However, these large units may also be less 
vulnerable to attack, as they tend to be better protected. In terms of cyber security, the level 
of ‘smart’ technology is very similar across the three pathways, and all three pathways assume 
the continued existence of the nationwide transmission system through to 2050, therefore it is 
not possible to differentiate between the pathways in this respect, although this could be an 
important factor when comparing the security of pathways with significant differences in 
reliance on ICT systems. It is worth noting that some have argued that a more decentralised 
electricity system will be ‘inherently’ more resilient to these types of disruption; references for 
these claims and counter-claims are given in section 5.9.5. 
 
7.3.1.5 Energy efficiency 
It is often suggested that energy efficiency can act as a win-win for all aspects of the energy 
trilemma, because it can improve the ability of supply to meet demand, can reduce costs for 
consumers, and can lower GHG emissions (Adelle et al 2009; Berk et al 2006; Froggatt and Levi 
2009; Greenpeace 2010a; Hoggett et al 2013). It is interesting to note that only two 
respondents suggested including energy efficiency as an indicator in its own right. Moreover, 
these two respondents both suggested it precisely because other indicators of energy security 
are highly linked to energy efficiency: 
I think a secure affordable low carbon system will have a very 
high level of energy efficiency… I think some sort of indicator 
linked to energy efficiency would be a good one, because it 
delivers security of supply, because it lowers consumption, it 
reduces costs and therefore impacts affordability. 
(Respondent G) 
 
One solution is energy efficiency – you haven’t pulled that 
out as specific heading, but it probably should be there… 
There’s an important linkage between energy efficiency and 
building retrofits and fuel poverty and that sort of agenda. 
(Respondent V) 
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It is worth emphasising, however, that energy efficiency is a complex and contested subject 
which is not so easily turned into an indicator. Hoggett et al (2013) point out that increasing 
energy efficiency does not simply equal better energy security, because a disruption to 
supplies will affect energy services no matter what the level of energy efficiency; one way of 
looking at it is that a highly efficient economy will be less secure because each unit of energy is 
more valuable and therefore a loss of any one unit is more problematic. Moreover, there are 
many potential ways of measuring energy efficiency, each of which would have slightly 
different implications: for example, it could refer to energy intensity per unit of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (EIA 2015c), energy intensity per unit of Purchasing Power Parity 
(Suehiro 2007), manufacturing output (or other sector output) per unit of energy used (Green 
and Zhang 2013), exergy (Gundersen 2011; Laitner 2013), or even the number and reach of 
policies to improve energy efficiency. Respondent G said “…you can measure energy efficiency 
in various ways, you can link it to GDP you can link it to various things…”, thus suggesting that 
some sort of indicator relating to energy efficiency would be beneficial, but that it would 
require careful thought over how to measure it. Hoggett et al (2013) actually argue that a 
more important goal is to reduce overall consumption of energy, a goal which is dependent on 
a raft of wider social and behavioural practices (Eyre et al 2011). If this is taken to be the case, 
it could be argued that overall energy demand would make a better indicator. However, most 
indicators already incorporate demand figures as part of their calculations; therefore it would 
be worth being cautious about including overall demand as an indicator in its own right. 
 
7.3.1.6 Technological innovation 
Two respondents suggested that ‘technological innovation’ should be included as an indicator 
in its own right. However, neither of these two respondents went into any detail regarding 
how best to design an ‘innovation’ indicator: 
One observation – we’ve said nothing here about innovation 
and technology. It seems to me that’s absolutely vital…. You 
need to spur that innovation and technological development 
to deal with these challenges. (Respondent I) 
 
Innovation and R&D I think is an absolutely crucial area, 
that’s more long term but it is about finding choice. And it’s 
not just in technologies it’s about systems, the whole 
smarter agenda, materials, science, because it’s those things 
that can provide that disruptive journey which can really 
accelerate the transition. (Respondent G) 
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There are numerous metrics which are used to measure innovation. These can be broadly 
divided into ‘input’ indicators such as Gross Expenditure on R&D or number of trained 
scientists per capita, and ‘output’ indicators such as numbers of patents or publications (see 
for example OECD 2015; Statistical Office of the European Communities 1997). There is a large 
literature which examines and critiques the usefulness of such counting methods for 
examining the level of innovation in a system or sector; a detailed appraisal is beyond the 
scope of this section, but for a good overview see Freeman and Soete (2009). However, 
regardless of whether such metrics are regarded as useful, the detail in the pathways is by no 
means sufficient to be able to use them in this instance. 
 
In the absence of such detailed input/output data, all that can be done is to take a rather 
broader view of technological innovation evident in the pathways. All three pathways rely on 
existing technologies, although some (such as CCS) are not currently deployed at scale in the 
UK. It is useful to distinguish between incremental and more ‘radical’ innovations (Freeman 
1992): for existing technologies, innovation in all three pathways leads to incremental 
improvements, whilst the pathways also include several emerging technologies which appear 
at scale in future decades: 
- all three pathways assume that CCS becomes commercially viable (the TF pathway 
includes CCS on a smaller scale, due to lower proportion of fossil generation); 
- all three pathways include the emergence of a Smart Grid for managing electricity 
demand; 
- all three pathways presume widespread electrification of heating and transport; 
- all three pathways include the emergence at scale of tidal and wave generation; 
- all three pathways include innovations in energy efficient appliances and other 
demand-reduction technologies (this is especially evident in the CC and TF pathways); 
- all three pathways presume incremental efficiency improvements in existing 
generation technologies; 
- none of the pathways includes the emergence of more radical innovations such as 
nuclear fusion, new types of cost-effective batteries, advanced biofuels for transport 
etc. 
 
As can be seen from the list above, there is little to differentiate between the pathways in 
terms of the technological innovation evident in their respective technology mixes. The main 
differences are that CCS is used much less extensively in the TF pathway, thus meaning that 
the TF pathway would be at lower risk of being unfeasible if the necessary innovation and cost 
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reduction in CCS did not occur. The CC and TF pathways also include higher levels of buildings 
efficiency than the MR pathway, implying higher levels of innovation in this area. It is also 
worth noting that innovation can be important not only for improving the technology itself, 
but also for reducing costs, known as ‘learning curves’, an aspect which may be especially 
important for newer technologies such as wind and solar (Barreto 2001; Gross et al 2013; 
Grubler 2010). This issue is discussed in relation to the pathways in section 5.3.3 and in 
Appendix C. 
 
Another important aspect of an ‘innovation’ indicator would be whether there are sufficient 
incentives for innovation and whether new innovations can find the opportunity to emerge. 
However, it is highly challenging to assess which of the pathways would be better at 
incentivising technological innovation. Some economists might argue that a market-led system 
such as that envisaged in the MR pathway might be better placed to ensure efficient 
technological innovation, because the market will (in theory) seek the most economically 
efficient route (Less 2012; Moselle & Moore 2011; Nordhaus 2009). However, others point out 
that the existence of market failures and externalities mean that the public sector has a vital 
role to play, because the market won’t necessarily account for these when valuing innovations 
(Gross et al 2012; Mowery et al 2009). Finally, some suggest that the TF pathway might be 
better at incentivising bottom-up innovation from consumers and local groups (Barton et al 
2015; Bolton and Foxon 2015). It becomes very complex to differentiate between the 
pathways in this respect, because the pathways themselves cannot be easily reduced to 
‘private’ versus ‘public’: it should be emphasised that both public and private sectors have a 
role in all three of the pathways, although their relative importance varies. For example, the 
MR pathway may be market-led but it does not preclude the existence of state support for 
innovation, especially at the early R&D stage; the CC pathway on the other hand might involve 
lots of state support for innovation, but private firms will still be needed to commercialise 
technologies (Balachandra and Reddy 2007).  
 
This discussion shows that it is not simply the amount of innovation which matters; a small 
amount of cleverly targeted innovation which can bring about critical improvements in vital 
technologies is much more useful than scattered innovations across the board (Irvine and 
Martin 1984). In this respect, it must be emphasised that concepts of ‘innovation’ are 
themselves highly contested (although none of the interview participants mentioned this). As 
pointed out by Stirling (2009; 2014), concepts of innovation are often reduced to simple 
questions such as ‘how much?’, ‘how fast?’ and ‘who leads?’, yet this is deterministic and 
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assumes that there is a single best route for innovation. A more plural understanding gives rise 
to questions such as ‘which way?’, ‘what alternatives?’, ‘who says?’ and ‘why?’ Moreover, 
innovation is not just about technological invention, nor is it always beneficial (Stirling 2014). 
The complex and contested nature of innovation as a concept would warrant an extremely 
lengthy discussion which is outside the scope of this section, but which reinforces the 
significant challenges which would face attempts to include this as an indicator. 
 
7.3.1.7 Supply capacity at the other end of interconnectors 
As discussed in sections 5.8.4 and 6.5.2, interconnection can in theory bring benefits for 
electricity security by providing additional flexible capacity for dealing with stress periods; 
however, interconnection could also generate risks, especially if a fault occurs at the other end 
of the interconnector or if several interconnected countries experience a stress moment 
simultaneously. Therefore, it was suggested that an indicator of the supply capacity at the 
other end of the interconnectors could help to reduce some of this uncertainty. Just one 
respondent suggested this as an additional indicator, stating “I wonder if you need something 
around generation capacity levels in our interconnecting areas…” (Respondent N). 
 
However, for the purposes of this assessment, all three pathways are remarkably similar in 
their levels of interconnection, and all include interconnection to the same sets of countries, 
therefore it wouldn’t be possible to differentiate between these pathways for this indicator. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that supply capacity at the other end of the interconnector is 
not the only factor which determines the effectiveness of the interconnector at improving 
system security. Electricity imports need to be available at the specific times required; for this, 
hour-by-hour modelling of transmission flows based on the supply/demand balances of all 
interconnected countries would be required, which is outside the scope of this thesis. 
Regulations are also important, because they can help to control what happens during a stress 
moment, in particular ensuring that international markets are working to effectively distribute 
power to where it is needed most and helping to ensure that power does not flow out of the 
UK when it is required (House of Lords 2015). The interaction between System Operators in 
different countries is also critical: getting this interaction right can help to regulate load flows 
and can help to mitigate the impact of cascade faults (RAEng 2014). As noted by respondent N, 
it is also important that the market arrangements in different countries work well together; 
there is currently some uncertainty over how the various independent Capacity Mechanisms 
236 
 
236 
 
emerging in Western European countries will work together in the context of increased 
interconnection (ACER 2013; Newbery 2014). 
 
7.3.1.8 Availability of key skills 
As noted by one of the respondents, ‘resources’ does not necessarily only apply to physical 
resources such as fuels and materials. It is also crucial that there is an adequate supply of 
labour, engineering skills and technological know-how for newer technologies: 
… I don’t know if you can put the skills shortage in there as 
well. I would say we haven’t got it here, but that’s a biggy, 
because if you don’t get engineers, the right people trained 
up, it’s going to be increasingly difficult to run an energy 
system in the future. (Respondent J) 
 
There is not enough data in the pathways to assess the availability of key skills in the future. 
Again, this is an area in which policy and regulation can intervene to ensure that the right 
labour and training incentives are in place to ensure good availability of key skills. It is worth 
noting that this is potentially an area of greater risk for the TF pathway, because the 
decentralised nature of the energy system would mean that some level of expertise may need 
to be available at local level. This could create a barrier to local energy schemes, especially for 
the operation and maintenance of municipal or community generation assets (Morrison et al 
2013), although it is possible that Energy Service Companies (ESCos) could mitigate this to 
some extent (Bertoldi et al 2006). 
 
7.3.1.9 Air pollution / local air quality 
As pointed out by one of the respondents, mitigating air pollution and maintaining air quality is 
not just important for environmental and health reasons: in fact, it can have an impact on the 
ability of power stations to run, because air pollution controls could constrain some fossil 
generation capacity. For example, the EU Industrial Emissions Directive and its predecessor the 
Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) have already had an impact on coal generating 
capacity in the UK, with numerous old coal plants choosing to close instead of complying with 
the emissions limits (Loyd and Craigie 2011). There is also a Medium Combustion Plant 
Directive in process in the EU, due to come into force from 2020 onwards (European 
Commission 2013); this illustrates that the suite of air pollution controls is likely to get more 
stringent in the future as legislators attempt to minimise the serious health impacts of 
airborne pollution. Although this was only suggested as an additional indicator by one 
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respondent, it could be argued that the decision not to include air pollution in the initial 
assessment (see Appendix A) was an oversight, and that this indicator could be useful in future 
research. 
 
Unlike most of the other additional indicators suggested by the respondents, this would have 
been possible to include as a quantitative indicator. Treyer et al (2014) conduct a life-cycle 
assessment of various electricity generation technologies for particulate matter and other 
impacts on human health. Their results show that particulate matter formation is most serious 
for lignite and hard coal. Adding CCS does improve this somewhat, but coal with CCS is still 
more damaging than other forms of electricity generation. The next most damaging is gas, 
followed by geothermal (of which there is none in the pathways), then solar (mainly due to the 
diesel generators used when building the array), then nuclear (mainly due to plant 
construction), then all other RES. A full quantitative assessment is outside the scope of this 
section, but a preliminary overview shows that pathways which are heavily reliant on coal and 
gas generation (i.e. the MR pathway, and to a far lesser extent the CC pathway) would produce 
the greatest risks from air pollution. Therefore it could be argued that the MR pathway may 
also run the greatest risks to plant closures or increasing costs due to air quality controls such 
as the LCPD (although in the absence of information about specific future regulations this is 
still fairly speculative). It is also worth noting that this could impact the MR and CC pathways 
by increasing the cost of fuel supplies from overseas, if for example producer countries 
implemented more stringent air pollution controls on mining processes. 
 
7.3.2 Conclusions from missing indicators 
This section has illustrated the following key conclusions from the analysis of indicators which 
were suggested by respondents as missing from the initial set of indicators: 
 There was no overwhelming consensus regarding indicators which stakeholders felt 
were missing from the initial set of indicators.  
 Out of all the additional indicators which were suggested by the respondents, only 
‘energy efficiency’ and ‘air pollution’ would really be possible to measure using 
available data. However, ‘energy efficiency’ in particular is complex and contested.  
 The missing indicators suggested by respondents reinforce the importance of stability 
of policies, institutional effectiveness, and securing adequate investment. These 
aspects are difficult to measure and are impossible to assess in the context of 
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transition pathways into the future as it is possible to envisage a range of plausible 
political and investment risks for all three pathways.  
 
 
7.4 Summing up chapter 7 
 
This chapter has brought together the results presented in chapters 5 and 6, in order to assess 
the impact of stakeholders’ perspectives on the results from the initial security assessment. 
First of all, the results from the initial security assessment (presented in chapter 5) were 
presented as a dashboard analysis, which enables the identification of trade-offs between 
various objectives, and thereby acts as a useful precursor for the application of the interview 
results to the results from the security assessment. In order to do this, the dashboard analyses 
were examined in light of the results from the interview analysis, in order to flag up significant 
areas of risk for the pathways which may be echoed by UK energy stakeholders. Finally, this 
chapter looked in more detail at some of the additional indicators recommended by the 
interviewees, and analysed what impact including these additional indicators would have had 
on the results of the security assessment of the three pathways. 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of using multiple indicators from multiple 
dimensions to assess security. The results help to identify trade-offs; each indicator is much 
less useful if taken in isolation. Therefore the results reinforce the importance of taking a 
dashboard approach which incorporates a broad range of indicators whilst avoiding 
aggregation. This chapter showed that there was generally agreement amongst interviewees 
over the importance of system flexibility, and it highlighted the risks created by a reduction in 
flexible and responsive electricity supply in all three pathways. The three pathways were all 
less risky for several of the indicators which were said to be of minimal importance by the 
stakeholders interviewed, but more risky for others suggested as being highly important. It 
could be argued that this suggests the need for more of a focus on system resilience and 
flexibility in low-carbon transition pathways in general. This chapter also showed that there 
are big challenges for the development of a generalisable set of indicators for assessing the 
security of multiple systems in a low-carbon context. These challenges are mainly caused by 
three factors: a lack of consensus regarding the inclusion of affordability and sustainability 
dimensions; a lack of consensus regarding the inclusion of ‘traditional’ indicators of energy 
security such as diversity and import dependence; and the importance of spatial and 
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technological context on the choice of indicators. These challenges mean that it is important to 
design assessments in a way which captures the multidimensional nature of energy security, in 
a transparent manner which does not seek to aggregate diverse indicators. 
 
The dashboard analysis showed that the area of highest risk in general for the pathways is the 
affordability dimension, whereas the area of lowest risk in general is the sustainability 
dimension. This could point to a trade-off between affordability and sustainability objectives, 
which if it were the case would have major implications for the UK’s ability to address all three 
dimensions of the energy trilemma; however, it was also noted that comparison with a higher-
carbon pathway would be needed to test this. The dashboard analysis also found evidence to 
suggest that maintaining a centralised electricity system trajectory could be less risky in the 
medium-term, but more risky in the longer-term. This raises some interesting questions about 
what the priorities should be for policy in the immediate future, because the results suggest 
that pursuing less risky strategies now could lock the UK into a less secure future if a low-
carbon trajectory is maintained. This is especially interesting in light of the interview data 
which suggested that the extent of power system decentralisation could be a crucial factor in 
determining both the security of the system going forward and how to assess it. This reinforces 
the conclusion from both the dashboard analysis and the interviews, that certain ‘low regret’ 
options such as demand reduction which can generate benefits in multiple dimensions should 
be a priority. 
 
Finally, this chapter explored some of the indicators which were suggested by respondents as 
missing from the set of indicators, as a means of testing the set and potentially providing 
useful insights for further development in future research. The additional indicators suggested 
by respondents reinforce the importance of policy stability, institutional effectiveness, and 
securing adequate investment. These aspects are difficult to measure and are impossible to 
assess for the Transition Pathways studied here; a range of plausible political and investment 
risks can be envisaged for all three pathways. Of all the additional topics which were suggested 
by the respondents, only “energy efficiency” and “air pollution” would really be possible to 
implement using available data, and ‘energy efficiency’ in particular is complex and contested.  
 
The next and final chapter concludes the thesis. The next chapter will reiterate the goals which 
this thesis set out to achieve, including a summing up of the methods used to achieve these 
goals. It will summarise the results from chapters 5, 6 and 7 in order to provide answers to the 
research questions posed, and will describe the contributions to knowledge that this thesis has 
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made. The next chapter will also present the main limitations of this thesis, as well as areas 
which could prove fruitful for further research. Finally, the following chapter aims to generate 
practical applications of this research by generating a set of policy recommendations arising 
from the knowledge created in this thesis. 
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8 Conclusions 
 
This final chapter presents the conclusions from the thesis as a whole, and describes the 
contributions to knowledge that this thesis has made. Section 8.1 reiterates the overarching 
aims of the thesis and the research questions, and briefly outlines the ways in which the 
research questions were answered. Section 8.2 then provides the answers to these research 
questions by summarising the results and discussion from the preceding three chapters. 
Section 8.3 describes the contributions to knowledge that this thesis has made. Section 8.4 
then discusses the uncertainties and limitations of the thesis, and outlines areas in which 
further research would be beneficial. Finally, section 8.5 gives policy recommendations arising 
from the results. 
 
8.1 Goals of the thesis, and how they were achieved 
 
The overarching aim of this thesis has been to assess the future security of the UK electricity 
system in a low-carbon context, in order to identify the main risks, trade-offs and synergies 
which may emerge between different objectives in a transition to a low-carbon electricity 
system. This thesis has carried out a systematic empirical assessment of the security of three 
low-carbon transition pathways for the UK electricity system, in order to answer three 
research questions: 
 
i.  “What indicators are appropriate for assessing the security of low-carbon transition 
pathways in the UK, and what are the results of such an assessment using a set of 
existing pathways?” 
 
ii. “What are the reactions of energy stakeholders to the proposed set of indicators, and 
what does this tell us about the diversity of perspectives in the UK energy 
community?” 
 
iii. “What impact do the stakeholders’ perspectives have on the results of the security 
assessment and on their preferred options for improving electricity security?” 
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The first research question was addressed in chapter 5. A four-dimensional analytical 
framework for assessing the security of low-carbon transition pathways for the electricity 
system was proposed from a review of the existing literature. In order to operationalise this 
framework, a set of 22 security indicators was developed and was applied to three low-carbon 
transition pathways for the UK electricity system. It was found that many indicator approaches 
suffer from problems caused by the aggregation of diverse and distinct indicators, and that a 
‘dashboard’ approach may be preferable because it allows for a manageable number of 
quantitative and qualitative indicators to be used without aggregation, and allows for trade-
offs between objectives to be identified. The framework and methodological approach has 
been designed to be applicable to any pathway for the electricity system of any jurisdiction, 
provided that the raw data is available; the set of indicators therein was designed specifically 
for the purposes of assessing the security of UK electricity systems, although many of the 
indicators would also be applicable in other national contexts. Herein lies an advantage of 
using a dashboard approach: it may be that some indicators are of limited utility in other 
countries, or that data for some is unavailable, and therefore it is useful to be able to choose 
the indicators best suited for the purpose. Detailed information regarding the applicability of 
specific indicators to non-UK contexts is given in section 4.4, and in the table in Appendix A. 
 
The second research question was addressed in chapter 6. The theoretical approach of the 
thesis, set out in chapter 2, suggests that several answers to a question may be ‘approximately 
right’, meaning that the perspectives of other stakeholders can therefore provide multiple 
lenses through which to view the results. Interviews were carried out with 25 experts from the 
UK energy sector, in order to elicit their opinions on the set of indicators and to explore the 
diversity of perspectives in the UK energy community. In this way, this thesis has put some 
concrete empirical material behind the claim that different people think differently about 
energy security. The qualitative data from the interviews was analysed using thematic coding 
analysis. 
 
The third research question was addressed in chapter 7. As mentioned above, the perspectives 
of multiple stakeholders provide a highly useful lens through which to view the results from 
the initial security analysis in chapter 5. Therefore the results from chapters 5 and 6 were 
brought together in the discussion in chapter 7: the interview results were applied to the 
results from the security analysis, in order to analyse the impact of stakeholders’ perspectives 
on the results. This chapter also explored in more detail some of the additional indicators 
suggested by respondents, assessing whether including these indicators would have been 
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possible or practical, and what impact these additional indicators might have had on the 
security assessment of the pathways.  
 
 
8.2 Overview of results 
 
The results from the security assessment of three transition pathways for the UK electricity 
system showed that the centralised Market Rules and Central Coordination pathways both 
experience deterioration in their overall security from 2030 to 2050, whereas the 
decentralised Thousand Flowers pathway experiences some heightened security risks in the 
medium-term ‘transition’ period. This suggests that maintaining a centralised electricity 
system trajectory could be less risky in the medium-term, but more risky in the longer-term. 
The results demonstrated that demand reduction can bring co-benefits in multiple security 
dimensions; this finding adds empirical weight to existing claims in the literature, discussed in 
section 2.3.2. However, in this analysis, demand reduction was assumed to be cost and risk 
free; this thesis has not explicitly investigated the costs and risks of demand reduction, 
therefore this finding would warrant further investigation in future research. 
 
It has also been suggested in the existing literature that increasing the penetration of RES will 
bring about co-benefits in multiple security dimensions (see section 2.3.2). The results from 
this analysis show that the picture is somewhat more complex, with synergies in some areas 
but trade-offs in others. Increasing penetration of RES was shown to increase the diversity of 
the fuel mix, and may also have a positive impact on general public approval. Moreover, 
increasing penetration of RES has a beneficial impact on fuel depletion risk, and the 
‘sustainability’ dimension was the area of lowest risk in general. However, high penetrations of 
RES were also shown to generate ‘red flags’ for the security of the three pathways in other 
dimensions. For example, it is often suggested that RES will improve security by reducing 
dependence on imports – not only has this thesis shown that reducing imports is not 
necessarily important for energy security, but it has also shown that reliance on imports may 
not necessarily decrease with the introduction of more RES (all three pathways displayed 
ongoing dependence on either imported fossil fuels or imported biomass). The results show 
that all three pathways exhibit a reduction in flexible, responsive supply capacity, which could 
reduce the ability of the system to cope with unexpected perturbations in the supply/demand 
balance. In particular, high penetrations of wind generation plus high penetrations of nuclear 
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would potentially compromise the resilience of the electricity system, as would high 
penetrations of intermittent generation plus high electricity demand. These risks could be 
mitigated somewhat by increasing flexibility on the demand-side, or by increased use of 
measures such as electricity storage and interconnection. The results from both the security 
assessment and the interviews suggest that flexibility of both supply and demand should be a 
greater security priority than reducing imports or even increasing diversity. Much of the 
literature focuses on improving security by minimising causes of insecurity, but this thesis has 
shown that this approach sometimes neglects the critical issue of improving the capability of 
the electricity system to respond to insecurity, for instance by improving flexibility.  
 
The results from both the initial security assessment and the results when viewed from the 
perspectives of multiple stakeholders suggest that the decentralised Thousand Flowers 
pathway is less risky than the centralised Market Rules and Central Coordination pathways, 
especially in the longer-term. Because of the impossibility of conclusively aggregating or 
weighting the indicators, it is not possible to state from this that the decentralised pathway is 
more secure; however, this finding is an interesting addition to the energy security literature 
and to policy discussions which have sometimes debated the potential security benefits of a 
decentralised electricity system for the UK but have not yet explored this issue in empirical 
detail. However, this thesis has also highlighted that there are many areas of uncertainty and 
potential security risk in a transition to a decentralised pathway, including the finding that the 
more ‘radical’ decentralised pathway may experience some aspects of heightened security risk 
in the medium-term.  This reinforces the conclusion from both the security assessment and the 
interview analysis, that certain ‘low regret’ options such as demand reduction which can 
generate benefits in multiple dimensions should be a priority. 
 
The results have highlighted areas which need more attention in the modelling of transition 
pathways in future. Firstly, the findings from the reliability dimension have demonstrated that 
it is necessary to include more than one measure of the ability of electricity supply to meet 
peak demand. This is because despite being modelled to meet demand on an hourly basis, two 
of the pathways experience a negative de-rated capacity margin in 2050, thus suggesting that 
some of the pathways assumptions may have been overly optimistic and that a separate 
measure of supply adequacy would be useful for minimising the risk of capacity shortfall at 
peak times. Secondly, the results from the interviews show that one of the most critical areas 
for security is incentivising adequate investment in infrastructure, and the importance of policy 
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stability in achieving this; this issue is usually not explicitly addressed in transition pathways, 
and is highly challenging to assess (discussed in more detail in section 8.4.2). 
 
This thesis has explored stakeholder perspectives on energy security, thereby contributing to 
the existing literature on defining and conceptualising ‘energy security’. This part of the 
research generated five cross-cutting themes which encapsulate the key issues which UK 
energy experts consider when deciding what is important for security and why, and also 
ascertained some of the underlying concepts which are used when making or justifying these 
choices. The interview analysis found that some interviewees focused upon what they 
perceived to be current risks to the system or areas in which policy has an obligation to act, 
leading to a preference for indicators such as public acceptability and fuel poverty; meanwhile 
others focused on indicators which are simple and direct or more easily quantifiable and 
usable, leading to a preference for indicators such as diversity and capacity margins. The 
results also demonstrated that the views of the experts interviewed were not necessarily 
aligned with the type of organisation for which they work (although it should be emphasised 
that statistical analysis of this hypothesis was not possible with the selection methods used, 
and this finding simply reflects the results of the qualitative analysis of the interview 
transcripts). The reason for this lack of alignment may be that all the stakeholders chosen for 
this study possess extensive experience and in-depth knowledge of energy issues, and 
therefore possess complex, nuanced and widely differing opinions, thus meaning that they are 
unlikely to be co-opted by the ‘party line’ of their various organisations. It could also be that 
movement between types of organisation could partly explain this result; in the energy field, it 
is not uncommon for experts to move between private, public and non-profit sectors. 
 
The application of the interview analysis to the results from the initial security assessment 
illustrated that there are big challenges for the development of a generalisable set of 
indicators for assessing the security of multiple potential electricity systems. These challenges 
are caused by three main factors: a lack of consensus regarding the inclusion of affordability 
and sustainability dimensions; a lack of consensus regarding the inclusion of ‘traditional’ 
indicators of energy security such as diversity and import dependence; and the importance of 
spatial and technological context on the choice of indicators. The thesis has shown that the 
security of an energy pathway or system is highly influenced by whether affordability and 
sustainability are viewed as integral to energy security: if affordability is not viewed as integral, 
all three pathways have fewer areas of high risk, whereas the opposite is true for 
sustainability. This is an important finding because it suggests that energy security assessments 
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should be explicit about which view of security they follow, and should acknowledge the 
impact that opposing views could have on the results. The process of applying the interview 
analysis to the results from the initial security assessment also strengthened the conclusion 
that all three pathways exhibit a reduction in flexible and responsive supply capacity, and 
reiterated the importance of demand reduction and demand flexibility.  
 
 
8.3 Contributions to knowledge 
 
This thesis assesses the future security of the UK electricity system in a low-carbon context, in 
order to identify the main risks, trade-offs and synergies which may emerge between different 
objectives in a transition to a low-carbon electricity system. This thesis therefore makes a 
methodological contribution to knowledge by proposing and testing a set of indicators to 
measure the security of electricity systems in long-term scenarios of national energy 
transitions. To do this, this thesis has developed existing frameworks from the energy security 
literature, as follows: firstly, a set of four energy security ‘dimensions’ has been proposed as 
being suitable for assessing the security of low-carbon electricity systems (acceptability, 
affordability, sustainability, and reliability): these four dimensions were first proposed by 
Elkind (2010), and have been applied here in a novel way to a set of pathways for a low-carbon 
transition. Secondly, a set of indicators has been proposed as being suitable for assessing a 
broad range of different aspects of energy security; this builds on existing assessment 
frameworks such as that developed by Jewell et al (2013; 2014), but with particular focus on 
assessing the security of national electricity pathways. The set of indicators is tested by using 
them to assess the security of three pre-existing low-carbon transition pathways for the UK 
electricity system.  
 
This thesis operationalises the idea of a ‘dashboard’ of indicators, utilising a manageable 
number of quantitative and qualitative indicators without aggregation in order to identify 
trade-offs. It is the first time that such a comprehensive security dashboard has been used to 
assess a set of future electricity system scenarios. In doing so, this thesis takes an 
interdisciplinary approach which explicitly recognises the importance of actors and policies as 
well as technologies, systems and markets. A further novel aspect of the indicator dashboard is 
that it includes both reliability and cost parameters alongside other important aspects of 
energy security such as diversity, trade and acceptability; this thesis thereby extends the 
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empirical work of existing frameworks to explore the potential implications of a low-carbon 
transition on electricity system reliability and costs, and the potential trade-offs between 
objectives.  
 
This thesis makes a further empirical contribution by identifying the diversity of perspectives 
on energy security amongst UK energy stakeholders; this is a novel contribution to the energy 
security literature, which contains few empirical studies on experts’ perspectives on energy 
security, and no previously-existing work of this kind in the UK context. The results from the 
interviews showed that there is a need to accept the existence of multiple perspectives and to 
at least attempt to take them into account when discussing energy security; for example, 
energy security assessments should be explicit about whether to include affordability and 
sustainability indicators, and should acknowledge the impact that opposing perspectives could 
have on the results. In keeping with this recommendation, this thesis has analysed the impacts 
of the experts’ perspectives on the results of the security assessment; this is the first study of 
this kind to actively incorporate multiple perspectives on energy security into an indicator 
assessment. The results from this process have shown that all three analysed pathways 
experience security risk through maximising certain aspects of environmental sustainability 
whilst neglecting important reliability issues such as flexibility and shock resilience.  
 
 
8.4 Limitations and areas for further research 
8.4.1 Data gaps that the research has identified 
As shown in chapter 5, there are considerable uncertainties in some of the projections of UK 
electricity security through to 2050, several of which arise from limitations in data availability. 
One highly useful outcome of this uncertainty is in highlighting areas in which further research 
could be beneficial in order to improve the robustness of the assessment. In particular, the 
analysis has illustrated several areas in which increased availability of information in transition 
pathways or scenarios would make it more feasible to conduct a full analysis of their security. 
To some extent, this could be achieved by increasing the scope of model inputs (or outputs); 
however, some aspects might be highly challenging to model, and therefore may be more 
suitable for alternative quantitative or qualitative approaches. This sub-section briefly 
identifies some of the key areas in which increased data availability would be beneficial: 
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 Patterns of electricity demand: In addition to data on the volume of electricity 
consumption, it would be useful to have more detailed information on the way in 
which consumers use electricity in the pathways in the future. This could include 
information on changes in consumer behaviour, ‘smart’ appliances, and rebound 
effects. 
 Spatial data: It is highly challenging to make an assessment of security without 
locational detail regarding generation sites, networks and import terminals. Improved 
spatial data, including network maps and locations of major generation sites, would 
increase the robustness of estimates for multiple security indicators.  
 Imports: The uncertainties in the assessment of future supply diversity and stability 
are enormous. Transition pathways would benefit from the inclusion of data on major 
exporting nations (and the likely resource availability in these nations), and the routes 
taken by major fuels and materials in transit.  For gas, it is also vital to have 
information on proportions of piped gas and LNG, and the locations of import 
terminals. 
 Biomass: Biomass is becoming an increasingly important fuel input, and its importance 
may increase in a low-carbon context as biomass is both renewable and flexible. It is 
extremely difficult to assess the future security of biomass generation without detailed 
information on types of feedstock (e.g. wood, residues, waste etc.), types of process 
(e.g. co-firing, anaerobic digestion etc.), major exporting nations, and import transit 
routes.  
 Fuel stockpiles: To some extent, fuel security depends on the amount of storage 
available, therefore security assessments would benefit from data showing the 
proportion of fuel inputs which are sourced from domestic stockpiles.  
 Income data: Data on people’s incomes is needed to assess the future impact of 
electricity prices on levels of fuel poverty; disaggregated income data would assist in 
the identification of vulnerable groups. It would also be useful to have locational 
income data in order to identify the potential impact of electricity price increases on 
deprived areas. This could be especially useful for assessing in more detail the impact 
of a decentralised pathway on fuel poverty and inequality, because concerns have 
been raised that rapid decentralisation could result in fragmentation whereby 
deprived areas fail to reap the benefits. 
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8.4.2 Limitations and areas for further research 
At the core of most of the biggest uncertainties in the analysis lies the fact that there are 
enormous challenges in attempting to actually assess empirically how people might act in the 
future. This is probably one of the reasons why many existing energy security assessments 
focus on a small number of quantifiable metrics such as diversity and import dependence; 
however, this thesis has shown that such an approach is not sufficient. Connected to this issue, 
uncertainties arise from the lack of ability to assess whether enough investment will be 
available to build the infrastructure required for a low-carbon transition: the results from both 
the security assessment and the interviews highlighted the fact that a major risk could be the 
political and economic feasibility of actually realising ambitious transition pathways, rather 
than the (technical) security of the pathways themselves. In order to address these issues in 
future research, there is a real need for ongoing work into maintaining a broader approach to 
assessing energy security, and focusing on actors and policies as well as technologies, whilst 
simultaneously working to find ways of reducing some of the inherent uncertainties.  
 
The choice of transition pathways for any kind of assessment is always subject to multiple 
limitations. The justification for the choice of pathways was described in detail in section 4.2; 
however, the choice of pathways also created some limitations of the research, which are as 
follows: 
 Unlike some other pathways options, the Transition Pathways do not include a BAU. 
Later reflections on the research suggested that comparing a BAU or high-carbon 
pathway would have been highly beneficial, because it would allow better 
identification of trade-offs between low-carbon objectives and the other indicators. 
However, creating and comparing a BAU or high-carbon pathway was outside the 
scope of this thesis, and would therefore potentially be an interesting area for further 
research. 
 The pathways focus on the electricity system only, although heating and transport are 
included in their modelling. The thesis as a whole also focused on the electricity 
system, as a necessary means of bounding the study. Limiting the energy system to 
one carrier such as electricity is challenging and fraught with complications, and a 
whole-systems analysis would be desirable. 
 The raw data used for the Transition Pathways, which begin from a baseline of 2008, is 
now completely out of date. Since 2008 there have been enormous changes to the 
energy system, including an oil price crash, significant advances in some technologies 
such as solar and storage, and severe setbacks to the UK’s nuclear and CCS ambitions. 
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This illustrates the challenges of conducting research over long timeframes in a fast-
moving field such as energy. 
 
It is worth briefly mentioning the ‘oversupply/capacity factors’ indicator, which was found to 
be of somewhat limited utility in the analysis. This indicator was initially included on the basis 
that a key issue for the pathways could be the high amounts of spare capacity required to back 
up the high penetrations of intermittent RES in the pathways, potentially leading to 
investment risk. However, high amounts of spare capacity do not necessarily translate into 
high investment risk; investment risk is complex and difficult to assess (as discussed in section 
7.3.1.2), and cannot therefore be easily reduced down into an indicator such as this one. It is 
therefore worth critically reflecting on the utility of this indicator for future energy security 
assessments. 
 
Finally, it is worth highlighting a rather specific limitation of the interviews conducted as part 
of this thesis. Stakeholders were interviewed using a pre-defined set of indicators, in an 
attempt to tease out perspectives on energy security from concrete underpinnings; however, 
this leaves the responses vulnerable to framing effects whereby some of the pre-defined 
indicators may have sparked interest from the respondents which would not have been 
apparent if the questions had been framed in a more open-ended manner. Therefore it could 
be beneficial for further research to elicit stakeholder opinions using more open-ended 
questions, for instance by asking similar sets of stakeholders to define ‘energy security’ in their 
own words, and triangulating this with the responses regarding specific indicators.  
 
 
8.5 Policy recommendations 
 
Policy decisions are frequently justified on the basis of ‘improving energy security and reducing 
carbon emissions’, without detailed empirical assessment of whether the measures proposed 
will actually improve energy security in the context of a low-carbon transition. Therefore the 
findings in this thesis are highly policy relevant. 
 
The UK Energy Security Strategy (DECC 2012a; see section 2.1.1) defines energy security 
primarily as access to energy supplies and avoidance of price volatility. As shown in section 
1.2.3, current UK policies for ensuring electricity security are focused on centralised supply-
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side measures (for instance, incentives for large power stations) and are also keen to maximise 
indigenous fuel resources (for instance, by supporting shale gas exploration and North Sea fuel 
recovery). It is interesting to note that current UK energy security policy, with its focus on 
increasing generation capacity and reducing imports, may potentially be failing to capitalise on 
some of the key measures which this thesis has highlighted as beneficial for future electricity 
security. In particular, the results from the interviews showed that flexibility of supply and 
demand and public acceptability are felt by stakeholders to be important in improving energy 
security, whereas reducing reliance on imports is not. Therefore it could be argued that by 
focusing on a narrower concept of energy security which does not incorporate broader issues 
such as societal and environmental concerns, important risks and measures to mitigate those 
risks may be being underplayed. 
  
This thesis has found that policies to improve electricity security should focus on measures 
which can improve the capability of the electricity system to respond to insecurity, in order to 
redress the imbalance which currently exists in which energy security is usually conceptualised 
as referring to measures which are thought to reduce causes of insecurity. For example, an 
emphasis on flexibility and responsiveness of both supply and demand is imperative, especially 
in the context of a low-carbon transition because of the increasing penetration of intermittent 
generation such as wind and solar and inflexible generation such as nuclear. This thesis has 
shown that high penetrations of wind generation plus high penetrations of nuclear would 
potentially compromise the resilience of the electricity system, as would high penetrations of 
intermittent generation plus high electricity demand; policy could mitigate these by 
maximising flexibility on the demand-side, or by increased use of measures such as electricity 
storage and interconnection.  
 
The results show that reducing overall energy demand and increasing flexibility on the 
demand-side may be highly beneficial in terms of generating benefits in multiple dimensions. 
However, it should be emphasised that in this analysis, demand reduction was assumed to be 
cost and risk free, which may not be the case in reality. Moreover, there are concerns over 
how much demand flexibility can be realised, especially from the residential sector; 
government therefore needs to work to improve the evidence base in order to provide better 
estimates of how much flexibility is realistic from the residential and commercial sectors, and it 
needs to work to ensure that this important resource for security is realised as fully as 
possible. Current UK energy policy displays a very prevalent focus on supply-side measures 
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such as support for large new power stations; the results from this thesis suggest that 
important opportunities on the demand-side may be being missed. 
 
The results from this thesis suggest that biomass can provide a valuable source of flexible yet 
renewable electricity supply; however, there are multiple concerns over the sustainability and 
future availability of biomass feedstocks, and high uncertainty regarding sources and trade 
flows, meaning that maximising more sustainable resources such as energy-from-waste could 
be highly valuable for security. Closing down gaps in knowledge regarding the security of 
biomass feedstock may require more than just research; real-world experience of emerging 
supply chains for large-scale biomass power generation (e.g. the large conversion project at 
Drax) could also be highly useful. 
 
Finally, this thesis has reinforced the point that realising any transition pathway will be 
dependent on ensuring sufficient investment in infrastructure, and has shown that whichever 
route to transition is taken there may be security problems caused by high levels of 
uncertainty regarding capital flows and investment. This is often an ‘elephant in the room’ 
when transition pathways are discussed; a number of transition pathways take a fairly 
technocratic approach which assumes that the investment is ‘waiting out there’ somewhere. 
This thesis argues that in order to incentivise the investment needed to realise a secure, low-
carbon electricity system, there is an urgent requirement for policy stability and to reduce 
policy uncertainty. This requires long-term planning and continuity of policies, often on longer 
timescales than the 5-year election cycle.  
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Appendix A: Indicators ‘long list’ 
This appendix details the process for long-listing and short-listing potential indicators of the 
security of electricity system transition pathways. 
 
Initially, indicators were identified from the list provided in Sovacool and Mukherjee (2011: 
5347-5352). These were then narrowed down considerably by removing duplicates of 
indicators which are highly similar (for example, their article lists ‘reserve-to-production’ for 
each fuel individually). Potential indicators were then assessed for their suitability for the 
purposes of this thesis, following the advice of Axon et al (2013) that indicator sets should be 
derived ‘for a set purpose’, and following as much as possible the guidelines set out in the 
‘methodology’ chapter (section 4.3). Indicators were rejected for a number of reasons: 
a. They do not show a clear link to a plausible risk or vulnerability29 to the electricity 
system 
b. They are not relevant to the UK, or they are more suited to multiple-country 
comparative studies30 
c. They cannot be used to assess multiple pathways or scenarios 
d. Immediately apparent problems with accessing the data or information required for 
the indicator 
e. Complex or aggregated indicators, or indicators which require dedicated modelling, 
were judged to be outside of the scope of this thesis. 
 
The ‘suitability’ of each indicator was graded on a simple low/medium/high scale; table A.0.1 
shows the notes from this initial selection process. Following this, the final set of indicators 
was selected using the methodology explained in section 4.3.  
 
 
 
                                                          
29 Jewell et al (2014) define ‘vulnerability’ as a combination of exposure to risk, and resilience (i.e. the 
capacity of the system to respond). 
30 Indicators in the ‘long list’ are not necessarily specific to the UK. The indicators chosen to assess the 
pathways are chosen on the basis of being relevant for assessing the security of UK electricity systems, 
as per the explicit purposes of this thesis; however, many of these could potentially be applicable to 
other countries, and are indicated as such in the table. 
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Table A-0-1: Initial long-list of potential indicators for assessing the security of electricity system 
transition pathways 
Dimension Indicator Relevant risk / 
vulnerability 
Suitability
31  
Non-
UK32 
Notes 
Availability Supply/demand 
index 
Supply does not 
meet demand 
Medium Yes Complex composite index; 
out of scope 
Availability Import 
dependence 
Supplies disrupted 
due to problems with 
imports 
High Yes  
Availability Diversity of fuels / 
suppliers / routes 
Alternative options 
not available in event 
of disruption 
High Yes  
Availability Stability / 
corruption of 
exporting 
countries / 
historical 
relationship 
Supply disruption 
due to instability in 
supplier country 
High Yes  
Availability Popularity Public opposition / 
disruption to new 
infrastructure 
High Yes  
Reliability Willingness-to-
pay 
? Medium Yes Data availability problems: 
challenging to measure or 
forecast 
Availability REES index 
(designed to 
quantify risk 
arising from 
geopolitical 
threats) 
Disruption to imports Medium Yes Complex composite index; 
out of scope 
Availability Reserve-to-
production ratios 
Fossil fuel depletion Low Variable Only relevant for fossil fuels; 
less applicable to electricity 
systems, especially when 
integrating RES 
Availability / 
reliability 
Electricity 
demand / peak 
electricity 
demand 
? Medium Yes Unclear link to 
risk/vulnerability: doesn’t 
tell you about the ability to 
meet that peak or that 
demand 
Affordability Price of imports Economic risk: cost of 
fuel too expensive, or 
disruption to imports 
Medium Yes Data availability problems 
Reliability Installed 
electricity 
? Medium Yes Unclear link to 
risk/vulnerability; doesn’t 
                                                          
31 Suitability key: “Low” = not relevant (for example, the indicator doesn’t relate to electricity or doesn’t relate to 
the UK). “Medium” = could be a useful indicator but possible problems with data availability or is out of scope. 
“High” = potentially useful indicator. 
 
32 The ‘non-UK’ column signifies the potential applicability of the indictor to countries other than the UK.  
“Yes” = applicable to other countries outside of the UK, particularly other industrialised countries. “Limited” = 
limited applicability; indicator may only be relevant for the UK context, or may only be relevant for a small selection 
of other countries, or not relevant for industrialised countries. “Variable” = applicability of indicator varies; may be 
applicable to a large number of other country contexts but this could be highly dependent on the country.  
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generation 
capacity 
tell us about the ability of 
supply to meet demand 
Availability Refining capacity Not enough domestic 
oil refining capacity? 
Dependence on oil? 
Low Limited / 
variable 
Relates to oil supply 
therefore less relevant for 
electricity security 
Availability Percent served by 
microgeneration / 
CHP / alternative 
transport fuels 
 ? Low Variable Unclear link to 
risk/vulnerability: doesn’t 
tell us about the security of 
these options 
Affordability Balance of 
payments 
(imports) 
Economic risk Low Yes Challenging to measure and 
forecast 
Reliability Interconnection Lack of options for 
system balancing  
High Variable  
Reliability / 
sustainability 
Share of nuclear 
energy 
? Low Variable Is nuclear more or less 
secure? Unclear link to 
risk/vulnerability 
Sustainability Share of non-
carbon energy 
sources 
? Low Variable Are non-carbon energy 
sources more or less 
secure? Unclear link to 
risk/vulnerability 
Reliability Flexible demand Lack of options for 
system balancing  
High Yes  
Affordability End-use energy 
prices (by fuel?) 
Energy becomes 
unaffordable / 
economic risk 
High Yes Needs to be a whole-system 
assessment 
Affordability Price volatility Economic risk Medium Yes Data availability problems: 
challenging to forecast 
Affordability Price of 
macroeconomic 
shocks caused by 
volatility 
Economic risk Medium Yes Extremely challenging to 
forecast 
Reliability Customer 
minutes lost 
Supply not meeting 
demand; loss of 
welfare 
Medium Yes Important but challenging to 
forecast 
Reliability Short-term 
balancing services 
(FR, STOR etc.) 
Lack of options for 
system balancing 
High Yes  
Reliability % / rate of 
households with 
grid connection 
Energy access 
vulnerability 
Low Limited Not relevant for highly 
industrialised nations 
Sustainability Reliance on 
biomass for 
cooking 
Energy access 
vulnerability 
Low Limited Not relevant for highly 
industrialised nations 
Affordability Household 
expenditure on 
energy 
Households unable 
to afford electricity 
supply; fuel poverty 
High Yes  
Sustainability Ownership levels 
of various specific 
appliances 
? Low Limited Less relevant for highly 
industrialised nations; not 
relevant for low-carbon 
context 
Reliability Level of 
decentralisation 
? Low Variable Unclear link to 
risk/vulnerability: is 
decentralisation good or 
bad for security? 
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Affordability Market prices for 
fuels 
Economic risk Medium Yes More useful as system-wide 
costs than for individual 
fuels 
Affordability Transmission and 
distribution costs 
Economic risk High Yes Also could be used as a 
proxy for network adequacy 
/ amount of network 
upgrades required? 
Affordability Energy prices Economic risk; 
households unable to 
afford supply 
High Yes  
? Innovation and 
research 
Lack of development 
of more secure / 
efficient / clean / 
affordable energy 
options 
Medium Yes Limited data availability 
Availability Number of 
terrorist attacks 
Deliberate attack on 
electricity 
infrastructure 
Medium Yes Lack of data availability to 
forecast; might be worth 
discussing as a side-note 
Reliability SAIDI / SAIFI / 
CAIDI (measures 
of system 
reliability) 
System not reliable 
enough; electricity 
shortfalls 
Medium Yes Complex aggregated indices; 
possibly out of scope 
Reliability VoLL (damage of 
an electricity 
shortfall per unit 
of lost load) 
? Medium Yes Huge uncertainty even in 
present-day calculations; 
link to specific 
risk/vulnerability is 
somewhat unclear 
Reliability Capacity margins Lack of spare margin 
to ensure supply can 
meet demand 
High Yes  
Reliability LOLE / generation 
adequacy 
Lack of generation 
capacity to ensure 
that supply meets 
demand 
High Yes  
Reliability Spare capacity / 
oversupply 
Risks making 
investments in 
infrastructure 
economically 
unattractive 
Medium Variable Can inform information 
about attractiveness of 
investment? 
Sustainability Energy intensity Inefficiency (see 
below) 
Medium Yes GDP data not available in 
the pathways; also see 
‘efficiency’ notes below  
Sustainability Energy efficiency ? Medium Yes Unclear link to 
risk/vulnerability: is an 
efficient system more or 
less secure? 
Availability / 
reliability 
Storage / 
stockpiles of fuels 
Lack of spare fuel 
supply in case of a 
disruption 
Medium Variable Less relevant in a system 
with lots of non-fuel-based 
supply (e.g. RES). Possibly 
worth mentioning in 
relation to availability 
indicators 
Reliability Electricity storage Lack of options for 
system balancing 
High Variable  
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Sustainability Average thermal 
efficiency of 
power plants 
Possible economic / 
fuel depletion risk? 
Medium Variable Only relevant for 
conventional generation; 
less relevant for low-carbon 
system 
Sustainability Fuel economy of 
vehicles 
Possible economic / 
fuel depletion risk? 
Low Yes Not electricity 
Reliability Transmission and 
distribution losses 
Network is 
inefficient; more 
network 
infrastructure 
needed to meet 
demand 
Medium Yes Low data availability 
Reliability Investment in 
transmission / 
distribution 
Faults on the 
network due to lack 
of investment 
Low Yes Repetition of transmission / 
distribution costs 
Reliability Planned new 
energy projects 
? Medium Yes Low data availability; 
unclear link to risk 
? Employment in 
the energy sector 
Low employment 
leads to lower levels 
of public support 
Medium Yes Low data availability 
Affordability Investment in 
energy 
infrastructure 
Lack of investment 
leads to lack of 
capacity or faults on 
ageing capacity 
Medium Yes Comes in under affordability 
indicators? Possible 
problems with data 
availability 
Sustainability Deforestation Deforestation leads 
to flooding which 
puts energy systems 
at risk 
Low Limited Less relevant for the UK 
? Research 
intensity 
Lack of development 
of more secure / 
efficient / clean / 
affordable energy 
options 
Medium Yes Low data availability 
? Equity of access 
to Grid 
Energy access 
vulnerabilities 
Low Limited Low data availability; less 
relevant for the UK 
Sustainability Greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Climate change 
impacts on energy 
infrastructure 
High Yes  
Sustainability Carbon intensity Climate change 
impacts on energy 
infrastructure 
High Yes  
Sustainability Air pollution ? Medium Yes Unclear link to risks to 
energy systems 
Sustainability Waste produced 
from electricity 
generation 
? Medium Yes Challenging to forecast with 
available data; unclear link 
to risks to energy systems 
Sustainability Oil spills ? Low Variable Less relevant for electricity 
? Number of 
regulators 
System is poorly 
regulated and 
managed 
Low Yes More suitable for multiple-
country comparative studies 
? Corruption / 
transparency 
index 
System is poorly 
regulated and 
managed 
Low Yes More suitable for multiple-
country comparative studies 
Availability Satisfaction with 
policy and 
Public opposition to 
infrastructure or 
investments 
High Yes  
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planning 
mechanisms 
Availability Participation in 
decisions 
Public opposition to 
infrastructure or 
investments 
High Yes  
? Country credit 
ranking 
Inability to access 
affordable credit for 
new infrastructure 
Low Yes More suitable for multiple-
country comparative studies 
Availability Trade (number of 
pipelines / import 
routes / 
interconnectors) 
Supplies disrupted 
due to lack of import 
diversity 
Low Variable Repetition of import 
stability/diversity and 
interconnection indicators 
? Foreign Direct 
Investment in the 
energy sector 
? Medium Yes Low data availability. Is 
foreign involvement good 
for security? 
? Competition / 
market share 
Lack of diversity in 
the energy market = 
lack of alternative 
options in the event 
of a problem? 
Medium Yes Low data availability 
Affordability Total amount of 
subsidies 
? Low Limited Are subsidies good or bad 
for security? This indicator is 
more relevant for 
developing country contexts 
Availability Public resistance / 
disruptive 
opposition 
Disruption to 
operational or 
planned 
infrastructure 
High Yes  
? Energy literacy Low energy literacy = 
higher opposition to 
a transition? 
Low Yes Low data availability; link to 
risk/vulnerability somewhat 
unclear 
Availability Number of 
customers served 
by net metering 
Low levels of 
participation and 
energy literacy? 
Medium Variable Low data availability; link to 
risk/vulnerability somewhat 
unclear 
Availability Industrial 
disputes 
Disruption to 
infrastructure or 
supplies 
Medium Yes Low data availability 
Availability Deliberate attack Disruptive attack on 
electricity system 
infrastructure 
Low Yes Repetition of ‘terrorism’ and 
‘public resistance’ 
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Appendix B: Availability Methods 
B.1 Likelihood of domestic disruption to electricity availability: 
Methods 
B.1.1 Public approval ratings 
As pointed out by Pidgeon and Demski, there is often a sense that achieving a transition to a 
low-carbon energy system will be a purely technical and economic process; “a key assumption 
is that new technologies, fostered though appropriate market instruments, will lead to the 
necessary reductions in emissions” (2012: 42). The article goes on to point out that this is a 
great oversimplification of the issue. In reality, the constraints upon system transitions are 
often related to socio-political issues, such as the acceptability of various options and 
pathways. This indicator therefore takes public levels of approval of various forms of energy 
generation as one possible indicator of acceptability in general, and therefore as a constituent 
indicator of levels of risk incurred due to opposition from the general public. This sub-
dimension of the security assessment views the mitigation of domestic disruption to supplies 
as potentially a three-way strategy – improving overall support, increasing participation, and 
reducing opposition to specific aspects of the energy system or specific new additions. As such, 
this ‘public approval’ indicator should be viewed in parallel with the other two indicators from 
this sub-dimension. 
 
The core data for this indicator is provided by a nationally representative survey, which was 
carried out by Demski et al in 2013 (n=2441). The data from this survey is supported by 
literature review of academic and grey literature into public opinions on various forms of 
energy, carried out by Whitmarsh et al (2011). The data regarding survey responses is given in 
terms of support (“very / mainly favourable”), opposition (“very / mainly unfavourable”) and 
neither in support or opposition (“neither favourable nor unfavourable”). Full methodology for 
the survey is available in Demski et al (2013). 
 
The proportion of capacity of each type of fuel in the pathways (in GW) is weighted according 
to a ‘support’ parameter. The support parameter is given as a proportion (taken from the 
percentage results reported in the survey). Those in support are given a positive parameter, 
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whereas those in opposition are given a negative parameter. This is then multiplied by the 
capacity of each generation technology in the pathways, for 2010, 2030 and 2050, for both 
support and opposition. The minus figures given to the ‘opposition’ parameters mean that for 
some fuel types, the end figure is a minus number. The results are then summed to give the 
total level of support for generation for the pathway (in GW). The total level of support is then 
divided by the total amount of generation in the pathway (in GW) to give a percentage of total 
capacity in the pathway which is ‘approved of’.  
 
B.1.2 Land requirements (proxy for disruptive opposition) 
In addition to the public approval scores from the national survey, it is important to note that 
high levels of general public acceptance don’t always translate into public support for specific 
projects (Devine-Wright 2005). In some cases, a lack of support for a project can result in 
highly disruptive opposition and even the cancellation of planned infrastructure. According to 
Bell et al (2005), in the UK around 80% of people claim to support onshore wind power, but 
only 25% of contracted wind power is actually commissioned; meanwhile Pidgeon and Demski 
(2012) suggest that much of the local opposition which arose in response to nuclear power in 
the 1970s may well be resurrected with the advent of large-scale onshore renewable 
installations, suggesting that many of the concerns are similar regardless of the technology in 
question. Therefore this indicator comprises 3 sub-metrics which measure the amount of land 
required by new infrastructure; these are used as proxies for likely levels of disruptive 
opposition: the amount of new generating infrastructure required, the amount of new 
transmission infrastructure required, and the amount of domestic extraction of resources. 
  
Generation infrastructure 
People are far more likely to protest against new installations, and communities which live 
close to older or existing sites are shown to be more supportive than national polls report 
(Greenberg and Truelove 2011). Therefore the amount of land required by new generation 
capacity in the pathways can act as one proxy for opposition to generation infrastructure. 
 
The capacity at one point in time (e.g. 2030) is subtracted from the capacity at another point in 
time (e.g. 2050). It is then important to calculate the amount of land actually required to build 
this additional capacity; therefore the power output per area of each generation type is 
calculated using data from existing power stations (for coal, gas, oil, biomass and CHP) and 
from MacKay 2009 (for renewables). The power output per area is calculated in W/m2; this is 
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then used to calculate the total land area which would be required to build the additional 
capacity required by the pathways. Finally, the results are weighted 70-30 to reflect the 
difference between onshore and offshore capacity, as offshore will usually be subject to lower 
levels of opposition because of reduced local impacts such as noise and environmental 
degradation, and a lower visual impact (Centre for Sustainable Energy 2011; Gardiner 2012). 
 
It is important to note that this capacity measure is less a function of overall capacity (which is 
driven by levels of demand and the incorporation of intermittent RES) as it is a function of the 
level of change required from the current system. Larger changes will require more new 
capacity to be built as older or existing capacity is scaled back; as such, this indicator also 
provides a useful measure of the overall level of change from the current system. 
 
Biomass assumptions 
It should be noted that biomass is given a power output per unit of just 0.5W/m2 by David 
Mackay. However, this also includes the land required for growing the crops; this introduces 
some complexity, because much of the biomass required in the pathways will be imported (see 
section 5.2.2.1). Moreover, domestic production of biomass feedstock is covered in the 
‘extraction of resources’ indicator below. Therefore the biomass output figures are 
taken simply using the power station itself (along with any stores onsite), using data 
from existing power stations in the same manner as for coal and gas. 
 
Changing efficiencies over time 
Assumptions must be made about the pace of technological advancement. In the future, 
improvements in technologies will potentially mean that less land is required to generate the 
same amount of power. Addressing this uncertainty would require detailed projections of 
learning rates over the next 40 years, which is outside the scope of this project. However, for 
the purposes of this analysis, this uncertainty is not a major drawback for comparisons of the 
pathways, because the difference in output per m2 between RES and thermal plant is so huge 
that thermal generation doesn’t really factor into the overall results, and all three pathways 
are actually relatively similar in terms of dependence on thermal plant.  
Transmission infrastructure 
People often protest against new transmission lines, especially when they feel that their 
community is receiving all the disruption of upgrades but none of the benefits (Cohen et al 
2014; Pidgeon and Demski 2012). Therefore the level of transmission upgrades required is an 
292 
 
292 
 
aspect of risk from disruptive opposition. The cost of required transmission upgrades 
(identified as part of the ‘affordability’ indicator) is used as a proxy for total capacity required. 
Because offshore transmission is seldom subject to protests, the only figure for transmission 
will be the onshore transmission costs. 
 
Extraction of resources 
Another common cause of disruption is the domestic extraction of fuel resources, as illustrated 
by the recent delays and disruption caused by opposition to fracking for shale gas in the UK. 
Levels of domestic extraction of resources are identified in the ‘import dependence’ indicator 
(in TWh/y). Higher levels of domestic extraction (of coal, gas and biomass) are judged to be 
more insecure. For uranium, the import dependence indicator identifies a proportion of UK 
reserves as ‘domestic’; however, these are from stockpiles rather than domestic extraction, 
and therefore are not considered here. 
 
Biomass assumptions 
Assumptions must be made about the importance of biomass in this indicator. Some forms of 
biomass are more subject to opposition than others – for instance, corn ethanol has been the 
subject of many environmental protests, and biomethane from waste (e.g. Anaerobic 
Digestion (AD) plants) are often opposed by local residents. On the other hand, biomass 
residues from forestry and agriculture are seldom unpopular. To avoid confusion, domestic 
biomass will be given equal weighting as for gas and coal; this introduces some uncertainty to 
the calculations, but this is mitigated somewhat by the low levels of domestic production of 
biomass projected in the pathways. 
 
B.1.3 Public participation 
People tend to protest less if they feel empowered in the decisions being made. Bell et al 
(2005) point out that a democratic deficit in the planning of generation sites could be to blame 
for much so-called NIMBYism. Therefore engagement with the public is crucial. As such, 
pathways which incorporate higher levels of public participation in energy provision will be 
assumed to militate against some of the acceptability issues outlined above.  
 
This indicator is carried out using a qualitative assessment of the pathway ‘storylines’, using 
the narrative information provided in Foxon (2013). Interestingly, people currently perceive 
the government as having the core responsibility for undertaking the transition to a low-
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carbon energy system (Butler et al 2013). There are very low levels of trust in energy 
companies, and people don’t perceive that the private sector is capable of delivering transition 
aims in an equitable or effective manner. Therefore market-led solutions rank the lowest in 
terms of public participation. 
 
B.2 Likelihood of Non-domestic disruption to Electricity Availability: 
Methods 
 
External disruption to fuel supplies can occur from a wide variety of sources, including natural 
events such as storms and tsunamis, terrorism, political instability, theft, and civil unrest, 
blockades or strikes in the exporting country. In order to accurately gauge the likelihood of 
external disruption in the exporting country, an unfeasible amount of knowledge about the 
future development of both exporting nations and regional and global supply chains would be 
required, along with considerable levels of disaggregation regarding the sources of the fuels 
and their supply routes. Even equipped with this level of knowledge, as pointed out by Stirling, 
an empirical risk-based assessment would only succeed in capturing the likelihood of events 
about which we have a good understanding of both the probability and impacts (Stirling 
2008b; 2010). The potential sources of external unrest listed above do not fall into this 
category. 
 
Nonetheless, there are proxies which are often used to show risk from external disruption. The 
‘external disruption’ indicators consist of three core elements: 
 Diversity  
 Diversity and Stability of exporting nations 
 Level of import dependence 
 
B.2.1 Diversity of fuel types 
Diversity can act as a hedge against multiple unpredictable and unknowable risks, and is 
therefore useful as a proxy by which to measure the risk of non-domestic disruption. The 
diversity of fuel sources in the pathways is calculated using the Shannon-Wiener diversity 
index (H’) for 2010, 2030 and 2050:  
 
, where pi is the proportion of fuel sources in the overall mix i.  
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Since by definition the proportions will all be between zero and one, the natural log makes all 
of the terms of the summation negative, which is why we take the inverse of the sum.   
 
The Shannon index increases as both the richness and the evenness of the fuel mix increases. 
In a mix with just one fuel, H’ will be 0, because Pi would equal 1 and be multiplied by ln Pi 
which would equal 0. It is important to note that absolute values for H’ are insufficient on their 
own, and that the index is best when used for comparison.  
 
Generation capacity (in GW) for each fuel is converted into proportions of the total generation 
mix. Calculations are then run for each proportion of the formula Pi*(Ln(Pi)) 
The inverse sum of the row is then calculated to give the Shannon Wiener Diversity Index 
result. 
 
Assumptions 
One of the main challenges with the calculation of a diversity index lies in the subjective 
choices which must be made regarding aggregation. In this instance, each fuel type is grouped 
together; so for example, ‘coal’, ‘coal CCS’ and ‘coal CHP’ are all simply shown as ‘coal’. 
Renewables are disaggregated according to type, although the two types of wind energy 
(onshore and offshore) are grouped together.33 The choices made here will substantially 
impact upon the diversity index; therefore the greatest value in a diversity index is in making 
comparisons between pathways using the same index. 
 
B.2.2 Diversity and stability of fuel imports 
B.2.2.1 Import diversity 
For import diversity in 2010, the origins of existing imports of major fuels (gas, coal, uranium, 
biomass and electricity imports) are researched using publicly available data (see below). 
These are then used to create the diversity measure for 2010, for each of these fuels, in order 
to illustrate those which currently experience higher diversity (and therefore higher security of 
                                                          
33 It is important to note that proponents of wind energy could argue that offshore and onshore should be grouped 
separately, as they make use of a spatially disaggregated resource; this is a point for discussion, but they have been 
grouped together here for simplicity. 
295 
 
295 
 
supply). The import diversity calculation uses the Shannon-Wiener diversity index outlined 
above. 
 
Diversity data sources 
 
Coal: 
Data from DECC (2013g). It should be noted that the DECC data groups EU supply as 
homogenous. The EU supplies a very small proportion of UK coal (2%), so this shouldn’t have a 
particularly significant effect on the diversity index. 
 
Gas: 
Data from DECC (2013h). 
 
Uranium: 
Rather unsurprisingly, it is not possible to obtain data showing where the UK imports its 
uranium from. However, Good Energy published a report which reaches a rough 
approximation (Good Energy 2012); their method can be used here. They used data from the 
World Nuclear Association (2014), which shows the levels of production of uranium according 
to country, for each year from 2002 onwards. Of these countries, according to the World 
Nuclear Association the UK only has supply contracts with three nations: Australia, Canada and 
South Africa. Using production volumes from each of these countries, an approximation of 
supply to the UK has been extrapolated. 
 
Biomass: 
Data for imports of biomass is more complicated than for gas or coal, because the UK doesn’t 
have such a strong history of accountability for imports to the biomass industry. Moreover, 
types of biomass supplies are very diverse, and most products are used for other processes as 
well as energy (for instance, wood chips are also used in construction). Therefore data for 
biomass is limited. Ofgem issued a directive which required all biomass electricity generators 
to publish their import sources for the year 2009-10; this dataset provides the necessary data 
for this accounting period (Ofgem 2010).  
 
The Ofgem data only includes dedicated biomass or AD plants; it does not include data for co-
fired plants. Data for the proportion of total power from co-firing is highly fragmented. 
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However, for 2010, DUKES estimates that imported biomass made up 8% of the total biomass 
used in the UK. This is fairly consistent with the other estimates; the imported biomass is 
mainly used for co-firing, which makes up a small yet not insignificant proportion of total 
generation from biomass. Information regarding the likely sources of imported fuel for 
biomass co-firing is also fragmented and highly incomplete. Information for 2007 imports is 
available in the UK biomass strategy (DTI/DEFRA 2007). This data shows that the majority of 
imported solid fuel for co-firing comes from the UK and from Indonesia and Malaysia (from 
palm residues). Although the data only permits estimates to be made, as it is highly 
incomplete, the proportion of total power from imported biomass for co-firing is small enough 
that it doesn’t impact too greatly on the overall results. 
 
Oil: 
Oil represents a tiny fraction of the UK’s electricity mix, and in all the pathways the oil-fired 
share of the mix is projected to drop to zero very early on (at the latest, by 2015 in the Central 
Coordination pathway). Therefore a diversity analysis was deemed irrelevant for oil supply. 
However, it should be noted that oil can still provide a useful backup supply for gas-fired 
generators. To this end, it should be noted that the UK’s imports of oil are in general extremely 
diverse (more so than for any of the other fuels), therefore oil doesn’t represent a concern for 
supply diversity. 
 
Electricity imports: 
We actually have more information about where electricity imports may come from in the 
future than we do for fuels, because of the many interconnectors which are already 
operational or which are in the planning stages. Assuming that the planned interconnectors 
get built, we will source electricity from Ireland (up to 1200MW); France (up to 3500MW); 
Netherlands (up to 1000MW), Belgium (up to 2000MW) and Norway (up to 1400MW) 
(National Grid 2013a; 2013d). 
 
B.2.2.2 Import stability 
For stability in 2010, this indicator uses existing data on the origins of major fuels. The import 
diversity data is augmented with information regarding the political stability of the exporting 
countries. This is done by including a parameter ‘b’ representing stability into the SW index 
outlined above, using the Neumann Shannon-Wiener Index (NSW1): 
NSW1= -∑ Pi*(Ln(pi))*b 
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The stability parameter is taken from the Fragile States Index 2014 (Foreign Policy 2014). These 
are converted to a stability parameter by dividing by 178 (the total number of states in the 
list), giving a stability score from 0 to 1 (1=highest stability).  
 
For 2030 and 2050, the lack of data in the pathways about the source of imports in the future 
means that a stability calculation is impossible. Therefore, qualitative statements are all that 
can be made regarding the situation in 2030 and 2050, based on the calculations for each fuel 
for 2010. 
 
B.2.2.3 Import dependence 
Gas and coal 
The total amount of domestic extraction for gas and coal is given in the pathways data. From 
this, it is possible to calculate the proportion of coal and gas coming from domestic extraction 
in 2030 and 2050. Unfortunately, the pathways data doesn’t give any units for the domestic 
extraction figures. Therefore the domestic proportions need to be worked out using 
percentages. This is done by calculating the percentage decrease in domestic extraction 
relative to 2010 (for 2030 and 2050), and then using this combined with the data on gas and 
coal output (in TWh/y) to show the output which comes from domestic sources. This is then 
shown as a percentage of total gas and coal output.  
 
Uranium 
As noted above, it is difficult to find out where the UK gets its uranium from. The UK doesn’t 
produce any of its uranium domestically. However, the UK does hold significant stockpiles of 
uranium; these stockpiles are estimated as being enough to fuel three 1GW reactors for their 
entire 60-year lifespans (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority 2007). Because of this, stockpile 
data has been used instead of domestic production data. Data on UK stockpiles is only 
available for the year 2007. From this, the year 2010 is assumed to show very little change 
from 2007.  
Assumptions must be made regarding the proportion of imports to stockpiles for 2030 and 
2050; in absence of any data, the assumption is that levels remain the same. 
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Biomass 
The UK currently imports around 50% of its solid fuel requirements. For the most part, it is 
solid fuel which is used in electricity production, while liquid fuels are mostly used in transport 
and heating. The pathways data uses an estimate of the indigenous UK biomass resource as an 
input for the model of 19TWh/y. Therefore this same input will be used here. In 2030, biomass 
requirements for the Market Rules pathway were 20.599TWh for electricity alone. This 
indicator assumes that 50% of biomass is used for electricity, with the other 50% used for 
heating and transport. 
 
  
299 
 
299 
 
Appendix C: Affordability methods 
C.1 Cost of electricity generation 
The Levelised Cost of Electricity generation (LCOE) is calculated for the pathways, using a 
widely recognised calculation which includes CAPEX (pre-development and construction), fixed 
OPEX (fixed operation and maintenance, insurance and connection charges) and variable OPEX 
(variable operation and maintenance and fuel). This is then used to calculate the total annual 
costs of generation in the pathway (in £bn), using the method shown below. Unless otherwise 
stated, all data is from DECC (2013d) and Mott MacDonald (2010). 
 
C.1.1 Mathematical method 
CAPEX 
1. Capital costs of building the plant (in £/MW) = pre-development + construction costs 
2. Discount rate of 10% (the standard rate used by DECC) 
3. CAPEX LCOE (£/MWh): This is the yearly financial payment to cover a loan taken out at 
a rate of the discount rate, over a period of the lifetime to cover the total capital costs. 
It is calculated in excel using the PMT function, which calculates the yearly financial 
payment using the capital cost, the economic lifespan of the plant, and the discount 
rate. This is then divided by the number of load hours (capacity*capacity factor) to 
give CAPEX LCOE in £/MWh 
 
OPEX 
1. Fixed costs (in £/MW/y) = Fixed Operation and Maintenance (O&M) + Insurance + 
Connection and Use of System (UoS) charges 
2. Variable costs (in £/MWh) = Fuel + Variable O&M + Decommissioning 
3. OPEX LCOE: This is the fixed cost (in £/MW/Year) divided by full load hours and added 
to the variable OPEX (in £/MWh) to give OPEX LCOE in £/MWh 
 
Total costs 
Total LCOE (in £/MWh) = CAPEX LCOE + OPEX LCOE 
Cost per unit output (in £/MW) = Total LCOE/MWh*Load hours 
Total annual generation costs for the capacity in the pathway = Total/MW * Capacity 
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C.1.2 Generation costs assumptions 
Learning cost curves 
CAPEX reductions are assumed for newer technologies: in 2030 and 2050, the pre-
development and construction costs take the low estimate from the DECC core data (DECC 
2013d) for wind, solar, biomass, marine, CHP, and CCS. Sensitivity analyses are also run; see 
sections C.1.3 and C.1.4. 
 
Discount rate 
DECC and Mott Macdonald both quote their discount rate at 10%. However, real-world 
discount rates vary and tend to be commercially sensitive, therefore data was not possible to 
obtain. The base case of 10% doesn’t reflect the fact that different types of power generation 
will incorporate different levels of risk. Therefore sensitivity tests are also carried out; details 
are given in sections C.1.3 and C.1.4. 
 
Fuel costs 
Projected fuel costs are based on DECC central scenario projections out to 2030 (DECC 2011b), 
and sensitivity tests carried out (see sections C.1.3 and C.1.4). There is no data available on 
projections of fuel costs past this point, therefore due to absence of data the fuel cost 
trajectory is extended in a linear fashion past this point. This means that there is greater 
uncertainty in the results for 2050 than for 2030 for generating types which have high fuel 
costs (gas, coal and biomass).  
 
For biomass, data is given in E4Tech (2010). The report recommends that a typical supply chain 
for future price projections could not be constructed, because of high variety of feedstock 
types, the prevalence of long-term contracts and bilateral agreements, and uncertainty over 
how the sector will develop in the future. Therefore they recommend instead that 2009 prices 
are used as indicative. The report gives prices for indigenous and imported biomass, which 
allows us to work out price projections using the proportion of indigenous biomass. Price 
increases can be calculated using the proportional increase from one year to another.  
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Load factors 
The load factors given in the Transition Pathways data are low for all types of generation. This 
is for two main reasons: 
 - The FESA model used to calculate the Transition Pathways data does not model 
unexpected outages or system failures. This makes the capacity factor look a bit low; however, 
it also makes the ability of the system to meet peak demand look slightly optimistic (see 
sections 5.8.1 and 5.8.2 for more on this). 
 - The data from 2007 and 2008 upon which the model is based showed high installed 
capacity and margins. In fact, even in 2010, the nameplate installed capacity was over 80GW 
(Ofgem 2012), resulting in low capacity factors. 
  
Scale of hydropower, solar and onshore wind 
The DECC cost assumptions differentiate between different scales of generation for hydro, 
solar and onshore wind. These are assumed to be pathway specific. Therefore, for the Market 
Rules and Central Coordination pathways, the largest scales given in the DECC report are used. 
For the Thousand Flowers pathway, it is assumed that there will be a high enough proportion 
of small-scale power generation in the mix to alter the cost of the generation. However, there 
will also still be some large-scale generation technology in the mix, especially as the mix will 
still include some power generation options which are being commissioned in the near future. 
Therefore for the TF pathway, for each technology where both large-scale and small-scale 
costs are given (onshore wind, solar PV, hydro and dedicated biomass), the mean of these is 
used. 
 
Type of biomass 
Because the pathways don’t specify the type of biomass used, the cost data uses the figures 
for large-scale dedicated biomass for the Market Rules and Central Coordination pathways, 
and for small-scale dedicated biomass for the Thousand Flowers pathway. 
 
Tidal 
The DECC figures give cost estimates for 3 types of tidal technology – shallow tidal stream, 
deep tidal stream, and tidal range. There is no data in the pathways to identify which of these 
three technologies is used, and it is not really possible to predict. Therefore in absence of data, 
the mean of these three is used. 
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Coal 
The DECC report does not give figures for unabated coal. Therefore these figures are taken 
from Mott MacDonald (2010). Mott MacDonald gives different price estimates for Advanced 
Supercritical (ASC) and Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC); therefore the coal 
capacity is split according to the IGCC proportion figures given in the Transition Pathways 
model inputs. The coal prices are all for ‘nth of a kind’ coal plants, as it is assumed that in a 
low-carbon pathway no new unabated coal will be built. 
 
CHP 
No cost estimates for CCGT CHP are given in the DECC report; therefore cost assumptions are 
taken from Mott MacDonald (2010) (which informed most of the DECC fuel assumptions). 
 
The Transition Pathways include some CHP from ‘other fuels’; this is partly coal and partly oil. 
This represents a very small part of capacity in the pathways. Figures are not given for non-gas 
fossil CHP in either DECC or Mott MacDonald. Therefore it is only possible to give a very rough 
assumption for this technology. To do this, the uplift on a CCGT CHP plant as compared with a 
regular CCGT plant (without CCS) is applied in order to uplift the coal cost to a coal CHP cost.  
 
 
C.1.3 Generation costs sensitivity tests: methods 
Sensitivity tests are carried out to show the impact of changing assumptions regarding 
discount rates, CAPEX figures, fuel costs, and carbon price. Sensitivity analyses are carried out 
based on both flat changes to assumptions across all pathways, and assumptions which are 
specific to the pathway storylines. 
 
Discount rates (DR) 
In order to reflect the impact of discount rates, it is possible to conduct sensitivity analyses of 
the generation cost data, based on the logic of the pathways. The key story here is the 
confidence of investors. If risks are perceived to be low, investors can make big investment 
decisions with low cost of capital (i.e. low discount rate). 
 
DR1. Doubling of the discount rate (for all pathways) 
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DR2. Discount rate impacted by choice of pathway, but same for all fuels: 
a. Market Rules = medium confidence = DR 10% 
b. Central coordination = high confidence = DR 5% 
c. Thousand Flowers = low confidence = DR 20% 
DR3. Discount rate differs for different fuels: 
d. Market Rules = higher discount rate for high CAPEX power generation (see 
notes below) 
e. Central Coordination = government soaks up the risk, therefore 10% DR for all 
powergen 
f. Thousand Flowers = very little assurance, therefore very high DR for high 
CAPEX powergen 
V. high CAPEX = >£3m/MW = MR 18% discount rate, TF 25% 
High CAPEX = £2-3m/MW = MR 15%; TF 20% 
Medium CAPEX = £1m-2m/MW = MR 10%, TF 12% 
Low CAPEX = <£1m/MW = MR 5%; TF 5%  
 
CAPEX reductions (LC) 
As outlined above, several technologies are assumed to benefit from decreasing CAPEX (i.e. 
pre-development and construction costs) due to learning and economies of scale by 2030. 
However, this is an assumption which will benefit from sensitivity analysis. This can illustrate 
how sensitive the calculations are to various assumptions regarding CAPEX reductions over 
time. All other assumptions remain equal, including a flat discount rate of 10%. 
 
In order to show the sensitivity of the calculations to proportional decreases in pre-
development and construction costs, this sensitivity test assumes a flat percentage decrease: 
LC1: All technologies CAPEX decrease by 10% 
LC2: CAPEX decrease of 50% for newer technologies (wind, solar, biomass, 
gas/renewable CHP, CCS, marine) 
These percentage decreases are not intended as a reflection of the actual learning rates to be 
expected (which are complex, contested and outside the scope of this thesis). Rather, they are 
intended to show the sensitivity of the calculations to assumptions such as a 50% reduction in 
CAPEX.  
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Change in CAPEX based on DECC estimates (CAP) 
A further sensitivity test for pre-development and construction costs is based on the actual 
data in DECC 2013d. It takes higher and lower estimates from the report (according to the 
technology assumptions outlined earlier):  
CAP1: CAPEX low estimate for wind, solar, biomass, gas and renewable CHP, CCS and 
marine 
CAP2: CAPEX high estimate for all technologies 
CAP3: CAPEX low estimate for all technologies 
For hydro and storage, no high or low estimates are given in the DECC report. Therefore 
estimates are based on the proportional differences between high and low CAPEX for other 
established technologies. 
 
Fuel costs (FC) 
Projecting fuel costs into the future is highly challenging and notoriously inaccurate. Therefore, 
the best approach is to show the sensitivity of the calculations to fuel price assumptions in 
2050. 
o FC1: Low fuel price: no change in fuel price from 2010 
o FC 2: DECC central scenario costs (DECC 2011b) are increased by 50% for all fuel inputs 
(gas, coal, biomass, uranium) 
o FC 3: High gas: gas increases 50% on DECC central scenario costs, the rest stay the 
same 
 
Carbon price (CC) 
Carbon pricing depends on carbon policy, which is more unpredictable and isn’t given explicitly 
in the pathways. For this reason, carbon prices are added separately to the main cost analysis, 
as a sensitivity test. 
 
Originally, DECC planned a carbon price floor rising to £76/t CO2 in 2030 (DECC 2012b). 
However, this was originally supposed to be a top-up to the carbon price in the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS). Recently, the carbon price in the ETS has been so low that the trajectory 
rising to £76/t in 2030 has been deemed unsustainable, and a cap of £18/t until 2020 has been 
implemented. This cap will be revised under successive carbon budgets (HM Revenue and 
Customs 2014). 
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There is therefore considerable uncertainty over the level of the carbon price in the future. As 
such, the analysis has adopted a ‘high, medium and low’ sensitivity approach: 
CC1: flat carbon price of £6/tonne (reflecting the current level in 2014) 
CC2: low: carbon price is capped at £18/tonne in 2030, and remains here in 2050 
CC3: high: carbon price is capped at £18/tonne in 2030, and rises to £76/tonne in 2050 
  
The cost of carbon is calculated using the following indicative values for carbon intensity 
(assuming a small amount of carbon reduction in 2030 and 2050 from today’s levels due to 
efficiency improvements): 
Coal 0.85g/MWh 
CCGT 0.4g/MWh 
Coal CCS 0.1g/MWh 
Gas CCS 0.05g/MWh 
Open-Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) 0.5g/MWh 
For simplicity of calculation, non-thermal generation is assumed to be 0g/MWh 
 
 
C.1.4 Generation costs sensitivity tests: results 
 
Figure C-0-1: Results of generation costs sensitivity tests 2030 
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Figure C-0-2: Results of generation costs sensitivity tests 2050 
 
 
 
As shown in figures C.0.1 and C.0.2, the range of results returned by the sensitivity calculations 
is considerable. Despite the range of sensitivities tested, it is clear that the TF pathway is still 
by far the most expensive in terms of total annual generation costs in 2050. There is actually 
fairly little overlap between the pathways; the CC pathway consistently has the lowest total 
annual generation costs. 
 
The greatest impact is felt from the sensitivities around discount rates; this is unsurprising, but 
problematic, as it is extremely difficult to get hold of reliable data on discount rates. Discount 
rates are essentially a measure of how risky a project is to undertake, and the extent to which 
the government is underwriting the risks; as such, commercial sensitivity leads to low data 
availability.  
 
A further significant sensitivity test result is for fuel costs, specifically the impact of a doubling 
of fuel costs across the board. This has an enormous impact on the TF pathway, because of the 
dependence on biomass in this pathway; biomass fuel costs are high already, and therefore 
any increase to biomass prices could have a big impact on the generation cost of the TF 
pathway. This is very important because there is still considerable uncertainty about biomass 
fuel prices. 
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C.2 Wholesale prices 
Step 1: Define Load Duration Curve 
The net demand data for the pathways is used to create Load Duration Curves (LDC). The LDC 
curves need to include inflexible generation, but not intermittent generation. 
Step 2: Vertical points on the graphs 
The LDC curves are split into time periods along the x axis, representing four illustrative 
demand periods for the year: winter peak, winter off-peak, summer peak, summer off-peak 
Winter = 50% of the time 
Peak = 25% of the time 
Therefore winter and summer peak = 12.5% of the time; winter and summer off-peak = 37.5% 
of the time 
 
These demand periods are placed in order of amount of electricity usage, beginning with 
winter peak and ending with summer off-peak: 
Winter peak = 12.5% = 0 to 1095 hours 
Summer peak = 12.5% = 1096 to 2190 hours 
Winter off-peak = 37.5% = 2191 to 5475 hours 
Summer off-peak = 37.5% = 5476 to 8760 hours 
 
These demand periods are plotted vertically on the LDC graphs. The exact demand for the 
boundary point of each time period is identified. For each of these time periods, the hour is 
plotted on the LDC graph to find out the load at that point in time. 
 
Step 3: Horizontal stacks 
The LDC graphs are split horizontally into ‘stacks’. Each stack represents a fuel generation 
technology. The technology is ordered in terms of merit order of generation. The merit order 
of generation through to 2050 is slightly uncertain, as it depends on the market, prices and 
subsidies involved. However, some assumptions can be made, leading to the merit order as 
listed below: 
- Nuclear as baseload: nuclear comes first in the merit order, because it is inflexible.  
- Hydro: hydro runs all year, and is a renewable power source with zero fuel costs. 
Therefore it can be assumed to come just after nuclear in the merit order 
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- Biomass: although there is some uncertainty as to the role of biomass in the merit 
order in the future, currently biomass is being used mainly as a direct substitute for coal, and 
many plants are either converting directly or are switching to co-firing of coal and biomass. 
Therefore biomass is assumed to come alongside coal in the merit order. 
- Coal (abated and unabated) 
- CCGT (abated and unabated): CCGT is very flexible, and capable of quick ramping up 
and down in response to changes in demand.  
- Pumped storage: storage is best used when most needed, and is therefore 
considered a peaking provision, to be used only when capacity is required to meet big peaks in 
demand 
- Imports: Imports flow into the electricity system in the UK when the UK price is 
higher than that in neighbouring jurisdictions. Therefore it is assumed that imports will be 
flowing into the UK to meet peaks in demand, when electricity will be at its most expensive 
(Ofgem 2014). 
 
The generation capacity of each fuel is adjusted according to availability factors. The 
availability factors are given in the Transition Pathways data; the availability of CCGT, coal and 
biomass is 90%, and of nuclear is 75% up to 2025 and 80% thereafter.  
 
It should be noted that such generation stack models using LDCs are always to some extent an 
inaccurate reflection of how the electricity merit order works. The merit order is decided by 
the market, and as such it is impossible to assess with any kind of accuracy the exact merit 
order into the future. However, stack models are widely used in both markets and engineering 
fields, and are an accepted method for establishing the likely price-setting fuel [Staffell and 
Green 2012]; therefore they are used here with the caveat that they are sensitive to market 
forces. It can be assumed that certain characteristics of the merit order (such as the use of 
inflexible nuclear as a baseload) are likely to continue into the future.  
 
Step 4: Defining price-setting fuel 
The number of hours at which each fuel type is setting the price is calculated. For example: 
MR 2010 winter peak: Demand peak for coal = 34.03GW 
Time period for winter off-peak = 2190 to 5475 hours 
Demand curve drops below 34.03GW at 4565 hours 
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Therefore gas is setting the price from 2190 to 4565 hours. Coal is setting the price from 4565 
to 5475 hours (910 hours). 
Total winter off-peak time period = 3285 hours 
910 = 27.7% of 3285. Therefore gas is setting the price for 27.7% of the winter off-peak. 
 
Step 5: Calculating average wholesale price for the time period 
‘Total variable costs’ from the LCOE calculations are used to estimate the wholesale price of 
the price-setting fuel. The total variable costs include fuel costs, variable operation and 
maintenance, and decommissioning and waste, and carbon prices (see below). The variable 
costs for each fuel are given in £/MWh. A weighted average is obtained by multiplying the cost 
of each (in £/MWh) by the number of hours it is setting the price for.  These are then added 
together and divided by 8760 to give the weighted average wholesale price, in £/MWh. 
 
For 2010, the variable cost estimates used here include a carbon price of £6/tonne. For 2030 
and 2050, there is too much uncertainty over future carbon prices; therefore the baseline is 
run with no carbon price, and sensitivity analyses are carried out (see section C.1.3). 
 
For coal and gas, a weighted average price for the different types of gas and coal generation is 
obtained from the load hours.  
 
Step 6: Weighted demand 
As shown in the steps above, the generation is weighted according to winter peak, winter off-
peak, summer peak, and summer off-peak. Therefore, the wholesale price estimates will be 
more accurate if demand is weighted in the same way. Mean average demand is calculated for 
each time period. For example, for winter peak, the hourly demand for each hour between 0 
and 1095 are added together, and divided by 1095. 
 
 
C.4 Distribution upgrade costs 
 
The cost of upgrades to the distribution system in the pathways has been carried out by 
Pudjianto et al (2013). They modelled the potential cost to the system of the electrification of 
UK heating and transport under the Transition Pathways. They first modelled peak electricity 
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demand, taking into account hourly demand profiles, shown in figure C.4. The peak demand 
profiles are also given in the Transition Pathways data.  
 
It is important to note that Pudjianto et al only modelled demand which is connected to the 
distribution network, therefore some demand centres (especially of large industrial consumers 
which are connected straight into the transmission network) are ignored. For this reason, it 
can clearly be seen that the peak demand data in the Pudjianto paper is significantly lower 
than in the Transition Pathways data. For the purposes of this indicator, the data in figure C.0.3 
is more suitable, because this indicator is only interested in demand which connects to the 
distribution network. 
 
Figure C-0-3: Projected peak demand 
 
 
Pudjianto et al (2013) then modelled the cost of distribution network reinforcements and 
upgrades necessary to meet the peak demand profiles shown above. The method is described 
in more detail there, but the basic steps are as follows: 
1. Create network topology at the Low Voltage (0.4kV) level. Different consumer 
settlements (urban, rural etc.) are created on the basis of fractal theory. Locations of 
distribution transformers are optimised to minimise cost, loss and voltage drops. 
2. Two representative low voltage (LV) networks are developed, one for rural and one for 
urban.  
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3. From this network topology, year-round Alternating Current (AC) load flow calculations 
are performed. These are then used to design the network circuits, based on 
minimising life-cycle cost. 
4. An interconnection High Voltage (11kV) matrix is created, also using fractal theory. 
This creates a High-Voltage (HV) distribution network, using the LV networks created in 
step 1. 
5. Steps 2 and 3 are carried out for HV network. 
6. An Extra-High-Voltage (≥33kV) network is created using a simplified model which 
connects the different HV networks created in step 4. 
 
 
C.2.1 Wholesale price assumptions 
Gas price assumptions 
The gas price tends to be higher in winter due to colder weather and demand for gas for 
heating, especially so during peak periods when gas is in high demand. As such, gas wholesale 
prices are assumed to be 20% higher for winter off-peak, and 30% higher for winter peak 
(estimates based on a general comparison of UK summer and winter gas spot prices for 2010 
and 2011, EIA 2011). 
 
Interconnector assumptions 
Interconnector prices are the wholesale price for that country. It is impractical to attempt to 
project wholesale prices for all of the potential import nations (especially as imports set the 
price for very few hours per year). Therefore estimates must be made of the import price. 
These are appended with sensitivity analyses, because of the inherent uncertainty. It is to be 
expected that the import price will make very little difference to the average wholesale price, 
because of the limited number of hours per year (typically less than 50) for which imports are 
setting the price. 
 
It is assumed that the interconnectors will only import when we need it, i.e. at peak times 
when the UK price exceeds that of neighbouring countries in Europe. Therefore we can assume 
that the interconnector price will be higher than the UK wholesale price. For 2030 and 2050, a 
baseline import price is assumed which is £5 higher than the average wholesale price for that 
pathway.  A sensitivity analysis is then run for imports valued at 50% higher than this baseline 
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estimate, to show that even with such a high mark-up, the price of imports has very little 
impact on the average wholesale price. 
 
C.2.2 Wholesale electricity prices sensitivity tests 
 
In order to keep things simple, wholesale prices sensitivities were carried out for the key price-
setting fuels (gas, coal, nuclear and biomass). For each fuel, the total variable cost was 
increased by 20% to show the impact of this upon the average wholesale price. A further test 
was carried out to show the impact of carbon pricing. 
o 1Gas = Gas price of generation increases by 20% 
o 2Coal = Coal price of generation increases by 20% 
o 3Bio = Biomass price of generation increases by 20% 
o 4Nuc = Nuclear price of generation increases by 20% 
o 5Carb = Wholesale price includes a carbon price at £18/tonne for 2030 and £76/tonne 
for 2050. 
 
The results in figure C.0.3 show that the pathways are not overly sensitive to wholesale price 
assumptions for the individual price-setting fuels; the results are fairly consistent across the 
various sensitivity tests. The biggest impact is on biomass in the TF pathway, especially in 
2050; an increase in biomass generation costs results in a significant increase in the wholesale 
price for this pathway. Finally, including a carbon price has a fairly significant impact on the 
wholesale price in 2050. Surprisingly, the biggest impact of a carbon price is felt in the TF 
pathway; this is probably due to the overall prices rather than the fuel mix, as the higher prices 
for the TF pathway lead to a higher differential.  
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Figure C-0-4: Wholesale price sensitivity results 
 
 
 
C.3 Transmission upgrade costs 
C.3.1 Offshore costs 
Offshore wind 
The analysis first develops an understanding of the likely future sites for offshore wind energy. 
This can be done using the most recent licensing round for offshore wind, as well as National 
Grid information about future siting of onshore wind. Much of the information regarding siting 
and capacity comes from the National Grid Electricity 10-Year Statement (National Grid 2012), 
which looks at likely transmission upgrades for the UK until 2030 for all of their pathways. 
Their ‘Accelerated Growth’ pathway is very aggressive for large-scale wind and nuclear power, 
meaning that the National Grid projections of necessary upgrades for this pathway are 
sufficient to carry the Transition Pathways out to 2050. 
 
The order in which the wind farms are built is important, as this dictates to some extent which 
are included in the pathway and which are not (which will affect overall cost). This is 
impossible to assess with any certainty, as the building of wind farms is subject to a wide array 
of political and market pressures. Therefore offshore wind farms are divided into Round 2 and 
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Round 3, with the assumption that the Round 3 arrays will be built last. They are then ordered 
according to distance from shore (assuming that closer to shore is cheaper, and thus more 
likely to get built; this creates a conservative cost estimate). 
 
The costs for connecting the offshore farms are calculated using the unit costs of the 
transmission infrastructure. All unit cost data is from the National Grid 10-year statement 
technology appendix (National Grid 2013c). The unit costs used are given in Appendix F. 
 
Interconnection 
The interconnector costs are calculated using the same method as for wind farms, using the 
cost/km of undersea cable (in this case, all HVDC; see Appendix F), and the distances for each 
cable (mostly obtained from information from the individual projects, available online). The 
ordering of the projects is fairly important, because the pathways don’t use all the potential 
interconnector capacity which is planned or proposed for the UK. Therefore the projects were 
ordered in terms of their projected completion date (with some projects having already been 
completed). This method is clearly a big estimation, as costs of installation are probably much 
higher in the deep water required by interconnectors. However, the amount of 
interconnection in the pathways is very similar, so the estimates don’t affect the results too 
much. 
 
C.3.2 Onshore costs 
The Electricity Strategy Networks Group (ESNG) has provided some cost estimates for 
upgrades and reinforcements to the onshore transmission network, based on certain amounts 
of installed capacity in various areas of the UK (ENSG 2012: 36). From the information given by 
the report, it is possible to estimate the necessary costs of reinforcement of the onshore wind 
in the pathways. The cost per MW is calculated from the information in the report; from this, 
the cost of additional generation is calculated according to the capacity of the pathway: Total 
cost = (cost/MW)*capacity.  
 
Onshore wind 
Today’s proportions for wind power in Scotland, England and Wales are carried forward to 
estimate regional onshore wind generation in the pathways. As for all onshore transmission 
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cost estimations, it is only the additional capacity required for 2030 and 2050 which is taken 
into account.  
 
Nuclear power 
The nuclear capacity in several of the pathways is very high. Uncertainties around the Hinkley 
C project indicate that it is very challenging at present to estimate the potential sites of new 
nuclear upgrades. Therefore in order to estimate the siting of new nuclear capacity, the 
existing nuclear capacity of the UK is used. This is split into proportions according to the 
regions in ENSG 2012, in the same way as for onshore wind.  
 
Other onshore 
Using the same figures, it is also possible to calculate additional onshore costs for all other 
types of onshore generation. Other types of generation are assumed to be much more 
distributed; therefore for ease of calculations, other onshore costs are assumed to be spread 
equally across the country. 
 
Centralised vs decentralised 
It is important to note that considerable amounts of decentralisation in a pathway could have 
an impact on the transmission costs, as in general, decentralised installations will be 
connected directly to the distribution network. Therefore this must be taken into account, by 
reducing the onshore costs accordingly. 
 
The pathways data shows figures for ‘maximum total electricity demand’ and ‘maximum 
centrally-generated demand’. This provides an indication of the amount of decentralised 
generation (in GW). 
The transmission method splits onshore costs into wind, nuclear and ‘other’; nuclear can be 
assumed to all be centralised. The proportion of the pathway which is decentralised is 
subtracted from the onshore generation requirements of the wind and ‘other onshore’ 
components of the pathway.  
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C.5 Annual household electricity bills 
 
Annual electricity bills can be calculated using estimates of the breakdown of the various 
components which make up a household electricity bill, from DECC (2013e). For this indicator, 
it is estimated that the wholesale price of generation makes up around 40% of an average 
electricity bill. Energy and climate policies are estimated to add 9% to the annual bill. Supplier 
profits and costs are currently estimated at around 19%. Network costs are around 20%. VAT is 
5%. 
 
The baseline estimate for annual bills is taken from the wholesale price of electricity, the 
method for which was covered in section C.2, added to a proportion for supplier costs, a 
proportion for social and environmental programmes, and a proportion for network charges. 
For the baseline, these are taken straight from the DECC figures. The 5% VAT is not included: 
this is standard methodology for calculating electricity bills, because it makes it easier to 
compare between countries. It should also be noted that this calculation does not include any 
discounts consumers may receive for buying their gas and electricity from the same supplier. 
 
We then need to calculate average household usage, in MWh. Total UK demand figures are 
given in the pathways.  
Average household demand = Total UK demand / number of households 
Household demand (in MWh) * full cost (in £/MWh) = annual bill (in £) 
 
Population growth forecasts are taken from the Office for National Statistics ‘principle’ case 
(ONS 2015). The interactive website offers a number of alternative forecasts, some of which 
will be used later in the sensitivity tests.  The household demographic is assumed to stay 
roughly the same; that is, the ratio of people to households is assumed to stay constant in 
order to work out the number of households: 
2010: 63.7 million = 26.4 million households 
2030: 71 million = 29.4 million households 
2050: 77 million = 31.9 million households 
 
C.5.1 Annual bills sensitivity tests: methods 
Sensitivity tests were carried out to show the impact of assumptions regarding the various 
components of the ‘uplift’ on the bill (i.e. the proportion which is added to the bill on top of 
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the wholesale price). These included changes to social and environmental programmes, 
network charges, and carbon price. Tests were also carried out to show the impact of 
population growth and changes to the wholesale price of electricity. 
 
Additionally, a further three tests were carried out based on the narratives of the pathways 
themselves, thus involving different assumptions for each of the pathways. This involved 
testing the impact of changes in costs due to learning and economies of scale, changing costs 
due to policies for incentivising low-carbon generation, and the profit margins of the 
generators. All tests and baseline are shown without VAT. 
 
Social and environmental programmes:  
o Env1. Assumes that the percentage represented by social and environmental costs 
remains the same, but are shifted to general taxation. This results in a 9% decrease in 
the retail uplift.  
o Env2. Assumes that the impact of increasing pressure to mitigate climate change leads 
to increasing costs, and the cost of EMR impacts increases electricity prices 
significantly. The cost of social and environmental programmes is doubled, meaning an 
18% increase in the retail uplift. 
 
Wholesale price 
There is lots of uncertainty regarding wholesale price. Therefore high and low estimates, from 
the wholesale price tests, are used. For each, the percentage increase is on the wholesale 
price: 
o Wh1. High estimate 
o Wh2. Low estimate 
 
Use of System (UoS) charges 
The baseline UoS charge is 20% of the total bill.  
Total system costs = Baseline UoS charge + upgrade costs 
A percentage uplift is calculated using the results from the ‘transmission costs’ indicator, and 
added to the 20% UoS charge on the total bill. 
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Population growth 
Household demand is calculated using total annual demand figures from the pathways data, 
and population estimates of the number of households. Therefore the higher the assumption 
regarding population growth, the lower the cost per household will be. Population data is from 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) 2015. 
o Pop1. ONS low case: 2030: 68.3 million people, 28.3 million households. 2050: 68.8 
million people, 28.5 million households 
o Pop.2 ONS high case: 2030: 73.8 million people, 30.5 million households. 2050: 85.4 
million people, 35.3 million households 
 
Carbon price 
A carbon price is introduced of £18/tonne in 2030 and £76/tonne in 2050. These are the same 
indicative carbon prices as used in the ‘generation cost’ indicator; the rationale behind these 
assumptions is explained in more detail in Section C.1.3. 
 
Economies of scale 
This test assumes that the small-scale generation in the TF pathway fails to capitalise on 
economies of scale, and thus wholesale prices are assumed to be 20% higher. For the MR 
pathway, the test assumes that cheaper components and technologies are purchased from 
overseas, and wholesale prices are 20% lower. 
 
Incentivising low-carbon generation 
This test assumes that capacity payments and subsidies for low-carbon sources rise 
considerably. The social and environmental programmes component of the bill is varied 
according to individual pathways storylines. The MR pathway stays the same; CC pathway sees 
government programme costs triple; TF pathway sees costs double due to pressure on local 
councils to incentivise low-carbon sources. 
 
Profit margins 
This sensitivity test assumes that the MR pathway is left vulnerable to rent-seeking by large 
utilities. As such, the profit margin in this pathway increases from 5% of the total to 15% of the 
total. The CC pathway is assumed to be less vulnerable to rent-seeking, and central control 
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reduces profit margins to 2.5%. TF pathway is controlled by small companies, who are less 
capable of rent-seeking but also encounter higher risk; profit margins increase to 7.5% 
 
C.5.2 Annual bills sensitivity tests: results 
 
Figure C-0-5: Results from annual bills sensitivity tests, 2030 
 
 
Figure C-0-6: Results from annual bills sensitivity tests, 2050 
 
 
As shown in figures C.0.5 and C.0.6, the biggest impact on annual bills is in changes to the 
wholesale price. This is important, because there is considerable uncertainty over wholesale 
prices in the future. Increases in wholesale prices – especially in the gas price – have led to 
significant increases in fuel bills in the UK in the past (UK Committee on Climate Change 2012), 
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and therefore this could represent considerable risk for all the pathways. Changes to 
environmental and social programmes also have a big impact; again, this affects all the 
pathways in a similar manner. This is important because it shows that the price of achieving a 
low-carbon transition could impact consumers even more than the baseline price originally 
shown for this indicator, depending on government policy regarding subsidising low-carbon 
generation. Interestingly, changes to system costs don’t have a huge impact on annual bills. 
Finally, the graphs show that a lower population would result in higher bills, because the 
demand figures assumed for the pathways would be split between more people and therefore 
would result in lower bills per household. However, this sensitivity test should be regarded as 
illustrative only, because the electricity demand figures assumed in the pathways are based 
upon mid-way population assumptions, as used in the baseline estimate above. 
 
The last three sensitivity tests (scale, carbon pricing, and profits) are conducted on the basis of 
the pathways storylines, and therefore make different assumptions for each pathway. As 
shown, the biggest impact is felt through changes to social and environmental programmes – 
the CC pathway experiences price risk if the government is expected to pay for incentivising 
low-carbon generation. This could result in a public backlash in this pathway, and could result 
in a trade-off between incentivising low-carbon generation and keeping bills at a manageable 
level, although this depends somewhat on whether these costs are paid for out of energy bills 
or general taxation (see section 5.4.4). The results for economies of scale show a big 
differentiation for the TF pathway in 2030, making this pathway the most expensive; however, 
by 2050, this difference has evened out and the TF pathway is once again the least expensive.  
 
C.6 Fuel poverty 
 
A key aspect of affordability is equity, and because of this it is desirable to examine the 
possible impact of the pathways on levels of fuel poverty. Broadly defined, a household in fuel 
poverty will spend 10% or more of their disposable income on fuel for lighting, heating, 
cooking, transport etc. However, moving on from this basic definition, the Hills Review – a 
major piece of work commissioned by the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change in 
2011 – recommended that this definition fails to fully illustrate important underlying trends of 
fuel poverty, and that by including fuel as a relative proportion of income it incorporates 
households who are clearly not poor. Therefore, the Hills Review argues that fuel poverty 
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should refer to “individuals living on a lower income in a home that cannot be kept warm at 
reasonable cost” (Hills 2012:7).   
 
It isn’t possible to accurately project levels of fuel poverty without income data. The Hills 
review only manages to project incomes out to 2016; and even then, the review notes that the 
projections are based on non-linear trends, and are therefore highly likely to be severely 
inaccurate. Moreover, levels of fuel poverty are highly dependent on income inequality: higher 
median incomes don’t necessarily mean higher incomes for those most likely to be affected by 
fuel poverty. Because of these limitations, the analysis will be limited to a review of rising bills, 
and the importance of government policies in limiting fuel poverty. 
 
The method for this indicator uses the high, median and low estimates of annual bills from the 
annual bills indicator. These are then assessed qualitatively in conjunction with narrative 
information about the ‘storylines’ of the pathways, from Foxon (2013).  
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Appendix D: Sustainability methods 
D.1 GHG emissions and intensity 
 
The IPCC has collated data on the life-cycle GHG emissions intensity of electricity generation, 
measured in CO2e/kWh, as shown in table D.0.1 (Moomaw et al 2011). It is important to take 
into account the possible range of estimates, because of the inherent uncertainty in calculating 
life-cycle emissions intensity. This information can be particularly important for biomass, 
because biomass emissions can be high if poor land-use practices take place (for instance, the 
replacement of tropical rainforest for palm); on the other hand, they can also be very low, 
because in theory it is possible to generate negative emissions from biomass by capturing the 
embodied carbon which the plants have absorbed over their lifetimes.  
 
Pathway carbon intensity = Fuel-type intensity * (fuel-type generation / Total generation) 
 
Table D-0-1: Carbon intensity of various generation types. Source: Moomaw et al (2011) 
 
 
 
D.1.1 Carbon intensity assumptions 
Bioenergy 
For bioenergy, it appears that there is a misprint on the original version of Table D.0.1 – it 
seems highly unlikely that the 25th percentile for bioenergy is 360g/kwh when the 50th 
percentile is only 18g/kwh. Therefore, a mid-estimate of 5g/kwh is used. This is consistent with 
the assertion in the IPCC report that the carbon intensity of bioenergy is between the 
emissions intensity of nuclear and of gas. 
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CCS 
For CCS, only minimum and maximum values are given by the IPCC. Therefore a mid-point was 
arrived at by selecting the mid-point between these estimates. 
 
CHP 
Woods and Zdaniuk (2011) estimate CHP carbon intensity at around 400g/kwh (assuming that 
CHP heat is replacing electrical heat from gas power stations, and assuming a CHP electrical 
efficiency of 35%). This roughly equates to the mid-estimate for gas. Thus the carbon intensity 
is assumed to be the same as for the non-CHP fuel. 
 
D.2 Resource depletion 
 
‘Resource depletion’ can cover a wide range of issues, including scarcity of cheap-to-extract 
primary fuels such as oil, potential scarcity of non-fossil fuel sources (e.g. lack of biomass due 
to land shortages), and depletion of important materials used in the production of power. 
Some of the potential issues with the supply of fuels are covered in the ‘availability’ dimension. 
As such, the following two indicators focus on physical depletion: 
1. Depletion of primary fuels (gas, coal, biomass, uranium etc.) 
2. Depletion of secondary materials (metals, minerals and elements used in power 
production) 
 
There are high levels of uncertainty around future resource availability. Much of the impact of 
resource depletion will probably be felt through prices, rather than actual scarcity; Helm 
(2011) argues that ‘peak fuel’ is unlikely to happen, as increasing fuel prices due to scarcity 
simply mean that it becomes more possibly to extract previously uneconomic fossil resources. 
Moreover, many of the security risks associated with resource depletion can be overcome 
through better practices – for instance, increased use of residues for biomass, or increased 
recycling of metals. As such, it is difficult to make quantitative projections. Therefore the best 
means of tackling this indicator is via qualitative methods. Information from the existing 
literature is used to explore the extent to which primary fuels and secondary materials may be 
at risk of depletion through to 2050. The pathways are then assessed for their level of reliance 
on these fuels and materials. 
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D.3 Water usage for cooling and for biomass production 
 
Water usage estimates for each type of power generation are shown in Table D.0.2. The table 
shows both water withdrawals and water consumption – an important distinction, especially 
when considering water-based generation such as hydropower, which has virtually no water 
withdrawals but high water consumption (mainly due to evaporation from the lakes created by 
dams) (Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2011). Because of this, this indicator carries out analysis for 
both water withdrawals and water consumption.  
 
Table D-0-2: Water withdrawal and consumption intensities. Source: Kyle et al (2013) 
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For each type of power generation, water intensity estimates (in m3/MWh) from Kyle et al 
(2013) are multiplied by the power output in the pathways (in MWh). The results are shown in 
m3/year for overall water usage (consumption and withdrawals). 
 
D.3.1 Type of cooling 
 
Table D-0-3: Assumed cooling system shares in % (Kyle et al 2013) 
 
 
As can be seen in table D.0.2, the type of cooling which is used in the power station has a 
significant impact on the water use. Table D.0.3 shows assumed proportions of different 
cooling systems for the base year of 2005, and projections for future years. For Western 
Europe, there is no difference between current and future proportions of cooling systems 
used; therefore the same cooling system proportions can be assumed for all projections. 
 
For each type of power generation, the type of cooling which is used is estimated using the 
data above. This data is used to give a weighted average of the water use for each type of 
power generation. So for example, for coal with 80% evaporative and 20% 1-thru, and an 
estimate of 1000L/MWh for evaporative and 500L/MWh for 1-thru, and a power output of 
5,000MWh, the calculation would be: ((1000*5000)*0.8)+((500*5000)*0.2) 
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D.3.2 Weighting 
Further to the calculations above, it is suggested for this indicator that it is more damaging 
from an environmental perspective if the power station uses fresh water as opposed to salt 
water, because sea water is more plentiful. Therefore, the results are weighted 70-30 to reflect 
this. Sensitivity tests are carried out to show the impact of different weightings on the results; 
see section D.3.4. 
 
For each fuel type, National Grid data (National Grid 2012) on current power station 
placement is used to count the proportion of power stations on land, and the proportion by 
the sea, of each type (coal, gas, biomass, nuclear). All hydro, solar and pumped storage is 
assumed to be on land. For renewables, the water use is minimal, therefore RES are not 
included in the weighting. For each result for water use, withdrawals and consumption, the 
consumption is first split into land and sea using the existing proportions for each. Then a 70-
30 weighting is applied. 
 
D.3.3 Assumptions 
Biomass 
Biomass uses around the same amount of water for cooling as coal plants. Kyle et al (2013) 
assume that water requirements for biomass post-2025 are roughly the same as for IGCC. 
Water is also required for biomass production; however there are big differences in the water 
requirements depending on what type of feedstock is used and where it is grown. In the 
absence of such information, it is not possible to accurately measure the water requirements 
of biomass feedstock. As with other issues of biomass, it is likely that feedstocks produced in 
the UK (which rarely suffers from drought) may be less vulnerable than those produced in 
some overseas regions.  
CCS 
Table D.0.2 shows the water intensities for CCS, which is about 30-40% more water intense 
than unabated generation. 
Coal: ASC and IGCC 
Different types of coal generation have different water requirements. Therefore the ‘coal’ 
generation in the Transition Pathways must be split between ASC and IGCC coal. This is done 
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for years 2030 and 2050, as the UK did not have any IGCC in 2010. The coal generation is split 
according to the same proportions used in the ‘generation cost’ indicator, following from the 
proportions shown in the Transition Pathways data. 
Climate change 
It should be noted that one major impact on water usage could be decreasing availability of 
water due to climate change. However, Van Vliet et al (2013) carried out modelling of hydro 
and thermal power production potential for European countries (based on the IPCC SRES A2 
[medium/high] climate scenario, for the years 2031 to 2060), and found that for the UK, 
climate change has a minimal impact on power production and on wholesale power  prices. 
Although this doesn’t directly correlate to the issue of water temperatures, it does illustrate 
that for the UK under a low-carbon transition pathway, the impact of climate change on water 
resources is probably not significant enough to be a major issue. 
 
 
D.3.4 Water sensitivity tests 
 
Depending on the location of an electricity generator, it may use either freshwater or 
seawater. When assessing the sustainability of water withdrawals and water consumption, it is 
important to take both into account. For instance, water use for cooling from either 
freshwater or seawater will impact the temperature of the water being replaced, thus 
impacting ecosystems and potentially human activities which rely on that water. However, 
freshwater use is probably more damaging from a security perspective, because of the 
implications of using a potentially depletable resource and on drinking water and food 
systems. Because of this, the baseline estimates for water usage use a weighting of 70-30 to 
show the greater impacts of freshwater requirements. 
 
However, this weighting is somewhat arbitrary, because of the significant challenges in 
developing a non-arbitrary weighting. To do this would require detailed data on plant 
locations, water temperatures and ecosystem services, and would be highly location-specific. 
Because of this, it is useful to carry out a sensitivity test which shows the impact of different 
assumptions regarding freshwater/seawater weightings on the results. Figure D.0.1 below 
shows the results for sensitivity tests using weightings of 50/50, 70-30, and 100/0.  
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These results show that the weighting of freshwater vs seawater has a significant impact on 
the results, including altering the results of the pathways relative to each other. Weighting 
freshwater and seawater equally means that the TF pathway uses less water than the other 
two pathways, whereas weighting freshwater use at 100% (i.e. completely ignoring seawater 
use) means that the TF pathway uses most water. The CC pathway shows the opposite pattern, 
driven by the large amount of nuclear power in the CC pathway (which in the UK is mostly 
located on the coast), and the large amount of biomass and CHP plant in the TF pathway 
(which due to the decentralised nature of the pathway will mostly be located near to 
population centres, many of which will be inland). The MR pathway appears to have relatively 
high water use regardless of the weighting, although similarly to the CC pathway the MR 
pathway benefits from a 100/0 weighting due to the prevalence of nuclear in this pathway. 
 
These results indicate that it is important to specify what the main concern is when looking at 
water requirements for power generation. If the main concern is an environmental or 
ecological one, it makes sense to use a more equal weighting. It is important to note that these 
ecosystem impacts may also have societal and economic impacts, due to the effects on 
ecosystem services such as fish stocks. On the other hand, if the main concern is related to 
natural resource depletion or the ‘nexus’ of food, water and energy, it makes sense to place 
emphasis on freshwater use, because saltwater is not at risk of depletion. The patterns are the 
same regardless of whether focusing on consumption or withdrawals. This is probably due to 
the fact that the main difference between consumption and withdrawals is in the use of hydro 
power, which withdraws lots of water but does not consume it; all three pathways have 
similarly low levels of hydro.  
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Figure D-0-1: Results of sensitivity tests using different weightings for freshwater vs seawater 
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Appendix E: Reliability methods 
E.1 De-rated capacity margin 
 
In a context of increased renewable and intermittent generation, it is becoming common to 
measure capacity margins using a ‘de-rated’ measure (DRCM), which reduces the maximum 
capacity for all generation types to give an assumed level of generation capacity availability at 
the time of peak demand. Therefore, even non-intermittent sources such as coal and nuclear 
are given a rating of less than 100%, to account for planned maintenance and faults at the 
plant. DRCM for the pathways is calculated using the assumed percentage of operating 
capacity for each fuel, weighted according to the generation mix in the pathways.  
 
Assumed de-rated capacity margins for each fuel are referred to as ‘capacity credit’. The 
capacity credit of each generation type is estimated by the National Grid 10-year statement, as 
shown in Table E.0.1 (National Grid 2012: 30). 
 
Table E-0-1: Capacity Credit of generation types (National Grid 2012: 30) 
Biomass 87% 
CCGT 89% 
CHP 89% 
Coal 89% 
Geothermal 90% 
Hydro 92% 
Nuclear 86% 
OCGT 77% 
Offshore wind 8% 
Oil 81% 
Onshore wind 8% 
Pumped storage 95% 
Tidal 35% 
Wave 35% 
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DRCM is calculated as follows (RAEng 2013): 
 
𝐷𝑅𝐶𝑀 (%) =
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
 𝑥100 
 
Where total available capacity = (nameplate capacity * capacity credit)/100. 
 
E.1.1 DRCM Assumptions 
Imports 
Imports have been rated at 50%, to take into account the potential that supply through the 
interconnector will be unavailable at the time of peak demand, either due to a fault or due to 
high demand in the interconnected country. Sensitivity analyses are also run to show the 
impact of changing assumptions on import capacity credit; these are explained in section E.1.2. 
 
CCS 
Defining the capacity credit of CCS is complex, because it depends on assumptions regarding 
whether the CCS has been built flexibly. CCS reduces plant efficiency, therefore in theory it 
could reduce the capacity credit. However, there are several ways of building a CCS plant, 
some of which could incorporate flexible CCS. Therefore for instance, during a demand peak, 
the CCS part of the plant could be switched off temporarily, which would allow the plant to 
generate more power to deal with the peak. Another possibility would be to configure the CCS 
plant to delay the most energy intensive processes of CCS, so that the carbon is captured but 
the processing is carried out during the night when system demand is low, thus increasing the 
peak time capacity credit. However, building plant to incorporate this kind of flexibility is more 
expensive. 
 
The Transition Pathways data does not express whether the CCS plant has been built flexibly. 
Therefore as a starting assumption, coal CCS is given the same capacity credit as unabated 
coal, and gas CCS the same as unabated gas. Sensitivity analyses are then run for different 
assumptions (see sections E.1.2, E.1.3 and E.1.4). 
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Solar 
National Grid does not give a capacity credit for solar. This is probably because the credit for 
solar is effectively 0%, because peak demand generally occurs on winter evenings, when no 
solar is available at all. 
 
Changing capacity margins over time? 
It could be argued that generation technologies will improve over time, and that therefore 
their generation availability may increase. However, this has not been assumed in the initial 
calculations. This is because the availability of a new generation technology generally follows 
more of a bell-curve pattern: when the new technology or plant is introduced, its availability is 
generally small, increases over time, and then drops again towards the end of its lifetime. 
Therefore capacity margins are held constant to 2050. 
 
E.1.2 DRCM sensitivity tests: methods 
Imports  
Imp 1: baseline 
For the baseline, imports are assumed to have a capacity credit of 50%, to take into account 
the possibility that power will be unavailable through the interconnector at the time of the 
request. 
 
Imp 2: Imports low 
As noted above, the capacity availability of imports is dependent on assumptions regarding the 
likelihood of a fault occurring on the other end of the interconnector at the same time as the 
system peak. Therefore a sensitivity analysis is carried out for imports at 0% capacity credit. 
 
Imp 3: Imports varied according to pathway logic 
It could be argued that the market and governance structure of the European electricity 
system will have an effect on the likelihood of these events occurring. Therefore a sensitivity 
analysis is carried out which differentiates between the centralised and decentralised 
pathways in terms of the likeliness of an Integrated European Market for electricity (IEM). It is 
assumed that the MR and CC pathways would be more likely to have an IEM; therefore in 
these pathways, imports are rated at 80%. For the TF pathway, an IEM is assumed to be less 
likely, therefore imports are rated at 20%. 
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Wind 
National Grid (2012) points out the importance of assumptions regarding the capacity 
availability of wind power, and the large difference that this can make to conclusions regarding 
overall system DRCM. Therefore sensitivity analyses are carried out which rate wind at 5%, 
20% and 40% capacity credit, to show the effects this has on the overall DRCM. 
 
Baseline: wind at 8% capacity credit (from National Grid 2012: 30) 
Wind 1: wind at 5% 
Wind 2: wind at 20% 
Wind 3: wind at 40% 
 
CCS 
CCS 1: Baseline 
For the baseline, CCS is rated the same as unabated coal and gas generation (89%). 
 
CCS 2: CCS high 
In theory a flexible CCS plant would offer an extra energy boost at times of system peak (see 
section E.1.1, and therefore would be rated at above 100%. Therefore a sensitivity analysis is 
carried out for CCS at 110% (to take into account the 89% of unabated coal and gas, plus 21% 
extra). 
 
CCS 3: CCS low 
However, this only happens if the plant is built flexibly to begin with. If not, the reduced 
efficiency of the plant caused by CCS (which can reduce efficiency by up to 30%) will reduce 
the capacity credit; therefore a further calculation is carried out which subtracts the same 
amount as above, and assumes a capacity credit of 68%. 
 
 
E.1.3 DRCM sensitivity tests: results 
Figures E.0.1 and E.0.2 show that the DRCM results are not overly sensitive to assumptions 
regarding the capacity credit of electricity imports. Reducing imports to a 0% capacity credit 
reduces the DRCM of the MR and CC pathways to below zero in both 2030 and 2050, 
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suggesting very poor system reliability. In these pathways, were power to be unavailable 
through the UK’s interconnectors at the time of peak demand, the system may not be able to 
meet this peak. Even increasing the capacity credit of imports to 80% – a very high assumed 
capacity credit for imports – is not enough to increase the DRCM of the MR and CC pathways 
to above zero in 2050. The DRCM of the TF pathway remains high throughout; even reducing 
the imports credit to 0% only reduces the overall margin to 39% in 2050. Electricity surplus 
remains an issue in the Thousand Flowers pathway (see sections 5.8.2 and 5.8.3). 
 
These results show that despite low DRCM in general, the MR and CC pathways both achieve a 
positive DRCM when wind is rated at 20% capacity credit. However, the DRCM for the CC 
pathway is still only just above zero for a 20% wind capacity credit. Despite the potential for 
aggregation of wind generating capacity over a large area (which, assuming no transmission 
bottlenecks, should improve the wind capacity credit), it should be noted that large 
anticyclones do occur occasionally, meaning that 20% for wind could be an optimistic 
assumption. If the pathways were to include large amounts of electricity storage, it could be 
argued that higher capacity credit for wind would be plausible, because of the ability of 
storage to make intermittent power available when required; however, the economics of 
electricity storage are unfavourable, and as such the pathways do not include the level of 
electricity storage which would be required to achieve this (see section 5.8.4).  
 
Assumptions regarding CCS are shown to be fairly important for the DRCM of the MR and CC 
pathways, with inflexible CCS resulting in very low DRCM for both. Inflexible CCS is a fairly 
realistic assumption to make and would thus signal that the MR and CC pathways may struggle 
to meet peak demand in 2050. The TF pathway, as in the sensitivity analyses for the other 
fuels, shows a high DRCM throughout.  
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Figure E-0-1: Results from DRCM sensitivity analyses 2030 
 
 
Figure E-0-2: Results from DRCM sensitivity analyses 2050 
 
 
E.1.4 DRCM sensitivity tests: marginal increases 
Figure E.0.3 shows the percentage change which could be expected in the overall DRCM of the 
pathways, in response to a 1% change in the estimated capacity credit of imports, wind power, 
and CCS. The graph shows that the pathways are most sensitive to assumptions regarding wind 
power; this is especially important for the MR and TF pathways. This result is somewhat 
surprising as the TF pathway includes less wind power than the CC pathway; however, the 
demand in the TF pathway is also lower, which means that wind makes up a greater 
proportion of overall demand and therefore has a bigger impact on the DRCM.  
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Figure E-0-3: Impact of sensitivity assumptions on marginal (per unit) changes in DRCM 
 
 
E.2 Capacity factors and oversupply 
 
The FESA model which was used to create the Transition Pathways adjusts the capacity factors 
of each type of generation. In order to accommodate increased penetration of intermittent 
power generation, the remaining dispatchable generation must accommodate this variability. 
This causes an increase in the range of dispatchable generation output, which results in a 
decrease in average capacity factors. A reduction in capacity factors could be a cause for 
concern for operators or investors, as it risks making the initial investment in this type of 
generation capacity economically unviable. As such, the main security impact would be on 
cost; it would be a concern that the flexible generation needed to balance the pathways (in the 
form of low-carbon thermal generation) would not be realised, because of the economic 
unattractiveness to generators of operating their plants at such low capacity factors. 
 
 
E.3 Shock resilience: methods overview 
 
Even in a system which has been carefully designed to ensure that supply is adequate to meet 
demand at all times, and that the network is capable of delivering this supply, there is still a 
possibility that unexpected deviations will occur in the supply-demand balance. These can 
occur for a wide variety of reasons – for instance, a fault at a large generating unit, a trip 
somewhere on the transmission network, or errors in weather forecasting causing a much 
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larger or smaller output from renewables. Such shocks are felt through deviations in the 
frequency of the load (in Hz); when supply is greater than demand the frequency will increase, 
and when demand is greater than supply the frequency will decrease. 
 
Whilst steps should be taken to ensure that such ‘shocks’ are avoided, a resilient system will 
also have the ability to quickly restore the system to an acceptable frequency level. National 
Grid acts to ensure that the system responds quickly and effectively; this is important, because 
a trip in one part of the system can occasionally lead to a knock-on effect of further trips, 
which could eventually lead to large-scale blackouts (RAEng 2014). Therefore an important 
aspect of energy security is not just how likely it is that faults and deviations may occur, but 
also how well the system is capable of mitigating the effects of such deviations. These 
deviations are referred to in this section as ‘shocks’, meaning an unexpected change in the 
supply-demand balance, occurring over a short time-period of less than 4 hours. 
 
There are several different means of ensuring that the system can respond to a shock: 
1. Flexible generation 
o Frequency Response 
o Short-term Operating Reserve (STOR) 
o Black start plant 
o System Inertia 
2. Flexible demand 
3. Electricity storage and interconnection 
 
E.4 Frequency response capability 
 
Frequency Response (FR) is the first response of the system when it encounters a shock. When 
there is an unexpected imbalance between supply and demand, the frequency will deviate 
away from 50Hz. FR manages this by quickly bringing more or less generation onto the system. 
FR is an extremely short-term measure; it is provided on 2 timescales: Primary (6-30 seconds) 
and Secondary (30 seconds to 30 minutes).  
 
FR is mandated by National Grid – generation units need to provide a certain FR capacity 
within a certain timeframe, for a certain duration, depending on their contract with National 
Grid. National Grid publishes data which shows the FR capabilities of all the different units on 
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the system (including pumped storage) (raw data available from the author on request). From 
this, it is possible to work out historical data and averages on the FR capability of different 
generation types.  
 
The different plants are grouped in terms of type, and an average and a maximum FR 
capability is obtained for each type from the National Grid data. This data shows FR capabilities 
for 0.2Hz, 0.5Hz and 0.8Hz for primary FR, and for 0.2Hz and 0.5Hz for secondary FR: this is the 
capability of the unit (in MWh) to respond to a 0.2, 0.5 or 0.8Hz deviation in frequency. For 
simplicity, the results for the shock resilience indicator are calculated just for 0.8Hz for primary 
FR and 0.5Hz secondary FR. thus representing the capability of the unit to respond to a 
significant deviation, following a large shock to the system. 
 
From this, the FR capability of each unit of generating power is calculated per MW capacity. So 
for a 500MW unit, the FR capability (in MWh) is divided by the unit capacity (in MW), to show 
the FR capability for each MW of that unit. An average FR capability per MW and a maximum 
FR capability per MW is calculated for each generation type. Finally, the capacity of each fuel 
type in the pathways is multiplied by the FR capability per MW to show the average and the 
maximum potential FR capability of the pathway (in MWh).  
 
It should be noted that this method paints a very broad representation of the potential FR 
capability of the system. It should only be used for comparative purposes between the 
pathways. 
 
 
E.4.1 Frequency response assumptions 
It is assumed that all plants which are capable of providing FR are fitted with this capability. 
Therefore for a 10GW coal capacity, it is assumed that 10GW of the pathway is capable of 
providing the average FR capability for coal power.  
 
However, because FR is a very short-term measure, plants cannot provide it if they are 
switched off at the time of the request. The pathways do not contain data on whether specific 
plants will be on or off, but it is possible to estimate this using the load factors (which in many 
cases are fairly low, and which therefore provide an important representation of short-term 
STOR capability). It is more cost effective to have some plants off and some operating at near-
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full capacity, rather than all plants operating at reduced load factor. Therefore for example, if 
the load factor of coal is ‘60%’, it will be assumed that 30% of plants are off. The remaining 
10% comes from the fact that most plants will be operating at near-full, rather than total full 
capacity. The load factors are calculated to give a weighted average for each type of 
generation (e.g. ‘coal’, ‘coal CCS’ and ‘coal CHP’ are combined into a weighted average for coal 
load factor). The load factor then has 10% added to it (to reflect the fact that most plants 
won’t be running at quite full capacity) to show an estimated percentage of plants which are 
switched on at the time of the FR request. 
 
Recent plant changes 
It should also be noted that the data from National Grid is from 2011; as such, some of the 
power stations shown have since closed or converted to biomass. However, as this is to give an 
indication of the FR capabilities of different types of power station, the 2011 data is used in full 
and is not updated for more recent station closures. 
 
Biomass and co-firing 
For biomass, because of the early stage of the technology at the time of publication of the 
National Grid data, only one dedicated biomass plant is shown as offering FR (Tilbury). It can 
be expected that the FR capability of biomass will be similar to coal or gas, especially if co-
firing takes place. The average results for Tilbury are similar to the results for coal and gas; 
however, it should be noted that the maximum is rather low, as it is simply the same as the 
average for Tilbury. Therefore, the maximum FR is given as the same as coal. 
 
E.5 Short-term operating reserve and black-start capability 
 
Frequency Response covers the system if generating power is suddenly lost (for instance, due 
to a fault at a large generating unit). However, for the system to return to normal, reserve 
power then needs to come online, to cover the system until it returns back to ‘normal’ status. 
For this, the system uses Short-term Operating Reserve (STOR). STOR acts over slightly longer 
timescales than FR; it is delivered within 4 hours or less. However, National Grid is mostly 
interested in the ability of power generation to deliver reserve capacity within about 30 
minutes. STOR then needs to be maintained for a minimum duration of 2 hours. 
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In theory, all conventional generation can provide STOR. All such plants (gas, coal, biomass, 
nuclear) can usually provide STOR within about an hour, regardless of the status of the plant at 
the time of the National Grid request. However, providing STOR over shorter timescales (e.g. 
under 45 minutes) depends on the status of the plant: 
 OCGT can ramp up very quickly, regardless of whether it’s switched on at the time of 
the request 
 Coal, CCGT and biomass struggle to ramp up quickly if the station is off at the time of 
the request. For these stations, STOR for a switched-off station is unlikely within 1 
hour 
 Oil can ramp up quickly if it’s warm; however, most of the UK’s oil stations are old and 
most are being retired; therefore for the small amount of oil-fired generation in 2010 
in the pathways, it is assumed that oil suffers the same constraints as coal etc. 
 Nuclear cannot provide STOR if the station is off 
 
Because of the differences in STOR capability, there will be two indicators of STOR capability 
for the pathways – ‘short-term’ (under around 45 mins) and ‘long-term’ (45 mins to 4 hours). 
 
E.5.1 Long-term STOR  
The capacity of each STOR-capable generation is divided by the total capacity of the pathway, 
and these are summed to give a percentage of the total pathway which is capable of providing 
long-term STOR. Nuclear cannot provide STOR if it is switched off; therefore the nuclear 
capacity is adjusted to take into account load factors (see below). Nor can nuclear provide 
black-start capability. 
 
E.5.2 Short-term STOR 
Like for FR, plants cannot provide short-term STOR if they are switched off at the time of the 
request. Because the pathways do not contain data on whether specific plants will be on or 
off, this must be estimated using the same method as for the FR indicator (section E.4.1). The 
percentage of each type of plant which is estimated to be running using this method is then 
multiplied by the capacity of each type of fuel (coal, gas, biomass and oil) and summed to give 
the percentage of the pathway which would be capable of providing short-term STOR in <45 
minutes.  
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E.5.3 Black-start capability 
Some power plants have black-start capability. This is the ability to start the plant without the 
use of electricity from the grid. This is normally done using a small generator (usually using 
liquid fuel), which is used to ‘jump start’ a larger generator; generators of increasing size are 
then daisy-chained to start the main turbine. This is important in the event of a blackout over a 
large spatial area. 
 
Because of the spatial aspect of black-start power, calculating an accurate representation of 
system black-start capability requires highly granular data on the locations of power plants. 
This data is not available in the pathways; therefore black-start capability is calculated using 
the same method as STOR, because the two functions are very similar. Any thermal plant 
which can provide STOR can in theory provide black-start power provided it is fitted with the 
capability, with the exception of nuclear. Because black-start power usually takes longer than 
STOR, the difference between short-term and long-term ramp rates is not important. 
 
E.5.4 Fast start capability 
Historically, certain plants were also contracted to offer ‘fast-start’ capability, i.e. the ability to 
ramp up quickly from a standing start. However, this requirement has been phased out by 
National Grid, possibly because it is preferred that capacity payments come through the new 
Capacity Mechanism, rather than through the ancillary services market. Therefore fast start 
capability is not factored into the analysis. 
 
E.6 Response and reserve requirements 
 
E.6.1 Calculating the response (FR) requirement 
In the future, the electricity system may require more Frequency Response capability, for two 
reasons: 
 Loss of system inertia (from increasing RES and reducing conventional thermal 
generation) 
 Increasing size of largest generation unit (for instance, due to large nuclear power 
plants). 
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E.6.1.1 Inertia 
When a turbine is spinning, it has built-up kinetic energy; when the turbine stops (due to a 
fault or trip), it slows down gradually. Therefore making use of this kinetic energy provides 
natural inertia. Inertia is therefore a by-product of any generation which involves a turbine 
(coal, gas, biomass, CCS, nuclear and hydro). 
 
Wind generation doesn’t currently provide inertia. Therefore in a system with high penetration 
of wind, more FR from the rest of the generation mix would be required to cover the same 
amount of losses. Wind therefore creates a double problem – it creates the need for more FR 
via lack of inertia, yet can’t provide any FR. There has been some discussion in the UK about 
requiring new generators – including wind – to provide inertia. Some overseas manufacturers 
and power companies require renewable generation to provide inertia, and it is technically 
feasible. However, the UK does not currently mandate synthetic inertia control in wind farms. 
 
There is little existing modelling work into the impact of increasing wind generation on levels 
of inertia and the resulting increases in FR requirements, therefore there is little quantitative 
basis upon which to build an analysis. Therefore inertia is assessed using a simple proxy for this 
thesis, using a representation of the proportion of the generation mix is capable of providing 
inertia, and the resulting percentage increase in FR requirements. The proportion of the 
generation mix which would be capable of providing inertia (GW capacity of all generation 
minus wind, marine, solar and imports) is turned into a percentage increase/decrease in 
inertia capability, from 2010 to 2030 and from 2030 to 2050. This is then translated directly 
into percentage change in FR requirement; so a 20% decrease in system inertia corresponds to 
a 20% increase in FR requirement. 
 
E.6.1.2 Size of generation units 
National Grid (2011) states that the FR requirement is expected to increase with the 
anticipated connection of larger generation assets. Their projections show a marked step 
change in reserve requirements in 2014-15, due to the increase in the largest credible in-feed 
loss risk from 1320MW to 1800MW; this is based on an expectation that the first 1800MW unit 
(probably at Hinkley C) will connect to the grid. This is clearly out of date now due to project 
overruns at Hinkley C; however, Hinkley C is still predicted to connect sometime in the 2020s, 
therefore these projections can still be used to calculate the FR requirement for the pathways 
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in 2030 and 2050. National Grid projects FR requirements out to 2025 in MW, as shown in 
figures E.0.4 and E.0.5. 
 
As shown, the primary FR requirement is projected to increase from 600 to 1050/MW at the 
time of connection of the 1800MW units: an increase of 75%. The secondary FR requirement is 
projected to increase from 1050/MW to 1600/MW in 2014/15: an increase of 52%. 
 
 
Figure E-0-4: Primary Frequency Response Requriement (sic.), 2010 to 2026 (National Grid 2011) 
 
 
Figure E-0-5: Secondary Frequency Response Requirement, 2010 to 2026 (National Grid 2011) 
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This step change is accounted for in the FR calculations. However, it would also be necessary 
to estimate from the pathways whether the largest generation asset could be expected to 
increase any more than 1800MW. It seems plausible that the Thousand Flowers pathway will 
not undergo any more increases in the size of the largest generator. However, as noted in the 
‘transmission costs’ indicator, the Hinkley C nuclear plant is expected to still be operational out 
to 2050, and as there is still some nuclear capacity in 2050 in the Thousand Flowers pathway, it 
seems likely that this 1800MW unit size will remain. 
 
For the Market Rules and Central Coordination pathways, the centralised nature of the 
generation mix makes it seem plausible that there will be an increase in the largest credible in-
feed loss (it is worth noting that although the National Grid projections calculate this based on 
the connection of a large generating unit, this could also in theory be caused by the connection 
of a large interconnector, or even a group of large wind arrays connecting directly to the 
transmission system). However, this is not possible to calculate from the information given in 
the pathways. Therefore a sensitivity test is carried out which assumes another unit size 
increase from 1800MW to 2280MW, sometime between 2030 and 2050. Therefore the 
sensitivity test illustrates a further 75% increase in primary FR requirement and a further 52% 
increase in secondary FR requirement in 2050. The increases in FR requirements due to inertia 
and unit size are then combined to give percentage change estimates for the FR requirements 
in 2030 and 2050. For the low estimate, only the change due to decreases in system inertia is 
taken into account.  
 
 
E.6.2 Calculating the reserve (STOR) requirement 
There are two factors which could lead to increasing reserve requirements: 
 An increase in wind generation 
 An increase in the largest unit size on the grid. 
 
E.6.2.1 Increase in wind generation 
In a pathway with much more wind, the reserve requirement will be much greater. This is 
mainly to allow for inevitable errors in wind forecasting. In theory, this could be mitigated from 
2020 onwards by improvements in forecasting accuracy; however, National Grid does not 
indicate a slow in the rate of reserve requirement growth up to 2025, therefore there is no 
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data with which to calculate the impact of this. It is also worth noting that it is still unlikely that 
it will become possible to accurately predict wind speeds on the short timescales required for 
system balancing. Importantly, even if forecasting errors become less common, the impact of 
such forecasting errors will increase as more wind generation comes onto the system. 
 
Indicative reserve requirements are given by National Grid (2011). They estimate that for their 
‘Gone Green’ pathway, which projects an installed capacity of 29GW of wind in 2020, for an 
average 30% load factor the reserve requirement increases by around 50% from 2010 to 2020, 
in a generally linear fashion (see figure E.0.6). The average load factor of wind in the Transition 
Pathways is close to 30%, therefore this trend can be applied to the pathways. For an 
additional 23.8GW of wind, the reserve requirement increases by 50%. Therefore for every 
extra GW of wind, the reserve requirement increases by approximately 2.1%.  
 
Figure E-0-6: Operating reserve requirement Gone Green (0%, 30% and 100% wind load factor) 
 
E.6.2.2 Increase in largest grid-connected unit size 
National Grid (2011) also notes that the reserve requirement is expected to increase with the 
anticipated connection of larger generation assets. Their projections show a marked step 
change in reserve requirements in 2018, in line with the expectation that the first 1800MW 
generator will connect during this period. This is due to the increase in normal in-feed loss risk 
from 1000MW to 1320MW, and the largest credible in-feed loss risk from 1320MW to 
1800MW. This step change is reflected in the calculations described above. However, it would 
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also be necessary to estimate from the pathways whether the largest generation asset could 
be expected to increase any more than 1800MW. This is carried out using the same method as 
for increases in FR requirement due to unit size, described in section E.6.1.2. 
 
E.7 Flexible demand 
 
Historically, most system resilience has come from generation flexibility, as described in the 
preceding sections. However, the demand side could also offer shock resilience services. 
Demand-side response (DSR) involves altering demand at a signal from the System Operator or 
the distribution network operator, in response to a change in the supply-demand balance. 
There is potential for flexible demand to allow peak-shaving and load-shifting, which would 
flatten the peaks in electricity demand. Flattening the peak means that less generation is 
required to meet peak demand, resulting in potentially fewer requirements for the types of 
shock resilience measures described in sections E.4 and E.5 above. It is therefore likely that 
increased flexibility of demand could mitigate many of the risks described previously in this 
section. 
 
However, unfortunately, the demand data in the pathways is fairly limited, and therefore it is 
very difficult to estimate the proportion of flexible demand. It is noted in the pathway 
narratives (Foxon 2013) that all three pathways will require smarter networks (i.e. which can 
automatically shift and alter demand in response to signals from National Grid or the DNOs) in 
order to balance supply and demand. However, more detailed information than this is absent. 
Therefore rough estimates and proxies are all that can be used to estimate the potential for 
flexible demand in the pathways. 
 
There have been a number of other useful studies into load-shifting potential in the present-
day UK electricity system: 
 Dudeney et al (2014) found that the technical shiftable potential across all sectors 
(present-day) may be up to ~18GW on a January weekday winter evening, and up to 
~10 GW on an August weekend evening. However, the amount that is realistically 
shiftable is unclear, but is almost certainly much less. 
 Element Energy and De Montfort University (commissioned by Ofgem) found peak 
load-shifting potential in non-domestic buildings of 8 to 30% (Element Energy 2012) 
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 Smart meter trials have indicated that 7 to 10% of residential load could be shifted 
without any automation (AECOM 2011) 
 Palmer et al (2013) found that there is some potential to shift peak household loads 
using controls on washing machines, tumble dryers and dishwashers. However, 
replacing appliances with more efficient ones would do more to reduce the peak than 
DSR at present (Dudeney et al 2014). 
 
From this, it is possible to suggest that 10% total load represents a very conservative estimate 
for total shiftable potential in the future, whilst 20% represents a more ambitious estimate. 
Importantly, this must then be compared with peak demand in the pathways, because the 
main purpose of flexible demand is to reduce peak load. This indicator amends peak demand 
in the pathways for 2030 and 2050 (in GW) according to the conservative and ambitious 
shiftable potential estimates.  
 
Secondly, electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps can be used as a rough proxy for flexible 
demand in the pathways in 2030 and 2050. EVs and heat pumps both provide potential 
mechanisms for flexible demand, because both can be used to shift electrical load to the time 
that it’s needed most. For example, if the owner of an EV comes homes from work at 6pm and 
puts the car on to charge overnight, it won’t take all night to charge; therefore if there’s a 
spike in demand at 8.30pm at the end of a particularly riveting episode of EastEnders, a ‘smart’ 
demand system could automatically stop the car charging for a short period of time, thus 
reducing demand at the crucial moment. EVs and heat pumps both represent relatively large 
electrical loads, especially compared to other appliances which could be used to load-shift 
such as fridges, therefore their use as a proxy for flexible demand as a whole is justified. This is 
also necessary in the absence of further data in the pathways about the composition of 
demand (i.e. how much demand comes from certain services or appliances). The numbers of 
EVs and heat pumps in the pathways are added together to show an indicative level of flexible 
demand in the pathways. This is presented in % of the total generation mix, and also in TWh/y 
in order to show the impact of reducing overall demand. 
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Appendix F: Offshore wind technology 
costs 
 
All the data in this appendix is from National Grid 10-year statement technology appendix 
(National Grid 2013c). For all technologies, National Grid gives a low and a high estimate. The 
mean of both / all estimates is used here. For each technology, the notes below denote that 
technology’s relevance to the types of array and connections used in the Transition Pathways, 
and if necessary the multiplication methods used for application to the pathways. 
 
High-Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) subsea cable 
The options for HVDC cables come in Extruded and Mass Impregnated, which have similar 
costs. Mass Impregnated Insulated Subsea (MIIS) cables are a mature technology with high 
reliability and performance. Therefore cost estimates will all be for MIIS. 
The maximum contracted rating is 500kV and 800MW on a single cable. 
This component is relevant for all HVDC. The number of cables is multiplied according to the 
maximum contracted rating. 
Cost of an 1800mm 400kV cable with a maximum rating of 800MW = £497/m  
 
High-Voltage Alternating Current (HVAC) three-core subsea cable 
These have been the preferred technology for connecting offshore farms which are located 
relatively close to shore and with relatively low power transfer requirements. They have 
maximum capacity abilities; therefore sometimes more than one cable will be needed. 
Multipliers are given in the 10-yr statement (National Grid 2013c: 11) as follows: 
Power capacity (MW) Number of cables Cable Voltage Cost of each cable 
100-250 1 132kV £602/m 
251-450 2 132kV £602/m 
451-700 2 220kV £655/m 
701-900 3 220kV £655/m 
901-1200 4 220kV £655/m 
1201-1500 5 220kV £655/m 
1501-1800 6 220kV £655/m 
1801-2100 7 220kV £655/m 
> 2101 8 220kV £655/m 
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HVDC and HVAC onshore cables 
Onshore cables are used to transfer the electricity from the onshore substation to the rest of 
the grid. 
Overhead cables are less expensive than underground cables, because the underground cables 
cannot use the air as insulation and therefore require extra insulation. Underground cables 
therefore only tend to be the preferred option in built-up areas where overhead lines are 
impractical. 
However, the only cost data for onshore cabling is for HVAC overhead lines. The actual choice 
of cable is likely to be project-specific. Including onshore cabling costs would require data on 
the length of the cable required to connect from the onshore substation to the grid. Because 
of lack of data availability, this cannot be done easily. However, the National Grid Round 3 
Connection Study (National Grid n.d.) gives an assumption of an additional 10% of total cost to 
be added for onshore costs. Therefore this can be used as a rough estimate for all. 
 
Voltage source converter (VSC)  
VSCs are used to convert from HVAC to HVDC (or vice versa). They are used when an offshore 
wind farm requires an HVDC connection. 
These are a new technology (building on the more conventional Current Source Converter 
[CSC], see below); they are currently only used for relatively low capacity installations, but 
there have been significant advances. Current costs mean that these are cheaper than CSC for 
anything up to 1000MW.  
One VSC is used for each HVDC array at or below 1000MW. Costs are dependent on the 
nameplate capacity of the array, as follows: 
1-500MW = £76m. 501-850MW = £100m. 851-1000MW = £122m. 
 
Current source converter (CSC) 
CSCs are essentially the same as VSC; however, these have been around for longer and can 
deal with a higher capacity at lower cost. 
One CSC is used for all HVDC farms above 1000MW. Costs are dependent on the nameplate 
capacity of the array, as follows: 
1000MW = £84m. 1001-2000MW = £152m. 2001-3000MW = £194m. 
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Transformer 
Transformers are used to step up the voltage from a turbine to the high voltage required for 
efficient long-distance transmission. 
One transformer is required for all arrays, according to substation details as follows: 
MegaVolt Amp rating (MVA) Voltage rating (kV) Transformer cost 
90 132/11/11 £1.065m 
180 132/33/33 or 132/11/11 £1.475m 
240 132/33/33 £1.675m 
120 275/33 £1.47m 
240 275/132 £1.83m 
240 400/132 £2.09m 
 
Switchgear 
Switchgear is used to allow switching to be performed to control power flows on the network. 
The switchgear includes a variety of technology, including circuit breakers, disconnectors, 
earthing switches and instrument transformers. 
One switchgear set is used for all arrays, at a cost of £1310 (132kV). 
 
Shunt reactor 
Shunt reactors are used to compensate for the capacitive reactive power present in HVAC 
systems, and to provide a means of regulating the network voltage. They are used at the 
onshore interface point and possibly at the offshore platform. 
Two shunt reactors are used for each array, at an average cost of £3818. 
 
Static VAR compensator / Shunt capacitor bank / STATCOM 
These are all options at the onshore substation, to provide capacitive reactive power. The 
three options have fairly similar costs, and the cost depends very much on how much reactive 
power is required; this level of detail isn’t available in the pathways, therefore VAR 
compensator is used throughout. 
One 200 MVAR compensator is used for each onshore substation, at a cost of £13 million. 
 
Offshore platforms 
Offshore platforms are used to house the electrical equipment required for generation 
collection and transmission to shore. Depending on the capacity of the project, multiple 
platforms may be required. 
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AC platforms have an option of 200-400MW or 500-700MW types; it is assumed that the 
biggest possible is used. So for an AC array of 350MW, a 400MW platform is used. For a big 
array of 2000MW, 3x700MW is used. 
For HVDC arrays, a separate Direct Current (DC) platform is also required. DC platforms are 
also available in various sizes, the top rating being 2500MW. Again, it is assumed that the 
biggest is used. 
Each array requires one AC platform. 
Each HVDC array requires one DC platform. 
Costs are as follows: 
Type Array nameplate capacity (MW) Cost 
AC 
200-400 £43m 
500-700 £88m 
DC 
1000 £295m 
1250 £333m 
1500 £424m 
1750 £472m 
2000 £477m 
2250 £534m 
2500 £572m 
 
 
Subsea cable installation 
Costs of cable installation vary according to the type of installation, whether single cable, twin 
cable, or two single cables. The cost for two single cables is higher; therefore it is assumed that 
where multiple cables are required, they are laid as a twin cable. Costs of installation are as 
follows: 
Single cable = £0.52m/km 
Twin cable = £0.73 m/km
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Appendix G: Copy of briefing note sent to all 
stakeholders in advance 
Expert Stakeholders: Briefing Note 
“Assessing the future security of the UK electricity system 
in a low-carbon context” 
 
 
Many thanks for agreeing to participate in this research; your views are highly 
valuable and greatly appreciated. This brief introductory document will set out 
the aims and background of the study.  
 
During the interview, we will be discussing a framework for the assessment of 
the security of electricity systems in the context of a low-carbon transition. The 
indicators which make up this framework are presented overleaf. Please feel 
free to think about the indicators in advance of the interview; however, this 
isn’t vital as there will be time for discussion in the interview. 
 
Participants have been selected from diverse sectors including policy, academia, 
suppliers and civil society. Participants will be kept anonymous. 
With permission, interviews will be recorded for ease of note-taking. 
 
Background 
In order to meet legislative targets for mitigating climate change, future energy 
systems will need to become secure, affordable and low-carbon – the so-called 
‘trilemma’ of sustainable energy policy (Boston 2013). In the UK, the trilemma 
has received growing attention as energy security concerns rise up the political 
and public agenda, driven by declining indigenous fossil fuel reserves and 
increasing concerns over anthropogenic climate change (DECC 2012; 
MacKerron 2009). As part of a growing body of research into energy security 
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and low-carbon energy transitions, this project focuses on the security of 
electricity systems in the UK in the context of a low-carbon transition.   
 
Previous research has noted that ‘energy security’ means different things to 
different people (Chester 2010). This situation is unlikely to change; however, 
it creates challenges for energy security policy, because it makes it difficult to 
reach agreement on how best to maximise overall system security. This study 
will use the indicator framework overleaf as a starting point for a discussion 
about this diversity of views, including question such as: 
- What are the most important dimensions of low-carbon electricity 
security? 
- What metrics and indicators are most useful, and why? 
- What impact do different timescales have on which dimensions are most 
relevant? 
- Are there important dimensions and indicators missing from the 
framework? 
 
During the interview, respondents will be asked to rate the indicators on a scale 
of 1 to 5, to reflect their importance as part of an overall assessment of the 
security of a low-carbon electricity system (with 5 as ‘crucially important’ and 1 
as ‘not important’).  
 
The indicator list is presented overleaf. Please feel free to think about how you 
would rate the indicators in advance; however, this isn’t vital as we will be 
discussing them in the interview. 
 
 
Indicators for assessing the security of low-carbon transition 
pathways for the UK electricity system  
 
 Public approval 
 Levels of public participation and engagement 
 Likelihood of disruption due to direct opposition 
 Diversity of fuel types in the energy mix 
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 Import dependence 
 Import diversity (diversity of imports of both fuels and materials) 
 Import stability (stability of major supply nations and supply routes 
to the UK) 
 Annual electricity bills to consumers 
 Cost of electricity generation 
 Cost of upgrades to the distribution networks 
 Cost of upgrades to the transmission networks 
 Impact on levels of fuel poverty 
 Carbon emissions 
 Depletion of major fuels (gas, coal etc.) 
 Depletion of secondary materials (metals, rare earth elements etc.) 
 Water consumption and water withdrawals 
 De-rated capacity margins 
 Oversupply / spare generation capacity 
 Response and Reserve for Grid balancing  
 Flexible demand 
 Storage  
 Interconnection 
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Appendix H: Application of individual stakeholder perspectives to security assessment results 
Table H-0-1: Application of individual stakeholder perspectives to security assessment results, 2030 
Stake
holder 
Most important indicators Least important indicators This stakeholder 
would find major 
security risks in… 
This stakeholder 
would find 
moderate security 
risks in… 
A 
Fuel depletion; DRCM; Response and Reserve 
(R&R) 
Annual bills; Generation cost; Fuel poverty; Carbon; Water MR pathway x1; 
CC pathway x1 
MR  pathway x1; CC 
pathway x1; TF 
pathway x1 
B R&R; Flexible demand; Storage Import dependence; Import stability; Import diversity CC x1 MR x1; TF x1 
C Public approval; DRCM; Interconnection Generation cost; Fuel poverty; Fuel depletion; Oversupply MR x1 CC x1 
D Import dependence Generation cost; Fuel poverty; Materials depletion; Fuel depletion  MR  x1; TF  x1 
E Emissions; Interconnection Opposition; Import dependence; Import diversity   
F 
Annual bills; Generation cost; Fuel poverty Fuel diversity; Import stability; Import diversity; Materials depletion; 
Water 
MR x1; TF x1 MR x1; CC x1; TF x2 
G 
Public approval; Participation; Opposition; Fuel 
diversity; Import diversity; Flexible demand; 
Storage 
Import dependence; Generation cost; Annual bills; Fuel poverty; Fuel 
depletion; Water; Oversupply 
MR x1 CC x1 
H 
Public approval; Annual bills; R&R; Flexible 
demand; Storage; Interconnection 
Emissions; Fuel depletion CC x1 MR x2; CC x2; TF x2 
I 
Public approval; Import stability; Fuel poverty; 
Emissions; Interconnection 
Fuel depletion; Oversupply MR x1 TF x1 
J 
Public approval; Annual bills; Distribution costs; 
Fuel poverty 
Emissions MR x1 MR x2; CC x2; TF x3 
K DRCM Fuel poverty; Emissions; Oversupply MR x1 CC x1 
L Annual bills; Emissions Materials depletion; Storage  MR x1; CC x1; TF x1 
M Import diversity; Fuel depletion Emissions; Oversupply   
N 
Annual bills; Network costs; Fuel poverty; R&R; 
Flexible demand; Storage; Interconnection 
Import dependence MR x1; CC x1 MR x4; CC x4; TF x4 
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O 
Public approval; Participation; Opposition; 
Imports x3; Annual bills; Generation; Fuel 
poverty; Emissions; DRCM; Oversupply; R&R 
Fuel depletion MR x3; CC x1; TF 
x1 
MR x3; CC x4; TF x5 
P 
Imports x3; Emissions; R&R; Flexible demand; 
Storage; Interconnection 
Public approval; Opposition; Fuel poverty; Fuel depletion CC  x1 MR x2; CC x1; TF x2 
Q 
Annual bills; Generation cost; Fuel poverty; 
Emissions; DRCM; Flexible demand; 
Interconnection 
Import dependence MR x2; TF x1 MR x1; CC x2; TF x2 
R 
Participation; Fuel diversity; Fuel poverty; 
Emissions; Water; DRCM; R&R; Flexible 
demand; Storage; Interconnection 
Import dependence MR x3; CC x1 MR x1; CC x2; TF x2 
S 
Public approval; Participation; Opposition; 
Import stability; Generation cost; Fuel poverty; 
Emissions; DRCM; Oversupply; R&R 
Fuel depletion; Water MR x3; CC x1; TF 
x1 
MR x1; CC x3; TF x3 
T Opposition; Generation cost; Flexible demand Distribution costs; Fuel poverty; Materials depletion; Water TF x1 CC x1 
U 
DRCM; Oversupply; R&R; Flexible demand; 
Storage; Interconnection 
Fuel poverty; Fuel depletion MR x1; CC x1 MR x1; CC x2; TF x2 
V Fuel diversity Transmission costs; Emissions; Materials depletion   
W 
DRCM; R&R Opposition; Fuel diversity; Generation cost; Annual bills; Transmission 
costs; Fuel poverty; Materials depletion; Water 
MR x1; CC x1 MR x1; CC x1; TF x1 
X Public approval; Participation; Opposition DRCM MR x1 CC x1 
Totals 
MR 22; CC 10; TF 
5 
MR 23; CC 31; TF 
33 
 
  
357 
 
357 
 
 
Table H-0-2: Application of individual stakeholder perspectives to security assessment results, 2050 
Stake
holder 
Most important indicators Least important indicators This stakeholder 
would find major 
security risks in… 
This stakeholder 
would find 
moderate security 
risks in… 
A 
R&R; DRCM Annual bills; Generation cost; Fuel poverty; Water; Carbon MR pathway x1; 
CC  pathway x2 
MR pathway x1; CC 
pathway x1; TF 
pathway x1 
B R&R; Flexible demand; Storage Import dependence; Import stability; Import diversity; Distribution costs CC x1 MR x1; CC x1; TF x1 
C Public approval; DRCM; Interconnection Generation cost; Fuel poverty; Fuel depletion; Oversupply MR x1; CC x1  
D Import dependence Generation cost; Fuel poverty  MR  x1; TF  x1 
E Network costs; Emissions; Interconnection Opposition; Import dependence; Import diversity MR x2; CC x2 TF x2 
F 
Annual bills; Generation cost; Fuel poverty Fuel diversity; Import stability; Import diversity; Materials depletion; 
Water 
MR  x2; TF  x1 MR x1; CC x1; TF x1 
G 
Flexible demand Import dependence; Generation cost; Annual bills; Fuel poverty; Fuel 
depletion; Water; Oversupply 
  
H 
Public approval; Annual bills; R&R; Flexible 
demand; Storage 
Import stability; Emissions; Fuel depletion; Oversupply; Interconnection MR x1; CC  x2 MR x1; CC x1; TF x2 
I 
Public approval; Import stability; Fuel poverty; 
Emissions; Storage; Interconnection 
Fuel depletion; Oversupply MR x1 CC x1 
J 
Public approval; Annual bills; Distribution costs; 
Fuel poverty 
Emissions MR x3; CC x2 CC x1; TF x2 
K 
Participation; Opposition; Fuel diversity; 
DRCM; R&R; Flexible demand 
Fuel poverty; Emissions; Oversupply MR x2; CC x2 MR x2; CC x1; TF x1 
 
L 
Annual bills; Emissions Materials depletion 
 
MR x1; CC x1 TF x1 
M 
Import diversity; Materials depletion Emissions; Oversupply 
 
  
N 
Fuel diversity; Annual bills; Network costs; Fuel 
poverty; R&R; Flexible demand; Storage; 
Interconnection 
Import dependence MR x4; CC x4 MR x1; CC x2; TF x4 
358 
 
358 
 
O 
Public approval; Participation; Opposition; 
Annual bills; Fuel poverty; Emissions; DRCM; 
Flexible demand 
Fuel depletion MR x4; CC x2 MR x1; CC x1; TF x1 
P 
Imports x3; Emissions; R&R; Flexible demand; 
Storage; Interconnection 
Public approval; Opposition; Fuel poverty; Fuel depletion CC x1 MR x2; CC x1; TF x2 
Q 
Fuel diversity; Annual bills; Generation cost; 
Fuel poverty; Emissions; DRCM; Flexible 
demand; Interconnection 
Import dependence; Fuel depletion MR x3; CC x2; TF  
x1 
MR x1; CC x1; TF x1 
R 
Participation; Fuel diversity; Fuel poverty; 
Carbon; Water; DRCM; R&R; Flexible demand; 
Storage; Interconnection 
Import dependence MR x3; CC x2 MR x2; CC x2; TF x1 
S 
Public approval; Participation; Opposition; 
Import stability; Generation cost; Network 
costs; Fuel poverty; Emissions; DRCM; 
Oversupply; R&R; Flexible demand; Storage; 
Interconnection 
Water MR x5; CC x4; TF 
x2 
MR x3; CC x3; TF x3 
T Opposition; Generation cost; Flexible demand Distribution costs; Fuel poverty; Materials depletion; Water TF x1 MR x2 
U Emissions Fuel poverty; Fuel depletion   
V Fuel diversity; R&R Transmission costs; Emissions; Materials depletion CC x1 MR x1; CC x1; TF x1 
W 
Import dependence; Import diversity; DRCM; 
R&R 
Opposition; Generation cost; Transmission costs; Fuel poverty; Water MR x1; CC x2 MR x2; CC x1; TF x2 
X Public approval; Participation; Opposition Water; DRCM MR x1 MR x1 
Totals 
MR 35; CC 31; TF 
5 
MR 23; CC 19; TF 
27 
 
 
 
